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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
PARTICIPATING IN THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD: 
 
AN ENGAGEMENT WITH THE TRINITARIAN EPISTEMOLOGY OF T. F. TORRANCE 
 
 
KRIS A. MILLER 
 
 
The overall aim of this thesis is to assess the viability of a particular understanding of 
participation in the knowledge of God for the postmodern, scientific context in which 
it is now located. Through a critical engagement of the Trinitarian epistemology of  
T. F. Torrance, this thesis provides a more holistic, complex vision of participation in 
the knowledge of God that moves beyond the problems of reductionist accounts. 
 Part I of the thesis identifies and defines the modern problem of reductionist 
accounts of theological epistemology. To overcome these problems, this thesis 
proposes a complex vision of the knowledge of God through an engagement and 
expansion of Torrance’s Trinitarian epistemology.  
Part II delineates and analyzes seven general dynamics which comprise the 
nature of the knowledge of God for Torrance. Before moving to the center of his 
theological epistemology, this section provides an introduction and assessment of the 
general dynamics at work throughout his discussions of the knowledge of God. 
Part III goes to the heart of Torrance’s epistemology, the Triune God. This 
section begins by examining how the persons and relations of the ontological Trinity 
exercise a governing influence upon Torrance’s theological epistemology. From this 
Trinitarian framework, this section then turns to expand and appraise three 
epistemological dynamics which consequently become centrally important: 
knowledge of God as personal, relational, and participatory.  This section contends 
that these forms of knowledge involve the whole person and a way of life. This vision 
of participation extends the Trinitarian epistemology of Torrance with priorities to 
which his theological writings clearly point but which he himself did not develop. 
Part IV concludes the thesis by drawing together the assessments made along 
the way concerning knowledge of God in a postmodern, scientific age and proposing 
an epistemological model that moves beyond the problems of reductionism.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
THEOLOGICAL EPISTEMOLOGY AND MODERNITY’S 
REDUCTIONIST ACCOUNTS OF KNOWLEDGE:  
THE PROBLEM AND A COMPLEX PROPOSAL 
 
   
1.1    Introduction 
The overall aim of this thesis is to assess the viability of a particular 
understanding of participation in the knowledge of God for the postmodern, scientific 
context in which it is now located. For that assessment, this project will critically 
engage the theological epistemology of the twentieth-century Reformed theologian 
Thomas F. Torrance (1913-2007). Torrance was one of the most significant English-
speaking theologians of the twentieth century and one of the very few theologians 
who gave sustained attention to the notion of knowledge of God in dialogue with 
twentieth-century epistemological developments occurring within the natural 
sciences. Modern reductionist accounts of epistemology atomized the knowledge of 
God, deforming notions of participation. In the wake of modernity, this leads to the 
following question: how can we assess the continuing force of the tradition of 
participation in the knowledge of God now that the explanatory capacity of modern 
reductionist accounts of knowledge is diminishing? By engaging and expanding the 
Trinitarian epistemology of T. F. Torrance, this thesis intends to provide a more 
holistic, complex notion of participation in the knowledge of God for the postmodern, 
scientific age. 
This thesis begins by identifying and defining the modern problem of 
reductionist accounts of theological epistemology and proposing a complex vision of 
the knowledge of God through an engagement with Torrance’s epistemology (Chapter 
One). Toward that end, this study delineates and analyzes seven general dynamics 
which comprise the nature of the knowledge of God for Torrance (Chapter Two). 
Next, this thesis goes to the heart of Torrance’s epistemology, the Triune God, to 
examine how the persons and relations within the immanent Trinity exercise a 
governing influence upon his theological epistemology (Chapter Three). With this 
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central influence in mind, this study turns to appraise three resultant epistemological 
dynamics, namely that knowledge of God is personal, relational, (Chapter Four) and 
participatory, demonstrating how such participation involves the whole person and a 
way of life (Chapter Five). The thesis concludes by drawing together the assessments 
made along the way concerning knowledge of God in a postmodern, scientific age and 
proposing an epistemological model for moving beyond reductionism (Chapter Six).  
This chapter commences by defining the problem of reductionist accounts of 
the knowledge of God in the modern age (1.2), utilizing perspectives from Karl Barth 
(1.2.1), Hans Urs von Balthasar (1.2.2), and other Christian theologians (1.2.3). 
Following this is a summary of the problem and a proposed solution (1.2.4). Next, this 
chapter explains why Torrance is a good interlocutor for helping to provide a vision of 
participation in the knowledge of God in the contemporary milieu (1.3). Furthermore, 
this chapter explains how an engagement with Torrance has implications for three 
distinct though inter-related contexts of theological conversation, including historic, 
global discussions concerning the knowledge of God (1.3.1), Reformed and 
Charismatic-Evangelical theology (1.3.2), and T. F. Torrance scholarship (1.3.3). 
Finally, this chapter will outline the goals and moves of this thesis (1.4), followed by 
a review (1.5). We turn now to defining reductionism in order to demonstrate its 
challenges for the theological tradition of participation in the knowledge of God. 
 
1.2  The modern problem of reductionism for the knowledge of God 
A problem now recognized across the intellectual disciplines from the modern 
era is that of reductionism.1 The term reductionism is used to refer to those theories 
                                                 
1. Arthur Peacocke, ed., Reductionism in Academic Disciplines (Guilford, Surrey: The Society 
for Research into Higher Education, 1985). Richard H. Jones provides a trenchant analysis of 
reductionism in philosophy, the natural sciences, the social sciences, and religious studies in 
Reductionism: The Fullness of Reality (Cranbury, NJ: Associated University Presses, 2000). Also 
noteworthy for its inter-disciplinary discussions are the published papers from a conference of scholars 
from the sciences/mathematics, social sciences, and humanities/philosophy on the demise of 
fundamental premises concerning knowledge codified in the nineteenth century, including 
reductionism, is Richard E. Lee, ed., Questioning Nineteenth-Century Assumptions about Knowledge 
II: Reductionism (Albany: State University of New York, 2010). Nancey Murphy contends that there 
has been a catechretical extension of the reductionist “thinking strategy” from the natural sciences to 
most intellectual disciplines, particularly ethics, theology, political theory, philosophy of language as 
well as epistemology. Nancey Murphy, Anglo-American Postmodernity: Philosophical Perspectives on 
Science, Religion and Ethics (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), 14-18, 208. Other helpful 
interdisciplinary discussions include Terrance Brown and Leslie Smith, eds., Reductionism and the 
Development of Knowledge (Mahwah, NJ: L. Erlbaum, 2003), which engages biology, psychology, 
psychiatry, and sociology from a meeting of the Jean Piaget Society. There are many other resources 
that explore reductionism within one particular academic discipline. 
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according to which one can explain some reality by reducing it to a different and 
supposedly more basic level. “Classically, a reductionist thesis posits that complex 
high level phenomena, structures, and processes can be reduced, as far as their 
scientific explanation is concerned, to underlying lower level phenomena, structures, 
and processes.”2 Richard Jones writes,  
If a phenomenon is not deemed fully real, we must get down to the reality that 
is the source or substance of the phenomenon. We take it apart to see what 
makes it tick, or we retrace (from the Latin reducere, “to lead back”) the 
development of the phenomenon to its roots. A reduction thus proposes what 
in the final analysis is real in the phenomenon and in terms which we must 
understand it. With such a reduction, we find that what is apparently real is 
ultimately “nothing but” something else—either its parts or something that is 
more basic. Thereby, one apparent reality is “reduced” to another.3  
The most basic constituents of reality have “ontological priority” and are considered 
the source of a bottom-up, linear causality. This has consequences for many academic 
disciplines. Sociology can be reduced to psychology, psychology can be reduced to 
biology, biology to chemistry, and chemistry to physics.4  The human person can be 
reduced to a body, the body to a gene-driven machine, the mind to the brain, the brain 
to networks of neural cells, and eventually back to physics. Even in literary studies, 
aesthetics and meaning give way to the psychological and political motivations 
behind the texts. While reductions vary according to the discipline, the common 
denominator is the explanation of one reality in terms of another reality that is 
considered more basic and thus the real cause. In other words, Xs are nothing more 
than an aggregate of Ys. 
  The “logical positivists” of the early twentieth century provide a supreme 
example of reductionism. The founding philosopher, Auguste Comte, categorized the 
history of thought in three developing stages, moving from the theological to the 
abstract philosophical and ultimately to the scientific. He envisioned a future where 
the “positive” statements derived from scientific observation and experimentation 
would displace statements derived from theological and philosophical speculation.5 
                                                 
2. Jean Petitot, “Reduction and Emergence in Complex Systems,” in Questioning Nineteenth-
Century Assumptions about Knowledge II: Reductionism, ed. Richard E. Lee (Albany: State University 
of New York, 2010), 107. 
3. Jones, Reductionism, 13. 
4. Francis Crick famously quipped, “The ultimate aim of the modern movement in biology is 
in fact to explain all biology in terms of physics and chemistry.” See Francis Crick, Of Molecules and 
Men (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1966), 10.  
5. Gertrud Lenzer, ed., Auguste Comte and Positivism: The Essential Writings (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1975). 
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Consequently, the logical positivists attempted to construct a universal language for 
science by only using observational terms, which Rudolf Carnap first called 
“reduction statements,” and thereby secure science and philosophy on a strictly 
empiricist foundation. Their aim was to unify the sciences based upon the most 
fundamental level, which was for Otto Neurath the reports of sensory experience. 
Using Kantian categories, they created a “principle of verification” whereby only 
analytic statements (statements of definition or logic) or empirically verified synthetic 
statements were considered valid or meaningful. All other kinds of statements were 
rendered meaningless, leaving no room for aesthetics, ethics, metaphysics, or 
theology. Hence, with their strict form of empiricism, the logical positivists clearly 
demonstrate various types of reductionism.6 While the positivists have been critiqued, 
their legacy of reductionism has continued in various forms.7 
Because there are various types of reductionisms which are interrelated and 
are frequently not well distinguished, we will delineate four types for the purposes of 
this analysis.8 There are ontological or substantive reductionisms which make the 
metaphysical claim that reality is constituted by its most basic level or fundamental 
parts. A substantive or ontological reductionist is most often a monist who maintains 
that reality is comprised of one substance, whether divine, mental, or material. Yet, 
reductions are held not only to make complexity simpler but oftentimes to locate the 
causes or sources of a reality under discussion to its fewer, primary agents. These are 
                                                 
6. The primary text is A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (1936; repr., Harmdondsworth: 
Penguin, 1971). Before Ayer, there was Rudolf Carnap, The Logical Structure of the World and 
Pseudoprolems in Philosophy, trans. Rolf A. George (1928; repr., Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1969). 
7. For philosophical and theological critique, Alvin Plantinga, God and Other Minds (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1967), 156-68; Stephen T. Davis, “Theology, Verification and 
Falsification,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 6 (1975): 23-39; Paul G. Hiebert, 
Missiological Implications of Epistemological Shifts: Affirming Truth in a Modern/Postmodern World 
(Harrisburg, PA: Trinity International Press, 1999), 1-35; Jones, Reductionism, 46-47.  Discussion and 
critiques from the science and theology genre include Paul D. Murray, “Truth and Reason in Science 
and Theology: Points of Tension, Correlation and Compatibility,” in God, Humanity and the Cosmos, 
2nd ed., ed. Chris Southgate (London: T&T Clark International, 2005), 82-115, esp. 83-84; Murphy, 
Anglo-American Postmodernity, 174; Wolfhart Pannenberg, Theology and the Philosophy of Science, 
trans. by Francis McDonagh (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1973), 29-71. 
8. The four types of reductionism delineated above are most fitting for the purposes of this 
study, yet some authors have used other delineations. I have followed Richard H. Jones’ delineation of 
five types of reductionisms, omitting the “structural” or “conceptual,” Jones, Reductionism, 24-28. 
From the science and religion genre, a helpful discussion of ontological, epistemological, and 
methodological reductionism is Ian G. Barbour, Religion and Science: Historical and Contemporary 
Issues, 2nd ed. (London: SCM Press, 2005), 78-82, 230-33, 256-57, 359. Nancey Murphy discusses 
five reductionisms adding logical/definitional and causal to Barbour’s three in Nancey Murphy, 
“Reductionism: How Did We Fall Into It and Can We Emerge From It?” in Evolution and Emergence: 
Systems, Organisms, Persons, ed. Nancey Murphy and William R. Stoeger (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), 23-25. 
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causal reductionisms which hold that one can find ultimate causal explanations at the 
lowest, most reduced levels of reality. In other words, the better we can identify the 
most basic units of matter, the better we can explain reality and its primary causes 
which are from the bottom-up. In relation to the previous two, there are also 
epistemological or theoretical reductionisms which maintain that knowledge and 
theories concerning any level of reality come from knowledge or theories at a lower, 
more basic level. More fundamental fields, such as particle physics, provide the 
explanations for higher-level fields, such as chemistry, biology or psychology. 
Knowledge from the higher-level fields is derivable from the lower-level fields and 
eventually, it is supposed, the higher-level field may no longer be needed. This can 
lead to methodological reductionism, which is the analytical approach of 
disassembling complex wholes into more basic components as the only legitimate 
method to understand them. This is the dominant scientific approach to problem-
solving. The types of reductionisms need delineation particularly as we now consider 
the challenges of reductionism for the knowledge of God.  
 A primary challenge coming from outside Christian theology which the 
reductionisms of modernity present for the knowledge of God can be called 
epiphenomenonalist reductionisms.9 With naturalist or materialist convictions, God—
and therefore the knowledge of God—are held to be unreal. The phenomena of 
religious claims to knowledge of God are explained as the result of lower-level 
factors. While the phenomenon of religion—its cultural existence as human beliefs 
and practices—is deemed real enough, its ontological claims are not. Instead, the 
substance of their claims is explained by the “more fundamental” or “more real” layer 
of reality. For instance, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, knowledge of God 
has variously been reduced to sociological (Émile Durkheim),10 economic (Karl 
Marx),11 psychological (Sigmund Freud)12, neurological (Edward O. Wilson)13 and 
                                                 
9. On religion as an epiphenomenal reduction, see Jones, Reductionism, 23-24, 224-332. 
10. Émile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, trans. Joseph Ward Swain 
(New York: Free Press, 1915). 
11. Karl Marx argued that people act according to their economic interests, and thus, he 
famously reduced religion to the economic interests of humans: “Religion is the general theory of this 
world, its encyclopedic compendium, its logic in popular form, its spiritual point d’honneur, its 
enthusiasm, its moral sanction, its solemn complement and its universal basis of consolation and 
justification… Religious suffering is at one and the same time expression of real suffering and a protest 
against real suffering. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world and 
the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people.” Quotation from Karl Marx, introduction 
to “Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right,” in Karl Marx: Early Writings, trans. Rodney Livingstone 
and Gregor Benton (London: Penguin Classics, 1992), 244.  
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evolutionary (Daniel C. Dennet)14 explanations. These naturalistic types of 
reductionism discredit knowledge of God as mere epiphenomena, derivable and 
explainable from lower levels.15 Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that not only 
knowledge of God can be explained by lower levels, but all types of knowledge of 
any subject can be reduced to an epiphenomena under a consistent reductionism. It is 
also noteworthy that the reductionist theories concerning religion are in disagreement 
concerning the “real causal factor” of knowledge of God. According to a stringent 
reductionism, these “basic causes” are in conflict and would nullify each other until 
the real “basic cause” was established. 
The various types of reductionisms have presented challenges within Christian 
theology as well. During the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, Christian 
theologians from various traditions have recognized and articulated problems with 
reductionism for theological epistemology. They have identified how epistemologies 
shaped in modernity have curtailed notions of knowledge, diminishing the fullness 
which knowledge of God has enjoyed within the Christian tradition.16 To begin to 
present the problem of modern reductionism for the knowledge of God, we will first 
briefly consider how two representative, twentieth-century theologians understood 
and engaged the problem: Karl Barth (1886-1968) and Hans Urs von Balthasar (1905-
1988). Among twentieth-century theologians, these two theologians uniquely 
developed multifaceted, yet integrated theological epistemologies in response to the 
challenges of modernity. Though their theological writing came before discussions of 
postmodernity began in Christian theology, both theologians faced the problem of 
reductionism from the vantage point of their well-developed epistemologies.17 In 1.3 
                                                 
12. Sigmund Freud, The Future of an Illusion, trans. W.D. Robson-Scott, rev. ed. (Garden 
City, NY: Doubleday/Anchor, 1964). Also, Moses and Monotheism, trans. by Katherine Jones (1939; 
repr., New York: Vintage Books, 1955). In an earlier book, Freud contends for the sociological origins 
of religion, Totem and Taboo, trans. by James Strachey (1913; repr., New York: Norton, 1950). 
13. Edward O. Wilson explained religion in terms of the genetic evolution of the neural 
apparatus of our brains. See Wilson, On Human Nature (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1978). 
14. Daniel C. Dennett, Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon (London: 
Penguin Books, 2007). 
15. These epiphenomenalist reductionisms are ontological, causal, and epistemological 
reductionisms which, in turn, have led to methodological reductionisms in twentieth-century religious 
studies. For a nuanced discussion, see Jones, Reductionism, 298-332. 
16. We will categorize how various Christian theologians have critiqued the problem of 
reductionism below in 1.2.3. 
17. Both Andrew Louth and Mark A. McIntosh have noted the unique contributions of Barth 
and Balthasar in twentieth-century theology, who, like the Church Fathers, maintained the connection 
between theology and spirituality. Andrew Louth, Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1981), xi-xii; Mark A. McIntosh, Mystical Theology: The Integrity of Spirituality and 
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below, this study will demonstrate why T. F. Torrance is a particularly strong 
interlocutor for developing a theological epistemology after Barth in the postmodern, 
scientific milieu. Yet first, in order to introduce the modern problem of reductionist 
accounts for the knowledge of God within Christian theology, this study moves to 
consider the epistemologies of Barth and Balthasar and the distinctive ways in which 
they confronted reductionism. 
 
1.2.1   Karl Barth and the problem of reductionism for the knowledge of God 
While Barth’s relationship to modernity and postmodernity is complex and 
there are disputes on how he is to be interpreted, it seems clear that he intended to 
conceive and articulate the knowledge of God in response to modernity.18 Without 
giving a full discussion to the knowledge of God within Barth’s theology, we will 
note important, well-developed themes of his theology from which he challenged 
various reductionisms that affected theological epistemology.19 By noting these 
theological themes, we will discover how Barth conceived and critiqued various 
epistemological reductionisms. 
                                                 
Theology (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 1998), 101-18. Discussions such as Louth’s and 
McIntosh’s which contend for the relationship between theology and spirituality (sometimes within the 
literature on “mystical theology”) often note the need for the refurbishment of knowledge of God in the 
wake of modernity. For further example, see Andrew Louth, Discerning the Mystery: An Essay on the 
Nature of Theology (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), passim. McIntosh, “Theology and Spirituality” in 
Modern Theologians, 3rd ed., ed. David F. Ford with Rachel Muers (Malden, MA: Blackwell 
Publishing, 2007), esp. 392-98; Philip Sheldrake, Spirituality and Theology: Christian Living and the 
Doctrine of God (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1998), esp. 33-95. 
18. “One of the most fruitful ways of reading Barth is to look at his thought in the more 
general context of the breakdown of ‘modernity’—the decline, that is, of idealist metaphysics and the 
philosophical, moral and religious culture of subjectivity.” John Webster, Karl Barth, 2nd ed. (London: 
Continuum, 2004), 14-15. Also, Daniel W. Hardy, “Karl Barth,” in The Modern Theologians: An 
Introduction to Christian Theology Since 1918, 3rd ed., ed. David F. Ford with Rachel Muers (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 21. Those who present Barth as a postmodern theologian include Hans 
Küng, “Karl Barth and the Postmodern Paradigm,” in Theology for the Third Millennium, trans. Peter 
Heinegg (London: HarperCollins, 1991), 257-84; Walter Lowe, Theology and Difference: The Wound 
of Reason (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1993); Graham Ward, Barth, Derrida and the 
Language of Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995);  William Stacy Johnson, The 
Mystery of God: Karl Barth and the Postmodern Foundations of Theology (Louisville, KY: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 1997), esp. 184-91. 
19. More generally, on Karl Barth’s conception of the knowledge of God, see Eberhard Busch, 
The Great Passion: An Introduction to Karl Barth’s Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2004), 
57-81; David L. Mueller, Karl Barth (Waco, TX: Word, 1972), 49-93; Webster, Karl Barth, 77-83; 
Thomas F. Torrance, Karl Barth: Biblical and Evangelical Theologian (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1990), 
27-82 (more generally), 136-59 (on natural theology); Bruce L. McCormack, Karl Barth’s Critically 
Realistic Dialectical Theology: Its Genesis and Development, 1909-1936 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1995), esp. 155-62, 245-62. Whether or not “Barth’s own conclusions about how God is known 
are more severe and stringent than the ways in which many now suppose that such knowledge occurs,” 
the focus here is upon the key theological themes which helped him to resist epistemological 
reductionism. Quotation from Daniel W. Hardy, “Karl Barth,” 37. 
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First, for Barth knowledge of God has its source and end in God. The supreme 
knowledge of God is had by God within God’s being: “As he certainly knows Himself 
first of all, God is first and foremost objective to Himself.”20 Barth called this the 
“primary objectivity” of God. The objectivity by which He gives himself to be known 
in revelation Barth calls “secondary objectivity.” 21 It is only by God’s grace that, 
“although we are men and not God, we receive a share in the truth of His knowledge 
of Himself” which is secondary objectivity. “But in this share we have the reality of 
the true knowledge of Himself.”22 In both of these senses, primary and secondary, 
knowledge of God for Barth is objective.23 That is, its fount and fulfillment is not 
found within human subjectivity but within and from God. Barth contended for this 
type of objectivity to meet the challenge of Feuerbach who had argued that statements 
about God were basically statements about human nature. For Barth, modern liberal 
theology influenced by Schleiermacher had fallen into assuming an anthropocentric 
basis and methods.24 Barth understood this problem as an anthropological 
reductionism, basing the existence and knowledge of God on anthropological 
phenomena.25 He aimed for a theocentric reversal of this anthropological reduction by 
contending for the objectivity of God in Christ and likewise the knowledge of God.26 
Especially early on in his theological writings, Barth maintained with Søren 
                                                 
20. Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics vol. II, pt. 1 (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2010), 16. 
Hereafter, CD followed by the volume, part and page number: CD II/1, 16. 
21. CD II/1, 16: “God is objectively immediate to Himself, but to us He is objectively 
mediate.” 
22. CD II/1, 51. 
23. CD II/1, 3-62. See also George Hunsinger, How To Read Karl Barth: The Shape of His 
Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 35-39; Busch, The Great Passion, 72-76; Webster, 
Karl Barth, 77-9.  
24. For instance, in his lecture at the end of the 1920s, “The Word of God in Theology from 
Schleiermacher to Ritschl,” Barth attacked the “possession” of grace whereby God is brought to fit 
within any religious, ethical, or philosophical system. Theology and Church (London: SCM, 1962), 
216: Grace, though described as free, “did not remain free for them. They claimed it as a right, a 
certainty, a possession of the Christian, the so-called believing Christian.” For Barth, such a 
domestication of grace is commensurate with an anthropocentric reduction of the knowledge of God. 
25. Instead, Barth contended that the Holy Spirit provided the subjective possibility for 
revelation. CD I/2, 242-79. In a critique of a particular hymn, Barth argued that a person’s subjective 
experience of faith, “the spirit of human inwardness and seriousness, the spirit of mysticism and 
morals,” should not become the source, criterion, or organizing principle for knowledge of God. CD 
I/2, 257. 
26. On the freedom and objectivity of God’s self-revelation, see CD I/2, 1-25. “What Barth 
has successfully countered… was the logic of Feuerbach’s anthropological reduction. He had shown 
that the concept of God’s self-revelation, as affirmed by faith, logically entailed the concept that faith’s 
statements about God are objectively grounded. Although faith could not coherently find within itself 
the condition for its own possibility and all attempts to do so were logically self-defeating, faith could 
coherently believe that its basis lay not in itself but in God.” Hunsinger, How to Read Karl Barth, 36. 
Also, on anthropocentric versus christocentric theology in Barth, Mueller, Karl Barth, 49-53. 
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Kierkegaard that there is an “infinite qualitative difference” between the transcendent 
God and creation, and consequently the knowledge of God could not be reduced to 
any aspect of creation.27 In other words, God is known through God and through God 
alone.28  
Barth maintained a second theological theme reinforcing the previous one, yet 
making its own contribution. He held that God’s being is revealed in God’s action.29 
To begin, he argued that the speech of God, God’s Word, is itself the action of God.30 
This is why the Trinity informs and shapes his discussion of revelation.31 He wrote 
that revelation  
insists absolutely on being understood in terms of its object, God… 
God reveals Himself. He reveals Himself through Himself. He reveals 
Himself. If we really want to understand revelation in terms of its 
subject, i.e., God, then the first thing we have to realise is that this 
subject, God, the Revealer, is identical with His act in revelation and 
also identical with its effect. It is from this fact … that we must learn 
we learn that we must begin the doctrine of revelation with the doctrine 
of the triune God.32  
 
Through God’s actual and particular triune self-revelation, God has provided 
knowledge of himself. Before the activity of revelation, Barth used discussions of 
God’s hiddenness to argue that God’s nature is beyond human control and 
standards.33 He wrote,  
At this very point the truth breaks imperiously and decisively before 
us: God is known only by God; God can be known only by God … In 
faith itself we are forced to say that our knowledge of God begins in all 
seriousness with the knowledge of the hiddenness of God …The 
assertion of God’s hiddenness (which includes God’s invisibility, 
                                                 
27. For instance, from Barth’s commentary, The Epistle to the Romans (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1933), 330f: “God, the pure and absolute boundary and beginning of all that we are 
and have and do; God who is distinguished qualitatively from men and from everything human, and 
must never be identified with anything which we name, or experience, or conceive, or worship as 
God… Above and beyond the apparently infinite series of possibilities and visibilities in this world 
there breaks forth, like a flash of lightning, impossibility and invisibility.” An influential work for 
Barth’s “crisis theology” and “dialectical theology” was Søren Kierkegaard, Practice in Christianity, 
trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna V. Hong (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991). 
28. CD I/1, 296; cf. CD II/1, 44, 179-80. 
29. George Hunsinger refers to the active motif within Barth’s theology as “actualism” which 
he says “is present whenever Barth speaks, as he constantly does, in the language of occurrence, 
happening, event, history, decisions and act. At the most general level it means that he thinks in terms 
of events and relationships rather than monadic or self-contained substances. So pervasive is this motif 
that Barth’s whole theology might well be described as a theology of active relations.” George 
Hunsinger, How To Read Karl Barth, 30. 
30. CD I/1, 143-62. 
31. Barth’s discussion of the Triune-shaped revelation is found in CD I/1, 295-489.   
32. CD I/1, 295-96. 
33. Barth’s dialectic of divine veiling and unveiling is found in CD II/1, 179-204.  
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incomprehensibility and ineffability) tells us that God does not belong 
to the objects which we can always subjugate to the process of our 
viewing, conceiving and expressing and therefore our spiritual 
oversight and control. In contrast to that of all other objects, His nature 
is not one which in this sense lies in the sphere of our power.34 
  
Barth’s approach is in stark contrast with notions of the knowledge of God crafted in 
modernity without mention of God’s triune activity. He virtually always moved from 
the particular of revelation to the general.35 This means that he moved from the 
particular knowledge of God revealed in Christ as the supreme act of God’s self-
revelation to what this means for knowledge of God more generally. Stated 
emphatically in the Barmen Declaration, Jesus Christ is the “one Word of God that we 
are to hear.”36 Consequently, Barth considered much prolegomena in the wake of 
modernity as attempts to construct a non-theological basis for theology, making it 
possible outside the sphere of faith and the church: “The prefix pro in prolegomena is 
to be understood loosely to signify the first part of dogmatics rather than what is prior 
to it.”37 His is a theology from the particularity of God’s self-revelation within the 
church.38 Inspired by Anselm, Barth proceeded from faith in the “Credo,” the 
church’s confession of God’s Word.39 Instead of beginning with some aspect of 
human reason or experience, he began his Church Dogmatics with the doctrine of the 
                                                 
34. CD II/1, 183, 187. 
35. George Hunsinger describes this as the motif of “particularism” within Barth’s theology. 
How To Read Karl Barth, 32-35. 
36. “Jesus Christ, as He is testified to us in the Holy Scripture, is the one Word of God, whom 
we are to hear, whom we are to trust and obey in life and in death. We repudiate the false teaching that 
the church can and must recognize yet other happenings and powers, images and truths as divine 
revelation alongside this one Word of God, as a source of her preaching.” Cited in John H. Leith, 
Creeds of the Churches, 3rd ed. (Louisville, KY: John Knox Press, 1982), 520. 
37. CD I/1, 42. Furthermore, he wrote, “In order to give an account of the way of knowledge 
pursued in dogmatics, we cannot take up a position which is somewhere apart from this way or above 
the work of dogmatics. Such a place apart or above could only be an ontology or anthropology as the 
basic science of the human possibilities among which consideration is somewhere given to that of faith 
and the Church … In both cases, i.e., in both Modernist and Roman Catholic prolegomena, it can be 
known and said in advance, before actually embarking on dogmatics, what will be the proper way of 
knowledge. Evangelical dogmatics cannot proceed along these lines. It can only embark on its way, 
and then on this way, admittedly perhaps as its first task, yet genuinely on this way, concern itself with 
the knowledge of the correctness of this way. It knows that there can be no entering the self-enclosed 
circle of this concern from without, whether from a general human possibility or an ecclesiastical 
reality. It realises that all its knowledge, even its knowledge of the correctness of its knowledge, can 
only be an event, and cannot therefore be guaranteed as correct knowledge from any place apart from 
or above this event.”  
38. “Hence [dogmatics] does not have to begin by finding or inventing the standard by which 
it measures. It sees and recognises that this is given with the Church. It is given in its own peculiar 
way, as Jesus Christ is given, as God in His revelation gives Himself to faith.” CD I/1, 12. 
39. This approach is expounded definitively in Karl Barth, Anselm: Fides Quaerens 
Intellectum, trans. Ian W. Robertson (London: SCM Press, 1960), 26f. In Church Dogmatics, Barth 
explicitly refers the reader to Anselm for this approach. CD II/1, 4. 
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Word of God. In so doing, Barth considered himself to be departing from nineteenth-
century liberalism. Thus, Barth’s theology had a theological anchor, namely the 
Triune God who has claimed human beings as his covenant partners by his powerful 
actions of self-revelation and redemption in Jesus Christ.40 The Word of God revealed 
in Jesus Christ and witnessed to in the Scriptures is God’s primary means of self-
revelation that trumps all other claims to authority. From early on, some have argued 
that he has proposed a revelational positivism or foundationalism which is 
reductionistic. Barth did not allow God’s initiative and grace at work in creation a 
place in providing a limited, general revelation which Scripture, Calvin, and others 
have maintained it had. In this way, Barth restricted an avenue of God’s revelation, 
limited though it may be in comparison to the self-revelation in Christ.41 
Nevertheless, Barth pointed to God’s irreducible self-knowledge and self-revelation 
as the ultimate source and criterion for the knowledge of God.  
Consequently, Barth’s theology challenged modern theology in foundationalist 
or apologetic forms.42 He opposed laying a procrustean bed of abstract 
epistemological principles onto which knowledge of God must fit.43 By contending 
for the freedom of God, he opposed reducing knowledge of God to one component 
                                                 
40. Barth, “The Revelation of God,” in CD I/1, 295-489. “In effect, Barth makes the doctrine 
of the self-revealing Trinity do the jobs which in many other dogmatic works are undertaken by 
independent accounts of theological prolegomena.” Webster, Karl Barth, 53. 
41. Henri Bouillard, The Knowledge of God (London: Burns & Oates Limited, 1969), 11-62; 
James Barr, Biblical Faith and Natural Theology (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993), esp. 1-20; 102-37; Alister 
E. McGrath, A Scientific Theology: Nature (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2001), 1:267-72; Mueller, 
Karl Barth, 150. Some of the theologians who have charged Barth as promoting a type of revelational 
or otherworldly positivism include Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Paul Tillich, Reinhold Niehbuhr, and Emil 
Brunner. A good discussion of these critiques within their historical context is Gary Dorrien, The 
Barthian Revolt in Modern Theology: Theology Without Weapons (Louisville, KY: Westminster John 
Knox Press, 2000), 131-67. A more recent critique of Barth’s “canonical foundationalism” is William 
J. Abraham, Canon and Criterion in Christian Theology: From the Fathers to Feminism (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006), 361-90. 
42. Those who demonstrate parallels between Barth and a non- or post-foundationalism from 
within the “postliberal” school include George A. Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and 
Theology in a Postliberal Age (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1984), esp. 17-19, 23-24, 32-41; Hans 
W. Frei, Types of Christian Theology (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992), 38-46, 78-81, 
147-63; William C. Placher, Unaplogetic Theology: A Christian Voice In Pluralistic Conversation 
(Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1989), 135: “If my arguments have been correct, then 
Christian theology needs to take the form that Frei sees in Barth: a description of the world as seen 
from a Christian perspective that draws what persuasive power it has from the coherence and richness 
of the whole.” 
43. Although Barth did not use the language of “foundationalism,” his position challenged the 
Enlightenment’s constricting assumption that knowledge must be founded upon universally accepted 
categories of reason or experience. A noteworthy discussion is Stanley Haeurwas, Nancey C. Murphy, 
and Mark Nation, eds.,  Theology Without Foundations: Religious Practice and the Future of 
Theological Truth (Nashville: Abingdon, 1994). 
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within a larger philosophical system.44 For Barth, such approaches began 
anthropologically, reducing knowledge of God to the expectations and constructions 
of a culturally dominant philosophy beyond the actual place of the knowledge of God. 
His avoidance of various foundationalisms undergirded his vigorous denunciations of 
the analogia entis or the possibility of natural theology.45 God cannot be relegated to 
the category of “being.”46 Barth feared that natural theology could provide support to 
the German Christian synthesis of God, race, and Führer, diminishing the 
particularity and centrality of God’s self-revelation in Christ.47 For Barth, the 
Enlightenment and modernistic dogmatics had reduced revelation to religious history 
and experience of God in God’s freedom to experience in a general human sense. As a 
result, instead of having its ground in the being and activity of God, modern notions 
of the knowledge of God are reduced to human grounds “in a greater nexus of being” 
or “a greater nexus of scientific problems.”48 Yet, for Barth the knowledge of God 
cannot be defined by anything less than God who is revealed as Father, Son, and 
Spirit: “A result of the uniqueness of this object of knowledge might well be that the 
concept of its knowledge cannot be definitively measured by the concept of the 
knowledge of other concepts or by a general concept of knowledge but that it can be 
defined at all only in terms of its own object.”49 Because of its ultimately unique 
                                                 
44. John Macken, The Autonomy Theme in the Church Dogmatics of Karl Barth and His 
Critics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
45. For Barth’s discussion of the analogia entis or analogy of being, see Barth, CD I/1, xiii-
xiv; CD II/1, 226-27. Furthermore, Barth’s polemical book written against Emil Brunner’s defense of 
natural theology in Nature and Grace is Barth’s book Nein! published together with Brunner’s work in 
Natural Theology (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2002). In the 1937 and 1938 Gifford Lectures, a lecture 
event designed for the topic of natural theology, Barth did not so much engage the topic of natural 
theology as present on revealed theology as the proper theology of the Reformation. This is published 
as The Knowledge of God and the Service of God According to the Teaching of the Reformation 
(London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1938). For discussion, Busch, The Great Passion, 67-72; Mueller, Karl 
Barth, 90-93. However, an incisive critique of Barth’s dominant position against natural theology that 
he maintained throughout his controversy with Brunner, the Gifford Lectures and the early volumes of 
Church Dogmatics, is James Barr, Biblical Faith and Natural, passim. 
46. The standard interpretation of Barth’s development is that he decisively moved from a 
dialectical theology that opposed the “analogy of being” to a mediating position between liberalism, 
Roman Catholic theology, and his earlier dialectical theology that he defined as the “analogy of faith.” 
This influential interpretation was first advanced by Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Theology of Karl 
Barth, 3rd ed. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1992). Also, Thomas F. Torrance, Karl Barth: An 
Introduction to His Early Theology, 1910-1931 (London: SCM Press, 1962), 48-147. Barth himself 
endorsed this interpretation in Anselm: Fides Quarerens Intellectum, 11. However, there has been 
debate upon how decisive a break there is in Barth’s development between these positions, beginning 
with Bruce L. McCormack, Karl Barth’s Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology. 
47. While it is agreed that political controversies raised the issue of natural theology for Barth, 
it is also agreed that his polemic against it was not motivated purely by politics. Mueller, Karl Barth, 
42-43, 86-90; James Barr, Biblical Faith and Natural Theology, 10-12. 
48. CD I/1, 36-44, quotation on 36. 
49. CD I/1, 190. 
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source—God’s being and activity—the knowledge of God cannot be ultimately 
explained by a lesser cause than God. 
In continuity with the theme that God’s action reveals God’s being, for Barth, 
the one supreme act of God is both the revelation and reconciliation which God 
accomplished simultaneously in Christ and by the Spirit. Barth contended that the 
Reformers did not hold together closely enough justification with the knowledge of 
God or reconciliation with revelation: “They saw and attacked the possibility of an 
intellectual work-righteousness in the basis of theological thought. But they did not do 
so as widely, as clearly and as fundamentally as they did with respect to the 
possibility of a moral work-righteousness in the basis of Christian life.”50 However, 
for Barth, just as the possibility of human righteousness is taken away by the grace of 
God, so “the capacity to know God is taken away from us by revelation and can be 
ascribed to us again only by revelation.”51 Thus, no part of human justification or 
knowledge of God can ultimately be rooted or reduced to the human or human 
capacities. By holding together reconciliation with revelation, Barth guarded against 
epistemological reductionisms that removed knowledge of God from its theological 
center and soteriological context.52 
It should be noted that Barth’s emphasis on the objectivity of God and God’s 
being-in-action in Christ does not have to be interpreted as a disengaged theology 
without concern for human subjectivity in the knowledge of God. As noted from the 
vantage point of reconciliation, there is an essential anthropological component to the 
knowledge of God for Barth which he develops elsewhere.53 While the Trinitarian 
theological center remained, Barth discussed humans as the hearers of God’s Word 
and participants in the knowledge of God.54 Therefore, Hunsinger notes that Barth’s 
                                                 
50. Karl Barth, Nein!, reprinted in Natural Theology, 102.  
51. CD II/1, 184. 
52. Rowan Williams has argued that when Barth discusses the Trinity to address questions of 
knowledge, he subsumes theology and soteriology into epistemology. R. Williams, “Barth on the 
Triune God,” in Karl Barth: Studies of His Theological Method, ed. S.W. Sykes (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1979), 147-93. Nevertheless, Barth is explicitly answering epistemological questions using 
Trinitarian doctrine in CD I/1 and furthermore continues his discussion of the Trinity in volume 4 on 
redemption. Can the link between Trinity and epistemology as well as between Trinity and redemption 
that Barth maintains be read not as an instrumentalizing of the Trinity, but as the doctrine of God 
governing the discussions of epistemology and soteriology? 
53. Barth affirmed that “it was and will be men who are intended and addressed and therefore 
characterized as recipients, but as also themselves bearers of this Word.” CD I/1, 191.  
54. All of chapter 6 in CD I/1, “The Knowability of the Word of God”, 187-247, discusses the 
human recipients as the bearers of revelation. Furthermore, in chapter 5, “The Knowledge of God,” in 
CD II/1, the place and role of humans in the knowledge of God receives much attention.  
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theology contains a distinct strand of personalism.55 In fact, it can be argued that the 
objectivist motifs in his theology provided the framework for the human encounter 
with God. It is through God’s gracious self-revealing and reconciling work that 
human encounter with God occurs, an I-Thou relationship.56  
 In summary, for Karl Barth it is supremely God who prohibits the 
domestication of His self-revelation and the reduction of knowledge of himself to 
anything less than what God has made it. God’s triune being provides the knowledge 
of God with its own substance and integrity which cannot be reduced to any principle 
within creation, anthropological or otherwise. God’s simultaneous reconciling and 
revelatory activity provides the means and content for knowledge of God which 
cannot be simplified to generic epistemological abstractions. In brief, because God’s 
triune being and saving activity is irreducible, so knowledge of God is irreducible and 
cannot be explained by any object, dynamic, or philosophical principle less than God. 
Yet, some readers may wonder, is Barth’s approach not reductionistic in other ways? 
Might this be a Christomonistic reductionism, confining the knowledge of God to 
what has been revealed through Christ? This thesis will not attempt to answer this 
question concerning Barth’s epistemology. Yet, it is posed to demonstrate the 
possibility of other types of reductionisms, furthering the purpose of this section of 
introducing the modern problem of reductionist accounts of the knowledge of God. 
Before turning to consider how an engagement with the epistemology of T. F. 
Torrance might provide assistance in correcting the reductionist problem, we move to 
consider another twentieth-century theologian who had a distinct, well-developed 
epistemology from which he confronted the modern problem of reductionism. 
 
1.2.2  Hans Urs von Balthasar and the problem of reductionism for the 
knowledge of God 
To further develop this introduction to the modern problem of reductionist 
accounts of knowledge of God within Christian theology, this section, as with Barth 
in the previous section, will note important theological themes from which Hans Urs 
von Balthasar (1905-1988) conceived and critiqued various epistemological 
reductionisms. In some ways similar and in other ways quite distinct from Barth, 
Balthasar aimed to rehabilitate notions of knowledge of God in the wake of modernity 
                                                 
55. Hunsinger, How to Read Karl Barth, 40-42. 
56. CD II/1, 58. 
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by expanding some of its constricting assumptions.57 His perspective of the nature of 
God’s truth gave him hope for such an aim. He wrote, “God’s truth is, indeed, great 
enough to allow an infinity of approaches and entryways. And it is also free enough 
subsequently to expand the horizons of one who has chosen too narrow a starting 
point and to help him to his feet.”58 Balthasar’s fifteen-volume theological trilogy, 
The Glory of the Lord, Theo-Drama, and Theo-Logic, intended to provide theology 
with such an expansion by using the three Platonic transcendentals—the beautiful, the 
good, and the true—to demonstrate a proper use of the “analogy of being.”59 Edward 
T. Oakes notes that the order of his theological trilogy contains an implicit 
epistemology. Balthasar maintained that the epistemological approaches of René 
Descartes and Immanuel Kant have conditioned modern thinkers to begin with 
questions of truth, moving subsequently to questions of ethics and finally, if 
considered at all, aesthetics. Balthasar reversed this order, moving instead from 
aesthetics to ethics and then to truth.60 To expand the constricted starting points that 
emerged in modernity, Balthasar reclaimed aesthetics, and in particular beauty, as an 
important dimension of being and thus a beginning point to properly perceive truth 
and knowledge of God.  
                                                 
57. “And there is a recurring polemic throughout von Balthasar’s writings against those who 
choose reductive explanations, historical, psychological or whatever, and thereby fail to do justice to 
the object of their study.” Ben Quash, “Hans Urs von Balthasar,” in The Modern Theologians, 3rd ed., 
ed. David F. Ford with Rachel Muers (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 111.  
58. Hans Urs von Balthasar, “Seeing the Form,” in vol. 1 of The Glory of the Lord: A 
Theological Aesthetics, trans. Erasmo Leiva-Merikakis (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1982), 17. This 
is similar to the comment of Nicholas Lash when he wrote, “There is in certain scientific circles, a 
reductionism abroad according to which the only road to knowledge is that mapped out by techniques 
of enquiry which are today deemed ‘scientific’. But this, of course, is nonsense. Most of the things that 
most people know, they have not learned this way. There is an irreducible diversity of ways in which, 
as human beings, we feel our way towards the truth.” Nicholas Lash, Holiness, Speech and Silence: 
Reflections on the Question of God (Hampshire, UK: Ashgate, 2004), 86. 
59. In response to the Protestant challenge to Roman Catholic theology and in particular to 
Karl Barth, Balthasar defended the analogia entis or “analogy of being” from a Christological center. 
For his engagement and interpretation of Barth, see Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Theology of Karl 
Barth. Bruce McCormack challenged Balthasar’s interpretation that Barth shifted from “dialectic” to 
“analogy” through his 1931 study of Anselm. Instead, McCormack argued that Barth remained a 
“critically realistic dialectical theologian” in his book, Karl Barth’s Critically Realistic Dialectical. 
More recently, Stephen D. Wigley has argued that Balthasar did not so much misinterpret Barth, but 
that he responded and defended the analogy of being. Furthermore, Balthasar demonstrated its use in 
organizing and developing his theological trilogy in response to Barth’s challenge. Stephen D. Wigley, 
Karl Barth and Hans Urs von Balthasar: A Critical Engagement (London : T&T Clark, 2007). 
60. See chapter five of Edward T. Oakes, Pattern of Redemption: The Theology of Hans Urs 
von Balthasar (New York: Continuum, 1994), 133-58; Also, Edward T. Oakes, “Hans Urs von 
Balthasar,” in The Routledge Companion to Modern Christian Thought (London: Routledge, 2013). 
Edward Oakes allowed me to read a draft before publication, thus I am waiting to know the page 
numbers. 
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The proper perception of the form of revelation in its objective and subjective 
dimensions is the focus of volume one of The Glory of the Lord.61 The perception of 
beauty serves as an important analogy for Balthasar, for it invites the subject out of 
himself and into dialogue with the form and content of the beautiful, as with God’s 
self-revelation in Christ. Beauty takes into consideration the whole and thus the form 
of a presenting reality.62 By beginning with beauty, Balthasar emphasizes, “For the 
moment, the essential thing is to realize that, without aesthetic knowledge, neither 
theoretical nor practical reason can attain to their total completion.”63 This is a 
different approach than that of the sciences which obtain precision by splitting and 
dissecting. In contrast with a reductionist approach, Balthasar wrote, “For we can be 
sure of one thing: we can never again recapture the living totality of form once it has 
been dissected and sawed into pieces, no matter how informative the conclusions 
which this anatomy may bring to light.”64 Consequently, he argued that under the 
pressure of modern rationalistic accounts of science, questions of fundamental 
theology shifted from asking, “How does God’s revelation confront man in history? 
How is it perceived?” to questions like, “What basis acceptable to reason can we give 
to his [Jesus’] authoritative claims?” In short, the appropriate forms of perception 
were reduced down in the modern era to forms which are appropriate to one sector of 
reality, ignoring the larger, aesthetic question of perceiving form.65 
Balthasar also discussed appropriate forms of perception to God’s revelation 
in his Theo-Drama. Through the analogy of drama, Balthasar aimed to broaden 
notions of theological knowledge which had become “stuck fast on the sandbank of 
                                                 
61. Edward T. Oakes, Pattern of Redemption,131-208; Jason Paul Bourgeois, The Asethetic 
Hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer and Hans Urs von Balthasar (New York: Peter Lang, 2007), 
23-49; Stephan Van Erp, The Art of Theology: Hans Urs von Balthasar’s Theological Aesthetics and 
the Foundations of Faith (Leuven, Belgium: Peeters, 2004), 125-62; Oliver Davies, “The Theological 
Aesthetics,” in The Cambridge Companion to Hans Urs Von Balthasar, ed. Edward T. Oakes and 
David Moss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 131-42; Ben Quash, “Hans Urs von 
Balthasar,” 110-12. 
62. “And since the exact sciences no longer have any time to spare for it [‘Beauty’] (nor does 
theology, in so far as it increasingly strives to follow the method of the exact sciences and to envelope 
itself in their atmosphere), precisely for this reason is it perhaps high time to break through this kind of 
exactness, which can only pertain to one particular sector of reality, in order to bring the truth of the 
whole again into view—truth as a transcendental property of Being, truth which is no abstraction, 
rather the living bond between God and the world. And finally: since religion in our modern period has 
renounced that word, it would not be idle to investigate at least this once what countenance (if we can 
still speak of a ‘countenance’) such a denuded religion may exhibit.” Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord, 
18. Balthasar further describes how faith takes in and responds to the whole in his essay “A Verse of 
Matthias Claudias” in Elucidations, trans. John Riches (London: SPCK, 1975), 10-20. 
63. Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord, 152. 
64. Ibid., 31. 
65. Ibid., 173. 
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rationalist abstraction.”66 Moving from contemplation to action, he discussed here not 
aesthetic perception, but participation in the drama of salvation history as necessary 
for knowledge of God.67 “Now we must allow the encountering reality to speak in its 
own tongue, or rather, let ourselves be drawn into its dramatic arena. For God’s 
revelation is not an object to be looked at: it is his action in and upon the world, and 
the world can only respond, and hence ‘understand,’ through action on its part.”68 
God’s revelation has not only an aesthetic quality, but also a dramatic, active 
character.69 While the aesthetic quality of God’s self-revelation is centered in the 
beauty or glory of God, its active dimension has its center of gravity in the good.70 
God’s good action in history and the free human response in history comprise a 
dialogical drama between God and humanity. It is by participation in God’s dramatic 
activity through obedience that one perceives and thus has knowledge.71 “The good 
which God does to us can only be experienced as the truth if we share in performing it 
(Jn 7:17; 8:31f); we must ‘do the truth in love’… not only in order to perceive the 
truth of the good, but, equally, in order to embody it increasingly in the world.”72 
                                                 
66. Hans Urs von Balthasar, Prologomena, vol. 1 of Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic 
Theory, trans. by Graham Harrison (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1988), 25. 
67. Ben Quash, “The Theo-Drama,” in The Cambridge Companion to Hans Urs von 
Balthasar, ed. Edward T. Oakes and David Moss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 
143-57; Quash, “Hans Urs von Balthasar,” 112-16; Edward T. Oakes, Pattern of Redemption: The 
Theology of Hans Urs von Balthasar (New York: Continuum, 1994), 211-73; Jason Paul Bourgeois, 
The Aesthetic Hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer and Hans Urs von Balthasar, 39-49. 
68. Balthasar, Theo-Drama: Prologomena, 15. Emphasis his.  
69. “So the theodramatics makes a claim about the overwhelmingly dramatic character of the 
Christian revelation and the overwhelmingly dramatic response that it demands. It summons academic 
theology back from dessicated rationalism to a form and a register that are vibrant and forceful (and in 
touch with lived Christian life).”Quash, “The Theo-Drama,” 144.  
70. “There is nothing ambiguous about what God does for man: it is simply good. Theo-drama 
is concerned with the good…The good has its center of gravity neither in the perceiving nor in the 
uttering: the perception may be beautiful and the utterance true, but only the act can be good.” 
Balthasar, Theo-Drama, 18. 
71. “If by ‘aesthetics’ we are thinking more of the act of perception or its ‘beautiful’ object, 
we are succumbing to a static view which cannot do justice to the phenomenon [of God’s self-
revelation]. Aesthetics must surrender itself and go in search of new categories. … The ‘forms’, 
‘pictures’, ‘symbols’, which an ‘aesthetics’ can present … are insufficient in themselves to interpret 
revelation in its absolutely unique, definitive form and in terms of theological ‘universal validity’. This 
can only be done by the absolute commitment found in that drama in which the one and only God sets 
each of us to play our unique part. Death turns into life, and this is something that also takes place in 
our hearts so that, drawn into the action, they can look toward that center in which all things are 
transformed. But we have been appointed to play our part, and thus we share responsibility for our own 
understanding and expression of it.” von Balthasar, Theo-Drama, 16-17. 
72. Ibid., 20. Emphasis his. 
  
 
18 
Briefly put, knowledge of God occurs within the performed drama of salvation 
history, and theologians play a part in the drama which they in turn describe.73  
Turning directly to the nature of truth in Theo-Logic, Balthasar hoped to 
recover an early stream of the Christian tradition in epistemology which in modern 
times “has become slack and formed peculiarly stagnant pools.”74 He contended that 
the modern focus on proving the existence of truth is perhaps taking upon a defensive 
posture and allowing modern rationalism and skepticism to set the agenda. Such 
discussions of truth and knowledge are not commensurate with the understanding of 
Church Fathers like Clement, Origen, Gregory of Nyssa, Augustine, Anselm and 
Aquinas when the aim becomes “scientific clarity” and “unassailable certainty” which 
“can only be purchased by selling off huge acreages of truth.”75 With a clear 
statement of the problem, Balthasar argued, “This reduction of knowledge of the truth 
to a purely theoretical evidence drained of all vital personal and ethical decisions so 
palpably narrows the scope of truth that it ipso facto loses its universality and, 
therefore, its very essence.”76 He maintained the interrelationship of truth, goodness, 
and beauty as transcendental properties of being when he wrote, “only a permanent, 
living unity of theoretical, ethical and aesthetic attitudes can convey a true knowledge 
of being.”77 While Balthasar acknowledged that each of these three properties of 
being are distinct points of view, he argued that it is necessary to hold onto their 
coinherence and interplay to avoid the problems which result from rationalist 
reductionism. Treating them as mutually exclusive only distorts them:  
Modern rationalism, attempting to narrow the range of truth to a supposedly 
isolable core or pure theory, has exiled the good and the beautiful from the 
domain of the rationally verifiable, relegating them to arbitrary subjectivity or 
to a world of private belief and personal taste. As a result, the picture of being, 
the unified view of the world, is torn to shreds, so that any real conversation 
about truth becomes impossible. Discourse remains at the level of the 
generically accessible, hence ultimately trivial, while the deepest questions of 
truth, which need decision and taste even to be seen, are buried under the 
                                                 
73. Hans Urs von Balthasar, Dramatis Personae: Man in God, vol. 2 of Theo-Drama: 
Theological Dramatic Theory, trans. Graham Harrison (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1990), 53-59. 
His dramatic approach includes but goes beyond the focus upon “orthopraxy” in some modern 
theological discussions. Balthasar, Theo-Drama: Prologomena, 31-34. 
74. Hans Urs von Balthasar, Truth of the World, vol. 1 of Theo-Logic I, trans. Adrian J. 
Walker (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2000), 28. 
75. Ibid. 
76. Ibid., 28-29. 
77. Ibid., 29. 
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silence of a false modesty. If truth lacks decision, then decision, the personal 
decision that determines one’s view of the world, lacks truth.78  
 
By maintaining the unity of truth with beauty and goodness, Balthasar intended to 
correct the reductionisms of modern rationalism upon truth and knowledge. Without 
aesthetics and ethics, truth and knowledge are reduced to an imperceptible and 
impracticable form. 
 In his book Love Alone Is Credible, which can serve as a condensed survey of 
Balthasar’s trilogy, he critiqued theological approaches founded on the cosmos or 
world history as the problem of “cosmological reduction” in chapter one.79 In chapter 
two, he critiqued theological approaches based on anthropology as the problem of 
“anthropological reduction.”80 He then argued that “we cannot verify God’s Sign in 
terms of the world or in terms of man… There is no text that offers a ‘foundation’ for 
God’s text, making it legible and intelligible. It must interpret itself, and this is what it 
wishes to do.”81 The alternative Balthasar presented to these two types of 
reductionisms is the self-interpreting love of God which interprets God’s action and 
God’s truth together.82 God’s love brings God’s self-communication and thus God’s 
self-knowledge, even though these cannot be reduced to the sphere of logic. He 
writes, “The absolute uniqueness of the One God’s loving revelation to the unique 
persons of the saints cannot be reduced to general ontological and rational 
categories.”83 In other words, love brings knowledge, containing its own conditions of 
perception. Similar to how the love of a mother awakens love in a child and 
                                                 
78. Ibid., 29-30. 
79. Hans Urs von Balthasar, Love Alone is Credible, trans. D. C. Schindler (San Francisco: 
Ignatius, 2004), 15-30. 
80. Ibid., 31-50. This is also discussed in his chapter “Anthropology as Philosophy,” in The 
God Question and Modern Man  (New York: Seabury Press, 1958), 33, where he states, “To an epoch 
in which anthropology has been recognized as the key to philosophy, it is self-contradictory to foster an 
intelligence that approaches things from a merely rationalistic and technical point of view, indeed it 
completely misunderstands its own being.” 
81. Balthasar, Love Alone is Credible, 50. While Balthasar certainly contends for personal 
appropriation of the truth, the subject does not determine the truth of revelation. “The central 
presupposition of modernism, in a nutshell, is that every objective dogmatic proposition must be 
measured in terms of its suitability to the religious subject, in terms of its positive effects on and 
capacity to complete and fulfill that subject.” On pages 40-43, he goes on to argue that subjective 
appropriation of the truth is important in the Church Fathers. “Nevertheless, the tradition never set the 
criterion for the truth of revelation in the center of the pious human subject, it never measured the abyss 
of grace by the abyss of need or sin, it never judged the content of dogma according to its beneficial 
effects on human beings.” 
82. Balthasar did not hold human love as the framework for understanding God’s love, but in 
reverse, a weakened analogy of divine love. “The plausibility of God’s love does not become apparent 
through any comparative reduction to what man has always already understood as love; rather, it is 
illuminated only by the self-interpreting revelation-form of love itself.” Ibid., 56. 
83. Ibid., 71, note 2.  
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consequently also awakens knowledge, God interprets himself to humans as love. 84 
In other words, God’s love contains knowledge and yet “the inner reality of love can 
be recognized only by love.”85 So, for Balthasar, love precedes, encapsulates and 
enables knowledge.86 Thus, “the site from which love can be observed and generated 
cannot itself lie outside of love (in the sphere of ‘pure logicity’ of so-called science); 
it can lie only there, where the matter itself lies—namely in the drama of love.”87 The 
relationship between love and knowledge held an important place for von Balthasar in 
prohibiting reductive, impersonal accounts of knowledge.88 Without the governing 
reality and concept of love, the notion of knowledge of God is reduced to an 
unrecognizable, impractical, and illogical form.89 
 
1.2.3  Other Christian theologians and the problem of reductionism for the 
knowledge of God 
Unlike other twentieth-century theologians, Karl Barth and Hans Urs von 
Balthasar attempted to correct modernity’s reductionist accounts of knowledge of God 
by attending to God’s self-revelation in distinct ways.90 However, there have been 
other ways that theologians after Barth and Balthasar have identified and critiqued 
problems with modernity’s reductionist accounts of knowledge. Without attempting to 
be exhaustive, delineating some of these other critiques will help us to further grasp 
the modern problem of reductionism for theological epistemology. We will then be in 
a position to summarize the problem and offer a solution, turning to consider what 
resources there might be within the theological epistemology of T. F. Torrance for 
                                                 
84. Ibid., 76. 
85. Ibid., 75. 
86. “Christian action is therefore a being taken up into God’s action through grace, being 
taken up into God’s love so that one can love with him. It is only here that (Christian) knowledge about 
God becomes possible, for ‘he who does not love, does not know God; for God is love’ (1 John 4:8).” 
Ibid., 116. 
87. Ibid., 82. 
88. “For the sake of the world, the world’s own tendencies to reductive and impersonal 
knowledge need to be immersed in the habit of self-giving love.” Mark McIntosh, “Von Balthasar,” in 
The Blackwell Companion to Modern Theology, ed. Gareth Jones (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 
2004), 400.  
89. We will also find the relationship between love and knowledge important in Augustine’s 
theological epistemology and, moreover, for the continuing force of the tradition of participation in the 
knowledge of God in the current milieu. 
90. Nancey Murphy points out that in order to overcome reductionism in the philosophy of 
science and beyond, there has been the recognition of top-down or whole-to-part causation. Murphy, 
Anglo-American Postmodernity, 21-23, 30-34. As an interesting analogy, both Barth and Balthasar 
reformulated the knowledge of God “from above,” that is from God and God’s self-revelation, and 
Balthasar in particular gave attention to whole-to-part causation in “perceiving the form” of revelation. 
We will have more to say about the alternatives of holism and emergentism to reductionism below. 
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providing a robust alternative to reductionist accounts of knowledge for the 
postmodern, scientific age. For now, consider the following catalog of more recent 
theological critiques of reductionism.  
There have been critiques of Platonic or dualistic reductionisms which 
relegated knowledge of God to the soul of the human person.91 There have been 
critiques of Cartesian rationalist or cognitivist reductionisms which restricted the 
knowledge of God to the rational mind and its processes.92 Some have critiqued 
experiential reductionisms which defined the knowledge of God in terms of the 
experience of the knower.93 Others have critiqued the cultural or linguistic 
                                                 
91. This type of reductionism is based upon a Platonic body-soul dualism, taken up by 
Augustine. Consequently, knowledge of God is relegated to the soul (or “mind”) of the person which is 
distinct from the body. See Nancey Murphy, “Human Nature: Historical, Scientific and Religious 
Issues,” in Whatever Happened to the Soul: Scientific and Theological Portraits of Human Nature, ed. 
Warren S. Brown, Nancey Murphy, and H. Newton Maloney (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1998), 1-30; 
Nancey Murphy, Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006), 1-37. However, see the trenchant defense of Augustine by Luigi Gioia, The Theological 
Epistemology of Augustine’s de Trinitate (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
92. This type of reductionism has its roots within Descartes’ notion of the self as a thinking-
constituted being. Rationalist reductionisms have been critiqued by theologians who emphasize the 
affective or experiential dimensions of knowledge, most notably from Eastern Orthodox and 
Pentecostal traditions. For instance, from an Orthodox perspective, Dumitru Staniloae contends for the 
need for apophatic, direct, and mystical knowledge of God to complement rational, deductive 
knowledge. Dumitru Staniloae, Revelation and Knowledge of the Triune God, vol. 1 of The Experience 
of God: Orthodox Dogmatic Theology, trans. and ed. by Ioan Ionita and Robert Barringer (Brookline, 
MA: Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 1998), esp. 95-124. Also, philosopher James K. A. Smith critiques 
this type of reductionism epistemologically and anthropologically from the vantage point of 
Pentecostal spirituality. He writes, “Implicit in the practices of Pentecostalism are both a philosophical 
anthropology and an epistemology that resist the slimmed-down reductionism of modern cognitivism.” 
Thinking in Tongues: Pentecostal Contributions to Christian Philosophy (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 2011), 59. He defines his use of “cognitivism” as a near synonym of rationalism or 
intellectualism on 56, n.19. In response to a cognitivist or rationalistic reductionism, he develops an 
affective, embodied epistemology which, with Pentecostalism’s narrative emphasis, yields a “narrative 
knowledge” in chapter 3, “Storied Experience: A Pentecostal Epistemology,” 48-85. On p. 53, Smith 
contends, “This incipient epistemology [of Pentecostal spirituality] is not antirational, but 
antirationalist; it is not a critique or rejection of reason as such but rather a commentary on a 
particularly reductionistic model of reason and rationality, a limited, stunted version of what counts as 
‘knowledge.’” Also, theologians who emphasize the mystery or transcendence of God, retrieving an 
emphasis of pre-modern theology lost in modernity, bring critique to rationalist reductionisms. For 
instance, William C. Placher has developed the argument that “before the seventeenth century, most 
Christian theologians were struck by the mystery, the wholly otherness of God, and the inadequacy of 
any human categories as applied to God. That earlier view never completely disappeared, but in the 
seventeenth century philosophers and theologians increasingly thought they could talk clearly about 
God.” William C. Placher, The Domestication of Transcendence: How Modern Thing about God Went 
Wrong (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1996), 6. 
93. Following Descartes and Kant, who wished to insulate human free will from a reduction to 
the material world of necessity, Friedrich Schleiermacher rooted the fount of theology in the inner 
world or “feeling of absolute dependence” as the fount of knowledge of God. Friedrich 
Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith (1822; repr., London: T&T Clark, 1999). Protestant liberalism has 
followed in their path and is categorized by George Lindbeck as the “experiential-expressive model” in 
The Nature of Doctrine, 63-72, 113-23. Karl Barth and those who have followed, including T. F. 
Torrance, have critiqued and attempted to counter this type of reductionism with their focus upon 
revelation.  
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reductionisms which identified knowledge of God with the tradition or language 
which has mediated that knowledge.94 Still others have critiqued ethical or practical 
reductionisms which limit knowledge of God to what is embodied or practiced.95 
Nicholas Lash has critiqued religious reductionisms which contain knowledge of God 
to those settings and events which are demarcated as religious.96 Michael J. Buckley 
has contended against the natural theology of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
and its philosophical reductionism which attempted to define and defend knowledge 
of God on philosophical grounds without reference to Christology or Pneumatological 
experience.97 On the other hand, various theologians and philosophers of religion 
                                                 
94. The emphasis on this part of knowledge leads to the “cultural-linguistic model” for which 
Lindbeck contends in The Nature of Doctrine, esp. 18-27. This has been the emphasis of the “post-
liberal” approach. One critique includes Alister E. McGrath, The Genesis of Doctrine: A Study in the 
Foundation of Doctrinal Criticism (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1997). A condensed, later version is 
found in Alister E. McGrath, A Scientific Theology: Reality (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2002), 
2:39-54.  
95. Non-realists such as R. B. Braithwaite and Don Cupitt contend that because religious truth 
claims are false, they should be interpreted as basically ethical commitment. See R. B. Braithwaite, 
“An Empiricist’s View of the Nature of Religious Belief,” in The Philosophy of Religion, ed. Basil 
Mitchell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), 81f. “The trouble is that Cupitt’s scheme renders the 
idea of God almost exclusively functional,” writes Rowan Williams, Wrestling with Angels: 
Conversations in Modern Theology (London: SCM Press, 2007), 228-54, quotation on 239.  
96. This is the primary argument of Nicholas Lash, Easter in Ordinary: Reflections on Human 
Experience and the Knowledge of God (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990). In his 
seven-chapter critique of William James’ conception of “religious experience” and its reduction to an 
individual’s private feelings, Lash argues that ordinary human experience, interpreted from within the 
community of Christian discipleship and its narratives and symbols, can “furnish us with experience 
and knowledge of the mystery of God” (8). Not all religious experience is the experience of God and 
not all experience of God is religious. In other words, for Lash the experience of God is not confined to 
a certain region of creation or sector of human experience or gifted individuals, but rather is part of all 
creation and thus, all ordinary human experiences and all individuals, because all is in relation to God. 
See also Lash, Theology on the Way to Emmaus (London: SCM Press, 1986), 141-57; The Beginning 
and End of ‘Religion’ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 171-74. 
97. Michael J. Buckley, At the Origins of Modern Atheism (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 1987). To trace the origins and development of the atheism that took hold in the wake of 
modernity, Buckley examines the going theisms to which atheism defined itself so successfully. “In the 
rising attacks of atheism, Christology continued to discuss the nature of Christ … but the fundamental 
reality of Jesus as the embodied presence and witness of the reality of god within human history was 
never brought into the critical struggle of Christianity in the next three hundred years. The 
Enlightenment gradually took over the discussion of the meaning and existence of god. There was no 
need for the philosophes to draw up their own state of the question. It had been given to them by the 
theologians … In the absence of a rich and comprehensive Christology and a Pneumatology of 
religious experience Christianity entered into the defense of the existence of the Christian god without 
appeal to anything Christian” (67-68). Cf. a critique of Buckley’s interpretation and use of Aquinas, 
The Beginning and End of “Religion” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 132-49. 
However, Buckley has updated and furthered this project of exploring the internal contradictions in 
theism which gave rise to the atheisms of modernity including a re-engagement with Aquinas in 
Michael J. Buckley, Denying and Disclosing God: The Ambiguous Progress of Modern Atheism (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004). In sum, the critique of a philosophical reductionism that 
Buckley provides is that knowledge of God cannot be reduced to that which is non-theological, 
specifically natural theology or philosophical argument. This is in line with the Barthian critique, 
which in a nuanced way is continued in John Webster’s argument for a “theological theology” in John 
Webster, Confessing God: Essays in Christian Dogmatics II (London: T&T Clark, 2005), 11-31.  
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have critiqued revelational reductionisms which restrict the knowledge of God to the 
self-revelation of God in Christ and leave no room for a sensus divinitatis or a natural 
theology.98 William J. Abraham has critiqued epistemological or methodological 
reductionisms which have replaced the ecclesial canons that give rise to and support 
knowledge of God with a number of epistemological methods throughout Christian 
history.99 Particularly important in the postmodern era has been the critique of 
foundationalist reductionisms which reduced knowledge to what directly is, or 
indirectly can be, established by self-evident, indubitable foundations, requiring 
knowledge to have an infallible foundation and thus be universally accessible in order 
to be legitimate.100 Given these various critiques of modern reductionist notions of the 
knowledge of God within Christian theology, how are we to conceive of the 
knowledge of God in a postmodern age?  
                                                 
98. John Baillie, The Sense of the Presence of God: Gifford Lectures, 1961-2 (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1962). William P. Alston aims to justify religious belief by justifying the experiential 
awareness of God in Perceiving God: The Epistemology of Religious Experience (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1991). Alvin Plantinga contends for the sensus divinitatis and a “natural knowledge 
of God” which is part of “our original cognitive equipment” given us in creation which is repaired by 
the Holy Spirit through redemption. Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), esp. 167-98. Richard Swinburne sketches many thorough philosophical 
arguments for the knowledge of God, including: The Coherence of Theism (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997); 
The Existence of God (Oxford: Clarendon, 1979); The Christian God (Oxford: Clarendon, 1994). 
Related to the sensus divinitatis, William J. Abraham utilized the idea of the oculus contemplationis 
from Hugh of St. Victor in Crossing the Threshold of Divine Revelation (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 
2006), 58-78. This overlaps with the critique of Barth as a revelational positivist in footnote 40 above. 
99. With a sweeping historical study, William J. Abraham argues that the canonical heritage 
of the church cannot be reduced to any one epistemological theory which ends up replacing the 
church’s canons and making the church captive to a particular epistemic theory. He concludes, “We 
may have to be content with epistemic proposals which illuminate crucial tracts of Christian theology, 
rather than provide a single theory which will cover the whole terrain.” William J. Abraham, Canon 
and Criterion in Christian Theology, 479. Continuing this theme giving particular attention to the idea 
of revelation is his Crossing the Threshold of Divine Revelation. 
100. Postmodern critiques of foundationalism have pointed out that knowledge could not 
attain to the infallibility, certainty, objectivity, and universality promised. Theologically-informed 
critiques include J. Wentzel van Huyssteen, Essays in Postfoundationalist Theology (Grand Rapids, 
MI: Eerdmans, 1997); Stanley Hauerwas, Nancey C. Murphey, and Mark Nation, eds., Theology 
Without Foundations: Affirming Truth in a Modern/Postmodern World (Nashville: Abingdon, 1994); 
Stanley J. Grenz, Beyond Foundationalism: Shaping Theology in a Postmodern Context (Louisville, 
KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2001); F. Leron Shults, The Postfoundationalist Task of Theology: 
Wolfhart Pannenberg and the New Theological Rationality (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999); 
Placher, Unapologetic Theology, esp. 24-54, 154-174;  Paul D. Murray, Reason, Truth and Theology in 
Pragmatist Perspective (Leuven, Belgium: Peeters, 2004), 3-8. There have been many, nuanced 
philosophical critiques of foundationalism, including John Thiel, Nonfoundationalism (Minneapolis: 
Fortress, 1994).  It is noteworthy that contemporary epistemologists, like Robert Audi, distinguish 
between a “strong foundationalism” which argues that all justification comes from foundational beliefs 
and a “moderate foundationalism” which allows for other factors to contribute to justification. Robert 
Audi, Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge, 2nd ed. (London: 
Routledge, 2003), 183-216, esp. 193-95, 209-13. Also aware of the problems with foundationalism, yet 
contending for a reformulated weaker foundationalism is Laurence Bonjour, “The Dialectic of 
Foundationalism and Coherentism,” in John Greco and Ernest Sosa, The Blackwell Guide to 
Epistemology (Malden, MA and Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1999, 2001), 117-42.  
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1.2.4  Summary of the problem and a complex solution 
Before turning to how an engagement with the theological epistemology of T. 
F. Torrance might serve as a strong antidote to modern reductionist accounts of 
knowledge, we will first summarize the problem and propose a coherent solution. 
With the aging of modernity, the epistemological wineskins of reductionism have 
hardened. The above critiques, each in their own ways, help us to see that the 
reductionist epistemologies inherited from modernity are too restricted to be adequate 
for discussing what knowledge of God entails. A criticism they have in common is 
toward reductionism’s atomistic approach which attempts to define the whole by its 
parts. Reductionism is not mere dissection and analysis, but occurs when the whole is 
defined in terms of a part or parts. When this occurs within theological epistemology, 
the knowledge of God is atomized into basic “parts” which are separately considered 
either the essence or somehow constitutive for knowledge. The result is deformity, 
that is, the disfigurement of the structure and function of the knowledge of God. 
Concerning its deformed structure, reductionist accounts either totally neglect some 
aspects of knowledge or one aspect is defined over against the other, setting up an 
unnecessary contradiction within a multi-dimensional reality. The de-emphasized 
aspects of knowledge are not only less recognized but at times banished by the 
reductionist account, leaving knowledge of God in an abnormal shape. Concerning its 
deformed function, with the omission or de-emphasis of important co-determinants of 
a multi-causal reality, knowledge of God is reduced to the dynamic that is 
emphasized, deforming how knowledge of God actually functions. The complexity is 
reduced to a fundamental that is considered the foundation of a bottom-up, linear 
causality. Such ontological and functional deformities have at least distorted and at 
times disabled participation in the knowledge of God by restricting what knowledge 
of God is and therefore how human participation in the knowledge of God occurs. 
The atomized and deformed notions of the knowledge of God are problematic, which 
raises the central questions of this thesis. How can we articulate a vision of 
participation in the knowledge of God in light of the dissipation of the explanatory 
capacity of modern reductionist accounts of knowledge? What sort of conceptual 
model is ontologically faithful to what knowledge of God is and to how it functions? 
What potency can the tradition of participation in the knowledge of God have in the 
postmodern, scientific context in which it is now set? 
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 The postmodern era can be characterized as the dissipation of reductionism.101 
Post-positivist philosophers of natural and social sciences, such as Roy Bhaskar and 
Margaret S. Archer, have argued against reductionism in favor of an emergentism, 
maintaining that while a substance, entity or system is dependent upon another “more 
fundamental” substance, entity or system, the form and function of the dependent 
substance is not reducible to that lower reality.102 Likewise, theologians writing in the 
theology-science dialogue, such as Ian G. Barbour,103 Arthur Peacocke,104 and most 
recently Nancey Murphy105 and Philip Clayton,106 have challenged the problem of 
                                                 
101. Nancey Murphy contends that just as “the predominant strategy in modern science as 
well as in modern philosophy has been analysis and reduction” so Anglo-American postmodernity “is 
at its root a rejection of reductionism in all its forms.” Murphy, Anglo-American Postmodernity, 8, 34. 
She further develops this theme more recently in “Anglo-American Post-Modernity and the End of 
Theology-Science Dialogue?” in The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Science, ed. Philip Clayton 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 472-87. 
102. The primary works of Bhaskar and Archer which discuss reductionism and emergentism 
are Roy Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science, 3rd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2008), 77, 89-90, 115-
16, 181; The Possibility of Naturalism: A Philosophical Critique of the Contemporary Human Sciences 
(New York: Humanities Press, 1979), 124-37; Reclaiming Reality (New York: Routledge, 2011), 63-
73, 114, 117, 175. Margaret S. Archer, Realist Social Theory: The Morphogenetic Approach 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 33-63, 61, 72, 105, 136; Culture and Agency, rev. ed. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Archer prefers the term “conflation” over reduction 
in Being Human: The Problem of Agency (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), passim;  
Structure, Agency and the Internal Conversation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 1-
16, 154. 
103. Ian G. Barbour, Issues in Science and Religion (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), 324-
37; Religion and Science: Historical and Contemporary Issues, rev. ed. (London: SCM Press, 1998), 
233-37.  
104. Arthur Peacocke, God and the New Biology (Gloucester, MA: Peters Smith, 1994),  
passim; Theology for a Scientific Age (Minneapolis: Fortress,1993), 25-84, 300-302; “A Map of 
Scientific Knowledge: Genetics, Evolution and Theology,” in Science and Theology: The New 
Consonance, ed. Ted Peters (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), 189-210; “Emergence, Mind, and 
Divine Action: The Hierarchy of the Sciences in Relation to the Human Mind-Brain-Body,” in The Re-
Emergence of Emergence: The Emergentist Hypothesis from Science to Religion, ed. Philip Clayton 
and Paul Davies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 257-78. 
105. Nancey Murphy describes the move from medieval to modern science to include a shift 
from the Aristotelian concern with matter and form to a focus on the properties and behavior of the 
most fundamental components of matter. She describes this methodological reductionism as the 
“atomist-reductionist program” which includes the quest for the “most basic, indivisible constituents of 
matter.” Nancey Murphy, Anglo-American Postmodernity: Philosophical Perspectives on Science, 
Religion and Ethics (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), 12-18; Beyond Liberalism and 
Fundamentalism: How Modern and Postmodern Philosophy Set the Theological Agenda (Valley 
Forge, PA: Trinity Press International, 1996), 62-66; “Anglo-American Post-Modernity and the End of 
Theology-Science Dialogue?” in The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Science, esp. 475-77. Her most 
cogent discussion of reductionism is “Reductionism: How Did We Fall Into It and Can We Emerge 
From It?” in Evolution and Emergence: Systems, Organisms, Persons, 19-39; Also, in relation to 
anthropology, “From Causal Reductionisms to Self-Directed Systems,” in Did My Neurons Make Me 
Do It? Philosophical and Neurobiological Perspectives on Moral Responsibility and Free Will, ed. 
Nancey Murphy and Warren S. Brown (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 42-104, esp. 
78-84.  
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reductionism by developing the idea of emergence from the philosophy of science for 
theology.107 For these theologians, emergence is antireductionist, recognizing an 
ontological hierarchy of levels of reality which have evolved over time. The emergent 
realities cannot be reduced to their lower levels upon which they are dependent. 
Instead, each level has its own integrity and causal powers, contributing to downward 
causation from higher-level entities to lower-level components, spectacularly 
demonstrated by the emergence of human life and our capacity for knowledge (i.e., 
consciousness, intelligence).  
Alongside the discussions of emergence over reductionism has come the 
discussion of complexity and complex systems theory.108 For the purposes of the 
argument here, we will note a few characteristics of complex systems theory and 
complexity as it relates to the postmodern critique of reductionism. Complex systems 
theory has inspired the development of cybernetics, synergetics, the mathematical 
study of nonlinear dynamics, general systems theory, systems biology, chaos theory, 
and various complexity studies. The ontological and epistemological commonality 
between them is that each gives attention to the multi-dimensional, interrelated causal 
processes of the emergent wholes. Complex systems theory has been applied to 
                                                 
106. Philip Clayton, Mind and Emergence: From Quantum to Consciousness (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004); “Conceptual Foundations of Emergence Theory,” and “Emergence from 
Quantum Physics to Religion: A Critical Appraisal,” in The Re-Emergence of Emergence: The 
Emergentist Hypothesis from Science to Religion, ed. Philip Clayton and Paul Davies (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), 1-31, 303-22; “Toward a Constructive Christian Theology of Emergence” in 
Evolution and Emergence: Systems, Organisms, Persons, ed. Nancey Murphy and William R. Stoeger 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 315-44; Adventures in the Spirit: God, World, Divine Action 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2008), 63-115.  
107. Also noteworthy from the science-theology literature are the articles in Zygon 41, no. 3 
(2006); H. Morowitz, The Emergence of Everything: How the World Became Complex (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002); N. H. Gregersen, ed., From Complexity to Life: On the Emergence of 
Life and Meaning (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); J. Wetzel van Huysteen, Alone in the 
World? Human Uniqueness in Science and Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2006), passim; in 
a shorter, earlier form is his chapter “Evolution and Human Uniqueness: A Theological Perspective on 
the Emergence of Human Complexity,” in The Significance of Complexity: Approaching a Complex 
World through Science, Theology and the Humanities, ed. Kees Van Kooten Niekerk and Hans Buhl 
(Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004), 195-215. 
108. Basic introductions include Neil Johnson, Simply Complexity: A Clear Guide to 
Complexity Theory (Oxford: Oneworld, 2010). A good introduction by a leading complex systems 
scientist is Melanie Mitchell, Complexity: A Guided Tour (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
Textbook introductions to the contemporary discussion of complexity and science with extensive 
bibliographies include Klaus Mainzer, Thinking in Complexity: The Computational Dynamics of 
Matter, Mind and Mankind, 4th ed. (New York: Springer, 2004); Robert B. Northrop, Introduction to 
Complexity and Complex Systems (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2011); Ilya Prigogine and Nicolis 
Grégoire, Exploring Complexity (New York: W. H. Freeman, 1989). Applying complexity theory to 
various sectors of society, including education, health, international relations, from the 2005 
“Complexity, Science and Society Conference” is Jan Bogg and Robert Geyer, eds., Complexity, 
Science and Society (Oxford: Radcliffe Publishing, 2007). 
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physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, sociology, and economics to examine the 
intricate, multi-causal elements at work in the tapestries of physical, biological, 
technological, personal and social phenomena. Methodologically, because emergent 
wholes are more than a mere aggregate of their parts, holism instead of reductionism 
is the preferred approach in these nascent sciences.  
Nicholas Rescher begins his philosophical discussion of complexity by noting 
that it is “first and foremost a matter of the number and variety of an item’s 
constituent elements and of the elaborateness of their interrelational structure, be it 
organizational or operational.”109Rescher distinguishes between ontological, 
functional, and epistemic modes of complexity. Any type of object (non-human or 
human), including its composition and structure, its operations, and means of 
understanding and describing it, is intricate and complex.110 Furthermore, in stark 
contrast with linear reductionism, Rescher contends that reality is inexhaustibly 
complex and therefore human knowledge of reality is imperfectible, including its 
causalities and laws of operation.111 He concludes that the recognition of emergent 
complexities is a way between modern reductionist simplicity and postmodern 
anarchy.112 He writes,  
 Throughout the sciences—physics (stochastic phenomena), biology 
(evolutionary self-development), sociology (collective self-organization)—
                                                 
109. Nicholas Rescher, Complexity: A Philosophical Overview (New Brunswick, NJ: 
Transaction Publishers, 1998), 1. 
110. Rescher, Complexity, 8-16. 
111. Rescher, Complexity, 25-54. On 43-44: “For a particular system can always exhibit new 
patterns of phenomenal order in its operations over time, and so there is always more to be learned 
about it. There is no end to the new levels of functional complexity of operation that can be 
investigated with such a system. Coordination phenomenon have a life of their own. In principle, it will 
always be possible to discern yet further levels of lawfully structured relationship. When we change the 
purview of our conceptual horizons, there is always in principle more to be learned—novelties of order 
that could not have been predicted from earlier, lower-level information … Even though nature might 
be of finite physical and nomic complexity as regards its physical structure and its basic procedural 
laws, nevertheless it could be infinitely diverse in the unfolding operational complexity of its 
phenomenal products over time. To understand the world about us we need departments of biology and 
economics as well as departments of physics.” 
112. “Noting the inherent limitations of the ‘modern’ categories of understanding and 
explanation, the postmoderns forsook the courage of rational conviction and viewed themselves as 
living in a world that is fundamentally unintelligible and inaccessible to reason. By contrast, the post-
postmodern sensibility is in fact increasingly rehabilitating this rational conviction because it sees on 
all sides the development of intellectual tools by whose means those supposedly intractable forces of 
chance, contingency, and fluctuating variability permit of rational comprehension and explanation. 
Where the postmoderns saw incomprehensibility, their post-postmodern successors have come to see a 
mere complexity that is substantially tractable by new cognitive instrumentalities more powerful than 
those available before.” Nicholas Rescher, Complexity: A Philosophical Overview (New Brunswick, 
NJ & London, UK: Transaction Publishers, 1998), 207. Further philosophical development of the 
relationship between postmodernism and complexity is Paul Cilliers, Complexity and Postmodernism: 
Understanding Complex Systems (London : Routledge, 1998). 
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there is emerging a common recognition that a universe of chance and chaos is 
not unruly (anarchic) but merely complex, exhibiting through its natural 
operation the emergence of higher-order lawfulness …What is perhaps the 
principal theme of late twentieth century science—and one which 
distinguishes it from all that has gone before—is nature’s tendency to self-
organization, the natural dynamic in highly complex systems of an emergence 
of order from disorder, lawfulness from chance, structure from chaos. And in 
its own gradual way this recognition of self-organization and the natural 
emergence of complex order from chance and chaos has come to pervade the 
landscape of science. It nowadays occupies the middle ground between the 
modernistically oversimplification of a universe frozen into deterministic 
order and the postmodern vacuity of a universe viewed as anarchic, irrational, 
and totally unruly beyond the grasp of rational comprehensibility.113  
 
The important point to note here is that the now-recognized ontological and functional 
complexity of higher-level, emergent realities has burst the reductionist wineskin of 
fundamental parts and linear causality.114 This has consequences for presenting an 
epistemology in the postmodern era. 
In order to move beyond a modern reductionist account of theological 
epistemology, a more holistic conception of knowledge of God is needed, something 
analogous to a complex system.115 Therefore, the conceptual framework this thesis 
will use to discuss knowledge of God will neither be reductionist nor linear, but more 
                                                 
113. Rescher, Complexity, 206. 
114. From the philosophy of science, Nancy Cartwright contends against the idea that nature 
contains singular lines of causation within a simple system and instead argues for a “patchwork of 
laws” in The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999). See the discussion, William Seager, “Beyond Theories: Cartwright and Hacking,” in 
Philosophy of Science: The Key Thinkers, ed. James Robert Brown (London: Continuum, 2012), 213-
35. 
115. Rescher notes that philosophers of science have had to deal with complexity, yet “the fact 
remains that the idea of complexity is effectively absent from most metaphysical systems” with a few 
exceptions. Rescher, Complexity, 7. It is therefore not surprising that not much has been written on the 
relation of complex systems and Christian theology. Nevertheless, there are a few noteworthy studies. 
The second volume of the “Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action” sponsored by the Vatican 
Observatory is R. J. Russell, Nancey Murphy, and Arthur Peacocke, eds., Chaos and Complexity: 
Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995). An 
interdisciplinary engagement is Kees Van Kooten Niekerk and Hans Buhl, eds., The Significance of 
Complexity: Approaching a Complex World through Science, Theology and the Humanities (Hants, 
UK & Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004), esp. 135-216 on theological reflections. Also noteworthy is the 
reflection on divine action which critiques scientism (distinguished from science) through an 
evaluation of the work of John Polkinghorne and Arthur Peacocke in relation to chaos and complexity 
theory, T. A. Smedes, Chaos, Complexity and God: Divine Action and Scientism (Leuven, Belgium: 
Peeters, 2004); Also, the resources mentioned above in footnote 104 which concern both complexity 
and emergence by H. Morowitz and N. H. Gregersen.  
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like a complex model.116 A complex model of theological epistemology aims to 
include a fuller portrayal of the multi-causal components which together constitute 
knowledge of God as a dynamic, inter-dependent whole.117 While analysis and 
contingent conversations will require one to accentuate particular dynamics of 
theological epistemology, none of the currently recognized dynamics can ultimately 
be ignored without diminishing the fullness of the knowledge of God. Thus, to help 
heal the wounds of modernity’s reductionist accounts of God-knowledge, this thesis 
intends to portray knowledge of God as multi-dimensional and dynamic as the 
ontological realities that inform it. 
To avoid a methodological reductionism, this thesis does not intend to provide 
an account of the most basic causal components of the knowledge of God. A more 
ontologically-suitable approach is required. Yet, neither does this thesis 
presumptuously aim to offer a theological epistemology that logically and 
linguistically fully circumscribes what knowledge of God is.118 Instead, this thesis 
                                                 
116. A recent review of the use of models in the philosophy of science distinguishes between 
theories which use models and those which do not. Michael Weisberg, “Who is a Modeler?” The 
British Journal of the Philosophy of Science 58 (2007): 207-33. On p. 209, Weisberg contends that 
modeling is the “indirect theoretical investigation of a real world phenomenon using a model” in 
contrast with “abstract direct representation (ADR)” which other theories use. On the use of models in 
science-and-religion discussions, the seminal work is Ian Barbour, Myths, Models and Paradigms: A 
Comparative Study in Science and Religion (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1974). Also, see the 
discussion in Christopher Southgate, ed., God, Humanity and the Cosmos (London & New York: T&T 
Clark International, 1999; 2nd ed., 2005), 20-23.  
117. Günter Thomas observes the complex structure of theology with its many interacting 
elements in his chapter, “Complexity in Systematic Theology: The Case for the Christian Concept of 
‘New Creation’ in the Dialogue with Science,” in Niekerk and Buhl, eds., The Significance of 
Complexity, 167-93, esp. 171-74. While I agree with T. A. Smedes, Chaos, Complexity and God, 175-
84, that it would be a category mistake to attempt to construct theology using scientific language and 
concepts, I will use complex systems as an analogy for an appropriate model for conceiving knowledge 
in the postmodern, scientific era. This is not an attempt to simply adjust our mode of reasoning to the 
latest scientific mode, but instead, recognizing the limitations of the paradigm of reductionism that the 
postmodern age has highlighted, to recover a sense of the irreducibly complex, multi-dimensional 
nature of the knowledge of God which has been recognized at times throughout the Christian 
theological tradition. For instance, similar to what Baron von Hügel argued on the nature of religion, 
we can say that knowledge of God is constituted by personal dynamics such as the intuitional, 
emotional, and volitional; by cognitive dynamics such as the speculative and the rational; as well as by 
traditional dynamics such as the institutional and historical. While other dynamics are included (i.e., 
revelation), none can be excluded in a non-reductionistic, more holistic approach. Baron Friedrich von 
Hügel, The Mystical Element of Religion as studied in Saint Catherine of Genoa and Her Friends 
(London: J. M. Dent, 1909), 50-82. A helpful discussion of the interrelated dynamics is that of 
Nicholas Lash on the “triangles” of von Hügel and John Henry Newman in their attempts to correct 
“one-sidedness in religion.” Lash, Easter in Ordinary, 131-77. 
118. While it may seem like that anytime humans speak or write, we are being reductionist in 
our attempts to articulate reality, we are not. As we will see in chapter two, there is a fundamental 
difference between human speech and reality that cannot be overcome. Hence, all human descriptions 
omit certain aspects of reality in order to communicate something significant about the reality under 
consideration. In the postmodern era, there is a greater respect for the complexity of reality that 
transcends human language. 
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aims to present a (historically, culturally, psychologically, etc.) contingent, fallible, 
though more holistic, complex vision of what participation in knowledge of God 
entails within the postmodern, scientific context in which it is now set. To make such 
a presentation, this thesis will critically interact with a more recent, scientifically-
engaged theological interlocutor who has helped theology to move beyond some of 
the inappropriate epistemological restrictions of modernity. 
 
1.3  T. F. Torrance and participation in the knowledge of God 
An important part of remedying the problem of epistemological reductionism 
is a robust, holistic conception of the knowledge of God. Therefore, in order to move 
beyond modernity’s epistemological restrictions, this thesis aims to offer a more 
complex vision of participation in the knowledge of God. Towards that refurbishment, 
this thesis will critically engage the theological epistemology of the preeminent, 
twentieth-century British theologian, Thomas F. Torrance (1913-2007).  
In the first half of the twentieth century, Karl Barth decisively located the 
importance of the issue of the knowledge of God for contemporary theology in his 
massive Church Dogmatics and other theological writings. In the second half of the 
twentieth century, his pupil and key English translator of Church Dogmatics, T. F. 
Torrance, did not write a comprehensive systematic theology, yet many of his 
writings focused on the issue of the knowledge of God, taking his cues from his 
mentor, Karl Barth. Both Barth and Torrance attempted to overcome the 
epistemological problems incurred during the Enlightenment and its deleterious 
effects upon theology. However, some criticized Barth for not addressing issues posed 
within and outside the church by the pressures of secularist humanism and modern 
science.119 After Barth, Torrance intended to remain within Barth’s theological frame 
of reference and yet to extend and advance the discussion of theological epistemology 
with an eye toward the twentieth-century developments in epistemology within the 
natural sciences. The new theories of relativity by Albert Einstein and the emerging 
quantum mechanics of Max Planck, Niels Bohr, and Louis de Brogile eclipsed the 
classical science of Newtonian mechanics. These new theories reshaped the 
fundamental structure and nature of matter, energy, space, and time, effecting a shift 
from the Newtonian worldview. Accordingly, such drastic changes in science resulted 
                                                 
119. Langdon Gilkey, Naming the Whirlwind: The Renewal of God-Language (Indianapolis 
and New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969), 73-106; cited in Mueller, 154, note 14. 
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in far-reaching changes in concepts about knowledge.120 T. F. Torrance gave 
particular attention to these twentieth-century scientific and epistemological changes 
particularly concerning relativity but less concerning quantum theory. John 
Polkinghorne critiques Torrance for not engaging quantum theory. He notes that 
Torrance’s chosen influences—Michael Faraday, James Clerk Maxwell, and Albert 
Einstein—“represent the final flowering of classical physics. The advent of modern 
quantum theory has meant that today we see them as the last of the Ancients rather 
than as the first of the Moderns.” Polkinghorne affirms Torrance’s critique of a 
closed, deterministic universe, but contends that the way to affirm openness and 
realism is not by field theory or an Einsteinian approach to physics which is based 
upon a clear and determinate universe, but is rather by quantum theory.121 
Consequently, he helped to move the discussion of the knowledge of God beyond the 
trap of modernity’s reductive positivism. While the philosophy of science and its 
epistemological implications have continued to evolve, Torrance’s epistemology 
developed in the mid-to-late twentieth century which resonated with the 
epistemological developments in the philosophy of science at that time. 
In his “intellectual biography” of T. F. Torrance, Alister McGrath touts 
Torrance to be “widely regarded, particularly outside Great Britain, as the most 
significant British academic theologian of the twentieth century, and is especially 
noted for his ground-breaking contribution to the study of the relationship of Christian 
theology and the natural sciences.”122 John Webster described Torrance as one of the 
“most able dogmaticians” and “energetic intellects” of English-language theology.123 
Daniel W. Hardy claimed that Torrance “is virtually unique amongst theologians in 
                                                 
120. As we will see in chapter two, those historians and philosophers of science who have 
discussed ‘scientific revolutions’ called into question the way that rationality and knowledge function. 
The classic and controversial twentieth-century exposition is Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1962, 1970, 1996). 
121. John Polkinghorne, Belief in God in an Age of Science (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 2003), 81; Theology in the Context of Science (London: SPCK, 2008), 11-12. Also, with detailed 
exposition, Wing-Hong Wong clearly demonstrates, “In wrongly claiming that RT [relativity theory] 
has contributed to the downfall of strict determinism in physics, Torrance has not really come to grips 
with the unique role of QT [quantum theory] in overthrowing strict determinism in modern physics.” 
Wing-Hong Wong, An Appraisal of the Interpretation of Einsteinian Physics in T. F. Torrance’s 
Scientific Theology (PhD thesis, University of Aberdeen, 1994), 345. 
122. Alister E. McGrath, T. F. Torrance: An Intellectual Biography (London: T&T Clark, 
1999), xi. 
123. John Webster, “Editorial,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 10, no. 4 
(October 2008): 369-71. 
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the depth of his knowledge of the philosophy of the natural sciences.”124 In 1969, 
Torrance’s book Theological Science received the Collins Award and in 1978 he 
received the Templeton Foundation Prize for Progress in Religion. His primary 
academic career was spent as Professor of Christian Dogmatics at Edinburgh 
University from 1952-1979.125 He belonged to a number of academic societies 
pertaining to theology as well as the philosophy of science and was also widely 
engaged in ecumenical activities.126 He published over thirty books and hundreds of 
articles as well as superintended the translation of the major works of John Calvin and 
Karl Barth. He founded and edited the Scottish Journal of Theology. In 2004, the 
Thomas F. Torrance Theological Fellowship formed as a distinctively Christian 
scholarly society “devoted to the exploration, development, and dissemination of the 
theology of Thomas F. Torrance” with its own online journal, Participatio.127 With 
such accomplishments and influence it is not difficult to agree with Paul D. Molnar 
when he wrote, “There is little doubt that Thomas Forsyth Torrance … is one of the 
most significant English-speaking theologians of the twentieth century.”128 As a 
historical and dogmatic theologian who gave considerable attention to the 
epistemology of theology in conversation with the epistemological developments 
occurring within the natural sciences, T. F. Torrance is a valuable interlocutor for 
articulating a vision of participation in the knowledge of God in the scientific, 
postmodern age. 
This thesis will contain a presentation of Torrance’s Trinitarian 
epistemological vision. However, this work will not merely archive a description of 
what knowledge of God is in the writings of Torrance, such as its nature, scope, and 
limits as in an encyclopedic philosophical account. Instead, this thesis will provide a 
charitable, yet critical and constructive engagement with Torrance’s vision of 
participation in the knowledge of God. Through this engagement, this thesis aims to 
articulate a vision of participation in the knowledge of God that overcomes the 
                                                 
124. Daniel W. Hardy, “Thomas F. Torrance,” in The Modern Theologians: An Introduction 
to Christian Theology in the Twentieth Century, ed. David Ford (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1993), 
71.  
125. T. F. Torrance was previously Professor of Church History at Edinburgh from 1950-2 
and before that, Assistant Professor of Systematic Theology at Auburn Theological Seminary in New 
York from 1938-9. See McGrath, T. F. Torrance, op. cit., 47-58, 87-107. 
126. Ibid., 244, 246. 
127. The mission statement can be found at http://www.tftorrance.org/about.php and the 
online journal Participatio at http://www.tftorrance.org/journal.php.   
128. Paul D. Molnar, Thomas F. Torrance: Theologian of the Trinity (Surrey, UK & 
Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2009), 1. 
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problems of modern reductionist accounts of knowledge and that is suitable for the 
postmodern, scientific era. Developing this vision can make important contributions 
to three distinct though inter-related contextual levels: historical and global 
discussions, Charismatic-Evangelical and Reformed theology discussions, and 
discussions among scholars of T. F. Torrance. However, the focus of this thesis is 
upon the global, historical context. 
 
1.3.1 Contributions to historical, global discussions of knowledge of God  
T. F. Torrance is a good interlocutor for a theological discussion of the 
knowledge of God on the historical, global level. Derivative from and centered in the 
Triune God, Torrance’s notion of the knowledge of God is a thoroughly theological 
epistemology inspired by Karl Barth and yet is concerned with epistemological 
parallels among the natural sciences. As expanded above, Torrance finds his place 
among the historical discussions of theological epistemology within Barth’s 
theologically -grounded, Trinitarian framework, yet extended outward to engage the 
twentieth-century developments in epistemology within the natural sciences. Torrance 
is one of two major systematic theologians in the twentieth century to offer extensive 
engagements with the sciences.129 In the early twenty-first century, the engagement 
between science and religion or science and theology continues to burgeon 
internationally.130 While Torrance’s theological epistemology will not satisfy all of 
the concerns raised by contemporary theologians, there are resources within 
Torrance’s theology which make a unique contribution to a few challenges of the 
                                                 
129. The other major twentieth-century systematic theologian is Wolfhart Pannenberg. His 
primary works on the subject include Pannenberg, Theology and the Philosophy of Science (Louisville, 
KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1976); Towards a Theology of Nature: Essays on Science and 
Faith (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1993).  His other essays and articles on the 
relationship between science and theology have been collected in the volume, The Historicity of 
Nature: Essays on Science and Theology (Templeton Press, 2007). Discussions about Pannenberg on 
theology and science include Philip Hefner, “The Role of Science in Pannenberg’s Theological 
Thinking,” in Carl E. Braaten and Philip Clayton, eds., The Theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg 
(Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1988), 266-286; Carol Rausch Albright and Joel Haugen, eds., Beginning 
with the End: God, Science and Wolfhart Pannenberg (Chicago and La Salle, IL: Open Court 
Publishing, 1997); Jacqui A. Stewart, Reconstructing Science and Theology in Postmodernity: 
Pannenberg, Ethics and the Human Sciences (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2000); Stanley J. Grenz, 
Reason for Hope: The Systematic Theology of Wolfhart Pannenbereg, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 1990, 2005), 108-9, 114-17, 134-37. 
130. The continued growth is evidenced by the growing number of academic centers, posts, 
journals, and books dedicated to the dialogue. Nancey Murphy has written that “although it cannot be 
said (yet) that the postmodern era will be one in which religion and science are reunited, it can certainly 
be said that the sharp dichotomy between them is a modern phenomenon.” In  Anglo-American 
Postmodernity: Philosophical Perspectives on Science, Religion and Ethics (Boulder, CO and Oxford, 
UK: Westview Press, 1997), 5. 
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postmodern, scientific age. In order to transcend modern reductionist views of 
knowledge, this thesis engages and develops those resources within Torrance’s 
epistemology to offer a more holistic, complex vision of the knowledge of God. As 
this vision is developed, this study will note significant contributions for the 
historical, global discussion of the knowledge of God. For this contextual level, 
primary interlocutors will be seminal writers on the knowledge of God throughout the 
Christian tradition, such as Augustine of Hippo (354-430 CE), Maximus the 
Confessor (580-662 CE), Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274 CE), Gregory Palamas (1296-
1359AD), John Calvin (1509-1564 AD), and Karl Barth (1886-1968 AD), as well as 
contemporary theologians who have written in the area of theological epistemology, a 
few of whom are involved in the contemporary science-and-theology dialogue.131 
This thesis gives sustained attention to this contextual level. 
 
1.3.2  Contributions to Charismatic-Evangelical and Reformed theology  
Theology is done from and for particular theological traditions. Regarding my 
own historical and ecclesial context, I currently live and work within a stream of neo-
                                                 
131. Somewhat surprisingly, Torrance’s works have not received wide discussion among the 
“science and religion” or “science and theology” books and journals. For example, Torrance is not 
listed as one of the “important figures” in the development of the field of science and religion and is 
mentioned only once in the science and religion textbook, Christopher Southgate, ed., God, Humanity 
and the Cosmos (London & New York: T&T Clark International, 1999; 2nd. ed., 2005), 4-7. 
Furthermore, Torrance is not discussed by Ian Barbour, Arthur Peacocke, or J. Wetzel van Huyssteen. 
Nancey Murphy accepts Ronald Thiemann’s charge of “foundationalism” concerning Torrance’s 
epistemology without any direct or further engagement of his work in Anglo-American Postmodernity 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), 116-17. While Ted Peters lists Torrance as a “key partner” in 
the science and theology conversation in his Science, Theology and Ethics (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 
2003), 16, he spends a few pages summarizing Torrance’s approach to theology as a science, 26-28; An 
earlier version, “Science and Theology: Toward Consonance,” in Ted Peters, ed., Science and 
Theology: The New Consonance (Boulder, CO; Oxford, UK: Westview Press, 1998), 25-28. John 
Polkinghorne engages Torrance in a few places throughout his writings: Science and Creation: The 
Search for Understanding (London: SPCK, 1988), 13-15, 30, 41, 66-67, 84-6; Reason and Reality: The 
Relationship Between Science and Theology (London: SPCK, 1991), 1, 5, 16, 93; Theology in the 
Context of Science (London: SPCK, 2008), 11-12, 15; and his fullest discussion is Faith, Science and 
Understanding (London: SPCK, 2000), 173-85.  However, the primary exception is the work of Alister 
E. McGrath. Besides his “intellectual biography” of Torrance, McGrath aims to continue Torrance’s 
agenda of exploring “the fundamental relationship between Christian theology and natural science at 
the level of method” in The Foundations of Dialogue in Science and Religion (Malden, MA; Oxford, 
UK: Blackwell, 1998), 34. Furthermore, his “scientific theology” trilogy explores in greater detail the 
interface between the methods and working assumptions of Christian theology and the natural sciences 
and is explicitly intended to be “an exposition of a scientific theology representing a sympathetic yet 
critical response to the imposing and stimulating contribution to the dialogue between theology and the 
natural sciences by Torrance.” Alister E. McGrath, A Scientific Theology: Nature, vol. 1 (Edinburgh: 
T&T Clark; Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2001), 77; A Scientific Theology: Reality, vol. 2 (Edinburgh: 
T&T Clark; Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2002); A Scientific Theology: Theory, vol. 3 (Edinburgh: 
T&T Clark; Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2003). 
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Charismatic Evangelicalism.132 Therefore, in line with the approach of “receptive 
ecumenism,” this thesis will have implications for the question, “How might reading 
T. F. Torrance be helpful to Pentecostal-Charismatic and Evangelical theology and, in 
particular, to their concepts of the knowledge of God?”133  
When engaging in theological dialogue, hopefully all conversation partners are 
enriched. By providing a complex vision of participation in the knowledge of God 
through an engagement with Torrance, there will be contributions made that those 
from within the Reformed tradition can critically consider. My hope is that this 
reading of T. F. Torrance and the vision offered will contribute to the Reformed 
tradition’s rich heritage of discussions concerning knowledge of God. The embodied, 
affective and practical dimensions of participation in the knowledge of God may have 
received less emphasis within the Reformed tradition. Because this thesis locates and 
expounds the practical dimensions of participation in the knowledge of God within 
Torrance’s theology, it presents an opportunity that could lead to the repair of possible 
wounds of epistemological reductionism within the Reformed tradition. Given this 
tradition’s emphasis on the sovereignty of God and the doctrine of justification by 
grace alone, how can the descendants of John Calvin discuss human participation? 
Furthermore, how can this tradition discuss the embodied, affective, and practice-
oriented dimensions that are a part of human participation in the knowledge of God?  
While this contextual level is not the focus of this thesis, the notion of participation in 
the knowledge of God defended in this thesis has implications for these two 
theological traditions. A few will be noted along the way and in the conclusion. 
 
1.3.3 Contributions to scholarship on T. F. Torrance  
This work aims to repair the wound of reductionism with a more holistic 
model of the knowledge of God which has consequences for a third contextual level, 
                                                 
132. Since 2003, I have been a part of the Vineyard Church, which has conceived itself to be a 
convergence of the Charismatic and Evangelical traditions. On the theme of convergence, yet 
distinguishing the Vineyard from Pentecostal and Charismatic movements, see Rich Nathan and Ken 
Wilson, Empowered Evangelicals (Boise, ID: Ampelon Publishing, 1995); Bill Jackson, The Quest for 
the Radical Middle (Cape Town: Vineyard International Publishing, 1999). A helpful “outsider” 
perspective comparing Vineyard churches, Calvary Chapel churches, and Hope Chapel churches is 
Donald E. Miller, Reinventing Protestantism: Christianity in the New Millennium (Berkley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1997).   
133. Paul D. Murray, ed., Receptive Ecumenism and the Call to Catholic Learning: Exploring 
a Way for Contemporary Ecumenism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). On the approach of 
receptive ecumenism, see Paul D. Murray, “Receptive Ecumenism and Catholic Learning—
Establishing the Agenda,” 5-25.  
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namely, scholarship focused on the theology of T. F. Torrance. In developing this 
conceptual model, this thesis will address neglected areas among Torrancian 
scholarship, a specialized but nonetheless important context of theological research.  
Over the last twenty years, there have been several major publications 
concerning the life and thought of T. F. Torrance. The primary publications that give 
an overview are by Elmer M. Colyer,134 Gerrit Scott Dawson,135 Alister E. 
McGrath,136 and Paul Molnar.137 There have been other publications that have 
addressed various aspects of Torrance’s thought, but publications which address, in 
particular, his epistemology in helpful ways include a number of doctoral dissertations 
or theses,138 journal articles139 and chapters in edited volumes.140  While this work 
                                                 
134. Elmer M. Colyer, How to Read T. F. Torrance: Understanding His Trinitarian and 
Scientific Theology (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2001); The Nature of Doctrine in T. F. 
Torrance’s Theology (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2001). Also his edited volume, Elmer M. Colyer, 
ed., The Promise of Trinitarian Theology: Theologians in Dialogue with T. F. Torrance (Lanham, MD 
& Oxford, UK: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001). 
135. Gerrit Scott Dawson, ed., An Introduction to Torrance Theology: Discovering the 
Incarnate Savior (London & New York: T&T Clark, 2007). 
136. Alister E. McGrath, T. F. Torrance: An Intellectual Biography (London & New York: 
T&T Clark, 1999).  
137. Paul D. Molnar, Thomas F. Torrance: Theologian of the Trinity (Surrey, UK; Burlington, 
VT: Ashgate, 2009). 
138. Dennis Lee Sansom, Scientific Theology: An Examination of the Methodology of Thomas 
Forsyth Torrance (PhD dissertation, Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 1981); R. J. Newell, 
Participatory Knowledge: Theology as Art and Science in C. S. Lewis and T. F. Torrnace (PhD thesis, 
Aberdeen University, 1983); C. B. Kruger, Participation in the Self-Knowledge of God: The Nature 
and Means of Our Knowledge of God in the Theology of T. F. Torrance (PhD thesis, University of 
Aberdeen, 1990); E. M. Coyler, The Nature of Doctrine in the Theology of T. F. Torrance (PhD 
dissertation, Boston College, 1992); H-K. Yeung, Being and Knowing: An Examination of T. F. 
Torrance’s Christological Science (PhD thesis, University of London, 1993; Hong Kong: China 
Alliance Press, 1996); John Douglas Morrison, Knowledge of the Self-Revealing God in the Thought of 
Thomas Forsyth Torrance (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 1997); Robert K. Martin, The Incarnate 
Ground of Christian Faith: Toward a Christian Theological Epistemology for the Educational Ministry 
of the Church (Lanham, MD; Oxford, UK: University Press of America, 1998); Timothy Charles Gill, 
The Doctrine of Revelation in the Theology of Thomas F. Torrance (PhD thesis, University of Leeds, 
2007). Other theses and dissertations which do not primarily focus upon Torrance’s theological 
epistemology, but contain substantive epistemological discussions include Colin Weightman, Theology 
in a Polanyian Universe: The Theology of Thomas Torrance (New York: Peter Lang, 1994), 129-280; 
Wing-Hong Wong, An Appraisal of the Interpretation of Einsteinian Physics in T. F. Torrance’s 
Scientific Theology (PhD thesis, University of Hong Kong, 1994), esp. 122-215; R. Spjuth, Creation, 
Contingency and Divine Presence: In the Theologies of Thomas F. Torrance and Eberhard Jüngel 
(Lund, Sweden: Lund University Press, 1995); Jason Tapio Luoma, Incarnation and Physics: Natural 
Science in the Theology of T. F. Torrance (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); 
Andrew Maurice Bevan, The Person of Christ and the Nature of Human Participation in the Theology 
of T. F. Torrance: A Post-Modern Realist Approach to Personhood (PhD thesis, University of London, 
2002), esp. 9-54, 123-78.; Kye Won Lee, Living in Union with Christ: The Practical Theology of 
Thomas F. Torrance (New York: Peter Lang, 2003), especially 11-98; Myk Habets, Theosis in the 
Theology of Thomas Torrance (Surrey, UK; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2009), 93-97, 151-62. 
139. T. A. Langford, “T. F. Torrance’s Theological Science: A Reaction,” Scottish Journal of 
Theology  25 (1972): 155-70; D. S. Klinefelter, “God and Rationality: A Critique of the Theology of 
Thomas F. Torrance,” Journal of Religion  53 (1973): 117-35; M. Shuster, “What is Truth: An 
Exploration of Thomas F. Torrance’s Epistemology,” Studia Biblica et Theologica  3 (1973): 50-56; 
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will contribute to the discussion of Torrance’s theological epistemology, it aims to 
provide three unique contributions. There has not been a study which has used T. F. 
Torrance as its primary interlocutor to present a vision of participation in the 
knowledge of God that engages both the broader historical discussion of theological 
epistemology and the contemporary science-theology dialogue. While no one work 
can provide an exhaustive response to Torrance’s epistemological vision, the intent of 
this work is to develop a particular vision through a critique and expansion of his 
Trinitarian epistemology. Second, this thesis engages Torrance’s earliest materials 
available, including the Auburn Lectures (1938-39) and a few of his sermons from his 
time as pastor in Alyth, Scotland (1940-41), to demonstrate the development of his 
                                                 
Frank D. Schubert, “Thomas F. Torrance: The Case for a Theological Science” Encounter 45, no. 2 
(Spring 1984): 123-37; John V. Apczynski, “Torrance on Polanyi and Polanyi on God: Comments on 
Weightman’s Criticisms—A Review Essay,” Tradition & Discovery 24, no. 1 (1997-1998): 32-34; W. 
J. Neidhardt, “Thomas F. Torrance’s Integration of Judeo-Christian Theology and Natural Science: 
Some Key Themes,” Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith 41 (1989): 87-98; C. Baxter Kruger, 
‘The Doctrine of the Knowledge of God in the Theology of Thomas F. Torrance,’ Scottish Journal of 
Theology 43 (1990): 366-89; R. A. Muller, “The Barth Legacy: New Athanasius or Origen Redivivus? 
A Response to T. F. Torrance,” Thomist 54 (1990): 673-704; David F. Siemens, “Two Problems with 
Torrance,” Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith 43, no. 2 (June 1991): 112-13; Phee Seng 
Kang, “The Epistemological Significance of òμοονσον [sic] in the Theology of Thomas F. Torrance,” 
Scottish Journal of Theology 45 (1992) 341-66; Stephen D. Wigley, “Barth, Karl on St. Anselm—The 
Influence of Anselm’s ‘Theological Scheme’ on T. F. Torrance and Eberhard Jungel” Scottish Journal 
of Theology 46 (1993): 79-97; Mark P. Achtemeier, “The Truth of Tradition: Critical Realism in the 
Thought of Alasdair MacIntyre and T. F. Torrance” Scottish Journal of Theology 47 (1994): 355-74; J. 
D. Morrison, “Heidegger, Correspondence Truth and the Realist Theology of Thomas Forsyth 
Torrance,” Evangelical Quarterly 69, no. 2 (1997): 139-55; Susan Murtha-Smith, “The Advancement 
of New Theology Using New Science: The Three Key Concepts of Thomas Torrance,” Journal of 
Faith and Science Exchange 1 (1997): 65-71; Paul D. Molnar, “God’s Self-Communication in Christ: 
A Comparison of Thomas F. Torrance and Karl Rahner,” Scottish Journal of Theology 50 (1997): 288-
320; Jon D. Morrison, “Thomas Torrance’s Reformulation of Karl Barth’s Christological Rejection of 
Natural Theology” Evangelical Quarterly 73, no. 1 (January 2001): 59-75; Tom McCall, ‘Ronald 
Thiemann, Thomas Torrance and Epistemological Doctrines of Revelation,’ International Journal of 
Systematic Theology 6, no. 2 (2004): 148-68; M. F. Hanna, “The Use of Science in Theology: Case 
Studies of Landon B. Gilkey and Thomas F. Torrance,” Andrews University Seminary Studies 42, no. 1 
(2004): 217; Paul D. Molnar, “Natural Theology Revisited: A Comparison of T. F. Torrance and Karl 
Barth,” Zeitschrift für dialektische Theologie 20 (2005): 53-83; Benjamin Ayers, ‘The Stratification of 
Knowledge in the Thought of T. F. Torrance,’ Scottish Journal of Theology 61 (2008): 1-15; Rodney 
D. Holder, “Thomas Torrance: ‘Retreat to Commitment’ or a New Place for Natural Theology?” 
Science and Theology 7, no. 3 (2009): 275-96; W. Travis McMaken, “The Impossibility of Natural 
Knowledge of God in T. F. Torrance’s Reformulated Natural Theology,” International Journal of 
Systematic Theology 12 (July 2010): 319-40; David Munchin, “’Is Theology a Science?’ Paul 
Feyerabend’s Anarchic Epistemology as Challenge Test to T. F. Torrance’s Scientific Theology,” 
Scottish Journal of Theology 64, no. 4 (2011): 439-55. 
140. Kurt Anders Richardson, “Revelation, Scripture and Mystical Knowledge: Apprehension 
of Divine Knowledge” in Elmer M. Colyer, ed., The Promise of Trinitarian Theology: Theologians in 
Dialogue with T. F. Torrance (Lanham, MD & Oxford, UK: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001), 
185-204; Thomas John Hastings, “George Lindbeck and Thomas F. Torrance on Christian Language 
and the Knowledge of God,” in Redemptive Transformation in Practical Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 2004), 252-78; Douglas F. Kelley, “The Realist Epistemology of Thomas F. Torrance” in 
Gerrit Scott Dawson, ed., An Introduction to Torrance Theology: Discovering the Incarnate Savior 
(London & New York: T&T Clark, 2007), 75-102.  
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thought. Thus far, only one other work has engaged his earliest materials.141 Third, 
scholarship concerning T. F. Torrance has barely broached the topics of ethics or 
spirituality within Torrance’s theology.142 It is true that Torrance himself wrote very 
little on either subject. Nevertheless, this thesis aims to locate the ethical and spiritual 
dimensions that are latent within Torrance’s theological vision of participation in the 
knowledge of God but that he did not develop. Toward the healing of reductionist 
deformities, a more holistic, complex epistemological vision requires the inclusion of 
these dimensions, and perhaps other dimensions of which I am currently unaware. 
 
1.4 The goal and moves of this work 
Modern reductionist accounts of knowledge as critiqued by theologians and 
philosophers in the first part of this chapter suggest that a more holistic, complex 
vision of knowledge of God is needed. The goal of this work is to provide such a 
complex vision and, moreover, a vision of participation in the knowledge of God 
suitable for the postmodern, scientific milieu through a critical engagement and 
expansion of the theological epistemology of T. F. Torrance. To reach that goal, this 
study will advance with four main moves. 
 The first move delineates and defines seven of the primary themes or 
dynamics that Torrance used to discuss the knowledge of God throughout his 
epistemological writings (Chapter Two). Torrance did not provide a systematic 
presentation of these themes, nor did he give equal weight to all of the dynamics in 
any one discussion. Instead, contingent upon the context and argument made, he 
focused upon a particular theme, but not without the other themes close at hand. Thus, 
with one dynamic in view, he oftentimes would not resist bringing in a word or a 
short phrase that referred to other epistemological dynamics. In an attempt to hold 
together the dynamics of his epistemology, he fluidly, and sometimes tersely, moved 
between the dynamics.   
                                                 
141. Alister E. McGrath made use of Torrance’s Auburn Lectures and other earlier materials 
for his book, Torrance: An Intellectual Biography. These materials are now available at The Thomas F. 
Torrance Manuscript Collection, Special Collections, Princeton Theological Seminary Library, 
Princeton, New Jersey. Special thanks to Iain Torrance, the younger son of T. F. Torrance and 
President of Princeton Theological Seminary, who allowed me to research those materials. 
142. The exception is Paul D. Molnar who occasionally mentions Torrance’s ethics 
throughout, Thomas F. Torrance, esp. ,102, 151, 168, 348-9. His more sustained discussion is in 
Incarnation and Resurrection: Toward a Contemporary Understanding (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 
2007), 100-4, 144-51. 
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To begin to apprehend Torrance’s theological epistemology, chapter two 
outlines seven basic dynamics of the knowledge of God. Readers will discover how 
the knowledge of God is scientific, ontologically-determined, Trinitarian, creation-
situated, essentially rational and conceptual, transcendent, and realist for Torrance. 
In order to go beyond apprehending Torrance’s epistemology, this chapter will not 
only document and define these seven dynamics, but will evaluate aspects of each of 
them in light of the Christian tradition’s discussion of the knowledge of God. 
Furthermore, to move toward a vision of knowledge of God for the postmodern, 
scientific era, the evaluation will also be informed by contemporary theologians, 
including those who have written in the science-theology dialogue. 
With these seven dynamics in mind, the second move leads us to discern how 
the heart of Torrance’s theological epistemology, the doctrine of the Trinity, regulates 
the whole (Chapter Three). The general dynamics lead us to the central dynamic 
which is the Triune God. Because knowledge of God is determined by the nature of 
the object known (ontologically-determined) who is beyond human comprehension 
(transcendent) yet has revealed himself in the space-time world through the 
incarnation and the Spirit (Trinitarian, creation-situated), God’s Triune nature is 
determinative for the knowledge of God. Torrance gave preference to the immanent 
Trinity and what he called the “onto-relations” within the immanent Trinity. Within a 
three-tiered framework of theoretical knowledge, knowledge of the immanent Trinity 
comprised the highest theoretical strata of the knowledge of God for Torrance. His 
unique concept of “onto-relations” holds together his notion of the “One Being and 
Three Persons” which constitute the Triune God. God is personal and relational, 
understood not anthropocentrically, but in the unique way that God has revealed 
himself through the Economic Trinity.  
Torrance’s discussion of “onto-relations” is unique among Trinitarian 
theology, and yet his distinctive doctrine of the Trinity helped to secure a statement of 
theological agreement between Reformed and Orthodox Churches. This chapter will 
note some lines of agreement and disagreement from the theological tradition and 
among contemporary Trinitarian theology, particularly concerning the notions of 
person and relationship within God. Following Torrance’s ontologically-determined 
epistemological dynamic, because God is somehow personal and relational, then this 
would determine the nature of the knowledge of God.   
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 The third move considers the consequences of the personal and relational 
nature of the Triune God for theological epistemology (Chapter Four). This chapter 
will explore how the knowledge of God is personal and relational for Torrance. In 
contrast to impersonal notions of knowledge stemming from the Enlightenment, this 
chapter demonstrates how knowledge of God is personal knowledge for Torrance 
because it originates from the being and activity of the tri-personal God and because it 
has consonance with Michael Polanyi’s account of personal knowledge. Furthermore, 
this chapter will consider how knowledge of God is relational knowledge for Torrance 
because it likewise originates from the being and activity of the Trinity whose being is 
relational and because it is shared among humans within a community of persons.  
 The fourth move expands Torrance’s view of participation in the knowledge 
of God, demonstrating how it is person-involving and life-implicating (Chapter Five). 
Knowledge cannot be reduced to one “part” of the human, whether intellect, emotion, 
or the body as with practices. Neither can knowledge of God be reduced to one aspect 
of life, whether thinking, speaking, or any “religious” activity. Rather, in line with the 
biblical notions and in resonance with the better moments of the tradition’s 
theological epistemology as well as a few contemporary philosophers, this thesis 
concludes that participation in the knowledge of God involves the whole person and a 
way of life. 
To begin the engagement with the theological epistemology of T. F. Torrance, 
this study turns to delineate and evaluate seven general dynamics at work throughout 
his many writings on the knowledge of God. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THE DYNAMICS OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD IN THE 
THEOLOGY OF T. F. TORRANCE 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The first chapter introduced the agenda of the thesis as assessing the viability 
of a particular understanding of participation in the knowledge of God for the 
postmodern, scientific age. It also presented the modern problem of reductionist 
accounts of theological epistemology and proposed a non-reductionist, complex 
vision of the knowledge of God through an engagement with the epistemology of T. 
F. Torrance as a remedy. The aim of this chapter is to survey the epistemological 
whole of T. F. Torrance’s theology, delineating the basic theological and 
philosophical dynamics at work in his conception of the knowledge of God.1 This 
overview comes from the major epistemological writings of Torrance that directly 
engaged the topic of the knowledge of God.  
Following this survey, the next chapter will probe into the center of his 
theological epistemology, namely his doctrine of the Triune God (Chapter 3). The 
                                                 
1 I have chosen the word “dynamics” because it is often used in contemporary English to refer 
to the “forces or properties which stimulate growth, development or change within a system.” 
“Dynamics,” Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed., rev. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). The 
realities which facilitate knowledge of God for Torrance, as we will discuss, are a posteriori and 
kinetic. He thus advocated a “kinetic way of thinking.” T. F. Torrance, Theology in Reconstruction 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1965), 72-5; Christian Theology and Scientific Culture (1980; repr., 
Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 1998), 98-9. Torrance recognized a switch in science “from static to 
dynamic categories” and thus for a “dynamic way of understanding the universe” in The Ground and 
Grammar of Theology (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1980), 152. Also, Divine and 
Contingent Order (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 12-16, 54-6; Space, Time and Resurrection 
(1976; repr., Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1998), 184-6. “There now opens up a dynamic, open-structured 
universe” that is “more congenial to the Christian understanding of God in his dynamic and 
providential relation to the world.” Therefore, “the concept of science is shedding its older hard, 
mechanistic, instrumentalist character, and taking on a more subtle, elastic form appropriate to fields of 
dynamic and organic relations,” wrote Torrance in Reality and Scientific Theology (1985; repr., 
Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2001), ix, xiv, 72. See also 89-93, 148. Furthermore, Torrance held to a 
“dynamic view of revelation,” a “dynamic ontological structure” of human knowledge of God, and 
consequently to “dynamic theology” which is “objectively oriented in the living God” and is thus open 
to progressive revision in Reality and Evangelical Theology (1982; repr., Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 
2003), 16-17, 44-45, 49-51; Transformation and Convergence in the Frame of Knowledge: 
Explorations in the Interrelations of Scientific and Theological Enterprise (1984; repr., Eugene, OR: 
Wipf & Stock, 1998), 4. Thus the term “dynamics” seems to be the best word to describe the various 
factors involved in the knowledge of God for Torrance. Furthermore, “dynamics” is also used more 
specifically to refer to the energy and forces within mechanics. This is consistent with Torrance’s 
engagement with physics as an analogous discipline with which he frequently discussed theological 
epistemology. See also the theological use of the word in Robert Haight, S.J., Dynamics of Theology 
(New York: Paulist Press, 1990), 215-35. 
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immanent Trinity and the “onto-relations” within were supremely important for 
Torrance’s doctrine of God and provided a governing influence upon his 
epistemology. This study goes beyond Torrance while remaining within his 
Trinitarian framework to argue that these supremely important aspects of the nature of 
the Triune God centralize three epistemological dynamics as supremely important, 
namely that knowledge of God is personal, relational, (Chapter 4) and participatory 
(Chapter 5). Consequently, participation in the knowledge of God is not reducible to 
one dimension of the human person or one aspect of their experience, but instead 
involves the whole person and their way of life. This leads to the conclusion that 
knowledge of God is a multi-dimensional, complex reality with dynamics which are 
particularly suitable for the postmodern, scientific context (Chapter 6). 
The knowledge of God is a central topic in the large corpus of theological 
writings of Thomas F. Torrance. Whether directly discussed or immediately below the 
surface of the particular issue in focus, the knowledge of God is a predominant 
concern permeating his five hundred-plus publications.2 The knowledge of God is not 
only broached as an isolated topic and with theological topics closely related such as 
revelation, but also surrounds major doctrinal discussions such as the Trinity, the 
incarnation, and soteriology. Therefore, examining the knowledge of God provides a 
way for readers to grasp the overall topography of Torrance’s theological and 
philosophical landscape. It is a unifying theme enveloping the whole of his theology. 
Within Torrance’s theology, there is an integration of many varied 
epistemological dynamics. He cites examples from a variety of disciplines, especially 
the natural sciences and physics in particular, to provide analogies for his theological 
epistemology. He moves almost seamlessly at times from one dynamic to the next and 
from one field of inquiry to another. Many epistemological dynamics are presented 
together in relation to one another. One epistemological dynamic is often used to 
explain another, grounding one in the other. Torrance aimed to offer a broad, coherent 
theological epistemology, thus the dynamics are tightly interwoven and inter-defined. 
This can make particular dynamics difficult to distinguish and apprehend.3 Therefore, 
                                                 
2 The most thorough bibliography to date is Alister E. McGrath, T. F. Torrance: An 
Intellectual Biography (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1999), 249-96. See also Iain R. Torrance, “A 
Bibliography of the Writings of Thomas F. Torrance, 1941-1989” Scottish Journal of Theology 43 
(1990): 225-262. 
3 Daniel Hardy has criticized Torrance for writing too tersely in his chapter, “Thomas F. 
Torrance” in The Modern Theologians: An Introduction to Christian Theology Since 1918, ed. David F. 
Ford with Rachel Muers, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), 173; Torrance himself acknowledges the 
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for the sake of grasping his broad theological epistemology, this chapter shall 
delineate the distinct yet mutually supportive dynamics of the knowledge of God in 
Torrance’s theology, noting their inter-relationship and inter-dependency. I have 
demarcated seven dynamics, arranging them in a logical order consistent with 
Torrance’s thought and aiming to demonstrate their interconnections. Even though a 
particular dynamic may be mentioned within several of his epistemological works—at 
times with more development than others—the meaning and function of the dynamics 
remain basically consistent throughout his epistemological writings. Beyond the 
important work of delineation, this survey will provide a brief evaluation of each of 
these dynamics along the way, noting in particular their relationship to the Christian 
theological tradition and their potential for the postmodern, scientific context.  
Before proceeding to this chapter’s survey of the dynamics of knowledge of 
God in Torrance’s theology, it is important to note that Torrance neither systematized 
his epistemological dynamics that he discussed throughout his many works, nor 
arranged them in a particular order on the whole. Certainly there are priorities among 
his epistemological dynamics which we will discover. Subsequent discussions about 
the knowledge of God in the writings of Torrance have appeared, yet few have aimed 
to present a systematic presentation of the various dynamics of his theological 
epistemology.4 None have sought to compare or prioritize the dynamics with one 
another, developing and extending the more weighty dynamics. But before we move 
                                                                                                                                            
complexity of the form of his writing in Michael Bauman, Roundtable: Conversations with European 
Theologians (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1990), 117-8. 
4 Discussions include E. M. Colyer, How To Read T. F. Torrance: Understanding His 
Trinitarian and Scientific Theology (2001; repr., Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2007), esp. 322-74; 
Chapter 8, “Revelation, Scripture, and Mystical Apprehension of Divine Knowledge,” and chapter 9, 
“A Scientific Theological Method” in Elmer M. Colyer, ed., The Promise of Trinitarian Theology: 
Theologians in Dialogue with T. F. Torrance (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), 185-203, 
205-37; The Nature of Doctrine in T. F. Torrance’s Theology (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2001); John 
Douglas Morrison, Knowledge of the Self-Revealing God in the Thought of Thomas Forsyth Torrance 
(Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 1997); C.B. Kruger, Participation in the Self-Knowledge of God: the 
nature and means of our knowledge of God in the theology of T. F. Torrance (PhD thesis, University of 
Aberdeen, 1990); Dennis Lee Sansom, Scientific Theology: An Examination of the Methodology of 
Thomas Forsyth Torrance (PhD dissertation, Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 1981); The 
introduction in the newly released collection of Torrance lectures, Robert T. Walker, ed., Incarnation: 
The Person and Work of Christ (Bucks, UK: Paternoster; Downers Grove: InterVarsity Academic, 
2008), xxvi-xlvii; Mark P. Achtemeier, “The Truth of Tradition: Critical Realism in the Thought of 
Alasdair MacIntyre and T. F. Torrance” Scottish Journal of Theology 47 (1994): 355-74; Benjamin 
Ayers, “The Stratification of Knowledge in the Thought of T. F. Torrance,” Scottish Journal of 
Theology 61 (2008): 1-15; Douglas F. Kelley, “The Realist Epistemology of Thomas F. Torrance” in 
Gerrit Scott Dawson, ed., An Introduction to Torrance Theology: Discovering the Incarnate Savior, 
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2007), 75-102; C. Baxter Kruger, “The Doctrine of the Knowledge of God in 
the Theology of Thomas F. Torrance,” Scottish Journal of Theology 43 (1990): 366-89; Tom McCall, 
“Ronald Thiemann, Thomas Torrance and Epistemological Doctrines of Revelation,” International 
Journal of Systematic Theology 6, no. 2 (2004): 148-68. 
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to consider the most central dynamics (Chapters 3 through 5), this chapter introduces 
and critiques seven basic dynamics at work throughout his epistemology. 
For Torrance, the knowledge of God is scientific by which he means, in part, a 
credible and disciplined form of knowledge (2.2). Knowledge of God is ontologically-
determined since all types of knowledge are determined by the nature of the object 
known (2.3). Thus, knowledge of God is most centrally Trinitarian because God who 
has been revealed in Christ and by the Spirit is the “proper object” of theology (2.4).5 
Knowledge of God is creation-situated, for like all forms of human knowledge it 
occurs within the contingencies of the space-time universe (2.5). Knowledge of God 
is essentially rational and conceptual because knowledge always includes human 
thought (2.6). Knowledge of God is transcendent because even though God has truly 
made himself known, God remains beyond human comprehension (2.7). Finally, 
knowledge of God is “truly realist” because knowledge is a cognitive result, though 
limited, of meaningful engagement with mind-independent reality (2.8). This 
introductory, critical survey begins with a fundamental tenet of Torrance’s theological 
epistemology which also serves as a primary metaphor throughout, namely that the 
knowledge of God is “scientific.” 
 
 
2.2 Scientific 
 
One of the most important dynamics of theological epistemology for T. F. 
Torrance was that the knowledge of God is scientific. It was and continues to be one 
of the most characteristic and critiqued aspects of Torrance’s epistemology. 
Therefore, it requires more of an introduction and critique than the other six dynamics 
surveyed in this chapter.  
In his earliest lectures, Torrance differentiated two uses of the word “science.” 
One broad use connotes exactness, including the careful, clear, and systematic pursuit 
of all types of knowledge. The other, more narrow use is the investigation of 
empirical reality by well-defined methods.6 In subsequent writings when Torrance 
discussed knowledge of God and, consequently, theology as scientific, he intended the 
                                                 
5 The Trinitarian theological dynamic uniquely governed his epistemology and will be 
explored in greater detail in chapter 3. Nevertheless, to provide a coherent survey, this chapter 
introduces this dynamic. 
6 Thomas F. Torrance, “Theology and Science,” The Auburn Lectures, 1938-1939 (The 
Thomas F. Torrance Manuscript Collection. Special Collections, Princeton Theological Seminary 
Library), 1. 
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former, meaning a disciplined form of knowledge. Nevertheless, the analogous 
disciplines that Torrance most frequently used to discuss the knowledge of God are 
the natural sciences and likewise “scientific” was the primary metaphor for the nature 
of theology which he advocated. While we will further introduce what Torrance 
meant by science here, other dynamics will further develop his definition and criteria 
for what constitutes a discipline as scientific.   
To begin, it is important to note that Torrance had great respect for science 
because it asks important questions about reality and the cosmos. Science is 
“progressive,” revising its questions and advancing in knowledge.7 Science has the 
“most powerful and wide-spread impact in modern times. It is indeed a culture of the 
greatest significance: not to be influenced by it is really to be something of a 
barbarian!”8 Consequently, he contended that science sets the standards for all fields 
of inquiry.9 With almost eschatological overtones, Torrance proclaimed nothing will 
escape the judgment of scientific inquiry. “There cannot be any question about the 
fact that the whole of future life and thought will be dominated more and more by 
pure and applied science.”10 Torrance believed that the sciences will set the 
epistemological benchmark for all disciplines, thus he intended for theology to meet 
such standards in its own way. For the knowledge of God to have its place among 
other types of knowledge and for theology to have its place among other academic 
disciplines, both need to be conceived of as a science and operate scientifically with 
their own ontologically-determined methods.11 With evangelical intent, Torrance’s 
theological epistemology was concerned to secure a place for theology in a scientific 
                                                 
7 Torrance neither expounded upon the theme of science as “progressive,” nor did he use the 
term frequently. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that he anticipates the “steady progress of scientific 
theology.” See GR, 51. Also 33-34; TS, viii. 
8 CTSC, 14. 
9 “Today it is no longer philosophy but the physical and natural sciences which set the pace in 
human culture through their astonishing revelation of the rational structures that pervade and underly 
all created reality.” RST, ix. Also, STR, 23-4. 
10 TIR, 13. Similarly, Torrance wrote, “No form of knowledge can survive or maintain its 
impact on mankind that tries to keep alive by taking cover from the searching light of scientific 
inquiry.” Furthermore, “whether we like it or not the whole of the future will be dominated by 
empirical science and anything that fails to stand up to it rigorous discipline will fall away.” GR, 5, 51 
respectively. “I am wholly convinced that the more scientifically we can pursue our theology the more 
we shall be able to march forward as one, and the more relevant our message will be to a world that 
will always be dominated by empirical and theoretical science.” STI, ix. Also, TCFK, 263. 
11 The “ontologically-determined” dynamic developed next is closely tied to Torrance’s notion 
of science. 
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world.12 Now we turn to delineate four themes which Torrance used to help define 
science and, likewise, theological science. 
First, science for Torrance is constituted by rigorous and disciplined thought.13 
One paragraph clearly demonstrates how he used the term “science” and values its 
regulatory demands: 
 
There are not two ways of knowing, a scientific way 
and a theological way. Neither science nor theology is 
an esoteric way of knowledge. Indeed because there is 
only one basic way of knowing we cannot contrast 
science and theology, but only natural science and 
theological science, or social science and theological 
science. In each we have to do with a fundamental act 
of knowing, not essentially different from real knowing 
in any field of human experience. Science is the 
rigorous and disciplined extension of that basic way of 
knowing and as such applies to every area of human life 
and thought. It should be clear, then, that I am not using 
‘science’ in the vulgar sense to mean only natural 
science, and certainly not within natural science as 
limited to physics. I am using ‘science’ to denote the 
critical and controlled extension of our basic modes of 
rational activity with a view to positive knowledge.14   
 
Torrance conceived of science as the extension of disciplined rationality, hence the 
term “science” can be widened to include any discipline for him, as long as it is 
characterized by order and rigor. Consequently, he insisted that theology be scientific 
in terms of its demands and exacting standards. 
Second, what makes an inquiry scientific for Torrance is its concern for 
objectivity.15 Throughout, Torrance contended that every science is concerned with its 
                                                 
12 “This is also an evangelical task, for we will never be able to urge knowledge of God in 
Jesus Christ upon a world increasingly dominated by science unless we can commend it upon its own 
adequate scientific basis.” GR, viii. “Through the scientific community of theologians the Church 
indwells the world…in the hope that the general scientific world will in its way partake of its 
theological orientation toward the transcendent source of all the rational order of the universe.” RST, 
122. “What is ultimately envisaged is a reconstruction of the very foundations of modern thought and 
culture.” RST, x; Also, DCO, viii; GR, 6; TS, 25; STI, ix; GGT, 38-9. 
13 Torrance repeatedly stated that “by science I mean any real field of knowledge pursued in a 
rigorous and organized way.” GR, vii, 6, 51, 91-92, 114; TS, xii, 55, 85, 116; STI, viii; TCFK, 322. 
14 GR, 91-92. Also 114; GGT, 8-9. 
15 TS, xi-xiii, 13, 55-56, 75-85, 93, 116, 288, 295-297; GR, 8-10, 92-93; TCFK, 73-6. The 
motif of objectivity also permeated Barth’s discussion of theology and dogma as a science in CD I.1, 3-
11, 275-287. See Hunsinger, How to Read Karl Barth, 35-39; Busch, The Great Passion, 72-6. For 
Torrance’s interpretation and recognition of his indebtedness to Barth concerning objectivity, Thomas 
F. Torrance, Karl Barth: Biblical and Evangelical Theologian (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1990), 61-63, 
75-77, 145-47, henceforth, KBBET. 
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“proper object.”16 Though the subjective pole deserves its due weight, in order to be 
scientific the authority must remain with the given object which is entitled to control 
the subjective modes of reason and inquiry.17 Following the inductive methods 
pioneered by Francis Bacon,18 science is to be an a posteriori discipline.19 Science 
produces knowledge about objects in any field “under the compulsion of their 
independent reality.”20 This is not an individualist notion of objectivity, for “the really 
objective is that which is shareable, what we can experience together or in common, 
and which is transcendent to each of us.”21 Thus, in determining a physical law, while 
there may be various formulations possible, the one chosen “we choose under the 
compulsion of empirical evidence, for it is finally nature itself alone that can disclose 
to us its hidden pattern and thus be the judge of the truth or falsity of the many 
possible theories we bring to it.”22 As Torrance straightforwardly put it, “Utter respect 
for objectivity is the sine qua non of scientific activity.”23 Even more candidly, he 
declared that “scientific knowledge and objective knowledge are one and the same 
thing.”24 Therefore, Torrance considered knowledge of God scientific through an 
objectively-weighted engagement with God “in obedience to the demands of His 
reality and self-giving.”25 Torrance’s notion of objectivity overlaps with his form of 
realism which we will introduce and critique below (2.8). 
 Third, science, according to Torrance, does not commence its investigations 
with epistemological questions, but instead begins with its given object and 
presupposes its existence and rationality. Theories and models are constructed in 
response to the ontic structures of reality. Epistemological questions are thus in an 
auxiliary position and can be legitimately raised during the course of examination and 
                                                 
16 TS, 4, 23, 25, 55, 85, 204, 211, 286, 289, 346;GR, 3, 6, 10, 93, 114; STI, viii, 87. 
17 TS, viii; GGT, 33. 
18 TIR, 15, 66; TS, 69-85, 88, 120 n. 1, 320 n. 2; GR, 41-44, 93-95; CTSC, 41-44; GGT, 5, 51-
52; RST, 7, 15; TCFK, 5, 41. 
19 TS, 1, 174, 265; GR, 89, 100-1. 
20 GGT, 16. 
21 RST, 112. “Hence in all objective knowledge we try to eliminate those features which we 
cannot share together or cannot have in common with others, and which are relative only to this or that 
person in this or that particular situation.” 
22 DCO, 39. Similarly, Torrance wrote, “It is reality itself that must be allowed to be the judge 
of the truth or falsity of our thoughts and statements about it. Hence science is ultimately cast upon the 
grace of reality for justification or verification of its theories and results.” TCFK, 211. 
23 TS, 85. 
24 TS, 295. 
25 TS, ix. Thus, on page 138, he defined “scientific theology” as “the systematic presentation 
of its knowledge through consistent faithfulness to the divine, creaturely objectivity of God in Christ.” 
On the theme of the objectivity of theological knowledge, see 34-43, 56, 131-33, 337-38; STI, viii; GR, 
6. 
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theoretic construction.  Likewise, a scientific theology begins with actual knowledge 
of God: “How God can be known must be determined from first to last by the way in 
which He is actually known.”26 Only as it proceeds can theology look back to verify 
its knowledge. In other words, a scientific aspect of knowledge of God for Torrance 
was that it is particularist.27 Torrance contended for what epistemologists now call 
“epistemological particularism” instead of “epistemological methodism” in the 
sciences, and likewise in his theological science. Epistemological methodism holds 
that knowledge cannot be justified unless the right method is articulated and utilized 
whereas epistemological particularism holds that particular claims to knowledge are 
the beginning-place from which one constructs proposals about epistemological 
method.28 
 Fourth, Torrance maintained that science is limited in its ability to penetrate 
and comprehend reality. When boundaries at the frontiers of knowledge are crossed, 
often the scientist is confronted with contradiction and indeterminancy. That which is 
beyond the range of exact science elicits respectful silence. Though no direct 
comparison can be made, the knowledge of God also has its limits which evoke 
reverential silence before the profundity and mystery of God.29 
However, Torrance distinguished “theological science” from “other 
sciences.”30 Torrance first noted the differences with regard to objectivity.31 The 
                                                 
26 TS, 9. 
27 TS, 1-6, 9-10, 286-88. GR, 165.  
28 A seminal discussion in philosophy is Roderick Chisholm, “The Problem of the Criterion,” 
in The Foundations of Knowing (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), 61-75. On 
particularism in theological epistemology is William J. Abrham, Crossing the Threshold of Divine 
Revelation (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006), 30-35. The epistemological approach of Karl Barth is 
thoroughly particularist, deriving from the self-revelation of God in Christ by the Spirit, which directly 
influenced Torrance. KBBET, 17-19, 57-8. See also, Hunsinger, How to Read Karl Barth, 32-
5.Similarly, Thomas Aquinas in question one, article eight of his Summa Theologiae discussed whether 
sacred doctrine is a matter of argument. Thomas asserted, “As other sciences do not argue in order to 
prove their premises, but work from them to bring out other things in their field of inquiry, so this 
teaching does not argue to establish its premises which are the articles of faith, but advances from them 
to make something known.” Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Volume 1: Christian Theology (Ia. 
I), trans. Thomas Gilby O.P., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), Ia. q. 1, a. 8, p. 28. 
Hereafter, ST. [“Dicendum quod sicut aliae scientiae non argumentantur ad sua principia probanda, 
sed ex principiis argumentantur ad ostendendum alia in ipis scientiis, ita haec doctrina non 
argumentatur ad ostendendum alia in ipis scientiis, ita haec doctrina non argumentantur ad sua 
principia probanda, quae sunt articuli fidei, sed ex eis procedit ad aliquid ostendendum.”]  
29 TS, 290-92. The themes related to mystery and those features of Torrance’s epistemology 
which are “more than science” will be developed in the “transcendent” dynamic below (2.7). As we 
will note, an apophatic dimension of the knowledge of God has a long history in Christian theology, 
first developed theologically by Gregory of Nyssa (c. 335–c. 395). 
30 Discussions of the differences between “theological science” from the “other sciences” can 
be found in TS, 295-312; GR, 95-99.  
31 Differences with respect to objectivity are found in TS, 295-303. 
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knowledge of God is “profoundly relative” because it is qualified by the Absolute and 
“profoundly objective” because the Object is God who alone grounds knowledge of 
himself in himself. Knowledge of God is distinct from other knowledge because it is 
objectified by God and ultimately incomparable with other categories within creation. 
Furthermore, it is given out of pure grace. This grace-given knowledge is obtained in 
response to God’s self-giving, not as we respond to an object upon which we 
experiment and control, but as the Lord whom we know through submission and love. 
The results of particular experiments verify the general principles of science for all to 
investigate, making their truth-claims universal. With Christian theology, the 
universal truth comes in the concrete particularity of Jesus Christ, making an ultimate 
claim that he is the Truth of God for all humanity and the Lord of the universe.  
Torrance also discussed the differences between theological science and other 
sciences with respect to subjectivity.32 There is a personal coefficient in all knowledge 
including the use of the scientific method which involves personal judgments in 
selecting data, constructing hypotheses and experiments, and inducing conclusions. 
Unlike other sciences, the personal coefficients in theology are brought into a direct, 
intuitive dialogue with the Object, namely with God’s self-communication through 
his Word and Spirit. With such a reciprocal relation between subject and divine 
Object, the subject is invited to responsiveness and “opened up to the Object in his 
innermost being and made capable of apprehending Him.”33 This is a “trans-
subjective relation” to God where the human subject is made capable of objectivity. 
This secures the possibility for the ongoing correction of the subjects’ knowledge of 
God. With the empirical sciences, human subjects engage with a mute object to 
discover its rationality. Different from the natural sciences, Torrance suggests that a 
fuller objectivity is possible in dealing with a speaking, relational God more than 
impersonal objects which cannot oppose or persuade the subject to amend her or his 
thoughts and words.34 This dialogical dimension will be further explored in the 
discussion on how the knowledge of God is relational in chapter four. 
 Beyond these basic differences in objectivity and subjectivity, Torrance 
further distinguished theology from the sciences by a number of other unique 
                                                 
32 Differences with respect to subjectivity are found in TS, 303-12. 
33 TS, 308. 
34 Beyond the discussion on differences in subjectivity on 303-12, see also TS, 98; CTSC, 118-
19. 
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characteristics.35 First, the “utter lordship of the Object” puts the human subject not as 
the primary examiner and inquirer, but places the subject before the divine Object to 
be questioned. In an “epistemological inversion,” the knowledge of God originates 
with the Object who reveals himself while remaining Lord over the knowing subject, 
enabling the subject to know Him.36 Second, the knowledge of God diverges from the 
sciences in that the Object is personal.37 Chapter four will expand the personal 
dimension of the knowledge of God. Third, taking his cues from Barth, theological 
knowledge has a “two-fold objectivity,” a “primary objectivity which is God’s giving 
of Himself the Lord, a secondary objectivity in which He gives Himself to us in 
human form within our space and time.” Through the secondary, creaturely 
objectivity, human subjects encounter God’s primary, divine objectivity.38 Fourth, the 
centrality of Jesus Christ as the revelation and “self-objectification” of God marks off 
knowledge of God from other types of knowledge. As all scientific knowledge has 
ordering principles that can be found within the Object, so God in Christ is the unique 
ordering principle by which scientific theology offers a systematic arrangement of the 
knowledge of God.39 Fifth, epistemological demonstration and verification are 
determined by the nature of the object. Hence with the knowledge of God a 
demonstration of the Spirit is required. Nonetheless, due to the incarnation, earthly 
and historical demonstrations are also appropriate for God has provided His own 
demonstration for all humanity in the particularity of Jesus Christ.40 
Even though Torrance distinguished theological science from other sciences, 
all of Torrance’s epistemological dynamics are in accord with his conviction that 
knowledge of God and, consequently, theology is “scientific” as he defined it.41 As 
one of Torrance’s basic and uniquely emphasized dynamics, we will give a bit more 
space to expound a critique of this dynamic than with the other six dynamics in this 
introductory chapter. To begin, questions have arisen concerning Torrance’s use of 
                                                 
35 The “distinctive characteristics” of theology from “other sciences” can be found in TS, 131-
40. 
36 TS, 131-33. 
37 TS, 133-35. 
38 TS, 135-37. “Double objectivity” is further expounded on 298-299 in the discussion on 
differences between theology and science. For Barth’s discussion, CD II.1., 3-31, 204-54. For 
Torrance’s interpretation of Barth, KBBET, 69-71. 
39 TS, 137-39. 
40 TS, 139-40. 
41 This does not contradict the fact that I have named one dynamic “transcendent,” describing 
the various elements in Torrance’s theological epistemology which go beyond scientific description. 
Despite the fact that there are dynamics which go beyond his scientific paradigm, the exceptions he 
discussed demonstrate that science, nonetheless, is still yet the controlling metaphor for Torrance. 
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the word “science” and the analogies which he consistently makes from the natural 
sciences to theology and theological method. For instance, Donald S. Klinefelter 
questioned why Torrance repeatedly used scientific analogies for his theology but 
then also regularly discounted the natural sciences as belonging to a different order 
than that of theology.42 Ronald Thiemann maintained that Torrance was inconsistent, 
holding theology as an “objective science” yet denying the reciprocal relationship 
between investigating subject and object of inquiry which “is a general characteristic 
of rational scientific activity.” Furthermore, he characterized Torrance as a 
foundationalist.43 James Barr harshly criticized Torrance for using the scientific label 
to assert theological superiority.44 Moreover, Andrew Louth has provided the most 
                                                 
42 The differences between theology and the natural sciences are too substantial to make a real 
comparison according to Donald S. Klinefelter, “God and Rationality: A Critique of the Theology of 
Thomas F. Torrance,” The Journal of Religion 53 (January 1973): 117-35, esp. 120-25, 127. For a 
response, see  the discussion below in 2.5. 
43 Ronald Thiemann, Revelation and Theology: The Gospel as Narrated Promise (Notre 
Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame, 1985), 32-43, quotation on 38. Thiemann’s critique is inaccurate 
on two counts. First, Torrance’s epistemology has a relational dynamic which involves the knowing 
subject which will be discussed in chapter four. Second, Thiemann contends that Torrance attempted to 
rescue this “inconsistency” through the use of intuition, thus labeling him a theological foundationalist. 
Torrance himself strongly responded to Thiemann to correct his use of the term “intuition” and to the 
accusation that he was a foundationalist. Thomas F. Torrance, “Thomas Torrance Responsds,” in Elmer 
M. Colyer, ed., The Promise of Trinitarian Theology: Theologians in Dialogue with T. F. Torrance 
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), esp. 330-31. Furthermore, Elmer M. Colyer accurately 
critiques Thiemann’s understanding of Torrance on foundationalism and intuition, contending that 
Thiemann remains within a dichotomy of chance and necessity and frames the discussion within the 
foundationalist/anti-foundationalist debate instead of the Greek father’s concept of prolepsis which 
informed Torrance’s thought. Elmer M. Colyer, How to Read T. F. Torrance: Understanding His 
Trinitarian and Scientific Theology (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2001), 343-44, note 97; 
Also, The Nature of Doctrine in T. F. Torrance’s Theology (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2001), 50-51, 
note 9. Tom McCall demonstrates the problems with Thiemann’s conception of foundationalism. 
Arguing from a Reformed epistemology perspective, he demonstrates problems with coherentist 
doctrines of revelation and instead argues in favor of Torrance’s “modest foundationalism.” Tom 
McCall, “Ronald Thiemann, Thomas Torrance and Epistemological Doctrines of Revelation,” 
International Journal of Systematic Theology 6 (April 2004): 148-68. Paul D. Molnar demonstrates 
how Thiemann mistakenly equates revelation and intuition in Torrance’s writings and misses the 
reciprocal relationship between God and knower within the framework of justification by grace that 
Torrance maintained. Paul D. Molnar, Thomas F. Torrance: Theologian of the Trinity (Surrey, UK; 
Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2009), 326-28. 
44 James Barr, Biblical Faith and Natural Theology: The Gifford Lectures for 1991 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1993), 181-82: “I do not think that theology has or should have much of the character 
of science, or of a science. Theologians who argue for its scientific character are usually not arguing for 
the scientific character of theology, but for the scientific character of their own theology; in other 
words, it is an asserting of their own superiority, a typical phenomenon of the intratheological power 
struggle.” [Here, in footnote 6, Barr directs the reader to Ronald Thiemann’s discussion of Torrance in 
Revelation and Theology (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame, 1985), 32ff. Notice that Barr 
neither engages Torrance’s thought on science nor the history of the use of scientia. He continues with 
brief, dismissive comments.] “To me theology seems to have more the character of an art than of a 
science. It belongs with the human disciplines, not those of natural science. It belongs with literary 
appreciations, with the history of ideas, with history in general, with philosophy, and with language and 
linguistic studies. It has to handle human speech and human texts. Where it has claimed affinity with 
‘science’, it seems to me too often to have achieved affinity rather with politics and propagandist 
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nuanced and substantive critique of Torrance’s use of the word science and the 
methodological analogies with the sciences which we will now briefly consider.  
Louth has written on the nature of theology, challenging the character and 
direction of theology that accommodates itself to the dominating influence of the 
sciences that emerged in the Enlightenment.45 Louth began his critique by discussing 
a cultural split in the wake of the Enlightenment that has resulted in a one-sided way 
that humans seek and recognize truth. He contended that the progress of the sciences 
and the scientific method has monopolized notions of truth and how to apprehend 
truth. With the growth of the sciences, there came “the idea that there is a method by 
which we can reach the truth, ‘a general method through which, it was held, any kind 
of subject-matter must be approached, if knowledge of that subject was to be 
attained.’”46 As a result, it has been held that the sciences and those disciplines which 
can adapt to scientific methods are the disciplines able to address concerns of truth. 
Since the seventeenth century the natural sciences have progressed quite successfully 
and the scientific method has proven itself as a way of attaining knowledge. However, 
“the ‘method’ which will lead us to truth has been more difficult to come by in the 
humanities than in the sciences, and if come by at all, it has certainly not been nearly 
as successful.”47 Yet, in desiring the rigor and respectability of the sciences, the 
humanities have often times sought for scientific methods.48 As with other critics of 
Torrance’s use of science, Louth argued that “theology has more in common with the 
                                                                                                                                            
rhetoric. Lectures on ‘scientific rigrour’, supposedly based on the analogy of physics, come badly from 
those who have published some of the worst and most ludicrous misuses of biblical language in this 
century.” [Here, in footnote 7, Barr notes: “As indicated in the writer’s The Semantics of Biblical 
Language (London: Oxford University Press, 1961).” [This too is a reference to Torrance.] 
45 Andrew Louth, Discerning the Mystery: Essays on the Nature of Theology (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1983, 2003), esp. 45-72. Interestingly, T. F. Torrance was one of Louth’s former 
theology professors. Louth, along with Iain Torrance, both at Edinburgh University at the time, “read 
the proofs [of Theological Science] and helped to purge them of not a few errors.” T. F. Torrance, 
Theological Science (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), xviii. Louth’s discussion of the nature 
of theology is the most nuanced and substantive critique of using the word “science” for the nature of 
theology. However, the only book which Louth engages in his critique of Torrance is Theological 
Science. 
46 Quotation from A. Schouls, The Imposition of Method (Oxford: 1980), 5, in Louth, 
Discerning the Mystery, 7. 
47 Louth, Discerning the Mystery, 11. 
48 Louth clarifies the use of the word “scientific,” noting that while it “can simply mean 
having to do with knowledge (scientia), it has in English a more restricted denotation, as ‘science’ and 
‘the sciences’ now refer paradigmatically to the natural sciences, the ‘exact’ sciences, and to call 
something scientific is to evoke this paradigm. (This is less so in German and French where 
Wissenschaft and science are not as restricted in their significance.) To call a branch of study 
‘scientific’ is to claim that it has found a way of applying the methodology of the sciences.” Ibid., 13. 
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humanities than it has with the sciences.”49 Polemically, Louth wrote, “Theologians 
conduct their work in libraries, not in laboratories; they read books, they do not 
conduct experiments.”50 Louth maintained that theology directs us not to “solve 
problems” as within the sciences, but to “engage with mysteries.” Turning specifically 
to Torrance and how he drew analogies between the methodologies of the sciences for 
theology, Louth observed,  
 
What we find [with Torrance] is not simply an attempt 
to assimilate theology to the exact sciences; rather what 
we find is an attempt to derive some illumination for the 
theological task from the way in which modern science 
(and in particular modern physics) has had to grapple 
with the problem of epistemology, that is, the problem 
of understanding how knowledge is arrived at and what 
that knowledge is. And there is light to be found here: in 
particular, in Torrance’s emphasis on the way science 
has been able to hold on to the idea that it is concerned 
with objective knowledge and yet has escaped from the 
naivety of a crude empiricism. But in so far as this is 
true, it seems to me only to mean that knowing in the 
sciences, because it is a human activity, is much less 
unlike understanding in the humane disciplines than the 
early protagonists of the scientific method seem to have 
thought. The illumination that Torrance brings to the 
theological task is mainly oblique: for the simple 
reason, so it seems to me, that the procedures of 
theology are the procedures of the humanities, not those 
of the sciences (‘libraries, not laboratories’).51  
 
Thus, Louth argued that theology belongs with the humanities and therefore Torrance 
“is mistaken in the fundamental thrust of his enterprise. But it does not mean that 
there is not much to be learnt from the kind of considerations he raises in the course 
of his books.”52 Other bodies of knowledge, wrote St. Thomas Aquinas, could often 
provide “extraneous and probable arguments” which is what Torrance provided. But 
Louth emphasized that if the theologian is “to look over his shoulder at other 
academic disciplines at all, it is rather to the humanities that he should look, and in 
doing so should not be looking there for any analogy to the scientific method, but 
                                                 
49 Ibid., 45. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid., 52. 
52 Ibid., 53. 
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rather for a different way of knowing that does not rely on method and technique.”53 
Louth’s critiques raise questions concerning whether Torrance’s notion of the 
scientific character of the knowledge of God is appropriate given the Christian 
tradition and helpful in the contemporary post-Enlightenment, scientific context. We 
will first mention three important figures who have shaped the tradition of theology as 
a scientia before turning to the question of Torrance’s helpfulness in the 
contemporary era. 
Torrance’s insistence on disciplined, objective (and thus “scientific”) thinking 
was in line with that of his mentor Karl Barth.54 While Barth conceived of theology, 
and more specifically dogma, as a science, he emphasized its methodological 
uniqueness more than Torrance, resisting accommodation.55 Nevertheless, Barth 
maintained that theology should be described as a science, emphasizing its 
objectivity.56 Similarly, but from within a different framework, Thomas Aquinas also 
contended that knowledge of God was a scientia in question one of the Summa 
Theologia on the nature and extent of sacra doctrina. The concept of sacra dotrina 
was a key concept for Thomas which has consequently received wide, diverse 
interpretations. 57 To discuss sacra doctrina, Thomas used the Aristotelian scientific 
                                                 
53 Ibid., 54. However, Torrance was not looking so much to imitate the scientific method, but 
find analogies with the methods of the sciences in their attempts to adapt their methods to “the nature 
of the object” under consideration. 
54 See note 16 above. 
55 Barth did not find methodological analogies among the sciences as did Torrance. Cf. Barth, 
CD I.1, 8, 10: “If it [theology] is ranked as a science, and lays claim to such a ranking, this does not 
mean that it must allow itself to be disturbed or hampered in its own task by regard for what is 
described as science elsewhere. On the contrary, to the discharge of its own task it must absolutely 
subordinate and if necessary sacrifice all concern for what is called science elsewhere. The existence of 
other sciences, and the praiseworthy fidelity with which many of them at least pursue their own axioms 
and methods, can and must remind it that it must pursue their own axioms and methods, can and must 
remind it that it must pursue its own task in due order and with the same fidelity. But it cannot allow 
itself to be told by them what this means concretely in its own case. As regards methods, it has nothing 
to learn from them… If theology allows itself to be called, or calls itself, a science, it cannot in so 
doing accept the obligation of submission to standards valid for other sciences.” 
56 Barth, CD I.1, 10-11. 
57 “With the exception of his quaestio on the existence of God, Thomas Aquinas’ treatment of 
the nature and extent of sacred doctrine may be the most recognized and pondered theological text in 
his entire corpus…No other writing of this theologian offers such extensive and developed reflection 
on the issues related to the content of Christian belief and theological science considered as such,” 
writes Christopher T. Baglow, “Sacred Scripture and Sacred Doctrine in Saint Thomas Aquinas” in 
Thomas G. Weinandy, OFM, Cap, Daniel A. Keating, and John P. Yocum, eds., Aquinas on Doctrine: 
A Critical Introduction (London: T&T Clark International, 2004), 1. A seminal twentieth-century study 
argued that Thomas was the first medieval theologian to apply rigorously the Aristotelian notion of 
scientia to sacra doctrina, though he renders articles nine and ten of question one as disconnected. M.-
D. Chenu, “La The’ologie comme science au xiii sie’cle” Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Litteraire 
du Moyen’age 2 (1927): 31-71, as cited by Weisheipl and O’Brien below. Subsequent scholarship has 
continued to engage Chenu, but not without challenge. For instance, after noting the interpretation of 
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method described in Posterior Analytics and began with its most generic aspect and 
focused it down to its specific type and distinction.58 With question one, Thomas first 
defined the necessity (article 1) and then defended the nature (articles 2-8) of sacra 
doctrina in his context of the medieval academy. Beginning with article two, Aquinas 
discussed the quod quid est (nature) of sacra doctrina in comparison with the 
philosophical disciplines of the day.59 Here Thomas asked whether sacra doctrina is a 
scientia as defined by Aristotle as knowledge demonstrated by causes.60 After 
considering two objections, Aquinas concluded that sacra doctrina can legitimately 
be called a scientia in an Aristotelian, derived sense. Therefore, for Aquinas sacra 
doctrina is a scientia, derived from God’s self-knowledge and given by God’s self-
revelation which is distinct from philosophical speculation alone.61 Before Aquinas 
                                                                                                                                            
eight major commentators on Thomas, James A. Weisheipl looks to the content, division and order of 
question one for clues to interpret sacra doctrina. He concludes that Thomas, following the “strictly 
logical and scientific order” of Aristotle in Posterior Analytics, makes three declarations: (1) the an sit 
(necessity) of the subject (article 1), (2) the quod quid est (nature) of the subject (articles 2-7), and (3) 
the de modo (modality) of the subject (articles 8-10). Thus, he contends that the meaning of sacra 
doctrina is consistent throughout all ten articles of the first question. James A. Weisheipl, “The 
Meaning of Sacra Doctrina in Summa Theologiae I.q.1” The Thomist Vol. 38 No. 1 (Jan. 1974): 49-80. 
Another example includes T.C. O’Brien who contends that question one should be read more directly 
in its scholastic, academic setting. He presents the background of Thomas’s specific use of the term 
philosophicae disciplinae as a definable entity of human education in pursuit of wisdom which was 
considered key to human restoration against which sacra doctrina needed vindication. Thus, Thomas 
sets up a contrast with the sufficiency of the philosophic disciplines (articles 2-8) with sacra doctrina 
and the God-inspired knowledge of Scripture (articles 9-10). T.C. O’Brien, “‘Sacra Doctrina’ 
Revisited: The Context of Medieval Education” The Thomist Vol. 41 No. 3 (Oct. 1977): 475-509. More 
recently, in agreement with the Aristotelian form of question one maintained by Weisheipl, an 
argument has been made that Thomas’ model of sacra doctrina is that of sapientia (wisdom) rather 
than scientia. Mark F. Johnson, “God’s Knowledge in our Frail Mind: The Thomistic Model of 
Theology” Angelicum Vol. 76 (1999): 25-45; Mark F. Johnson, “The Sapiential Character of The First 
Article of the Summa theologiae” in Philosophy and the God of Abraham: Essays in Memory of James 
A.Weisheipl, O.P., ed. R. James Long (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1991), 85-98. 
58 James A. Weisheipl, “The Meaning of Sacra Doctrina in Summa Theologiae I.q.1,” 64-7; 
Mark F. Johnson, “God’s Knowledge in our Frail Mind: The Thomistic Model of Theology,” 33-8; 
Scott MacDonald, “Theory of knowledge” in The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas, edited by 
Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 160-95. 
59 “The status and study of the highest forms of human learning set the issues and criteria 
confronting sacra doctrina.” T.C. O’Brien, “‘Sacra Doctrina’ Revisited,” 489. See also Weisheipl, 
“The Meaning of Sacra Doctrina,” 64-67. 
60 “One index to the evolution of theology in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries is the 
progressive clarification of the status of sacra doctrina as scientia, as an intellectual discipline. It 
would be both odd and uncharacteristic if St. Thomas did not address this epistemological issue.” T.C. 
O’Brien, “‘Sacra Doctrina’ Revisited,” 477. 
61 In ST Ia. q.1, a.2., Thomas considered two objections. First, sacra doctrina is not a scientia 
for “every scientia proceeds from self-evident principles” and sacra doctrina “proceeds from articles of 
faith which are not self-evident” and “their truth is not admitted by all.” Second, sacra doctrina is not a 
scientia because “no scientia deals with individual facts.” Sacra doctrina deals with the history of 
individual human relationships with God and thus cannot be a scientia. “On the contrary,” Aquinas 
noted that Augustine calls the faith a scientia. He then goes on to distinguish between two kinds of 
scientia. One proceeds from principles “known by the natural light of intelligence” such as arithmetic, 
while the other proceeds from “principles known by the light of a higher scientia” such as music, 
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and the scholasticism of the Middle Ages, the influence of Augustine of Hippo on this 
matter held sway. Distinct from Aquinas, the Platonic framework of Augustine is 
evident in his discussion of the nature of knowledge of God.62 From Book XII onward 
in De Trinitate, Augustine contended that Christian teaching was sapientia (wisdom) 
which dealt with eternal things in contrast to scientia which dealt with knowledge of 
temporal things.63 Due to the Fall, the soul only knows a sin-distorted scientia instead 
of sapientia. Yet, scientia is not to be abandoned, for through the incarnation, 
Christian teaching included temporal phenomena and thus scientia was to be used to 
guide human action in the world. It is through Christ in whom “are hid both the 
treasures of wisdom and knowledge” that science and wisdom are reunited. Through 
his reconciling work and the love mediated by the Holy Spirit, the soul ascends 
                                                                                                                                            
emerging from mathematical principles. Sacred doctrine is thus a scientia “because it proceeds from 
principles established by the light of a higher science, namely the scientia of God and the blessed.” 
This is an important aspect of human knowledge of God for Thomas. God’s self-knowledge, like the 
knowledge which the blessed in heaven have of God, is the ontological source of human knowledge of 
God. See Eleonore Stump, chapter 5, “God’s knowledge” and chapter 7, “The foundations of 
knowledge” in her book, Aquinas (London & New York: Routledge, 2003), 159-187, 217-243; Mark F. 
Johnson, “God’s Knowledge in our Frail Mind: The Thomistic Model of Theology,” 25-45. Based on 
Aristotle’s notion of a subalternated science, just as music accepts and uses the principles of 
mathematics, “so Christian theology takes on faith its principles revealed by God.” ST Ia. q. 1, a. 2, p. 
10. “ita sacra doctrina credit principia revelata a Deo.” In this way, Thomas ontologically secured the 
certitude of knowledge of God. In response to the second objection concerning individual facts, 
Thomas noted that individuals within salvation-history are offered as universal examples for everyone 
and promoted as authorities through whom revelation came. With these two general functions, the 
individuals of the biblical narratives are used for universal purposes, thus legitimating sacra doctrina 
as an Aristotelian scientia. See also M.F. Sparrow, “Natural Knowledge of God and the Principles of 
‘Sacra Doctrina’” Angelicum 69 (1992): 471-491; John Jenkins, CSC, Knowledge and Faith in Thomas 
Aquinas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 78-101; Geoffrey Turner, “St Thomas 
Aquinas on the ‘Scientific’ Nature of Theology” New Blackfriars 78 (1997): 464-476; Rudi Te Velde, 
Aquinas on God: The Divine Science of the Summa Theologiae (Aldergate, UK: Ashgate, 2006), 23-8; 
Woflhart Pannenberg, Theology and the Philosophy of Science, trans. Francis McDonagh 
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1973), 228-31. The parallels with Barth’s perspective have been 
explored by Eugene Rogers, Thomas Aquinas and Karl Barth: Sacred Doctrine and the Natural 
Knowledge of God (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995), esp. 15-70, 183-
202. 
62 Nevertheless, on the dependence of Aquinas upon Augustine’s epistemology, see Lydia 
Schumacher, Divine Illumination: The History and Future of Augustine’s Theory of Knowledge (West 
Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 154-180.  
63 Augustine, De Trinitate, trans. Edmund Hill (417; repr., Hyde Park, New York: New City 
Press, 1991), Book XII, 322ff. On 12.4.22, p. 337: Scientia is “the action by which we make right use 
of things temporal” and sapientia is “the contemplation of eternal things.” For discussions of the 
contrast, see Luigi Gioia, The Theological Epistemology of Augustine’s De Trinitate (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 221-227; Mary T. Clark, “De Trinitate,” in The Cambridge Companion to 
Augustine, edited by Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001), 91-102, esp. 98-9; Robert Meagher, Augustine: On the Inner Life of the Mind 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 1998), 194-5; Wolfhart Pannenberg, Theology and the 
Philosophy of Science, trans. by Francis McDonagh (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1973), 8-11. 
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through scientia to sapientia.64 Nevertheless, Augustine held onto a more Platonic 
goal of sapientia over scientia as the aim of the soul, that is, the contemplation of the 
Triune God.65 Augustine, Aquinas and Barth each defined theology as a scientia in 
response to the notions of knowledge held within their cultural contexts. It is 
noteworthy that before Barth, Aquinas and Augustine spoke of the knowledge of God 
within their respective contexts, the Old and New Testaments also spoke of 
knowledge of God within their Hebraic and Graeco-Roman contexts, but of course 
knew nothing of the later contexts of these three theologians, much less the scientific 
categories and connotations of the word science since the seventeenth-century 
scientific revolution and its implications for epistemology.66 It was to this scientific 
culture which Torrance aimed to develop his scientific dynamic concerning the 
knowledge of God. Like the three other theologians before him, Torrance aimed to 
address his cultural context, but was his scientific epistemological dynamic a faithful 
or compromising accommodation?67 
                                                 
64 Augustine, De Trinitate, Book XIII, esp. 366-70, emphasized that the proper relationship 
between scientia and sapientia is established by the work of Christ and the Spirit. Quotation from 
Colossians 2:3. 
65 This is made particularly clear by Andrew Louth, The Origins of the Christian Mystical 
Tradition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 146-58. 
66 Basic introductions to the notion of knowledge of God within the fields of Old and New 
Testament studies include Terrence E. Fretheim, “yāda`” in New International Dictionary of OT 
Theology and Exegesis, ed. Willem A. VanGemeren Vol. 2 (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1997), 409-14; 
O.A. Piper, “Knowledge,” in The Interpreter’s Dictionary of the Bible, ed. by George Arthur Buttrick, 
ed. Vol. 3 (New York & Nashville: Abingdon, 1962), 42-8; Bergman & Botterweck, “yāda`” in 
TDOT, G.J. Botterweck and Helmer Ringgren, eds. Vol. 5 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1978), 448-481; 
T. C. Vriezen, An Outline of Old Testament Theology (Massachusetts: Charles T. Branford Co., 1960), 
128-147; R. Bultmann, “γινώσκω” in Gerhard Kittel, ed. TDNT  Vol. 1, trans. By Geoffrey W. 
Bromiley (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1964), 689-719; E. Schϋtz & E.D. Schmitz, “Knowledge” in New 
International Dictionary of New Testament Theology, ed. Colin Brown, Vol. 2 (Grand Rapids: 
Zondervan, 1976), 390-409; A.G. Patzia, “Knowledge,” in Dictionary of the Later New Testament and 
Its Developments, eds. Ralph P. Martin and Peter H. Davids (Downers Grove: IVP, 1997), 638-640; 
Heinrich Zimmermann, “Knowledge of God in the New Testament,” in J.B. Bauer , ed., Encyclopedia 
of Biblical Theology Vol. 2 (London & Sydney: Sheed & Ward, 1970), 472-8.  Book-length 
discussions include Robert C. Dentan, The Knowledge of God in Ancient Israel (New York: Seabury 
Press, 1968); Ian W. Scott, Paul’s Way of Knowing: Story, Experience and the Spirit (2006; repr. 
Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2009); Also, a well-rounded discussion of the knowledge of God 
within Old and New Testament studies is Mary Healy and Robin Parry, eds., The Bible and 
Epistemology: Biblical Soundings on the Knowledge of God (Milton Keynes, UK: Paternoster, 2007).  
67 David Munchin recently critiqued Torrance for giving in to a compromising alliance of 
theology to contemporary developments in science. He concluded on 455, “The absence of any sense 
of tension between natural and theological science implies that theological science has conformed to 
natural science once again, and there is no real attempt to show how theology might inform or 
transform the current paradigms of natural science. This ‘all good news’ appraisal of contemporary 
developments in natural science may lead us to suspect with Feyerabend that Torrance is simply and 
unwittingly collaborating with Western science’s imperialistic habit.” David Munchin, “Is theology a 
science? Paul Feyerabend’s Anarchic Epistemology as Challenge Test to T. F. Torrance’s Scientific 
Theology” Scottish Journal of Theology 64 (2011): 439-55. 
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From his earliest lectures, Torrance conceived of knowledge of God and 
theology as a science. At that time, he used the notion of science to mean primarily a 
disciplined, objective form of knowledge.68 But with and after the publication of 
Theological Science, Torrance expanded his use of the term, making extensive use of 
the natural sciences and in particular their epistemological methods as analogies for 
theological epistemology in order to demonstrate that theology is a comparable 
science and likewise that knowledge of God is in some ways comparable to scientific 
knowledge of the natural world.69 Accordingly, Torrance’s expanded use of the word 
science is distinct from Augustine’s, Aquinas’s and even Barth’s use of the word 
scientia.70 It also extended beyond his earlier use of the word by which he meant a 
disciplined, objective way of thinking.71 It seems apparent that in his attempts to 
“evangelize the foundations of… scientific culture”72 through a theological science, 
Torrance aimed to place theological knowledge on an equally respectable playing 
field as knowledge found in the natural sciences.73 Such a move is not only subject to 
                                                 
68 For instance, from his earliest lectures at Auburn, Torrance noted, “In the basic sense, then, 
science refers to the kind of knowledge which is forced upon us when we are true to the facts we are up 
against. Here we do not think in the way we want to think, but in the way we have to think, if we are to 
do justice to the ‘object’ we are investigating.” T. F. Torrance, “Scientific Dogmatics,” The Auburn 
Lectures, 1938-39 (The Thomas F. Torrance Manuscript Collection. Special Collections, Princeton 
Theological Seminary Library), 1.  
69 A few recent theologians who engage the philosophy of science call theology a science. For 
instance, Nancey Murphy’s contention that theology is a science is also methodological, in that 
theology creates theories from the data of experience similar to science. Nancey Murphy, Reconciling 
Theology and Science: A Radical Reformation Perspective (Kitchener, Ontario: Pandora Press, 1997), 
19-32. In contrast, Wolfhart Pannenberg describes theology as the “science of God” not because of 
methodological similarity, but, like Barth, because God is the unifying object of theology. Theology 
and the Philosophy of Science, 297-345, esp. 297-300. 
70 Alister E. McGrath agrees that Torrance has expanded the use of the term. “The term 
‘scientific theology’ thus comes to possess, in Torrance’s hands, rather different nuances than that 
found in the German phrase die wissenschaftliche Theologie. The German term implies only an 
intellectual coherence; the English-language associations of the word ‘scientific” implies at least a 
degree of affinity with the natural sciences.” Alister E. McGrath, Thomas F. Torrance: An Intellectual 
Biography (London & New York: T&T Clark, 1999), 234. Consequently, McGrath later follows 
Torrance with his “scientific theology” which is more than simply rigorous analysis or “objective” 
theology in the Barthian sense, but includes using the natural sciences as an ancilla theologiae and 
gaining insight from its epistemological methods from a realist perspective. In this way, McGrath’s 
work is “an attempt to develop and extend Torrance’s vision of theological science.” Alister E. 
McGrath, A Scientific Theology: Nature, vol. 1 (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2001), 3-78, quotation 
on 76. 
71 The other dimension which Torrance emphasized in his early conception of science is that 
methodology is determined by the ontology of the object under consideration, which is the next 
dynamic we will explore. 
72 This is a quotation of Torrance from I. John Hesselink, “A Pilgrimage in the School of 
Christ—An Interview with T. F. Torrance,” Reformed Review 38 (Autumn, 1984): 59. On Torrance’s 
evangelical intent, see note 13 above. 
73 Wolfhart Pannenberg notes, “The same concern, to defend the truth of Christianity by 
generally accepted criteria [as in philosophy], has been present since the thirteenth century in the 
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the above-mentioned criticisms of Louth, but alters the notion of knowledge of God as 
a scientia beyond its historic usage, accommodating it to modern scientific 
connotations.74 
Consequently, calling theology a science in the contemporary milieu may 
contribute to a number of distinctive but related problems. For theologians engaged in 
the science-religion discussion and for those who are not, there is an apparent concern 
for the loss of integrity of their respective primary discipline. For those engaged in the 
science-religion dialogue whose primary first discipline is science (i.e. Ian Barbour, 
Arthur Peacocke, and John Polkinghorne), they speak of concern of whether Torrance 
has crossed into Barbour’s category of “integration”, accommodating science to 
theology.75 For those theologians not engaged in the theology-science dialogue, there 
is a concern about the loss of integrity of theology. Like Barth (and Louth), they are 
concerned that theology not be compromised by science, questioning whether 
theology needs to look to the sciences.76 In fact, from the perspective of this thesis, 
                                                                                                                                            
argument about the scientific status of theology and its right to be included among the sciences taught 
in a university.” Theology and the Philosophy of Science, 13. 
74 On the history of theology as a science, see Pannenberg, Theology and the Philosophy of 
Science, 7-14, 225-96. 
75 I owe this insight to David Wilkinson who commented that this concern has been voiced 
more in conversation than put into print. For Barbour’s well-known four ways of relating science and 
religion, conflict, independence, dialogue and integration, see Ian G. Barbour, Religion and Science: 
Historical and Contemporary Issues, rev. ed. (London: SCM Press, 1998), 77-105. Mikael Stenmark’s 
more philosophically precise multidimensional model of the relationship between science and religion 
begins by considering three basic views: (1) the independence views (no overlap), (2) the contact views 
(overlap), and (3) the monist views (union). The monist views can be subdivided into a (4) complete 
scientific expansionist view and (5) complete religious expansionist view. Moreover, Stenmark 
discusses four levels or dimensions of science and religion: the social (practices), the teleological, the 
epistemological or methodological, and the theoretical. Mikael Stenmark, How To Relate Science and 
Religion: A Multidimensional Model (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2004), esp. 250-269.  It will be 
obvious, particularly with the ontologically-determined dynamic discussed next, that Torrance neither 
advocated an “integration” nor a “complete religious expansionist view” that collapses any of the four 
dimensions of sciences into theology. 
76 See Barth’s comment in note 43 above. William J. Abraham notes the irony in Canon and 
Criterion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 386-87: “Moreover, the choice of epistemic partner 
is both unsurprising and paradoxical. It is unsurprising, in that the whole modern period has been 
wedded to the idea of natural science as the paradigm of rationality and knowledge. It is paradoxical 
because the Barthian project was supposed to deliver us from bondage to the epistemic tools of modern 
culture; yet here again, in the very heartland of the Barthian tradition, one of them, the appeal to 
science as the paradigm of knowledge, suddenly reappears.” See also his Crossing the Threshold of 
Divine Revelation (Grand Rapids, MI; Cambridge, UK: Eerdmans, 2006), 3. This desire to maintain 
theology’s distinctiveness was seemingly behind what George Hunsinger wrote concerning Torrance’s 
interpretation of Barth. “Barth’s theology, Torrance urges, bears close comparison with ‘an exact 
science such as physics’... Like physics, theology is said to restrict its activities ‘to the limits laid down 
by the nature of its concrete object’ and to develop ‘a method in accordance with the nature of its 
object’… Torrance is not wrong to say these things of Barth, yet perhaps entirely too much of the 
atmosphere of the physics lab hangs subtly over the account … The continuities which interest 
Torrance between theology and physics are illuminating, but the discontinuities – the sense of rupture 
60 
 
calling theology a science in the contemporary milieu may sound like a reductionist 
strategy which attempts to describe theology using scientific language and categories 
instead of allowing theology its own integrity on its own level. We recall from chapter 
one that it was the positivists’ aim to unify knowledge based upon a universal, 
scientific (empiricist) method, challenging all who would attempt truth-claims to 
utilize their method. While Torrance distinguished theological science from other 
types of sciences, the question remains: why aim to unify all forms of disciplined 
thought as “sciences” and thereby categorize theology as a science? Or why try to 
place the knowledge of God onto a procrustean bed of a science which in 
contemporary English usage is still largely defined by the natural sciences?77 These 
questions become acute particularly in the postmodern context. A postmodern theme 
is “incredulity toward metanarratives,” particularly the Enlightenment’s scientific 
metanarrative which held out more promises of progress than it has been able to 
deliver.78 Therefore, to conceive of knowledge of God as scientia but not as a science 
would not only be in keeping with the theological tradition, but also could be more 
productive in two ways. First, the knowledge of God as scientia but not a science 
preserves the distinctiveness and integrity of the knowledge of God, and second, 
protects it from the postmodern critiques of the Enlightenment’s triumphalist and 
reductionist scientific metanarratives. While the parallels which Torrance drew 
between knowledge of God and scientific knowledge remain viable for the 
postmodern, scientific age, categorizing theology as a science is not the most suitable 
linguistic framework. 
                                                                                                                                            
which was always so important to Barth – ought not to be suppressed in the process.’ How to Read 
Karl Barth: The Shape of His Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 11-12. 
77 Louth clarifies the use of the word scientific, noting that while it “can simply mean having 
to do with knowledge (scientia), it has in English a more restricted denotation, as ‘science” and “the 
sciences” now refer paradigmatically to the natural sciences, the “exact” sciences, and to call 
something scientific is to evoke this paradigm. (This is less so in German and French where 
Wissenschaft and science are not as restricted in their significance.)” Discerning the Mystery, 13. 
78 Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, translated by 
Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), xxiv; Kevin 
J. Vanhoozer,  “Theology and the Condition of Postmodernity: A Report on Knowledge (of God)” in 
Kevin J. Vanhoozer, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Postmodern Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), 10: “The mark of the postmodern condition of knowledge, then, is a move 
away from the authority of universal science toward narratives of local knowledge.” See also Stanley J. 
Grenz,  A Primer on Postmodernism (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1996), 39-56;  J. Richard 
Middleton and Brian J. Walsh, Truth is Stranger than It Used to Be: Biblical Faith in a Postmodern 
Age (Downers Grove, IL: InverVarsity, 1995), 9-27; Diogenes Allen, Christian Belief in a Postmodern 
World (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1989), 4-5. 
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To further understand how the knowledge of God is scientific for Torrance, 
one must grasp his other epistemological dynamics. In a supplementary way, these 
other dynamics expand what it means for knowledge of God to be scientific, 
especially the next dynamic which Torrance repeatedly emphasized.  
 
 
2.3 Ontologically-determined 
 
Closely related and informing the scientific epistemological dynamic, the 
knowledge of God for Torrance is ontologically-determined. A basic epistemological 
principle in “theological science” and the “other sciences” was for Torrance that 
epistemology follows ontology. More precisely, there is a correlation between the 
nature of the object or subject matter we seek to know and how we know it. This 
epistemological dynamic was inspired by Aristotle,79 used by the Christian 
theologians and scientists of Alexandria during the first six centuries of the Christian 
era,80 and more immediately by Karl Barth’s theological approach which was 
committed to God’s Triune nature and self-revelation as the means for the knowledge 
of God.81 In many ways and with various implications, Torrance repeats this theme 
throughout his major writings on theological epistemology. It is widely recognized as 
a “fundamental axiom” which permeates his writings.82 The following paragraphs 
                                                 
79 TS, 108: “In the teaching of Aristotle, which dominated the conceptions of science for 
nearly two millennia, science is characterized by both unity and plurality. There is one world of nature 
which lies behind and requires a corresponding unity in our knowledge of it, but within this world there 
are different classes of thing with their peculiarities providing different subject-matter and therefore 
requiring different branches of science appropriate to them, each with its own scope and with its 
distinctive characteristics in method.” Also inspired by Aristotle, Torrance’s ontologically-determined 
epistemological dynamic is similar to the “principle of appropriate epistemic fit” discussed by William 
J. Abraham, Crossing the Threshold of Divine Revelation (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2006), 11, 14, 
29-30, 35, 41, 43, 45. 
80 TNS, 83-84. 
81 Barth, CD I.1, 3-24, 295-404 on “The Task of Dogmatics” and “The Place of the Doctrine 
of the Trinity in Dogmatics” respectively. Torrance comments on Barth’s approach, “Theological 
activity does not proceed in the light of the theologian’s faith, but in the light of what comes from the 
side of that in which he has faith, the self-authenticating and self-revealing reality of God which 
according to its very nature can be known and understood and substantiated only out of itself.” KBBET, 
66-69, q. on 69. More generally, Torrance’s thorough discussion of the Barthian shift in theological 
method is found in his Karl Barth: An Introduction to His Early Theology 1910-1931 (London & New 
York: T&T Clark, 1962, 2000). 
82 Elmer M. Colyer, How to Read T. F. Torrance (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 
2001), 322-25; Alister E. McGrath, Thomas F. Torrance: An Intellectual Biography (London: T&T 
Clark, 1999), 142, 1601-1, 209-11, 234-35. This is the epistemological dynamic for which John 
Polkinghorne repeatedly credits Torrance within the science and theology dialogue. Belief in God in an 
Age of Science (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003), 80-81; Faith, Science and 
Understanding (London: SPCK, 2000), 181-82; Reason and Reality: The Relationship Between Science 
and Theology (London: SPCK, 1991), 1. 
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outline how Torrance understood this dynamic as well as the implications for 
epistemology in general and for the knowledge of God in particular. 
Within a knowing relationship, epistemic agents rationally respond to the 
intelligible structures within nature. For Torrance, intelligibility and order is within 
the nature of things.83 God confers upon finite being “a created rationality different 
from, yet dependent on, His own transcendent rationality, and thus gives it an inner 
law of its own.”84 Torrance contended, along with Einstein, that scientific thinking 
begins with respect for the basic nature of things “in their own intelligibility.”85 
Consequently, human rationality derives from created rationality in the order of 
things. Contrasted with Kantian idealism in which “the understanding does not derive 
its laws (a priori) from, but writes them into, nature,”86 Torrance maintained that “our 
basic statements are formed by way of conceptual assent to what is there or by way of 
recognition of an intelligibility inherent in the nature of things.” Thus, for Torrance, 
the scientist is to “bring to light and express” the rationality embedded in nature.87 He 
called basic statements of knowledge in the sciences and theology “recognition-
statements”88 because “order is in the Object before it is in our minds.”89 Reality has 
“ontological primacy” and control over human concepts.90 Scientific knowledge 
brings the inherent rationality of things to some form of cognition and articulation.91 
                                                 
83 TS, xi, 57, 107, 138, 258, 287, 318, 338; GR, 10, 17-18, 42, 96, 139-41, 182, 196; STI, 9-10, 
13, 23-24, 60-1; BSCL, xiv-xvii, 9-13, 19; RET, 10-12, 26, 132-35, 151-53; CTSC, 7-9, 31-2, 39, 57-58, 
76, 81, 120-29; DCO, passim; GGT, 1, 4, 6, 52-57, 131-32; RST, 3-9, 20, 24, 33, 52-53, 73, 134, 138; 
STR, 1, 23, 180; TCFK, 45-46, 98-99, 196, 202; CFM, 16-27. For Torrance’s discussion of disorder, 
DCO, 85-142. 
84 GR, 139. 
85 GR, 10; TS, xi. 
86 Quoted in RST, 16-17. Torrance maintained “It is to be granted that nothing can be 
apprehended apart from the synthesising and conceptualising activity of the human reason, which 
seems to have been the root idea behind Kant’s ‘synthetic judgments a priori.” However, it is quite 
another thing with Kant to define what is possible cognitive experience in terms of our ability to 
construct it, as though any proper object of human knowledge were a construction which we made out 
of space and time, which sooner or later would become a construction out of our consciousness.” RST, 
102-3; “Western thought has suffered here considerably from the Kantian idea that space and time are 
a priori forms of intuition, and that substance and causality are a priori categories of the 
understanding, which together constitute the frame which gives our knowledge of any possible 
empirical experience a universal and necessary form. That is to say, by transferring absolute space and 
time from the mind of God to the mind of the human knower, Kant generalized classical determinism 
to make it affect all that man can know.” DCO, 16. For a longer, more mature engagement with Kant, 
see TCFK, 36-46. On 73, Torrance positively writes: “Whatever the demerits of Kant’s notion of the 
synthetic a priori it at least had the merit of recognising that empirical and theoretic factors operate 
together in all our knowledge of the phenomenal world.” Also, TIR, 71. 
87 GR, 42. See also 96, 182. 
88 TIR, 95; GR, 182; BSCL, 11-13, 16; GGT, 31. 
89 TS, 138. 
90 RET, 60; GGT, 33. 
91 TS, 107; GR, 196; RET, 26. 
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This is the priestly function of humans in creation, to articulate the intelligible order 
of creation.92 In order for thought and description to be real, epistemic agents learn to 
respond to “the nature of the reality into which they inquire.”93 They recognize or 
discover the inherent rationality in what is given in nature. Torrance elaborated, 
  
The passion of the scientist or the scholar is aroused by 
the intuitive apprehension of a reality that is not 
constructed or controlled by man but waits to be 
discovered…As Michael Polanyi has put it, he is caught 
up in the pursuit of a reality that is only partially 
disclosed but that has an indeterminate range of 
rationality still revealed…His scientific conscience is 
the counterpart or echo in himself of that transcendent 
element, a logic beyond his own mind…That is why 
Polanyi has so often insisted, there can be no pure 
science pursued freely for its own sake without 
dedicated service to a transcendent rationality.94  
 
This means that the basic act of knowledge is neither constructive nor inventive for 
Torrance. Rather, the “basic act of knowledge” occurs when reason “acts in 
accordance with the nature of the given object, that is, acknowledges and recognizes 
it, so that it attains its essential conceptuality as it lets its thinking follow the inherent 
rationality of the given.”95 Human knowledge acquires the intelligibility and 
coherence of the Object known “as we allow the Object to impose itself upon our 
minds.”96 When we can “bring to view the inner rationality of a field of knowledge,” 
then we can be confident that we are “in touch with reality” and “thinking as we are 
compelled to think by the essential nature of the realities themselves.”97  
Hence, to begin to define the relationship between ontology and epistemology 
for Torrance, one must recognize that the essential nature and structure of the object 
sought is basic and primary to the knowledge relationship. As Torrance succinctly put 
it, “Not for one moment can we separate knowledge from the nature of what is 
                                                 
92 GGT, chapter 1, “Man, the Priest of Creation,” 1-14; CFM, chapter 3, “Man, Mediator of 
Order,” 29-48; CTSC, 111; RST, 68-69. 
93 TS, xii-xiii. 
94 GR, 96. 
95 GR, 182. 
96 TS, 138. 
97 GR, 94. “In natural science we are concerned ultimately, not with convenient arguments of 
observational data which can be generalized into universal explanatory form, but with movements of 
thought, at once theoretical and empirical, which penetrate into the intrinsic structures of the universe 
in such a way that there becomes disclosed to us its basic design and we find ourselves at grips with 
reality.” DCO, 1. 
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known.”98 In short, scientific thought recognizes and appropriately responds to the 
rationality within nature. Along with his concern for objectivity and disciplined 
thought (2.2), his concern that ontology inform epistemology constituted science for 
Torrance, even from his earliest lectures.99 In reacting against Kantian idealism, 
Torrance’s type of realism is less sensitive to the postmodern theme of the 
constructive role humans play in interpreting the world. This will be further 
developed and critiqued below within the “truly realist” dynamic (2.8). Presently, we 
will note two implications of this epistemological dynamic and then turn to begin to 
consider how this dynamic may be viable for the postmodern, scientific era. 
First, for Torrance, when one seeks to know something or someone, the nature 
of what one seeks to know should have a decisive influence on how one knows it. 
“You know something only in accordance with its nature, and you develop your 
knowledge of it as you allow its nature to prescribe for you the mode of rationality 
appropriate to it.”100 Torrance repeatedly maintained that, when permitted, nature can 
prescribe the “mode of rationality” to the potential knower and determine the content 
and form of knowledge.101 In other words, “our knowing is determined by the nature 
of what we know.”102 This epistemic principle is definitive for the nature of the 
knowledge of God and Christian theology for Torrance. In his words, “Christian 
dogmatics is the pure science of theology in which, as in every pure science, we seek 
to discover the fundamental structure and order in the nature of things and to develop 
basic forms of thought about them as our understanding is allowed to be controlled by 
them from beyond our individualism.”103 More simply, “Theology is the positive 
science in which we think only in accordance with the nature of the given.”104 In 
short, the nature of God determines how we know God.  
Second, not only is ontology to be epistemically prescriptive for the knower, 
but reciprocally the knower’s epistemic tools are to be appropriately fitted for the 
                                                 
98 TS, 185. 
99 T. F. Torrance, “Scientific Dogmatics,” The Auburn Lectures, 1938-39 (The Thomas F. 
Torrance Manuscript Collection. Special Collections, Princeton Theological Seminary Library), 
passim; Thomas F. Torrance, “Theology and Science,” The Auburn Lectures, 1938-1939 (The Thomas 
F. Torrance Manuscript Collection. Special Collections, Princeton Theological Seminary Library), 
passim.  
100 GR, 52; Also, TCFK, 4. 
101 TS, xii, 138-39, 165, 198; GR, 33-35, 52, 92-93, 113, 165, 199-200; CTSC, 27-29; GGT, 8-
10; RST, 1-2, 76. 
102 RST, 1. 
103 TS, 338. 
104 TIR, 9. 
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nature of what one is seeking to know. Epistemic tools for Torrance may include 
things such as basic concepts, language, questions asked, ordering principles in 
systematic explanation, and verification and demonstration. These tools are to be in 
some way agreeable with the object one seeks to know. For example, the “essential 
forms of thought” should be under the “determination of its given subject-matter.”105 
Reason and modes of rationality are to act in a way “congruent with” the nature of 
given reality.106 Language is to be modified to “behave in terms of the nature of its 
own proper object” with a “distinctive vocabulary apposite to the nature of the 
realities in the field.”107 Concepts are to be “appropriate to” their proper objects.108 
Questions asked and modes of inquiry are to be “in accordance with” the nature of the 
object.109 The ordering principles for systematizing knowledge must “be the servant 
of knowledge.”110 Verification and demonstration are to be “determined by” and 
“appropriate to” the nature of its object.111 “Scientific procedures” are “controlled by 
material content” and thus each field of science is dedicated “to its proper object and 
method.”112 The result is that “what we know and how we know, subject-matter and 
method, cannot be finally separated from one another.”113 In various ways, Torrance 
persistently asserted that the various epistemic tools should be made suitable for the 
nature of its subject matter.114  
The ontologically-determined dynamic was a universal epistemological 
principle for Torrance. This dynamic can help to situate knowledge of God in the 
postmodern era, despite its perhaps overconfident realism which will be discussed 
                                                 
105 TS, 281, also 278; GR, 5. 
106 TS, 75; GR, 112, 182; CTSC, 34-36; GGT, 8-10. 
107 TS, 25, 266-67, 278, 284, 292-95; GR, 93; CTSC, 32-34; DCO, 17-18. 
108 TS, 23, 25; STI, 56; GGT, 98. 
109 TS, 124; STI, 55; GR, 98. 
110 TS, 138. 
111 Torrance illustrates this principle for verification colorfully when he writes, “You cannot 
demonstrate something in the realm of the mind by chemical analysis, or appreciate the weight of an 
argument by a machine that weighs things, any more than you can smell with your ear or determine the 
sound of something by your eyes. Thus the only kind of evidence for God that will satisfy us is one 
appropriate to divine nature, appropriate to one who is the ground of His own Being and the Source of 
all other being, to one whose Being is Spirit and whose nature is love.” GR, quote on 52-53. For similar 
illustrations, see 93, 113, 199-200; TS, 139-40, 198; GGT, 9. 
112 TS, 284. See also 70-73, 289. 
113 RST, 1. 
114 Here, it is worth noting that the various epistemic tools need not be cast only within the 
framework of the natural sciences. Also following Barth with a concern that ontology inform 
methodology was Hans Urs von Balthasar who contended that perceiving the form of God (and thus 
God’s glory) calls for one to see beauty. For Balthasar, seeing beauty is an appropriate, analogous 
epistemic tool. See chapter 1.2.2, esp. pgs. 15-16. Though Torrance emphasized scientific analogies, he 
was not wholly unaware of the epistemological relevance of art. RST, 98-102, 126-27. 
66 
 
below (2.8) and in subsequent chapters. Following Aristotle, Torrance maintained that 
there is “one pervasive rational order throughout the universe,” yet “the universe is 
manifold in character.”115 Along with Michael Polanyi who argued for a “hierarchical 
universe,”116 Torrance argued that there is a “stratified structure” to reality.117 “The 
universe is not flat, but is a stratified structure, so that our science takes the form of an 
ascending hierarchy of relations of thought that are open upward… but that cannot be 
flattened downward by being reduced to connections all on the same level.”118 
Torrance recognized that this ontological notion directly challenged the modern 
problem of reductionism.119 Positivism sought to define a basic level of reality in 
terms of what may be observed. A common motivation was ontological, 
epistemological and methodological unity and simplicity. Yet, as discussed in chapter 
one, if reality is stratified and multi-dimensional, then there is a greater amount of 
complexity than reductionism allows. This is precisely the problem of ontological 
reductionism, a hegemony of the various levels of reality by one layer of reality. One 
ontological level assumes priority and dominance. Consequently, the way of knowing 
appropriate to that one level is prescribed for the rest of reality. However, reality and 
knowledge of it are not reducible to one strata and its epistemological methods for 
Torrance. Instead, the many layers of reality invite many, distinct epistemological 
methods.120 If reductionism is quintessentially modern, then Torrance’s conception of 
a hierarchical or stratified universe moves beyond that modern notion. 
                                                 
115 DCO, 17. See note 67. 
116 Michael Polanyi’s discussion is found in his Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical 
Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1958, 1962), 328-31, 382; The Study of Man (Chicago: 
University of Chicago, 1959), 47-53; The Tacit Dimension (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1966), 29-
52. 
117 To a lesser extent, Torrance indicated his indebtedness for this concept to Albert Einstein. 
Torrance’s discussions of the stratification of reality are found in GGT, 13-14; STR, 188-91; CTSC, 37-
39; TCFK, 159-60. For discussion of Torrance’s use of Polanyi, see Colin Weightman, Theology in a 
Polanyian Universe: The Theology of Thomas F. Torrance (New York: Peter Lang, 1994), 235-62; For 
corrections of Weightman concerning Torrance’s use of Polanyi as an ancilla theologiae instead of as a 
source or foundation, see Alister E. McGrath, Thomas F. Torrance: An Intellectual Biography, 228-32. 
118 GGT, 13. 
119 “The universe that is steadily being disclosed to our various sciences is found to be 
characterised throughout time and space by an ascending gradient of meaning in richer and higher 
forms of order. Instead of levels of existence and reality being explained reductionistically from below 
in materialistic and mechanistic terms, the lower levels are found to be explained in terms of higher, 
invisible, intangible levels of reality. In this perspective the divisive splits become healed, constructive 
syntheses emerge, being and doing become conjoined, an integration of form takes place in the 
sciences and the arts, the natural and the spiritual dimensions overlap, while knowledge of God and of 
creation go hand in hand and bear constructively on one another.” RST, ix. See also, BSCL, 144-45. 
120 Incorporating Roy Bhaskar’s philosophy of critical realism against reductionism, Alister E. 
McGrath notes that his philosophy “demands that the different levels of reality be fully acknowledged. 
It is impossible to reduce reality to one ontological level, or to insist that what is “real” is determined 
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To faithfully respond to the multiple levels of reality, the principle of 
correlating epistemic tools with ontological realities becomes necessary, applicable to 
any reality and in any field of human experience. This is not to say that there is one 
universal epistemological method. On the contrary, because the methods of one field 
of knowledge cannot give the epistemic tools or criteria for another field of inquiry, 
the distinctive nature of the object creates distinctive epistemological criteria. This 
universal epistemological principle means that particular forms of knowledge within a 
field of inquiry are unique to that specific field, determined by the unique nature of 
the subject under consideration. For instance, not all sciences can be reduced to 
physics. But in an exemplary way, physics has developed methods appropriate to the 
nature of its own subject-matter. Likewise for every field of knowledge, if there is 
proper respect for the object, if “the method and the matter are purely matched,” then 
real discovery and knowledge can occur.121 This has profound implications for the 
knowledge of God and the nature of theology for Torrance within a postmodern, 
scientific era. 
“Theological science and natural science both…have to let their thinking serve 
the realities into which they inquire. Each has its own concern to take up, its own 
special modes of rationality and verification determined for it by the nature of its 
object…conforming knowing to the nature of reality.”122 Torrance defined theology 
in the light of this epistemological dynamic. “Theology is the unique science [or, as 
this thesis prefers, discipline] devoted to knowledge of God, differing from other 
sciences [disciplines] by the uniqueness of its object which can be apprehended only 
on its own terms and from within the actual situation it has created in our existence in 
making itself known.”123 Within the field of Christian theology, inquirers are 
concerned with a mode of knowing appropriate to the nature of God in Jesus Christ 
                                                                                                                                            
by whether it can be “known”—often by the improper use of only one methodology, corresponding to 
the one level of reality that such a reductionism recognizes. Theology and the natural sciences 
recognize a plurality of levels of reality, and refuse to reduce everything to one level.” Alister E. 
McGrath, A Scientific Theology: Reality, Vol. 2 (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2002), 209-26, 
quotation on 225. 
121 TS, 107. 
122 GR, 113; TCFK, 276; RET, 30: “Each science—theological science and natural science—
operates in accordance with the nature of the realities it is investigating and the field structures that 
characterize it, and in accordance with its own distinctive objective, so that while the two sciences 
inevitably overlap within the space-time of this world, they move in different directions.” 
123 TS, 281. 
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who has sent the Holy Spirit.124 It is a “scientific requirement” that theology “conform 
to the nature of the object.”125 Furthermore, “to consider that we can know Him in 
any way except out of Himself and in a way appropriate to His transcendent nature 
would be a form of irrationality.”126 This makes the knowledge of God and the field 
of theology unique, particularly within a nonreductionist, stratified universe. 
Theology operates on its “own ground,” with distinct “modes of inquiry,” “forms of 
thought,” “axioms,” “cannons,” and “with its own distinctive ends” determined by 
and apposite to its unique subject.127  
Consequently, Torrance’s ontologically-determined principle leads to a type of 
epistemological pluralism which is quite congenial with the postmodern era’s 
embrace of a plurality of epistemologies over a strong foundationalism.128 For 
Torrance, there is not an infallible, universal mode of rationality, but instead there are 
potentially as many epistemological modes as there are ontological natures.129 
Nevertheless, there is a unitary, contingent order permeating the cosmos for Torrance, 
rooted in the Creator of all things.130 Thus, there are basic unified aspects of 
                                                 
124 TS, 112-13, 337-38. We will further explore the Trinity as the third dynamic of Torrance’s 
theological epistemology. 
125 TS, 244. 
126 TS, 54. 
127 TS, 25, 244, 281, 285, 337-38; GR, 6, 98, 114; STI, viii; BSCL, 4. 
128 With the passing of modernity came the collapse of foundationalism, that is, the 
justification of beliefs by self-evident or infallible beliefs or universal standards of rationality. A few 
salient discussions include William C. Placher, Unaplogetic Theology: A Christian Voice In Pluralistic 
Conversation (Louisville, KY: Westmisnter John Knox Press, 1989), 11-54; Stanley Haeurwas, Nancey 
Murphy, and Mark Nation, Theology Without Foundations: Religious Practice and the Future of 
Theological Truth (Nashville: Abingdon, 1994), 9-19; Nancey Murphy, Anglo-American 
Postmodernity: Philosophical Perspectives on Science, Religion and Ethics (Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press, 1997),  7-35; J. Wentzel van Huyssteen, Essays in Postfoundationalist Theology (Grand Rapids, 
MI: Eerdmans, 1997), 1-102; The Shaping of Rationality (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999), passim; 
John Thiel, Nonfoundationalism (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1994); Paul D. Murray, Reason, Truth and 
Theology in Pragmatist Perspective (Leuven, Belgium: Peeters, 2004), esp. 3-8, 93-161; Stanley J. 
Grenz and John R. Franke, Beyond Foundationalism: Shaping Theology in a Postmodern Context 
(Lousiville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2001), 3-54. Torrance’s ontologically-determined 
epistemological principle mitigates against foundationalism, for the ways of knowing are contingent 
upon the ontology of the known, not an indubitable, infallible or universal foundation. For more on 
Torrance and foundationalism, see note 43 above. 
129 At one point, Torrance noted that “there are at least four basic modes of rational order with 
which we have to do, and to which we may refer in terms of number, logos, organic or organismic 
form, and aesthetic form. They are all distinctive forms of rational order which demand distinctive 
expression, but far from conflicting with one another they all appear to involve each other, although in 
different ways.” DCO, 17. Elsewhere, he contends that there is an indefinite range of rational modes, 
“as wide in fact as human experience itself.” TCFK, 87. 
130 “So far as theological science is concerned, the created universe must be regarded as 
having been given and as sustained in its rational order, only in so far as it is open upward toward God 
the Maker of all things visible and invisible. That is to say, as a unitary intelligible whole the universe 
must be thought of as ultimately integrated from above through the creative bearing upon it of the 
Trinitarian relations in God himself.” CTSC, 39. 
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knowledge which prohibit a strict isolationism among academic disciplines.131 Alister 
E. McGrath correctly notes, “Torrance’s approach thus allows for the affirmation of a 
universal scientific method [by which he means the ontologically-determined 
dynamic] on the one hand, and the particularity of theology on the other, avoiding the 
potential weakness of Barth’s approach while maintaining the uniqueness of theology 
as an intellectual discipline.”132 Therefore, Torrance’s ontologically-determined 
epistemological pluralism, which includes his notion of a multi-levelled structure of 
reality, simultaneously overcomes the problems of reductionism and foundationalism, 
strategically locating the knowledge of God in the postmodern, scientific age. We will 
further explore the place of knowledge of God within the emergent, stratified cosmos 
in chapter five. 
If one accepts Torrance’s axiom that the nature of God determines how we 
know God, then this raises two questions. What aspects of God’s nature are 
epistemically-formative? And then, specifically how do these aspects of God’s nature 
determine how we know God? We will explore aspects of God’s nature which are 
especially epistemologically-determinative in chapter three. For now, it suffices to 
note that the knowledge of God for Torrance is, like all other types of knowledge, 
ontologically-determined. We initially conclude that this is a viable notion for the 
postmodern, scientific era, yet we will return and develop its viability further in 
relation to other dynamics in subsequent chapters. Like the previous dynamic, this 
epistemological dynamic provides support for all other dynamics of the knowledge of 
God for Torrance, especially for the next dynamic: the knowledge of God is 
Trinitarian. 
 
2.4 Trinitarian 
 
Most centrally for Torrance, the knowledge of God is Trinitarian. Because 
scientific (or disciplined) knowledge is ontologically-determined for Torrance, the 
focus of theology is not to be religious phenomenology or the subjective experience 
of the theologian. Rather, theology is to concentrate on God and how God has 
                                                 
131 TS, 108: “If there were no basic unity in natural science, then the more profound and 
specialized our knowledge in the particular fields became, the greater would be our bewilderment and 
confusion. But, if there were no special sciences, we would have an extremely monotonous world with 
one uniform method, eliminating, or at least failing woefully to do justice to, the manifold riches of 
nature and experience.”  See also, STR, 189. 
132 McGrath, T. F. Torrance: An Intellectual Biography, 235. 
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revealed Himself, namely “through Jesus Christ” and “in the Holy Spirit.”133 
Following Karl Barth, Torrance maintained that the Trinitarian object of revelation 
gives revelation its distinctive form and order.134 Thus, as science aims to expose the 
rationality of its proper object, so theological science aims to disclose the rationality 
of the Triune God.135 As Torrance put it, “There must be a ‘Trinitarian’ character in 
our knowing of God, corresponding to the trinity of relations in God himself.”136 As 
theology’s “proper object,” the Triune God determines all epistemological dynamics 
for the knowledge of God. Torrance held that the Trinity is “the ultimate ground of 
theological knowledge of God, the basic grammar of theology, for it is there that we 
find our knowledge of God reposing upon the final Reality of God himself, grounded 
in the ultimate relations intrinsic to God’s own Being, which govern and control all 
true knowledge of him from beginning to end.”137 Hence, the Trinity is the most 
important dynamic in the knowledge of God for Torrance, governing all of its 
elements. We will further explore the centrality of the immanent Trinity and the 
importance of the “ultimate relations intrinsic to God’s own Being” for Torrance in 
chapter three and its implications for his epistemology in the remainder of the thesis. 
As mentioned (2.2), a unique dimension to the knowledge of God is that its 
“Object” has given Himself to be known.138 Unlike other sciences where one seeks 
after the intelligibility of the object, God discloses Himself.139 We come to know God 
not from an a priori epistemology that pre-determines how knowledge of God ought 
                                                 
133 Note the Trinitarian structure of TIR: “The Knowledge of God,” “Through Jesus Christ,” 
“In the Holy Spirit.” However, his most important epistemological discussions of the Trinity and the 
implications for knowledge of God are Chapter 6, “The Basic Grammar of Theology” in GGT, 146-78 
and “The Trinitarian Structure of Theology” in RST, 160-206. A primary contribution of Karl Barth 
that Torrance continued is the close connection between revelation and the Trinity for “revelation is 
God revealing Himself.” Barth, CD I.1, 295-304. For discussion of this theme in Barth, see Mueller, 
Karl Barth, 61-85; Webster, Karl Barth, 57-64. For Torrance on Barth, KBBET, 83-120, 193-97; Karl 
Barth: An Introduction to His Early Theology, 113-18. 
134 KBBET, 118-20. On 119, Torrance notes that Barth “did not build the doctrine [of the 
Trinity] through adducing explicit biblical statements, so much as through an analysis of the basic 
structure of divine revelation.” 
135 GR, vii, 6, 45-46, 97-98; TS, ix, 205-6; RST, 160-62. 
136 GGT, 148; Also, RST, 167, 178-200. 
137 GGT, 158-9; Also, TCFK, 95-96. 
138 Like Karl Barth, God’s self-revelation is the basis of Torrance’s theology and provides a 
“twofold objectivity.” For Barth and Torrance, this was in direct opposition to Feuerbach’s critique that 
all theological language is ultimately anthropological. For Barth, CD I.2, 1-25; II.1, 292-7; See also 
Busch, The Great Passion, 72-76; Hunsinger, Karl Barth, 35-39. For Torrance, TS, 32, 135-40. For 
Torrance on Barth, KBBET, 69-71, 77-78, 83-99. 
139 TS, 37-8, 46-54. 
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to be found, but rather we come to know God from engaging the ways that He gives 
Himself to be known.140 As Torrance succinctly put it,  
 
We have to remind ourselves unceasingly that in our knowing of God, 
God always comes first, that in a genuine theology we do not think out 
of a centre in ourselves but out of a centre in God and his activity in 
grace toward us. Hence when we are engaged in dialogue with modern 
thought in its science and philosophy we must not try to bring 
knowledge of God down to the level of man’s natural understanding, 
for we may not formulate our understanding of God on any ground 
lower than that which he has provided in revealing himself to us.141  
 
Therefore, knowledge of God comes from God and out of God and is thus “theo-
logical.”142 Scientific theology, in turn, responds obediently to God’s self-giving and 
self-presenting.143 Knowledge of God is made possible by God’s will and is a product 
of sheer grace.144 In other words, knowledge of God and consequently theology is 
established by its givenness.145 In the remainder of this chapter, we will discover how 
Torrance conceived that God has given himself to be known, namely through the Son 
and the Spirit. 
God has given Himself to be known through the incarnation of Jesus Christ in 
a definitive way.146 “The incarnation involves a hypostatic union not only between the 
Word of God and the word of man, the Rationality of God and the rationality of man, 
but between the uncreated Truth of God and the created truth of this world which God 
has made and to which we belong.”147 Since space, time and the other rational 
contingencies of creation were made through the Christ as the divine agent of 
                                                 
140 TS, 9-10, 26-27. See page 9, note 28 on particularism. 
141 TIR, 9. 
142 TS, 29, 182, 213; RET, 21-23; GR, 67-68, 182. On 81, Torrance quipped that theological 
knowledge takes the “road from God to man before the road of man to God.” 
143 TS, ix, 192. 
144 TIR, 110-11; TS, 37-38, 46-47, 157, 299-300; RST, 25: “If our theological concepts do 
terminate upon God, they do so only in virtue of his grace, and cannot therefore import any kind of 
necessary or logical relation to him even though they arise in our understanding under the pressure of 
God’s self disclosure”; RET, 123-24, 148-49. In n. 1, Torrance approvingly quotes H.R. Mackintosh, 
The Christian Apprehension of God: “All religious knowledge of God, wherever existing comes by 
revelation; otherwise we should be committed to the incredible position that man can know God 
without His willing to be known.” TS, 47. Torrance follows Barth by holding to the epistemological 
implications of the doctrine of justification by grace alone. TIR, 26, 162-64; GGT, 90; TCFK, 211-12, 
291-92. 
145 TS, 27-29, 40, 196. 
146 Throughout his epistemological writings, Torrance gave much attention to the incarnation 
and its relationship to epistemology. TIR, 30-45, 51-52, 128-49; STI, 52-90; TS, 46-54; GR, 45, 137-64, 
166; RET, 84-101, 125-27, 137-45; CTSC, 95-9; GGT, 39-41, 47-49, 107-9, 114-19, 132-36; DCO, 23-
25, 33, 134-42; RST, 86-91, 156-57, 183-92; STR, 1-26; TCFK, vii, 100-1; CFM, 10, 17-18, 26, 30-33. 
147 RET, 125. 
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creation, the incarnation is not an intrusion. Rather, it is the bringing of “his own 
creative being redemptively to bear upon our existence from within it.”148 The 
incarnation is the concrete place and time within the physical and tensed cosmos 
which gives knowledge of God who is beyond space and time. God “assumes created 
truth and rationality and makes them His own although He is distinct from them.”149 
The incarnation has provided “a real and rational relation” suited to human rationality 
within creation and history with a rationality that transcends both creation and 
history.150  For Torrance, we cannot know God except in accordance with His self-
revelation in the creaturely and historical event of the incarnation.151 From his earliest 
lectures forward, Torrance maintained the Christian tradition that “the incarnation of 
God in human form, Jesus of Nazareth, means the possibility of speech and thought 
about God” by humans.152 Yet, we note a distinctive emphasis within Torrance’s 
thought on the incarnation. 
The incarnation includes a two-fold movement of God within humanity for 
Torrance. God has adapted Himself to be known by humans and likewise, God adapts 
humanity so that humans might know Him.153 By bringing us into relationship with 
Him, we are “made capable of knowing Him.”154 The incarnation provides not only 
revelation, but moreover reconciliation which facilitates knowledge of God. In other 
words, through the incarnation, theological epistemology is bound up within 
soteriology.155 Therefore, revelation and reconciliation are inseparable.156 Before the 
incarnation, God formed Israel as a womb to conceptually prepare the world to 
receive the revealing and reconciling work of Christ.157 Jesus Christ came within 
Israel as the Word of God perfectly spoken as well as the Word of God perfectly 
received.158 Through the incarnation, God has broken into the closed circle of human 
ignorance and inability to know God and established knowledge of God.159  
                                                 
148 DCO, 24. 
149 STI, 65. 
150 STI, 13. See also 17, 23-24, 52-53. 
151 STI, 74. 
152 “The Christian Doctrine of Revelation,” The Auburn Lectures, 1938-1939 (The Thomas F. 
Torrance Manuscript Collection. Special Collections, Princeton Theological Seminary Library), 34; 
Also, “The Knowledge of God,” 5-6: “Revelation is the ground and possibility of knowledge of God.” 
153 TS, 45-54. 
154 GR, 165. 
155 TS, 41. 
156 TIR, 132. 
157 GR, 149; RET, 87. 
158 TS, 50-51; RET, 86. 
159 TS, 51. 
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God has also given Himself to be known through the Holy Spirit in a 
definitive way for Torrance. The Holy Spirit is essential for the knowledge of God for 
“we do not have any knowledge of God apart from the Spirit.”160 The Spirit is the 
personal presence of God who acts out of His own divine Being, bringing knowledge 
from the side of God and working within us to obtain that knowledge.161 In the 
beginning of Theological Science, Torrance offered a personal testimony to his 
experience of God’s presence. 
 
If I may be allowed to speak personally for a moment, I 
find the presence and being of God bearing upon my 
experience and thought so powerfully that I cannot but 
be convinced of His overwhelming reality and 
rationality. To doubt the existence of God would be an 
act of sheer irrationality, for it would be that my reason 
had become unhinged from its bond with real being. Yet 
in knowing God I am deeply aware that my relation to 
Him has been damaged, that disorder has resulted in my 
mind, and that it is I who obstruct knowledge of God by 
getting in between Him and myself, as it were. But I am 
also aware that His presence presses unrelentingly upon 
me through the disorder of my mind, for He will not let 
Himself be thwarted by it, challenging and repairing it, 
and requiring of me on my part to yield my thoughts to 
His healing and controlling revelation.162 
 
The Spirit brings the being and nature of God upon humans, compelling us to think in 
response to the weight of His reality.163 In line with John Calvin, Torrance maintained 
that the Spirit bridges the gap between God and human thought and language.164  
                                                 
160 GR, 165. His chapter called “The Epistemological Relevance of the Spirit” is the critical 
discussion, 165-192. 
161 GR, 171-74. 
162 TS, ix. 
163 GR, 167, 175-76. 
164 Concerning Torrance’s interpretation of Calvin’s doctrine of the Spirit in relation to 
knowledge and speech about God, TIR, 93: “Now the relation of language to being takes on a different 
form in accordance with the nature of being we are concerned with, creaturely being or the Creator 
source of all being. In this regard the Spirit of God is to be understood as the living action of the 
Creator upon which we rely for the effective actualization of the relation between language and the 
divine Being. That is the epistemological relevance of the doctrine of the Spirit for Calvin’s theology. 
No work of ours can establish a bridge between our understanding and the Truth of God. Knowledge of 
God is in accordance with his nature as Spirit, and takes its rise from his living personal action upon us. 
The relation between our statements about God and God himself in his own Truth is not one that we 
can create or describe in statements, but one that we can only allow to happen to us and which we 
accept in yielding our minds and speech obediently and gratefully to his revealing and saving acts. 
Christian theology is therefore ultimately a scientia practica. Full place for that divine action must be 
given in any true account of theological knowledge … It is the Spirit who provides transparence in our 
knowledge and language of God.” Distinct from Calvin’s discussion of the testimony of the Spirit is his 
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The Spirit is not independent within the Being of God. Nor does the Spirit 
operate independently of the rest of the persons of the Trinity. Rather, the Spirit 
brings the revealing and reconciling work of the Father accomplished through the Son 
to bear upon humanity.165 He effaces Himself to show us “the Face of the Father in 
the Face of the Son.” Though the Spirit is of one substance with the Father and of one 
substance with the Son, He directs us to the Father through the Son.166 The Spirit is 
distinct but inseparably related to the Father and the Son. 
The Holy Spirit creates in humans the capacity to know God. Within the 
grace-formed creation, God has given humans a “sense of the presence of God” unless 
it is suppressed.167 God’s Spirit works within creation and from within humans to 
“open us up subjectively toward Himself.”168 The Spirit facilitates and readies our 
epistemic capabilities for the knowledge of God, creating in us the “capacity to hear, 
recognize and apprehend Him.” Instead of suppressing rational capabilities, the Holy 
Spirit uses the creaturely realities of concepts, language, and speech as the media of 
revelation. 169 He then helps us to relate theological language to ordinary language.170 
Furthermore, the Spirit rehabilitates our relationship with fellow humans, creating a 
community of people who have been opened to know God. Theological knowledge is 
obtained within this community.171 Additionally, because “scientific” knowledge is 
ontologically-determined, knowledge must be in accordance with the nature of its 
Object, including its own demonstration. Hence a “divine Object requires a divine 
demonstration.” The Spirit of God provides demonstration for the knowledge of God. 
Demonstration is controlled by the Object as the Spirit provides His own 
demonstration.172 Concisely put, the Spirit is the presence of God who creates and 
sharpens the epistemic tools that produce the knowledge of God within humanity. 
Torrance demonstrated the biblical roots of the doctrine of the Trinity173 and 
traced its development to the Nicene creed.174 He maintained the tradition of 
                                                                                                                                            
concept of the “illumination” of the Spirit throughout his Institutes of the Christian Religion. See 
Edward A. Dowey, Jr., The Knowledge of God in Calvin’s Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 
1994), 172-91. 
165 GR, 179-83. 
166 GR, 166-8. 
167 TS, 103. On God’s creation made from grace and not necessity, DCO, 34-5. 
168 TS, 52. 
169 GR, 21, 168, 183-88. 
170 TS, 292-95. 
171 GR, 188-89. 
172 TS, 139; See also GR, 21-22; BSCL, 2-3. 
173 CDG, 32-72. 
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Trinitarian theology with a distinctively Barthian influence.175 His primary works on 
the Trinity were not written to develop an epistemology but for the doctrine of 
God.176 He then accented the two-fold movement of the incarnation and the Spirit. 
While his doctrinal works are not primarily epistemological, there are significant 
epistemological implications of his doctrine of the Trinity which we will explore in 
the remainder of this thesis.177 Chapter three will probe more deeply into aspects of 
Torrance’s doctrine of the Trinity that are epistemologically-formative, taking us to 
the heart of his epistemology. Chapters four and five will expand the implications of 
the Trinity for epistemology beyond what Torrance emphasized, but still within his 
Trinitarian framework. Chapter four will explore how a Trinitarian-shaped 
epistemology means that knowledge of God is personal and relational. Chapter five 
will discuss how a Trinitarian knowledge of God is participatory, involving the whole 
person and a way of life. In continuity with the previous dynamic, we close with a 
preliminary comment about the Trinity as an epistemological dynamic for the 
postmodern, scientific age before its fuller development in the remainder of the thesis. 
The previous dynamic demonstrated that knowledge of God is ontologically-
determined for Torrance. We have here introduced the content of this particular 
ontology, the Triune God. So, in this way, Torrance’s Trinitarian epistemological 
dynamic is particularist and challenges modernist reductionism. Knowledge of God 
cannot be reducible to the epistemological rules and standards which are at work in 
physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, or sociology in order to be considered 
knowledge. Each of these disciplines deal with unique complexities which cannot be 
reduced to lower levels and their epistemological criteria. Likewise, knowledge of 
God requires God-level or theological explanations which give shape to its distinctive 
form. In this way, working within a stratified and complex framework, Torrance, like 
Barth before him, may be considered a proto-typical postmodern, or at least as helpful 
to move us beyond modern reductionism.178  
                                                                                                                                            
174 CDG, 73-111. TF is his book-length exposition of the Nicene creed. 
175 Torrance acknowledges “the influence of Greek patristic and Reformed theology, with 
particular acknowledgements of debt to Athanasius the Great, Hugh Ross Mackintosh and Karl Barth” 
on his thought on the Trinity in CDG, ix. 
176 See especially CDG, TF, and TP. 
177 For Torrance, the Trinity and salvation are not collapsed into an epistemology, particularly 
his doctrinal works. Reciprocally, his doctrine of God has ontological priority. His epistemological 
works, through written prior to his books on the doctrine of God, cohere and reflect a Trinitarian 
priority. 
178 See 1.2.1 and especially pg. 7, note 19 on Barth and postmodernity. 
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To further assess the viability of the knowledge of God in the postmodern, 
scientific age through a critique of Torrance does not mean merely making theological 
epistemology fit within the contours of another discipline or what is currently 
epistemologically fashionable in a given cultural context. Rather, a viable theological 
epistemology will have an incarnational and missional function. Therefore, there are 
aspects of the knowledge of God which will set well within the current philosophical 
milieu, while other aspects may prove to be a challenge to it. To have a Trinitarian 
epistemology, the cosmos-wide mission of God governs the knowledge of God, 
entering into the various historic and global cultures and their ways of knowing and, 
in some way, re-ordering and transforming them. In this way, knowledge of God is 
Trinitarian not only in form, but also in function.179 Chapters three through five will 
explore the viability of the Trinitarian dynamic—which is at the very heart of 
Torrance’s epistemology—and develop its epistemological implications beyond 
Torrance’s discussions. 
The Trinitarian epistemological dynamic is not ethereal or unearthy for 
Torrance for it is actualized through the work of the Son and Spirit in creation. This 
theme is developed and concretized in unique ways with the next epistemological 
dynamic which is that the knowledge of God is creation-situated.  
  
2.5 Creation-Situated 
 
Another unique emphasis of Torrance’s theology and theological 
epistemology was his contention that all knowledge of God occurs within the context 
of the space-time universe. This is closely connected with his scientific 
epistemological dynamic. To introduce what he called the “bounds of Christian 
theology,” Torrance wrote, 
 
It is distinctive of Christian theology that it treats of 
God in his relation to the world and of God in his 
relation to himself, not one without the other. If it did 
not include the former, we who belong to the world 
could have no part in it, and if it did not include the 
                                                 
179 On the relationship of mission and epistemology, see the excellent collection of essays in J. 
Andrew Kirk and Kevin J. Vanhoozer, To Stake a Claim: Mission and the Western Crisis of 
Knowledge (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1999). Furthermore, Paul G. Hiebert discusses his move from a 
positivist epistemology to a critical realism in Missiological Implication of Epistemological Shifts: 
Affirming Truth in a Modern/Postmodern World (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity International Press, 1999). 
On the Trinitarian form and function of mission, Leslie Newbigin, Trinitarian Doctrine for Today’s 
Mission (Milton Keynes, UK: Paternoster, 2001). 
77 
 
latter, it could be concerned only with a ‘knowledge of 
God’ dragged down and trapped within the world and 
our relations in it. Knowledge of God by us in our 
creaturely status within the world must indeed be 
knowledge of God in his interaction with us and the 
world he has made, but if it is to be knowledge of God, 
it must be grounded ultimately in the reality of God, in 
the inviolable otherness and intelligibility of God as he 
is in himself beyond our world altogether.180 
 
Without leaving the Trinitarian dynamic behind, Torrance repeatedly reminded his 
readers that knowledge of God occurs within the contingencies of the space-time 
universe.181 “It is in and through the universe of space and time that God has revealed 
himself to us in modes of rationality that he has conferred upon creation and upon us 
in the creation, and it is in and through the same universe of space and time that 
theology makes its disciplined response to God’s self-revelation.”182 Furthermore, 
Torrance held that space and time have a formative or regulative role not only in the 
structure of the universe, but in the way humans know.183 Knowledge of God is given 
and participated in within space-time, and thus its epistemically-regulative dimensions 
require attention. For Torrance, the task of the theologian is not to explore the 
physical universe, but as a creature of space and time to consider “the way in which 
we make use of the framework of thought in space-time” for theology.184 Arguing for 
the relationship between the rationality within creation and within humans, Torrance 
wrote,  
[T]he doctrine of creation also involves the idea that man himself, in 
mind as well as body, has been created out of nothing along with the 
universe, so that he is a constituent element in the created order of 
things as an essential ingredient in the complex of rational order 
intrinsic to the universe. The rationality of man and the rationality of 
the created universe belong inseparably together. Thus in creating the 
universe out of nothing God has conferred on it  a created or 
contingent rationality of its own, as distinct from his divine rationality 
as creaturely being is from his divine being, yet as dependent on his 
uncreated rationality as creaturely being is upon his own being. Thus 
God has given contingent rationality within the universe a place and an 
authority which we are obliged to respect, not only if we are to have 
rational knowledge of God through the medium of space and time 
                                                 
180 RET, 21. 
181 TS, 56-57; GR, 112-13; STI, passim; STR, passim; RET, 30-39; TNS, 35-60; BSCL, xvi-
xvii; GGT, 1-10; CFM, 22; CDG, 138; DCO, 1-4. 
182 GGT, 1. 
183 STR, 187. 
184 GR, 99.  
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where he communicates himself to us, but even if we are to investigate 
the contingent process of nature and discover their laws as far as they 
may be disclosed to us.185 
 
Therefore, Torrance gave special attention to the shift from Newtonian physics to 
Einstein’s theory of general relativity and its consequences for the concepts of space-
time.186 Through two historical-theological studies, he contended for a relational view 
over a container view of space and time and its consequences for theology.187 No 
other major theologian in twentieth-century accented these themes in the way 
Torrance did.  
As introduced in the Trinitarian dynamic, the incarnation has a determinative 
role in Christian theology for Torrance. The incarnation established Jesus Christ as 
“the place in all space and time where God meets man in the actualities of his human 
existence, and man meets with God and knows Him in His own divine Being.”188 Its 
concrete occurrence within space and time provides knowledge of God its 
actuality.189Adapting a Barthian theme, Torrance wrote, “What He is toward us He is 
eternally and antecedently in Himself, but what He is in Himself He is toward us 
within our life in space and time.”190 Through the incarnation and resurrection, God 
has anchored knowledge of himself within the space-time structures of creation.191 
While knowledge of God is unbounded in that God is unlimited, transcending space 
and time, the knowledge of God is also bounded by the way which God has chosen to 
relate to us in the world through the incarnation.192  
Deriving from the creation-situated dynamic, there are implications for the 
relationship between theology and science, or as Torrance put it, between the natural 
sciences and “theological science.” Torrance maintained that theologies of creation 
                                                 
185 DCO, 3-4.  
186 GR, 99-103; DCO, 62-84; TCFK, 263-83; RET, 32-33. 
187 On page v, Torrance states that the second of the threefold purpose of STI is “to examine 
the place of spatial and temporal ingredients in basic theological concepts and statements and to clarify 
the epistemological questions they involve.” In this short book, he examines the concept especially of 
space in Nicene theology, modern theology and the implications for the doctrine of incarnation in 
particular. He gives more attention to the concept of time in STR. 
188 STI, 75; Also RET, 36-37, 89; CFM, 32. 
189 TS, 26-27. 
190 TS, 208. 
191 STR, 177-79. On 178: “Hence nothing that Jesus Christ was, taught and did is to be 
understood and interpreted through any kind of abstraction form the spatio-temporal structures and 
conditions of concrete human existence.” 
192 RET, 24-25. The transcendent dynamic of the knowledge of God will be explored further 
below (2.7). 
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give impetus for the development of science and some of its basic concepts.193 
Consequently, because both knowledge of God and knowledge of the natural world 
occur within the same creation, Torrance contended “we are obliged to bring our 
belief and knowledge of God to expression in the patterns of thought and speech 
which we gain under the impact of God’s creation upon us.” He continued, “Theology 
and science arise and take shape within the one world which God has made and upon 
which he has conferred the rational order that makes it accessible to our scientific 
inquiries.”194 Both occur in the medium of the space-time universe with its contingent 
intelligibilities, yet “one to investigate creaturely relations out of themselves, apart 
from God, and the other to inquire of God who transcends all creaturely relations and 
makes Himself known through his Word as the Lord of all space and time.”195 To be 
sure, theology and the natural sciences had different ends and means for Torrance.196 
Yet, there was a contextual overlap between them within the creation.197 This led him 
primarily to make epistemological or methodological analogies. However, it also led 
to his concern for theoretical correlation which he defined as follows: 
 
Empirical correlates have an essential place in any theology that seeks 
to be faithful both to the creation and to the incarnation…If we cannot 
cut off knowledge of God either from the world of which he is the 
Creator of from ourselves who are creatures of this world, then 
theological concepts and statements can have meaning for us only 
when they are coordinated with empirical reality…This is not to argue 
that every theological concept or statement must have a specific 
empirical correlate, but that theological concepts and statements have a 
proper place in a coherent system which at certain points is correlated 
with the empirical world.198 
 
                                                 
193 GGT, 44-74. Here, Torrance describes how three foundational Christian theological ideas 
about creation have enabled science: (1) the rational unity of the universe; (2) the contingent rationality 
or intelligibility of the universe; (3) the contingent freedom of the universe. For his expanded 
discussion of contingence and a contingent order, see DCO. 
194 BSCL, xvi-xvii. This is also the basic argument of John C. Polkinghorne in his One World: 
The Interaction of Science and Theology (1986; repr. West Conshohocken, PA: Templeton Foundation 
Press, 2007), esp. 115-16. 
195 RET, 30. 
196 See the ontologically-determined dynamic above (2.3). BSCL, xvi-xvii: “This does not 
imply that belief in God and knowledge of him are built upon the foundations of natural science, for 
they have their own proper ground in the self-revelation of God, but since that takes place within this 
world of space and time into which natural science inquires, we are obliged to bring our belief and 
knowledge of God to expression in the patterns of thought and speech which we gain under the impact 
of God’s creation upon us.” 
 
197 RET, 30-39. 
198 RET, 34-35. 
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Torrance sought correlation between knowledge of God and knowledge of the world. 
He placed the theologian alongside the scientist asserting that both are dedicated to 
the exploration and understanding of the universe.199 He maintained that theology 
“cannot pursue its activity in a sealed-off enclave of its own, but it must take up the 
relevant problems and questions posed by the other sciences in clarifying knowledge 
of its own subject matter.”200 Torrance’s correlative intention is noteworthy. In 
defining the discipline of systematic theology, John Webster recently wrote that it 
attempts to offer a “conceptual articulation of Christian claims about God and 
everything else in relation to God,” which often includes coordinating Christian 
thinking with other forms of intellectual activity outside theology.201 The concern for 
external coherence resonates with that of Thomas Aquinas when he wrote, “Now all 
things are dealt with in sacra doctrina in terms of God, either because they are God 
himself or because they are relative to him as their origin and end.”202 Torrance’s 
concern to engage the sciences fits within this traditional concern for theoretical or 
theological correlation. Torrance also sought epistemological correlation with the 
sciences and used scientific, methodological analogies because, for him, knowledge 
of God was creation-situated. Torrance’s concern for various levels of correlation 
between theology and the natural sciences distinguished his approach from that of 
Karl Barth.203 Furthermore, these correlations led Torrance to contend for a revision 
of natural theology.204 
                                                 
199 RST, 122-23. 
200 ST, viii. 
201 John Webster, “Introduction: Systematic Theology,” in The Oxford Handbook of 
Systematic Theology, ed. John Webster, Kathryn Tanner, and Iain Torrance (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), 1-3, 6-9.  In agreement with Webster, Paul S. Fiddes described systematic theology as a 
“connectional theology, aiming to make links within the Christian faith, with the world and other 
disciplines in our culture.” Paul S. Fiddes, “Concept, Image and Story in Systematic Theology” 
International Journal of Systematic Theology 11, no. 1 (January, 2009):  3-23 (quotation on 4). 
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Williams, “What is Systematic Theology?” International Journal of Systematic Theology 11, no. 1 
(January 2009): 40-55. 
202 Aquinas, ST, I.1.7. 
203 TCFK, x: “However, what Karl Barth did not seem to appreciate adequately, was the fact 
that since God makes himself known to us in the created universe where he has placed us and therefore 
in and through the spatio-temporal structures and intelligibilities of the universe which, under God, are 
more and more disclosed to our scientific inquiries, there are basic interconnections between 
theological concepts and natural scientific concepts which have to be brought to light, if we are to do 
full justice both to our knowledge of God and to knowledge of the created order.” 
204 RST, 69: “[T]here is a necessary and inescapable connection between theological concepts 
and physical concepts, spiritual and natural concepts, positive and natural theology, or rather between 
theological science and natural science, for it is in that connection that the changed status of natural 
theology has its place.” Such correlation is one of five functions of natural theology delineated by 
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By emphasizing the context of the space-time universe, Torrance extended 
beyond the Barthian emphasis but continued with the same epistemological 
framework centered in God’s grace and Triune self-revelation. This is clearly 
demonstrated by Torrance’s revised notion of natural theology.205 Barth’s repudiation 
of natural theology is well-known. Before Barth, a dominant strand of Catholic 
interpretation of Thomas Aquinas defended the possibility of the knowledge of God 
by the light of human reason, philosophy and what came to be regarded as natural 
theology.206 Barth outright rejected the possibility of a natural knowledge of God. 207 
With Barth, Torrance held that the actual knowledge of God mediated through God’s 
self-revelation in Jesus undermined idolatrous attempts to obtain knowledge of God 
beyond that self-revelation.208 He held this view from his earliest lectures.209 Yet, 
with Torrance’s attempts to correlate theology with the natural sciences, he articulated 
a revised natural theology which he claimed was anchored in a proper reading of 
Barth. He argued that “what Barth objects to in natural theology is not its rational 
structure but its independent character, i.e. the autonomous rational structure which it 
develops on the ground of ‘nature alone’ in abstraction from the active self-disclosure 
of the living God.”210 Thus, Torrance argued for a natural theology which, he believed 
                                                                                                                                            
David Fergusson which he considers commensurate with the Barthian paradigm. David Fergusson, 
“Types of Natural Theology,” in The Evolution of Rationality: Interdisciplinary Essays in Honor of J. 
Wentzel van Huysteen, ed. F. Leron Shults (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2006), 380-93. 
205 Thomas F. Torrance, “The Problem of Natural Theology in the Thought of Karl Barth,” 
Religious Studies 6 (1970): 121-35; reprinted in TCFK, chapter 9, “Natural Theology in the Thought of 
Karl Barth,” 285-301; also reprinted in KBBET, chapter 5, “Natural Theology in the Thought of Karl 
Barth,” 136-159. Further discussions include GGT, chapter 4, “The Transformation of Natural 
Theology,” 75-109; RET, 30-34; RST, chapter 2, “The Status of Natural Theology,” 32-63. 
206 Henri Bouillard, The Knowledge of God, trans. Samuel D. Femiano (London: Burns & 
Oates, 1969), 20-62. Although, more nuanced readings of Thomas delineate some of the incompatible 
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Thomas on the priority of grace and revelation. Fergus Kerr, After Aquinas: Versions of Thomism 
(Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2002), 20-62; Eugene F. Rogers, Jr., Thomas Aquinas and Karl 
Barth: Sacred Doctrine and the Natural Knowledge of God (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1995), esp. 17-70, 183-202. 
207 Emil Brunner and Karl Barth, Natural Theology: Comprising “Nature and Grace” by 
Professor Dr. Emil Brunner and the Reply “No!” by Dr. Karl Barth (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 
2002), 65-128; Barth, CD II.1, 63-254. However, more positively, cf. Barth, CD IV.3.1, 139. 
208 TF, 51; CDG, 24-25; KBBET, 141-43, 147-48. 
209 See especially his “The Christian Doctrine of Revelation,” The Auburn Lectures, 1938-
1939 (The Thomas F. Torrance Manuscript Collection. Special Collections, Princeton Theological 
Seminary Library), 11-12; “The Knowledge of God,” The Auburn Lectures, 1938-1939 (The Thomas 
F. Torrance Manuscript Collection. Special Collections, Princeton Theological Seminary Library), 12-
16. 
210 TCFK, 293-94; KBBET, 147. Or, as he put in GGT, 89: “Barth’s real objection to 
traditional natural theology rested on theological and scientific grounds. It is the actual content of our 
knowledge of God, together with the scientific method that inheres in it that excludes any movement of 
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Barth maintained, is included within revealed theology.211 Torrance used the analogy 
of the relation of geometry to physics to illustrate, claiming Barth’s verbal 
approval.212 Eucledian geometry is a distorting abstraction unless it is understood 
within the framework of physics and the space-time universe. Likewise, natural 
theology as an independent scheme is barren unless it is embedded within revealed or 
positive theology. Instead of allowing creation to interpret revelation, Torrance 
reversed the order, saying that in light of revelation, we can appropriately interpret 
creation. While creation can reflect the beauty and rationality of God and even raise 
questions at the boundaries of the sciences,213 no logical bridge exists between the 
world and God for Torrance.214 Torrance’s notion of natural theology allows 
knowledge of God to occur only within and as a consequence of God’s self-
revelation. This view of natural theology enabled him to retain the Barthian priority of 
the necessity and sufficiency of God’s Triune self-revelation and yet uniquely engage 
in dialogue between theology and the natural sciences. Yet, Torrance has been 
criticized for violating the Barthian paradigm. James Barr criticized, 
[P]eople who were very much in the Barthian line of thought began to 
talk as if some kind of natural theology…might after all be acceptable 
and even necessary – but all this without dismantling the earlier basic 
structures of Barthian theology which had, beyond all doubt, taken the 
absolute denial of natural theology as a central and non-negotiable 
position. 215 
 
More recently, Paul Molnar who is quite sympathetic to Torrance on most counts, 
critiques Torrance’s extension into natural theology as a departure from the Barthian 
paradigm.216 However, W. Travis McMaken adequately defends Torrance’s 
“reformulated natural theology,” contending that Molnar has conflated Torrance’s 
                                                                                                                                            
thought that arises on some other, independent ground as ultimately irrelevant and as an inevitable 
source of confusion when it is adduced as a second or coordinate basis for positive theology.” 
211 While appreciating Torrance’s engagement with the sciences, Rodney Holder criticizes 
Torrance’s Barthian prioritizing of revelation and faith, arguing for a more traditional natural theology 
which is free-standing. Rodney D. Holder, “Thomas Torrance: ‘Retreat to Commitment or a New Place 
for Natural Theology?’” Theology and Science 7, no. 3 (November 2009): 275-96. 
212 TCFK, 294-95/KB: B&ET, 148-49. GGT, 91-2; STR, ix-xi. 
213 RET, 10-11: “Now since God has endowed his creation with a rationality and beauty of its 
own in created correspondence to his transcendent rationality and beauty, the more the created universe 
unfolds its marvelous symmetries and harmonies to our scientific inquiries, the more it is bound to 
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214 RET, 32. 
215 For instance, James Barr, Biblical Faith and Natural Theology, 13. He then cites Torrance 
in note 18.  
216 Paul D. Molnar, “Natural Theology Revisited: A Comparison of T. F. Torrance and Karl 
Barth” in Zeitshrift für dialektische theologie 20, no. 1 (December 2005): 53-83; Molnar, Thomas F. 
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view with the traditional notion of natural theology and that Torrance admits no 
natural knowledge of God as a condition, but as a consequence of revealed 
knowledge.217 Similarly, Alister E. McGrath contends, “One of Torrance’s most 
significant theological achievements concerns his careful relocation of the place of 
natural theology within the Reformed tradition in general, and the Barthian heritage in 
particular.”218 While Molnar critiques McGrath for going beyond Torrance,219 it does 
not seem that Torrance has betrayed but extended the Barthian paradigm. David 
Fergusson has helpfully categorized five functions or types of natural theology in their 
respective contexts and described Barth’s relation to these five types. The last two 
types are a posteriori approaches, not proceeding independently of revelation but 
from faith convictions. Specifically, type five involves the correlation of the Christian 
faith with other fields of knowledge which Fergusson suggests is not unnecessary and 
dangerous, but a “necessary element of the church’s pastoral and educational 
work.”220 Fergusson identifies T. F. Torrance’s type of natural theology with this 
coordinating function.221 Consequently, Torrance’s revised notion of natural theology 
guards against reducing theology to a lower level of explanation yet remains engaged 
with the natural sciences. As with Barth’s rejection of natural theology, knowledge of 
God for Torrance was not based upon a lower anthropological or cosmological level 
(see 1.2.1), yet found analogies with the epistemological methods of the natural 
sciences. These two simultaneous moves, avoiding reductionism and engaging with 
the sciences, uniquely situate his notion of the knowledge for the postmodern, 
scientific age. 
Torrance’s creation-situated dynamic is also suitable for the postmodern, 
scientific age in another important way. A postmodern epistemological theme 
emphasizes the contextualization or rootedness of all knowledge. As Paul Murray has 
summarized, “For such [postfoundationalist] thinkers all human knowing is embedded 
                                                 
217 W. Travis McMaken, “The Impossibility of Natural Knowledge of God in T. F. Torrance’s 
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in and variously influenced by historical location (Hegel, Dewey), socio-political 
context (Marx), psychological factors (Freud) and shared patterns of behavior and 
linguistic practice (Pierce, Wittgenstein, Sellars et al).”222 In other words, there is no 
“view from nowhere.”223 Torrance has given focused attention to a broader context 
that has received less attention in discussions of postmodernity, namely the space-
time universe. While emphasizing this context, he has not fallen prey to a reductionist 
account, but has held to the notion of a stratified, complex universe in which 
knowledge of God occurs. For example, using the scientific analogy of “dual control,” 
Torrance noted, “Both in engineering and biology we operate with operational 
principles over and above the laws of physics and chemistry which obtain at a lower 
level, but which are open to control from beyond themselves at their boundary 
conditions.”224 Torrance continued that while engineering and biology are dependent 
upon the lower levels of chemistry and physics, they are not explainable by reference 
only to those levels, but also must include the distinctive higher-level aspects of 
organization which are not reducible. Similarly, Torrance observed that the 
resurrection of Jesus contains “spatiotemporal coordinates and connections” as well as 
divine activity. To deal faithfully with the resurrection of Jesus in a complex, 
stratified reality, Torrance advocated that his readers “think conjunctively” on 
multiple levels at the same time.225 Likewise, knowledge of God has taken on the 
forms of thought within space and time, but it cannot be reduced to these 
contingencies for it transcends them. As he clearly put it,  
 
Because its proper Object is personal, human, historical, etc., 
theological knowledge overlaps with other kinds of knowledge which 
involve the personal, human, historical, etc., but because it is 
knowledge of divine Truth in personal, human, historical forms, 
theological knowledge cannot be reduced or resolved into these other 
kinds of knowledge. It has a fundamental mode of rational activity that 
transcends them all and yet never leaves them behind.226  
 
                                                 
222 Murray, Reason, Truth and Theology, 5. 
223 The title comes from Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1986). This is a principle argument of postfoundationalist epistemologies. On 
postfoundationalism, see above note 116. 
224 RET, 38. 
225 RET, 37-39. 
226 TS, 204. This perspective explains why knowledge of God is both like and unlike other 
types of knowledge, including the sciences, adequately overcoming the critique of Klinefelter 
referenced in note 31. 
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The knowledge of God, because it is creation-situated, can find comparison with other 
types of knowledge, but because God is transcendent and radically other than 
creation, it cannot be reduced to anything within creation. Working within a 
nonreductionist and complex ontological framework, Torrance capitalized on how our 
notion of the space-time universe has implications for knowledge of God in an age 
which is particularly sensitive to context and complexity. Thus, his creation-situated 
dynamic is well-suited for the postmodern, scientific age. 
 
2.6 Essentially rational and conceptual 
 
Because the knowledge of God is situated within an orderly and rational 
creation for Torrance, it is also essentially rational and conceptual. From his earliest 
lectures, Torrance held that knowledge of God is neither sub-rational, irrational, nor 
even supra-rational, but rational.227 Torrance did not use the term “reason” simply to 
refer to the internal faculties of the mind, but frequently as the human capacity for 
objectivity. In other words, reason is the capability of thought to recognize and 
respond appropriately to the nature of reality presented. Therefore, knowledge occurs 
when the rationality inherent in the nature of things is apprehended by human 
rationality. As Torrance clearly put it, “The basic act of knowledge is not creative or 
inventive…The basic act of knowledge is one in which the reason acts in accordance 
with the nature of the given object, that is, acknowledges and recognizes it, so that it 
attains its essential conceptuality as it lets its thinking follow the inherent rationality 
of the given.”228 Accordingly, the rationality of God leads to the rational recognition 
of God by humans. Consequently, the attempt of apophaticism for wordless or non-
conceptual mystical experience is a mistaken direction according to Torrance, because 
rationality, word and speech are in the very Being of God.229 Nevertheless, Torrance 
allowed for a “non-conceptual element” in the knowledge of God that aims to 
                                                 
227 From his earliest lectures, Torrance contended against anti-intellectualism, arguing that 
“the Holy Spirit does not work with men in sub-rational or non-intelligible ways in the hearts of men.” 
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“safeguard an empirical relation to the divine Being, in the recognition that you 
cannot convert true relation to being simply into a statement.”230 Hence, he reserved a 
place for mystical theology providing an “extra-logical relation to God,” nevertheless 
even that remained closely connected to rationality for Torrance. He self-admittedly 
rarely used the term “mystical.”231 But on the occasion that he used the term mystical 
theology, he used it to refer to holding the mind “ontologically upon God himself” to 
sustain the “nonformalisable, intuitive relation to God” and to keep the mind “ever 
open toward the inexhaustible Mystery of God’s Love.”232  Rationality is an 
important tether for Torrance’s epistemological discussions. Given this emphasis, 
faith for Torrance is not beyond reason, but rather the “proper behaviour of the reason 
in accordance with the nature of the divine Object.”233 Thus, a consistent dynamic for 
Torrance is that the knowledge of God is a fully rational event.234 
 Consequently, the knowledge of God is essentially conceptual in its cognitive 
apprehension and articulation for Torrance. The incarnation within the intelligible 
structures of space and time make a real conception of God possible. A “non-
cognitive” revelation or faith reflects a “fatal deistic disjunction between God and the 
world which does not allow for any real Word of God to cross the gulf between God 
and the creature or therefore to permit man in space and time any real knowledge of 
God as he is in himself.”235 Torrance admitted that what is “conceived” is determined 
by the conceiver as well as by the nature of what is conceived. Yet, the nature of the 
object conceptually conceived governs the type of concepts that are born.236 Hence, 
Torrance contended for a bi-polar structure of concepts with their respective 
subjective and objective poles. On the subjective end, concepts are rooted in social 
and linguistic structures. Yet, for concepts not to be distorted by the ordinary 
language of a given society, they require constant revision by keeping our concepts as 
close as possible to the objective source that stimulated the concepts. If the bi-polar 
                                                 
230 TCFK, 318. 
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structure is bifurcated, a false dichotomy arises and concepts can become subjectively 
defined. True concepts arise through direct and intuitive apprehension of reality and 
then are brought to conceptual comprehension as we allow reality to take shape within 
human rational forms of thought and speech. For the knowledge of God, this means 
that conception arises under the influence of God’s Word and Spirit, generating the 
capability to conceive God. “Knowledge of God is thus conceptual in its essential 
root.” This conceptuality “derives from God’s self-revelation in his Word, but which 
we have to bring to articulate expression in our understanding, with a conceptuality 
that finds shape in our human forms of thought and speech, yet under the control of 
God’s own intelligible reality.”237 
While the knowledge of God is always conceptual for Torrance, there is a 
diversity of types of concepts determined by the nature of the object conceived. 
Torrance distinguished between “closed” and “open” concepts. Closed concepts are 
those which can be more fully grasped while open concepts are those which transcend 
full apprehension. The former can be reduced to propositions and are more rigid, but 
the latter are elastic and cannot be exhausted, continually going beyond what is 
understood or verbalized about them. From art, Torrance used the example of the 
Byzantine portrayal of Christ. There are fixed lines which give definition to the 
picture of Christ, but there are also divergent lines, opening toward a golden 
background, pointing to the inexhaustible eternity which cannot be circumscribed. 
From physics, the concepts of classical mechanics are limited to what is perceptible, 
while those of quantum mechanics open beyond the criterion of perceptibility. 
Therefore, while theological concepts are different than physics or art, Torrance used 
these examples to demonstrate the possibility and reality of open concepts, 
particularly when investigating that which cannot be conceived in terms of what is 
already known. “Theological statements operate, then, with essentially open concepts 
– concepts that are relatively closed on our side of their reference through their 
connection with the space-time structures of our world, but which on God’s side are 
wide open to the infinite objectivity and inexhaustible intelligibility of the divine 
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Being.”238 The knowledge of God is conceptual, yet because of its ineffable Object, 
theological concepts are “open toward God.”239 
Suitable with his notion of open concepts, Torrance also discussed the patristic 
distinction between apprehending and comprehending. Comprehension is appropriate 
for closed concepts, potentially bringing the totality of something under intellectual 
command. Likewise, apprehension is appropriate for open concepts, a “grasping of 
God which does not exhaust His transcendent reality and mystery; but it is no less 
conceptual for that reason.”240 Knowledge of God remains always conceptual for 
Torrance, yet it is a type of conception that is appropriate to the limitless Being of 
God. 
Furthermore, Torrance held to an exacting notion about the relation between 
concept and image. Patristic theology held concept and image together in a way that 
Cartesian dualism split apart. Disagreeing with Austin Farrer at particular points, 
Torrance held that images are “tools” rather than “pictures,” merely pointing to a 
reality they cannot fully portray and thereby “making themselves in a real sense 
dispensable as they do their work and we apprehend the reality through them.” 
Quoting Hilary, images are “to be regarded as helpful to man rather than as fitted to 
God, since they suggest or indicate and do not exhaust Him.”241 To maintain how 
images remain conceptual yet “do not actually image while pointing to and signifying 
a reality,” Torrance noted that in the biblical tradition, image and words work 
together. It is with words that “the images are made to signify or indicate that to 
which they point.” Thus, words are preferable to images because they help us to “look 
through” the images and “hear past them” so that we do not conceptually hang on to 
an idolatrous picture of God. In short, words are preferable to images in human 
conception of God for Torrance.242 
Additionally, due to the nature of the divine Logos, Torrance maintained that 
an auditory interpretation of concepts should find its place alongside the dominating 
optical interpretation. The Greeks gave primacy to vision, leading Western philosophy 
to make vision the primary mode of sense-experience and knowledge. In particular, 
positivism has restricted knowledge to what is observable, myopically limiting 
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epistemology to vision. While there is a place for knowledge to be held as visionary, 
it is misleading to interpret all knowledge in terms of sight. For instance, in biblical 
revelation it is through word that images are “made to signify or indicate that to which 
they point.” Theology operates with “a direct act of cognition in hearing God and 
engages in the act of conception through audition” which Torrance called “audits.” 
Concepts of Christ are open concepts because in Christ we hear the eternal Word of 
God. Distinguishing visual and aural concepts further clarifies the ways which the 
knowledge of God manifests itself conceptually.243  
With this dynamic, it is clear how anthropology influences epistemology. 
While it is true that knowledge of God involves the human reasoning faculty, it 
certainly involves other dimensions of the human person involved in knowing. While 
Torrance mentions mystical theology, by which he primarily meant humility in 
thought, the emphasis is still on its effects upon a person’s reasoning faculties. The 
other faculties which contribute to human knowing are given less attention by 
Torrance. These other dimensions may be generally included within Torrance’s 
discussions of personal knowledge, including the intuition and the tacit dimension that 
he incorporated from Michael Polanyi. We will discuss Torrance’s notion of personal 
knowledge in chapter four. Nevertheless, an early critique by Thomas Langford 
concerning Theological Science still seems to apply to this epistemological dynamic 
in general. He faulted Torrance for having “an extremely rationalistic or 
intellectualistic understanding of faith.” Faith, knowledge of God and even mystical 
apprehension are defined in terms of human reasoning. Langford wrote, “There is not 
enough provision for the affective, volitional, or active dimensions of the response of 
the total [person] to God in Christ.”244 Torrance’s essentially rational and conceptual 
epistemological dynamic minimizes attention to other dimensions of the human 
person involved in knowing which receive attention at different points throughout the 
Christian tradition. The Eastern Orthodox tradition, various mystical traditions within 
Roman Catholicism as well as contemporary Pentecostal movements among 
Protestantism give special consideration to the importance and integrity of the pre-
cognitive or trans-rational epistemological dimensions. To name a few examples, as 
an early influence upon a strand of Christian mysticism, Augustine provided seminal 
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thought for the interrelationship between love and knowledge rooted in a more 
integrated, complex anthropology being restored to the image of God.245 Similarly, 
for the Eastern Orthodox tradition, Vladimir Lossky has written, “Unlike gnosticism, 
in which knowledge for its own sake constitutes the aim of the gnostic, Chrisitan 
theology is always in the last resort a means: a unity of knowledge subserving an end 
which transcends all knowledge. This ultimate end is union with God or deification, 
the θέωςις of the Greek Fathers.”246 Soteriology contains epistemology for Lossky 
which includes the whole person. Whether or not or in what way one holds to a 
doctrine of theosis, it can be argued that the knowledge of God ultimately involves the 
eschatological transformation of the whole person and temporally engages the whole 
person towards that end.247 Likewise, for the Orthodox writer Dumitru Staniloae, 
temporal knowledge of God contains both rational or cataphatic knowledge of God 
along with an apophatic, experiential knowledge which goes beyond human 
reasoning.248 The latter type of knowledge is quite similar to what philosopher James 
K.A. Smith refers to as the affective, embodied epistemology of Pentecostalism. 
Because anthropology and epistemology are interrelated, Smith aims to correct the 
intellectualist model of human persons. Such a model conceives of humans as 
primarily “thinking things” or autonomous rational agents and disembodied centers of 
cognitive activity. In line with Augustine, he offers an anthropological critique 
presenting the human person as more basically a lover.249 According to Smith, this 
anthropological and thus epistemological critique is in line with the postmodern 
critique of modern rationalism.250 
                                                 
245 Luigi Gioia, The Theological Epistemology of Augustine’s De Trinitate (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 170-89; Robert Meagher, Augustine: On the Inner Life of the Mind 
(Indianapolis & Cambridge: Hackett Publishing, 1998), 70-111 ; Lydia Schumacher, Divine 
Illumination: The History and Future of Augustine’s Theory of Knowledge (Malden, MA & Oxford, 
UK: Wiley Blackwell, 2011), 1-65; Louth, Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition, 132-158. 
246 Vladimir Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church (Cambridge: James Clarke 
& Co., 1973), 9. See also the chapter, “Lossky, the via negative and the foundations of theology” in 
Rowan Williams, Wrestling with Angels: Conversations in Modern Theology (London: SCM Press, 
2007), 1-24. 
247 Ibid., 7-43; See also Vladimir Lossky, Orthodox Theology: An Introduction (Crestwood, 
NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary, 1978), 13-25. 
248 Dumitru Staniloae, The Experience of God: Orthodox Dogmatic Theology, Vol. 1 of 
Revelation and Knowledge of the Triune God, trans. and ed. by Ioan Ionita and Robert Barringer 
(Brookline, MA: Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 1998), esp. 95-124. 
 
249 James K. A. Smith, Desiring the Kingdom: Worship, Worldview and Cultural Formation 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2009), 39-73. 
250 James K. A. Smith, Who’s Afraid of Postmodernism? Taking Derrida, Lyotard and 
Foucault to Church (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2006), 59-80. 
91 
 
Torrance may be right to say that knowledge of God can be more than 
rational, but is never less than rational. Still, this framework of “more” or “less” 
misses the mark. Torrance’s portrayal of the necessity of the involvement of human 
reason is not mistaken, but insufficiently complex and improperly weighted. The 
Christian tradition, as emphasized by the postmodern, scientific age, gives more 
attention than Torrance did to those other dimensions of the human person which 
influence human reasoning. Chapter five will expand upon how knowledge of God 
involves the whole person. For here it is sufficient to note that subjective dimensions 
other than rationality are diminished by the emphasis of this dynamic within 
Torrance’s epistemology. Therefore, this assessment concludes that the knowledge of 
God involves human reason and concepts, but cannot be defined as essentially 
rational and conceptual without a diminishment of the other subjective dimensions 
which contribute to knowledge. 
Finally, it is noteworthy that the essentially rational and conceptual 
epistemological dynamic is in tension with the next dynamic we will explore, the 
transcendence of God. As David S. Cunningham described the doctrine of the Trinity 
in the modern era,  
This paradoxical God, who existed above and beyond all human 
categories of knowing, seemed to be quite thoroughly at odds with the 
spirit of the [modern] age – and particularly at odds with its penchant 
for rationalization and classification. Classical Trinitarian theology 
seemed to obscure the otherwise clear and distinct categories of human 
and divine, transcendnent and immanent, and even oneness and 
threeness.251 
 
While the Christian tradition supports Torrance’s contention that there is reason and 
order within God, there is incalculably more of the Triune God which transcends 
human reasoning capabilities. Therefore, the next epistemological dynamic will assist 
with expanding his Trinitarian epistemology. 
 
2.7 Transcendent 
 
While Torrance maintained that the knowledge of God is rational and 
scientific, he also acknowledged aspects of the knowledge of God which go beyond 
human comprehension. He noted this sense of beyond in many ways with several 
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terms. For instance, Torrance held that there is a “trans-logical” relation between 
concepts and experience.252 Also, he urged that epistemological authority should go 
beyond the subjective individual or institution and be located in the self-given object, 
calling such authority “trans-subjective.’”253 However, the most all-embracing word 
and concept which Torrance used which captures this epistemological dynamic is 
transcendence. Torrance defined transcendence as follows: 
 
Transcendence – extension beyond the bounds of the world, of human 
experience or comprehension. Traditionally, transcendence over the 
world is applied to God who is independent of the universe he has 
made and who while everywhere present in it cannot be regarded as 
contained within its space-time dimensions or as controlled within the 
limits of finite knowledge… Transcendence in the world is applied to 
realities that are independent of our knowledge of them, that can be 
known only out of themselves but which cannot be confined within the 
limits of our descriptions. 
 
We will explore how Torrance distinguishes between transcendence over the world 
verses in the world and its implications for knowledge of God. We begin with his 
notion of transcendence in the world. 
Torrance noted the difference between the “truth of being” and “cognitive 
truth” as having real significance for the knowledge of God.254 Being always 
transcends how humans think about it. In other words, reality outruns human 
experience and description. Also, the rationality of nature goes beyond human 
rationality. Being, reality and nature have ontological priority and transcend human 
conception and articulation, and thus there is a transcendent element in every 
science.255 The rationality embedded within the universe is not fully comprehensible 
by human rationality. The contingence of the universe makes its rationality 
mysterious “not because it is deficient in rationality but rather because the extent and 
nature of its rationality exceed our capacity to achieve complete mastery over it and 
therefore to reach any formalization of it.”256 In other words, the “intelligibility 
generated in the scientific enterprise points to a dimension of intelligibility 
                                                 
252 TCFK, 77-78. 
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transcending it.”257 Thus, in order to be scientific, there must be a “dedicated service 
to a transcendent rationality.” 258 To be objective, the rationality within reality must be 
allowed to speak for itself.259 In response to reality and being, humans are to use logic 
and language as transparent media through which to apprehend and describe them.260 
Torrance did not hold that there can be strict correspondence between theory and 
reality as in classical physics where “scientific theories have a one-to-one 
correspondence with the realities they describe” as “theoretical transcripts of 
reality.”261 Rather, because reality and the truth of being always transcend cognitive 
truth, all human knowledge inevitably falls short of representing reality. All human 
knowledge is, as Torrance put it, inescapably a “compromise between thought and 
being.”262 This will be explored further in the next dynamic, knowledge of God is 
“truly realist” (2.8). For now, we note that Torrance’s notion of transcendence in the 
world points to the order of reality which is ontologically distinct from human 
cognition and articulation. We turn now to how Torrance used the word 
transcendence with reference to God’s transcendence over the world. 
Torrance maintained that as the Creator of the space-time universe, God is 
transcendent over all that exists.263 This is in keeping with the Christian tradition. 
William C. Placher contends that before the seventeenth century, transcendence 
governed the predominant modes of thought and speech about God.264 In line with 
this tradition, Torrance maintained that God “transcends all that we can think and say 
of Him.”265 He explained, 
We are up against a reality that towers above our 
intelligence, which we cannot know or reflect about by 
trying to occupy some epistemic stance “above” it. This 
is the kind of reality which we may know by inquiring 
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into it from “below,” as it were, by submitting our 
minds to the authority of what it actually is and seeking 
to apprehend it by allowing our understanding to fall 
under the power of its intrinsic but transcendent 
intelligibility.266  
 
The transcendence of God does not diminish God’s rationality for Torrance. Instead, 
“the inherent difficulty we finite creatures have in knowing God lies in the excess of 
his divine rationality over our ability to comprehend it.”267 Even as early as his time 
in Auburn, Torrance lectured that with the knowledge of God “we must simply realize 
the truth that there are things quite out of reach of the finite mind.”268 In short, 
because God is transcendent over the world, knowledge of God has a transcendent 
quality. 
Even though Torrance championed theology as scientific, he recognized that 
God was not like any other object of scientific investigation. To conduct an 
investigation in the natural sciences, one observes natural objects, forms questions 
and hypotheses, plans and conducts experiments to obtain data or answers, and then 
draws conclusions based on the observations. However, God is utterly distinct from 
natural objects. God cannot be coerced to prove or disprove any hypothesis through 
empirical observation or forced by experiment to answer questions as routinely occurs 
in the application of the scientific method to nature. God neither submits to human 
manipulation nor surrenders to controlled analysis.269 Torrance elaborated, 
 
The experimental investigation through man-made 
controls, and the corresponding demonstration offered 
by making things work as we stipulate, are scientifically 
inappropriate to the living God, for it would not be the 
Lord God but an idol that could come under our power 
like that, and it would not be theology but magic that 
could conjure up and manipulate “the divine” like 
that.270 
 
God is distinct from nature and not subject to this kind of application of the scientific 
method. Rather, with an epistemic reversal, when humans submit and surrender to the 
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transcendent God, then they are enabled to know God.271 For Torrance, the 
uniqueness of this “Object” demarcates the distinctiveness of the knowledge of God 
as going beyond the natural sciences.272 Knowledge of God is distinct from other 
types of knowledge because it is knowledge of a transcendent God who is ultimately 
incomparable with reduced categories suited for creaturely realities.  
Even though through the incarnation God has entered into the rationalities and 
contingencies of the space-time creation, God remains transcendent over all.273 “In 
making himself known to us God discloses at once both that he has made himself 
open to us and accessible to our knowing of him and that even in revealing himself to 
us he remains ineffably transcendent over our knowing of him.”274 As noted in the 
creation-situated dynamic, the knowledge of God assumes the various forms of other 
types of knowledge within creation while at the same time surpassing them. Through 
the incarnation, the knowledge of God takes on human, personal, and historical 
dimensions, and thus has similarities with other types of knowledge. Hence, because 
it is creation-situated, knowledge of God has likeness to other types of knowledge, but 
because it is transcendent, it “has a fundamental mode of rational activity that 
transcends them all and yet never leaves them behind.”275  In other words, as Jesus 
Christ is the incarnated transcendence of God, so knowledge of God is creation-
situated, transcendent knowledge.276  
This epistemological dynamic contains both the notions of transcendence in 
the world, because reality transcends human concepts and language, as well as God’s 
transcendence over the world. These are most clearly held together in the mystery of 
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absolute priority and actuality, and therefore not by stealing knowledge of him behind his back, as it 
were, nor by climbing up to some vantage point above him, but only through reverent submission of 
our minds to his uncreated Light and Majesty.” 
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273 On the relationship between the transcendent rationality of God and the rationality within 
the space-time universe, see STI, 61-65; TS, 298-99; DCO, 3-4, 39-40; RST, 139-40; RET, 140-41: 
“While God reveals and communicates himself to us in the historical reality and particularity of Jesus 
Christ, the Truth that he is in Jesus Christ his incarnate Son, and eternally in himself the Father, 
remains infinitely transcendent. It is the revelation of Truth so unlimited and inexhaustible that the 
more we know of him the more we realize the ineffable and infinite fullness of his Reality which defies 
complete disclosure within the limits of our contingent being and experience.” 
274 RST, 106. 
275 TS, 204. 
276 Catherine Mowry Lacugna, God for Us: The Trinity and the Christian Life (San Francisco: 
HarperCollins, 1992), 217: “Can we affirm that God as God is altogether present in the economy of 
salvation history, and at the same time that God also exceeds and outstrips the human capacity to 
receive or explain this self-communication?” From the lens provided by the incarnation, Torrance 
answers “yes.” 
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the incarnation for Torrance. He wrote that “it is because mystery belongs to the 
nature of Christ as God and Man in one Person that it would be unfaithful of us not to 
respect that mystery in our knowing of Him…It is upon this fact that every attempt to 
reduce knowledge of God to a logical system of ideas must always suffer 
shipwreck.”277 Theology must respect mystery as part of the knowledge of God. A 
transcendent quality does not mean that knowledge of God contains no describable 
content. Rather, it has a sacramental character, because the incarnation holds together 
“visible and invisible, audible and inaudible, earthly and heavenly, the human and the 
divine” dimensions in a form of mystery, particular in its expression but infinitely 
transcendent and boundless in Being and content. There is an “infinite depth of reality 
calling for our recognition and reverence” in the incarnation of the Son who is the 
Sacrament of Truth.278 Human apprehension does not fully comprehend the ineffable 
mystery of God’s Being, but it is a form of conception appropriate to God’s 
transcendence.279 Human logic with its cognitive and linguistic tools must continue to 
evolve to arise to the challenge of serving the divine mystery.280 God’s transcendence 
over the world which has entered in the world through the incarnation shapes the 
transcendent nature of the knowledge of God. Hence, the mystery of God revealed 
faithfully but not exhaustively in the incarnation preserves the knowledge of God as 
both creation-situated and transcendent for Torrance. 
Torrance’s transcendent epistemological dynamic is in line with the Christian 
tradition concerning the transcendence of God and the limits of human understanding 
prior to the eschaton. Thomas Aquinas would remind us that the shortcoming in 
knowledge due to the transcendence of God would not apply to God’s self-
knowledge. God’s self-knowledge is the ultimate epistemological standard for 
Aquinas. The blessed, that is the deceased saints, also share in God’s self-knowledge. 
However, the transcendence of God clearly limits the knowledge of God of created 
minds in this life. Nevertheless, the beatific vision in eternity overcomes the barrier to 
knowledge of God for Aquinas.281 Yet, for Gregory Palamas and the Eastern 
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Orthodox tradition, there is a distinction between the created energies and essence of 
God which will not be overcome even in eternity. Thus, transcendence remains an 
epistemological dynamic even into eternity.282 While the nature of the knowledge of 
God in eternity has been debated within church history, God’s transcendence and the 
consequent partial or fallibilist nature of human knowledge of God prior to the 
eschaton has been consistent from the beginnings of the Hebrew and Christian 
traditions.  
Transcendence and mystery guard against reductionism. Torrance was aware 
of this. “Only as man’s mind is constantly lifted up in wonder and worship toward 
God the Creator of the space-time universe so that his thought is ultimately anchored 
in factors that transcend the universe altogether, will he be able to think in detachment 
from… reductionist observationalism and materialism.”283 Knowledge of God cannot 
be exhaustively defined by lower levels of reality and their epistemological rules 
because of its transcendence. Hence, this epistemological dynamic invites knowers 
upward instead of downward. Transcendence in the world among the various levels of 
reality point to a transcendence over the whole world. As Torrance put it, 
 
In Polanyi’s conception of the nature of the universe as an expanding 
horizon of hierarchical levels with their boundary conditions, each 
level is transcended by one more intangible and more meaningful than 
it, so that the most intangible things are the most real and the most 
transcendent. The range of reality everywhere exceeds our most 
complete grasp, but it beckons us forward in the promise of revealing 
ever new truths. That is transcendence in the world, which is not to be 
confused with the transcendence of God over the world, to whom the 
world as a whole is left open or indeterminate at is boundary 
conditions: thus transcendence in the world opens out toward and 
points to the transcendence of God over the world.284 
 
The upward move of explanation here is in the opposite direction of a materialist 
reductionism. Higher levels of complexity invite exploration at their boundaries and, 
in turn, can help explain lower levels without losing their dependence upon them. 
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Torrance’s transcendent epistemological dynamic resonates with the postmodern, 
scientific age which, in response to modernity’s reductionism, recognizes emergent 
complexities and has greater room for transcendence, mystery and the questions 
raised at the boundaries.285 On the other hand, knowledge of God is not insulated, 
transcendent knowledge which has no point of comparison with other types of 
knowledge. Because it is also creation-situated through the incarnation, it has points 
of comparison with various forms of knowledge. Both of these dynamics together—
theological epistemology’s transcendent, ontological distinctiveness and yet its 
similarity to other epistemic forms—make knowledge of God particularly suitable 
within the postmodern, scientific age. Holding together the creation-situated and 
transcendent dynamics together leads to the next dynamic which is Torrance’s own 
version of critical realism which he at first called “truly realist.” 
 
2.8 “Truly realist” 
 
For Torrance, the knowledge of God is “truly realist.” This last dynamic is an 
amalgamation of previous dynamics and, like the other interrelated dynamics, can be 
used as an apposite description of the entirety of Torrance’s theological epistemology. 
The term realism has been broadly used across a number of disciplines including the 
history and philosophy of science as well as Christian theology to describe a 
particular epistemological stance. Nevertheless, to understand Torrance’s brand of 
realism one cannot simply look to its definition among the other disciplines or even its 
uses in theology or science, but one must look to how he defines it and how his 
various epistemological dynamics work together to form his “truly realist” 
perspective.286 
The overall mode of Torrance’s epistemology is a type of realism, taking 
seriously the independence and authority of reality beyond the human mind. Daniel 
W. Hardy commented that Torrance’s position is “one of the strongest version of 
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realism… which is available in (and perhaps outside) theology today.”287 Besides the 
scientific epistemological dynamic, more challenge has come to this objectively-
weighted dynamic of his theological epistemology particularly from the postmodern 
context which has given much attention to the epistemic role of language and 
tradition.288 The objective dynamics of Torrance’s theological epistemology that have 
been discussed are that the knowledge of God is scientific, ontologically-determined, 
Trinitarian, creation-situated and transcendent. The objective dynamics are the most 
potent dynamics for the knowledge of God for Torrance, though they contain 
implications for the subjective aspects of human knowing. The most directly 
subjective dynamic discussed is that the knowledge of God for Torrance is essentially 
rational. Clearly, the focus for Torrance remains on the proper object giving it 
ontological priority over human thought and speech. This does not mean that 
Torrance failed to acknowledge the subjective dynamics or understand them in 
distinction from the objective. As Torrance wrote,  
Theological knowledge is after all a human activity, human knowledge 
of God, but of God in accordance with his revelation of man to himself 
to man. If the human factor is eliminated, then the whole is reduced to 
nonsense, but unless the divine element is dominant, then man is in the 
last resort thrown back upon his own resources and an impossible 
burden is laid upon him.289  
 
Torrance contended against the varieties of dualisms which have arisen attempting to 
split apart subject and object. For Torrance the epistemic poles are not ultimately 
separated, but neither are they connected with an easy naiveté. To grasp Torrance’s 
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theological realism, we need to step back and bring together the objective and 
subjective dynamics to see more fully how they relate to one another. Doing so will 
clarify his particular form of realism. 
 The relationship between sign and reality is representative of the relationship 
between subjective and objective elements and thus quite important for defining 
Torrance’s realism. In an important essay that is worth quoting at length, Torrance 
clearly described the nature of a sign and how it serves reality: 
 
Hence if a sign is to do its job properly it must have 
some measure of detachment or incompleteness or even 
discrepancy to allow it to point away from itself to the 
reality intended, in the light of which the truth or falsity 
of the sign will be judged. On the other hand, if the sign 
is merely an artificial convention or is so completely 
detached that it has no natural bearing on the reality for 
which it is said to stand, then it is empty of import or 
semantically useless, and all grounds for raising 
questions of truth and falsity are removed. In view of 
this argument we may make an initial generalization. 
An ultra-realist position, in which sign and thing 
signified perfectly coincide or a statement is absolutely 
adequate to its object (e.g. in the identification of a 
statement about the truth with the truth itself, or the 
identification of the truth of a statement with the truth of 
being), tumbles over into its opposite extreme, some 
form of nominalism or conventionalism. A truly realist 
position will be one in which the sign differentiates 
itself as sign from the reality on which it actually bears, 
and therein reveals a measure of disparateness or 
discrepancy which is an essential ingredient in its 
successful functioning as a sign. For true statements to 
serve the truth of being, they must fall short of it and 
not be mistaken for it, for they do not possess their truth 
in themselves but in the reality they serve: a dash of 
inadequacy therefore is necessary to their precision.290 
 
What Torrance wrote about signs is consistent with his thought about other 
intellectual tools such as language, numbers, concepts, symbols, and theories.291 
Moreover, what he says about the relationship between signs and reality is indicative 
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of the relationship between the subjective and objective poles of the knowledge 
encounter. As we have seen with the transcendent dynamic (2.7), the truth of being 
outruns the grasp of cognitive truth and the truth of statements and thus knowledge is 
always a “compromise between thought and being.” Nevertheless, there is a true 
correlation, a truth-bearing relationship, which obtains between knowing subject and 
object which enables truth to be conceived and articulated, albeit an inherently 
compromised representation. The relationship between sign and reality, language and 
being, exemplify the broader relationship between knowing subject and object which 
are fundamental to his truly realist dynamic.  
Torrance maintained that the human mind naturally differentiates between its 
ideas and the independent reality it perceives. We reflexively discriminate between 
our images, signs, and concepts and the reality to which they refer. Signs do not 
image reality so closely that they are indistinguishable from reality. He repeatedly 
declares that to be rational we distinguish “what we know from our knowing of it.”292 
But neither does the mind effortlessly sever all relationship between sign and reality. 
This would be unnatural. Rather, the knower perceives the reality through the concept 
or symbol as a transparent media. The attention of the knowing subject is directed to 
that which the sign points or intends to describe instead of settling upon the sign. Only 
when there are problems with the intended signification do we raise questions about 
the ideas, the reality, or the relationship between them. “The natural orientation of the 
human mind is, in this sense at least, quite ‘realist.’”293 
Problems arise when there is a naïve identification of sign and reality, 
ultimately leading to a type of fundamentalism. Torrance noted how one “cannot state 
in statements how statements are related to being, otherwise you convert the relation 
of statements to being into mere statements.”294 The distinction between the nature of 
concepts and the nature of reality does not allow for a strict correspondence. Yet, 
problems also arise when there is a rupture between sign and reality as a result of a 
dualist framework of thought. The sign becomes detached from the “objective control 
of reality” and has the potential to project the fears and fantasies of the subject onto 
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the object. Separation from a real reference to reality can lead to forms of 
conventionalism or essentially turn the sign into a myth. Sign and reality continue to 
be indicative of the relationship of subject and object. An inappropriate detachment 
between subject and object skews the nature and function of both.295 
The nuanced relationship between the subjective and objective dynamics of 
knowledge defines Torrance’s realism.296 Concepts, rationality, language, and the 
social coefficients which carry them can truly represent the rationality inherent in the 
nature of things. However, because reality transcends human conception and being 
transcends human articulation, there is a necessary detachment or approximation in 
human thought and statement. Indeed, “their inadequacy…is an essential part of their 
truth, in pointing away from themselves to the truth they serve.”297 In other words, 
Torrance’s realism maintains a fallibilism. This leads to the ongoing need for the 
subjective pole to be amended, re-conceptualized and re-articulated under the weight 
and guidance of reality. Revisability is thus an essential component of Torrance’s 
realism. We will further explore revisability as part of the relational dynamic of the 
knowledge of God (4.4). Here it is important to note that the necessity of revisability 
is a result of the inherent discrepancy between symbols and reality, the truth of 
statement and the truth of being, subjective conception and objective reality. Symbols, 
statements, and concepts need progressive revision in relationship with the intelligible 
structures of the proper object using a heuristic mode of discovery or “disclosure 
models.”298 Such revision does not discredit the validity of subjective representation, 
but rather demonstrates the transcendence of objective reality and that the subject is 
actually connecting with it and coming under its influence.299 Torrance maintained 
that this type of realism came to light theologically with the church’s struggle leading 
to the Nicene Creed and scientifically with Einstein’s theory of general relativity.300 
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Revisability is thus an inevitable force in the realist dynamic of the knowledge of God 
for Torrance.301 
The epistemological humility that comes from a fallibilist recognition of the 
limited role of human concepts and language is in line with the Christian 
epistemological tradition. Notably, Thomas Aquinas discussed the nature of 
theological language and left an influential notion of the analogia entis (“analogy of 
being”). While Aquinas’ comments about analogy have been variously interpreted, 
they at least raised the limited role of how creaturely words imperfectly and yet 
somehow truthfully signify God.302 Torrance followed Karl Barth who proposed the 
analogia fidei (“analogy of faith”) in response to Aquinas to contend that our 
knowledge of the empirical world is subservient to a God-given meaning of the world 
which comes by revelation.303 In short, humans cannot depict divinity analogously, 
but God depicts Himself and humanity with chosen analogies. Barth and Torrance 
held that to begin with creaturely reality through an analogy of being was to 
participate in natural theology, beginning with human philosophy, which we have 
already discussed in the creation-situated dynamic (2.5). Instead, according to the 
analogia fidei, God is transcendent, outside of space and time, and thus utterly distinct 
from creation, but God has condescended, objectifying Himself and willing that He 
should be known among the contingencies of space and time.  
Torrance maintained that the link which enables the analogia fidei and a 
realist knowledge of God is the homoousion of the Son and the Spirit. “It is because 
God has incarnated his own eternal Word and Rationality within the realities and 
intelligibilities of our creaturely existence in Jesus Christ that we, creatures though we 
are, may grasp God conceptually his own divine reality.”304 God has made His own 
rationality to be rationally apprehensible in the incarnation of the Word. Taking its 
                                                                                                                                            
God can be captured and comprehended within the bounds of our creaturely conceptualities, for God in 
the beauty and majesty and light of his being infinitely exceeds all the Church’s theological or 
dogmatic formulations.” “Theological Realism,” 186. 
301 “Theological Realism,” 182-86. For more discussion on the revisability within his realist 
framework, see TS, xii, 98, 119-26, 277-79; GR, 53-55, 113, 197-99; RET, 12, 66; RST, 26-27, 85-86, 
137; TCFK, 134-35, 154-55. 
302 ST Ia.3.13, including appendices 3 and 4, “Signifying Imperfectly” and “Analogy,” 104-5, 
106-7.  See also Fergus Kerr, After Aquinas, 35-37; Mark D. Jordan, “Theology and Philosophy,” in 
The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas, ed. Norman Kretzmann and Eleonore Stump (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993), 232-51; Eugene F. Rogers, Jr., Thomas Aquinas and Karl Barth, 
64-67. 
303 Barth famously quipped, “I regard the analogia entis as the invention of the antichrist.” 
Barth, CD I.1, xiii. For Torrance’s interpretation and endorsement of Barth’s rejection of the analogy of 
being, KBBET, 30-31, 168-70, 183-86; KB, 133-98. 
304 “Theological Realism,” 187. 
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cues from Athanasius, the church acknowledged that the Son was one and the same 
being with God. Furthermore, so was the Spirit. Torrance noted the implications of 
the homoousion of the Spirit for the knowledge of God when he wrote, “If the Holy 
Spirit is of one and the same being with God, then in giving us his Spirit God makes 
himself immediately present to us in his own divine being and reality which constitute 
the evidential ground for our knowledge of him.”305 The Holy Spirit is God as He is 
in Himself and God as he makes Himself known to us as a present reality in an 
evidential way. God who is both Word and Spirit eternally in Himself mediates 
Himself to humanity as Word and Spirit. Therefore, for Torrance the ontology of God 
mediated through the homoousion of the Son and Spirit enables a realist knowledge 
from its source in the Triune God communicated both rationally and evidentially.306 
The mediation of God through the homoousion of Word and Spirit enables the 
church to apprehend real knowledge of God, but the church is not enabled to 
comprehend the full mystery of God’s being “for God in the beauty and majesty and 
light of his being infinitely exceeds all the Church’s theological or dogmatic 
formulations.”307 The transcendence and mediation of God are both realities that 
come with the knowledge of God in the homoousion of Son and Spirit. Yet, as we 
have seen in the transcendent dynamic (2.7), the transcendence of reality in creation 
over human conception generates an ongoing need for revision of human concepts 
and statements. Likewise with the knowledge of God, the transcendence and 
mediation of God in Word and Spirit retains a necessary revisability. As Torrance put 
it,  
 
It is as our communion with God the Father through Christ and in his 
Spirit is grounded in and shares in the inner Trinitarian consubstantial 
or homoousial communion of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, that the 
subjectively-given pole of conceptuality is constantly purified and 
refined under the searching light and quickening power of the 
objectively-given pole in divine revelation.308  
 
Torrance maintained the importance for theology to be rooted in God’s own being 
(theologia in se) as well as mediated through the conditions and contingencies of 
                                                 
305 Ibid., 186. 
306 Ibid., 186-91; Also, TIR, 33-37; GGT, 160-67. 
307 “Theological Realism,” 186. 
308 Ibid., 193. 
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human life in our creaturely existence (theologia nostra).309 In summary, for 
Torrance, the Trinitarian, creation-situated, and transcendent dynamics of the Triune 
God facilitated a “truly realist” knowledge of God. 
 In 1985 with the publication of Reality and Scientific Theology, Torrance 
came to align his truly realist perspective with the term critical realism which had a 
growing influence within various sciences as well as in the science and theology 
dialogue.310 It is noteworthy that Roy Wood Sellars’ early twentieth-century 
development of the notion of critical realism in the United States came in response to 
the reductionism of the logical positivists. He developed a hierarchical view of nature 
as well as the sciences which he called “emergent realism,” “emergent naturalism,” 
and “evolutionary naturalism.” Therefore, critical realism was conceived as a way of 
interacting with emergent, complex wholes over the ontological and epistemological 
reductionism of the positivists.311 Torrance continued in the tradition of Sellars by 
maintaining the distinctiveness of human concepts and language in relation to various 
levels of reality with his own type of critical realism.312 This dynamic helped to move 
Torrance’s epistemology beyond the restrictions of modern reductionism. However, 
Torrance articulated his version of critical realism only as discussions of the realism 
of Christian theology in a postmodern age began.313 
                                                 
309 RET, 21-30. 
310 I have found that Torrance only once in his epistemological books used the term “critical 
realism.” In approval of Einstein’s conception of science, Torrance wrote “I have found particularly 
enlightening the critical and realist epistemology that he had to develop in the course of his scientific 
work … I have found myself forced to accept this epistemology of critical realism.” RST, 131-32. On 
critical realism within Torrance’s theology, P. Mark Achtemeier, “The Truth of Tradition: Critical 
Realism in the Thought of Alasdair Macintyre and T. F. Torrance,” Scottish Journal of Theology 47 
(1994): 355-74; Alister E. McGrath extends Torrance’s engagement with critical realism in A Scientific 
Theology: Reality (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2002), 195-244. We will further discuss critical 
realism in theology and science in the assessment of relational knowledge in 4.2.2. 
311 Roy Wood Sellars, Critical Realism: A Study of the Nature and Conditions of Knowledge 
(1916; repr. New York: Russell and Russell, 1966). I was alerted to the context of Sellars’ development 
of critical realism by Nancey Murphy, Reconciling Theology and Science: A Radical Reformation 
Perspective (Kitchener, Ontario: Pandora Press, 1997), 14-15. Also on the roots of critical realism and 
complexity, Alister E. McGrath, A Scientific Theology: Reality (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2002), 
203-4. 
312 Torrance’s approach to critical realism has been extended and developed by Alister E. 
McGrath in his chapter, “Critical Realism: Engagement with a Stratified Reality,” in his, A Scientific 
Theology: Reality, Vol. 2 (Grand Rapids, MI; Cambridge, UK: T&T Clark, 2002), 195-244. 
313 To what extent critical realism is better suited to the modern or postmodern world is 
contested. Nancey Murphy critiques the use of “critical realism,” contending that it only fits within a 
modern, and not a postmodern, worldview. Nancey Murphy, “Bridging Theology and Science in a 
Postmodern Age,” in Bridging Science and Religion, ed. Ted Peters and Gaymon Bennett (London: 
SCM Press, 2002), 35-46; Nancey Murphy, Anglo-American Postmodernity, 39-48. On the other hand, 
Garry Potter and José López contend that critical realism moves us beyond some of the pitfalls of 
postmodernism in “After Postmodernism: The Millennium,” in José López and Garry Potter, eds., After 
Postmodernism: An Introduction to Critical Realism (London & New York: Athlone Press, 2001), 3-
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 “It has been suggested that if modern theological realism has not been 
linguistic enough, postliberal theology has not been realist enough.”314 In attempting 
to incorporate the insights from postliberal and liberal-revisionist theology for an 
expanded form of critical realism, Sue Patterson sympathetically engages Torrance’s 
realism. She takes seriously the “language-riddenness” of reality and the constructive 
element in human knowing. Patterson acknowledges that Torrance discussed how 
context and language circumscribe the situations in which knowledge and linguistic 
symbols occur. However, Patterson critiqued, that there remained the hope for 
Torrance that somehow through numerous rigorous revisions, we can “eliminate the 
preconceptions, illusions and linguistic habits that obscure our knowledge of reality 
and thereby ‘grasp’ things as they are in themselves.”315  She questions how we are to 
“know things in themselves” or “let reality be the judge” of language and concepts 
apart from our own language and concepts within our given context. Perhaps either 
Patterson did not give due attention to Torrance’s distinction between “the truth of 
being” and the “truth of statement” or Torrance did not give this notion its due weight. 
Nevertheless, Patterson’s critique of Torrance’s realism for its “relegation of the 
human role to passivity and consequent insistence on a dichotomy between 
construction and discovery” is accurate.316 She maintains a form of critical realism 
but emphasizes how humans participate in not only the discovery but the creation of 
conceptual and linguistic description:  
 
As Paul Ricoeur has said of metaphor, what it creates it discovers and 
what it discovers it invents. If we are to ‘penetrate into the inner 
connections and reasons of things in virtue of which they are what they 
are’, this ‘penetrating into’ will necessarily involve describing and 
conceiving, as Torrance would agree. However, it may also involve not 
only ‘minds falling under the power of these structures and necessities 
to signify what they are in themselves’ but also minds supplying the 
noetic component to ‘things in virtue of which they are what they are’. 
For why is it necessary to state that the rationality of the universe is a 
function of ‘”natural” patterns and structures in the universe which are 
what they are independent of us but with which our mental operations 
are steadily coordinated? Can it not be that is as human knowledge 
participates in that knowledge that it is completed and fulfilled?317 
                                                                                                                                            
16. Following López and Potter, Alister E. McGrath agrees in his, A Scientific Theology: Reality, Vol. 
2, 191-93. 
314 Patterson, Realist Christian Theology in a Postmodern Age, 162. 
315 Ibid., 16. 
316 Ibid., 17. 
317 Ibid., 18-19. 
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We agree with Patterson that “we do more than reach through our images and 
concepts to grasp worldly reality.”318 In our engagement with reality, our perceptions 
and language influence our interaction. Furthermore, our descriptions are limited and 
the complexity of reality transcends complete comprehension. “For who but God is 
able to comprehend the whole?”319 Thus, human knowledge is both partial and 
linguistically-constructed. Kevin J. Vanhoozer aptly summarized the issue: 
  
For moderns, language was a transparent medium that enabled 
consciousness to grasp reality. Postmoderns find this picture of the 
mind-world relation incredible. Not only do we not have nonlinguistic 
access to the way things are, but the way we speak and think is 
conditioned by the particular language in which we dwell. It is simply 
not the case that reality informs thought and that thought informs 
language.320 
 
For something akin to Torrance’s version of critical realism to survive the linguistic 
turn of the postmodern world, further attention is needed concerning the language-
riddenness of reality and how we humans participate in the construction of concepts 
and language in response to reality, without letting go of his realist orientation. 
Therefore, in light of these critiques, this thesis contends for a subjectively-tempered 
realism. 
 
 
2.9 Review 
The present chapter has introduced and assessed the basic dynamics of the 
knowledge of God for T. F. Torrance which he discussed throughout his 
epistemological writings. Torrance himself did not attempt to systematize these 
dynamics or organize them into one coherent picture, but this does not mean they 
were not integrated as a coherent whole within his thought. As mentioned in chapter 
one, he often moved among a cluster of these dynamics almost seamlessly, giving 
certain ones attention while mentioning the others with a word or phrase. To illustrate, 
in the foreword to the 2002 edition of Reality and Scientific Theology, Torrance held 
                                                 
318 Ibid., 32. 
319 Ibid. 
320 Kevin J. Vanhoozer, “Theology and the Condition of Postmodernity: a Report on 
Knowledge (of God),” 12, 3-25. 
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together many of the epistemological dynamics discussed in this chapter in one terse 
definition of scientific theology. He wrote,  
 
[S]cientific theology is a disciplined form of intellectual 
communion with God within the relationship between 
God’s self-revelation and the community of Christian 
faith pursued in the light of the dynamic open-textured 
understanding of the universe progressively disclosed 
under God through the natural sciences. Theology is a 
human enterprise operating with revisable formulations 
in a manner similar in significant respect to that of a 
science operating with fluid axioms, but always under 
the constraint of the objective realities being 
explored.321 
 
Torrance’s conception of the knowledge of God was coherent, but without a sense of 
the whole and its distinctive dynamics, not easily grasped.  
In this chapter, we have sought to delineate and evaluate seven basic 
epistemological dynamics which Torrance maintained. Through our engagement with 
Torrance, this chapter concludes that the knowledge of God can be a disciplined form 
of knowledge, but it is not best called “scientific” in the current milieu (2.2). 
Knowledge of God is ontologically-determined (2.3) and most centrally Trinitarian 
(2.4), for who God is constitutes our way of knowing him. Through the Son and 
Spirit, knowledge of God is creation-situated (2.5). Though knowledge of God 
involves human reason and concepts, it is not merely rational and conceptual (2.6). 
Knowledge of God is transcendent (2.7) and realist, but with the recognition of the 
limited, contributive role of human language (2.8). With these preliminary 
conclusions in mind, we now move beyond engaging the basic dynamics of the 
knowledge of God in Torrance’s epistemological writings to the controlling center of 
his theological epistemology, the Triune God (chapter 3). From there, we will 
discover some of the more central, governing dynamics and their implications for 
theological epistemology in order to assess their viability for the postmodern, 
scientific age (chapters 4-6). 
 
 
                                                 
321 RST, vii-viii. 
 110 
CHAPTER 3 
A SUPREME DYNAMIC FOR KNOWLEDGE OF GOD: 
THE ONTOLOGICAL TRINITY 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we delineated and assessed seven, inter-related 
epistemological dynamics within T. F. Torrance’s theology of the knowledge of God. 
These dynamics point us towards an inner, governing dynamic in the center of 
Torrance’s theology for his conception of knowledge of God. Each of the seven 
dynamics discussed either lead to or flow out of his doctrine of the Triune God. God’s 
being and activity largely determines the nature of the knowledge of God for 
Torrance. It would not be an overstatement to say that the Trinity is at the heart of his 
theology. As Torrance put it, 
 
The doctrine of the Holy Trinity has been called the inner-most heart 
of the Christian Faith, the central dogma of classical theology, the 
fundamental grammar of our knowledge of God. Why is that? Because 
the doctrine of the Trinity gives expression to the fact that through his 
self-revelation in the incarnation God has opened himself to us in such 
a way that we may know him in the inner relations of his divine Being 
and have communion with him in his divine Life as Father, Son and 
Holy Spirit.1  
 
Notice how God’s triune nature has not only ontological supremacy, but also is 
explicitly determinative for knowledge of God for Torrance:   
 
[T]o know God we must know him in accordance with the form or 
structure of his own Being – that is, in terms of God’s inner divine 
relations. And that means we must know him as the Triune God who 
within himself has relations between Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; so 
that for us to know that God, we must know him in a mode of 
understanding on our part appropriate to the Trinity of Persons in God. 
                                                          
1 Thomas F. Torrance, Trinitarian Perspectives: Toward Doctrinal Agreement (Edinburgh: 
T&T Clark, 1994), 1. This chapter will demonstrate the centrality of the doctrine of the Trinity for 
Torrance’s theology and epistemology. See also, Paul Molnar, Thomas F. Torrance: Theologian of the 
Trinity (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2009), 31-72; Elmer M. Colyer, How to Read T. F. Torrance: 
Understanding his Trinitarian and Scientific Theology (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2001), 285-
321; John Douglas Morrison, Knowledge of the Self-Revealing God in the Thought of Thomas Forsyth 
Torrance (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 1997), 205-222; C. Baxter Kruger, “The Doctrine of the 
Knowledge of God in the Theology of T. F. Torrance: Sharing in the Son’s Communion with the 
Father in the Spirit,” Scottish Journal of Theology 43 (1990): 366-89. 
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There must be a “Trinitarian” character in our knowing of God 
corresponding to the trinity of relations in God himself.2 
This chapter will penetrate into the heart of Torrance’s theological epistemology by 
expounding key aspects of his doctrine of the Trinity which are epistemologically 
formative.3 In particular, this chapter will demonstrate how the onto-relations within 
the immanent or ontological Trinity are supremely important for Torrance’s doctrine 
of the Trinity.4 Consequently, the rest of the thesis aims to expand the epistemological 
implications of his Trinitarian doctrine with developments that Torrance himself did 
not accentuate. Before turning to the implications of his Trinitarian epistemology in 
subsequent chapters, this chapter now moves into Torrance’s theological center which 
is at the heart of his epistemology. Here, we will find the resources to extend 
Torrance’s epistemology. We begin by considering Torrance’s conception of the 
stratified structure of knowledge and the supremacy of the doctrine of the immanent 
Trinity. 
 
3.2 The stratified structure of knowledge and the supremacy of the ontological 
Trinity 
For Torrance, there is a multi-leveled or stratified structure of knowledge.5 As 
we will see, this is distinct from the notion of ontological stratification or a 
hierarchical universe discussed in chapter two. The stratified structure of knowledge 
concerns levels of conception and can be found in “a rigorous scientific account of 
knowledge in any field of investigation.”6 Likewise in theology, there are multiple 
levels of theological articulation. With Einstein and Polanyi, Torrance noted that this 
                                                          
2 GGT, 148. 
3 The primary resources on T. F. Torrance’s mature doctrine of the Trinity include The 
Trinitarian Faith, 2nd ed. (London: T&T Clark, 1997). Hereafter, TF; Trinitarian Perspectives: 
Toward Doctrinal Agreement (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1994). Hereafter, TP; The Christian Doctrine of 
God: One Being Three Persons (London: T&T Clark, 1996). Hereafter, CDG. 
4 A personal conversation with Gary Deddo at the T. F. Torrance Theological Fellowship at 
the 2009 American Academy of Religion highlighted the importance of the onto-relations within the 
Immanent Trinity within Torrance’s theology. Gary Deddo, “T. F. Torrance: The Onto-Relational 
Frame of his Theology,” The Princeton Theological Review 14, no. 2 (Fall 2008): 35-47. He has 
written more extensively on the theology of relations within Karl Barth’s theology. Rev. Dr. Gary 
Deddo, “The Grammar of Barth’s Theology of Personal Relations,” Scottish Journal of Theology 47, 
no. 2 (1994): 183-222; Gary W. Deddo, Karl Barth’s Theology of Relations: Trinitarian, 
Christological and Human: Towards an Ethic of the Family (New York: Peter Lang, 1999). 
5 On the stratified structure of knowledge, see GGT, 155-59; RET, 34-37. 
6 CDG, 84. 
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stratified structure of scientific knowledge typically comprises three levels of thought 
coordinated with one another:  
The primary or basic level, which is the level of our ordinary day-to-
day experience and the loosely organized natural cognitions it 
involves; the secondary level of scientific theory with its search for a 
rigorous logical unity of empirical and conceptual factors; and the 
tertiary level where we develop a more refined and higher logical unity 
with a minimum of refined concepts and relations.7  
 
While theoretically the process of ascending to higher levels of conceptual unity and 
simplicity could continue indefinitely, Torrance held that only three levels are 
typically needed to obtain a “unified conceptual grasp of the reality.”8 Terminology is 
refined as one ascends to these higher levels. Consequently, concepts in the higher 
levels become more simplified, cohesive, and, as we will see, determinative for the 
whole corpus of knowledge within that field. We now turn to a brief account of 
Torrance’s description of the three levels of knowledge within his doctrine of God.9 
The first level of knowledge is the basic or “primary level of daily life” where 
“our experiences and cognitions are naturally and inseparably combined together.”10 
Basic concepts and first principles are intuitively obtained naturally and tacitly 
through our multifaceted experience. Torrance understands this level of the stratified 
structure in the formulation of the doctrine of the Trinity as the “evangelical and 
doxological level.”11 It is the basic level of religious experience and worship in the 
life of the church and especially the encounter with Jesus Christ through the preaching 
of the Gospel, the interpretation of the Scriptures and the fellowship of the church. It 
is here that “our faith and worship take on the imprint of the three-fold self-revelation 
of God as Father, Son and Holy Spirit” and we intuitively apprehend the economic or 
evangelical Trinity. This is “incipient theology” when Triune truth is not yet analyzed, 
but “becomes built into the structure of our souls and minds, and we know much more 
than we can ever tell.”12 Torrance elaborated, “Our minds become inwardly and 
                                                          
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Torrance’s most thorough discussion on the stratified structure of the doctrine of God is 
CDG, 82-107, summarized on 113. Summaries and discussion include Benjamin Myers, “The 
Stratification of Knowledge in the Thought of T. F. Torrance,” Scottish Journal of Theology 61 (2008): 
1-15. Also, Alister E. McGrath, A Scientific Theology: Reality (London & New York: T&T Clark, 
2002), 234-38. 
10 CDG, 84. 
11 Ibid., 88-91; Also GGT, 156-57. 
12 CDG, 89. 
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intuitively adapted to know the living God. We become spiritually and intellectually 
implicated in patterns of divine order that are beyond our powers fully to articulate in 
explicit terms, but we are aware of being apprehended by divine Truth as it is in Jesus 
which steadily presses for increasing realization in our understanding, articulation and 
confession of faith.”13 The Trinitarian order of revelation is not yet apprehended by 
rational speculation or analysis at this level; nevertheless, in communion with God, 
the reason is intuitively adapted to the Trinitarian structure of God’s self-revelation.14 
In the church we become “inwardly so adapted to God’s triune interaction with us that 
we learn to think in a godly and worthy way of him appropriate to his divine 
Nature.”15 This primary level of experience involves the basic disclosure of the gospel 
from which Trinitarian theology arises and develops. It is here in Torrance’s 
framework that space is reserved for the epistemological importance of the experience 
of God and the work of the Spirit. 
The secondary or scientific level seeks after cogent, explanatory theories “to 
penetrate into the intelligible connections latent in reality that ground and control our 
basic experiences and cognitions.”16 Concepts and theories at this level help us to 
noetically grasp our experience of the inherent intelligible connections within reality, 
but perhaps not directly experienced. The concepts are to be commensurate with the 
basic experiences and thoughts which, under the influence of reality, are to be brought 
to a revisable theory. If such conceptions and theories prove to be consistent, then 
they are open to providing more profound truth, leading to an even higher level of 
conceptual organization. Using this framework to speak about the doctrine of God, 
Torrance calls this secondary level the “theological level.”17 As we seek to formulate 
concepts and theories about God within the first level of the experience of God, we 
                                                          
13 Ibid. 
14 Reason is adapted “in ways that are appropriate to the distinctive nature and intelligibility of 
its object, in this case, the distinctive kind of order immanent in the incarnate economy of God’s 
revealing and saving acts in Jesus Christ made known to us in the Gospel. Disclosure of that divine 
order takes place only as we live in personal union and communion with Christ and find our minds 
under the impact of his Spirit becoming at home, as it were, in the field of God’s self-revelation and 
self-communication. It is as we tune in to God’s eternal purpose of love and grace embodied in the 
humanity of the Lord Jesus Christ that under the enlightenment of the Holy Spirit we are given the 
anticipatory insights or basic clues we need in developing formal cognition of that divine order, and so 
apprehend something of the trinitarian structure of God’s self-revelation and self-communication to 
mankind.” Ibid., 90. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid., 84-85. 
17 Ibid., 91-98; Also GGT, 157. 
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move from the “experiential apprehension and worship of God” to discovering the 
patterns and structures revealed through Jesus Christ. Through Christ, we discover 
that God reveals God’s one Being as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.18 We learn of three 
basic modes of activity and, moreover, the three persons within the one Being of God. 
That is, we learn to speak of the economic Trinity in order to speak of the way that 
God communicates God’s self to us in a three-fold movement of revelation and 
redemption.19 In other words, within the second level, we move from the primary 
experience of God to apprehending the Trinitarian structure and shape which 
facilitates the primary experience of God. Such realization is not merely a projection 
of our subjectivity. Rather, what the economic Trinity is toward us in Jesus Christ and 
the Spirit, God is ontically within God’s self, “otherwise the economic Trinity would 
not be a faithful and true revelation of the transcendent Communion of Father, Son 
and Holy Spirit which the eternal Being of God is in himself.”20 In other words, the 
economic Trinity connects us to the immanent Trinity. Yet, to speak of the immanent 
Trinity leads us to the third, and highest, level of knowledge of God for Torrance. 
The third level is the “meta-scientific (or second scientific) level” which aims 
to “deepen and simplify the organization of basic concepts and relations” which were 
developed within the previous, scientific level.21 Concepts and theories are revised 
and clarified into a “more rigorously ordered theory” which can also be refined. Note 
the supremacy and governing function of concepts at this third level for Torrance. 
“Thus we reach the ultimate theoretic structures characterized by logical economy and 
simplicity (i.e. with a minimum of conceptual relations), through which we grasp 
reality in its depth as faithfully as we can, and which we use as the unitary basis for 
simplifying and unifying the whole body of our knowledge in the field in question.”22 
The relativity theory of Einstein is Torrance’s prime example of a theory which has 
                                                          
18 “It is through the common tradition of shared spiritual experience and insight in the Church 
that theologians make cognitive contact with the truths of divine revelation into which they inquire, and 
then through following up the clues thus mediated to them they seek to evoke depths of knowledge not 
discerned hitherto.” Ibid., 91. 
19 “This, then, is the first definitely theological level in which we are concerned with 
expressing doctrinal knowledge of the Holy Trinity in which our thought moves on from the intuitive 
incipient from of an understanding of the Trinity to conceptions of what is called the economic Trinity, 
the level in which the dynamic reality of God’s triune Being is being brought into clearer and more 
explicit formulation in terms of his differentiated yet unitary personal self-presentations and acts as 
Father, Son and Holy Spirit.” Ibid., 92. 
20 Ibid., 92. 
21 Ibid., 85. 
22 Ibid. Italics mine. 
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attained to the third level containing “logical simplicity and comprehensiveness.”23 
Advancing to this third level or “higher theological level” within the doctrine of God, 
we move beyond the economic Trinity in God’s revealing and reconciling activity 
toward us and move to consider the relations within the immanent Trinity or 
ontological Trinity. 24 It is noteworthy that this is a theological development which 
reversed Torrance’s earlier position that he preached in 1940.25 At that time, he held 
that we cannot know the ontological Trinity, that is, God in himself. At some point 
before he began writing on the doctrine of the Trinity, Torrance came to believe that 
humans can participate in the self-knowledge of the ontological Trinity. 
Two concepts were strategic for Torrance to move trinitarian knowledge from 
the second level dealing with the economic Trinity to the third level of the ontological 
Trinity. These were the notions of homoousion and perichoresis. Beginning with 
homoousion, Torrance viewed the application of this term by the Council of Nicaea to 
Jesus Christ to have extremely important theological significance, definitively 
describing the relation between the Son and the Father against Sabellianism and 
Arianism, Unitarianism and polytheism.26 The homoousion is the “ontological and 
epistemological linchpin of Christian theology.”27 It secures that what God is towards 
us in the incarnation of Jesus Christ, God is antecedently and inherently in the internal 
relations of God’s self. This theme is repeated throughout his works, especially within 
his writings on the doctrine of God. 28 God’s self-communication in the incarnation is 
the “controlling center” of all Christian doctrine.29 For Torrance, the homoousion of 
the Son is the link between the economic Trinity and the ontological Trinity, 
overcoming the dualism between the activity and being of God.  In his words, “The 
                                                          
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid., 98-107; Also, GGT, 157-67. 
25 T. F. Torrance, “Sermon: 2 Corinthians 13:14,” The Thomas F. Torrance Manuscript 
Collection. Special Collections, Princeton Theological Seminary Library (November 1940), 3: “The 
first thing I want to impress upon you is the fact that WE DO NOT KNOW GOD AS HE IS IN 
HIMSELF—we only know God through His WORKs on us and for us. Now there are many people 
who think they ought to know God as He is in Himself, but they only come up against a blank empty 
space. We can only know God as He is manifested in His work of revelation or redemption.” 
26 TF, chap. 4, “God of God, Light of Light,” pp. 110-45. On Gregory Nazianzen and John 
Calvin on the homoousion, TP, 24-25. 
27 CDG, 95. A good summary is Phee Seng Kang, “The Epistemological Significance of 
όμοούσον in the Theology of Thomas F. Torrance,” Scottish Journal of Theology 45 (1992): 341-66. 
28 A few references include CDG, 8, 92, 95, 99, 114, 136, 142, 158, 237; TF, 71, 130, 135; TP, 
2, 80-81, 117, 135; TIR, 38; RET, 14-15; CTSC, 30-31; GGT, 39-41, 67, 89-91, 151-52, 156-68; DCO, 
7, 108-9; RST, 156-57; TCFK, vii, 287-89, 303.  
29 RST, 156-57. 
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homoousion crystallizes the conviction that while the incarnation falls within the 
structures of our spatio-temporal humanity in this world, it also falls within the Life 
and Being of God.”30 Through the homoousion of the Son, we are allowed to pierce 
through Kantian appearances and grasp God’s “reality in its ontological depth.”31 The 
homoousion of the incarnation provides an epistemological bridge to an ontological 
center within God. “This is why the incarnation of the Son or Word constitutes the 
epistemological centre, as well as the ontological centre, in all our knowledge of God, 
with a centre in our world of space and time and a centre in God himself.”32 The 
homoousion makes a “categorical assertion that Jesus Christ is God, and that as God 
he shares equally with the Father in the one being of the Godhead.”33 Furthermore, 
the homoousion was not restricted to the Son, but with Athanasius and the Council of 
Nicaea, and most fully later in the Council of Constantinople, the homoousion was 
applied to the Holy Spirit as equally divine as the “Lord and Giver of Life.”34 The 
upshot of this for knowledge of God is that human experience of Christ and the Spirit 
is connected to the being of God. As Torrance put it, “our evangelical experience of 
God in Christ is not somehow truncated so that it finally falls short of God, but is 
grounded in the very Being of God himself… even although in the mystery of his 
self-revelation God set boundaries to our knowing of him.” 35 Thus it is through the 
homoousion of the Son and Spirit that we come to know the inner relations within the 
ontological Trinity.  
Central to Barth’s theology was the relationship between God-in-revelation 
and God-in-eternity or God’s being in his acts and his acts in his being which 
significantly influenced Torrance.36 After Barth, came Karl Rahner whose work on 
the Trinity has also been quite influential in the twentieth century and particularly 
noteworthy is his methodological insight often called “Rahner’s Rule.” “The 
‘economic’ Trinity is the ‘immanent’ Trinity and the ‘immanent’ Trinity is the 
                                                          
30 CDG, 95. 
31 GGT, 162. 
32 CDG, 101; Also, GGT, 161-64. 
33 TF, 133. Torrance contends that Jesus Christ is not only truly God but is also truly man, 
bringing salvation into the human condition in TF, chap. 5, “The Incarnate Savior,” 146-90. 
34 For Athanasius and the Council of Nicaea on the homoousion of the Spirit, TF, 195-99, 305-
13; TP, 10-11, 39-40. For the Council of Constantinople on the homoousion of the Spirit, CDG, 96-98. 
35 CDG, 99. 
36 Barth, CD I.1, 295-489; CD II.1, 257-321. For Torrance’s interpretation, KBBET, 193-97; 
KB, 113-18. 
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‘economic’ Trinity.”37 Before Torrance, these two theologians revitalized Trinitarian 
theology in the twentieth century and raised the discussion about the relationship 
between God-in-eternity and God-in-revelation.38  After Barth, it may seem that 
Torrance followed Rahner as well. However, though Torrance assisted with a 
theological meeting to engage the Trinitarian theology of Rahner, he found places of 
sharp disagreement with him. With Torrance’s axiomatic focus on the homoousion as 
the bridge from the economic to the immanent Trinity, Torrance held together the 
economic Trinity and the ontological Trinity yet without introducing any logical 
necessities or abstractions from the former into the latter, as Torrance thinks that 
Rahner had done.39 While for Torrance the economic Trinity leads us to knowledge of 
the ontological Trinity over the bridge of the homoousion, the immanent Trinity 
cannot be collapsed into the economic Trinity. For instance, beyond Karl Rahner who 
made a rule of the identity of economic and immanent Trinity, Catherine Mowry 
LaCugna and Jürgen Moltmann held that knowledge of God should be limited by the 
history of the economic Trinity. 40  Yet, while Torrance maintained that through the 
homoousion real knowledge of the ontological Trinity had been revealed, the 
immanent Trinity is ontologically prior. Not maintaining this distinction would 
compromise God’s freedom beyond his salvific work in human history and 
                                                          
37 Karl Rahner, The Trinity, trans. Joseph Donceel (New York: Crossroad, 1997), 22. 
38 Stanley J. Grenz, Rediscovering the Triune God: The Trinity in Contemporary Theology 
(Minneapolis: Fortress, 2004), 33-71; Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen, The Trinity: Global Perspectives 
(Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2007), 67-87, 390-93. 
39 For Torrance on Rahner, TP, 77-101; CDG, 9, 10, 112, 143, 200. Paul D. Molnar notes 
basic methodological differences between Torrance and Rahner. He writes, “While Rahner apparently 
wished to ground his theology in God’s economic Trinitarian self-revelation, his transcendental 
method, which begins with our experiences of self-transcendence and posits the existence of God as the 
nameless, silent whole or horizon surrounding us, effectively allows God’s oneness to be defined and 
understood without specific reference to God’s self-communication in Christ and the Spirit. The result 
is that God’s self-communication becomes for Rahner a universal element of human experience in the 
form of the ‘supernatural existential’… and Rahner ends up allowing his rather abstract idea of God’s 
oneness to determine his thinking about God in ways that Torrance would most certainly reject … 
Rahner’s axiom, with its vice versa, unfortunately allows for the possibility of thinking about our 
relations with God as mutually conditioned and mutually conditioning.” Molnar, Thomas F. Torrance, 
69. A fuller development of the methodological differences is found in Paul D. Molnar “God’s Self-
Communication in Christ: A Comparison of Thomas F. Torrance and Karl Rahner,” Scottish Journal of 
Theology 50 (1997): 288-320; Paul D. Molnar, Divine Freedom and the Doctrine of the Immanent 
Trinity (London & New York: T&T Clark/Continuum, 2002/2005), 83-114, 167-96. 
40 Catherine Mowry LaCugna, God for Us: The Trinity and the Christian Life (San Francisco: 
HarperCollins, 1992); Jürgen Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom: The Doctrine of God, trans. 
Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1993), esp. 151-78. For good discussions, Veli-Matti 
Kärkkäinen, The Trinity: Global Perspectives (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2007), 
178-92, 100-22, 390-93; Stanley J. Grenz, Rediscovering the Triune God, 72-88, 147-62. 
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experience.41 This is in line with Torrance’s transcendent epistemological dynamic, 
preserving the hiddenness and mystery of God-in-Himself (2.7).  
Besides the concept of the homoousion, the concept of perichoresis moved 
Torrance’s doctrine of the Trinity to this “third” or “meta-scientific” level. Torrance 
held that a refined form of thought developed to help interpret the biblical teaching of 
the mutual indwelling of the Father, Son, and Spirit. The Greek work perichoresis, 
coming either from the Greek word chora meaning “space” and “room” or chorein 
meaning “to make room” and “to contain,” “indicates a sort of mutual containing or 
enveloping of realities, which we also speak of as coinherence or coindwelling.”42 
Used first by Gregory Nazianzen to speak about how the divine and human natures 
coinhere in the person of Christ, this term was adapted and applied to the way in 
which the three Persons of God mutually indwell one another, yet remaining as 
distinct Persons. “In this way the concept of perichoresis serves to hold powerfully 
together in the doctrine of the Trinity the identity of the divine Being and the intrinsic 
unity of the three divine Persons.”43 The distinctiveness-in-unity and the mutual 
indwelling has significant epistemological implications for knowledge of the 
ontological Trinity.  
At the end of the twentieth century, a number of theologians used the doctrine 
of the Trinity including the concept of periochoresis to offer sociopolitical critiques. 
In distinct ways, they used the idea of the nature of the divine community among the 
three divine persons to give guidance for human communities. To name a few 
examples, elevating the concept of history, Jürgen Moltmann used perichoresis to 
establish unity among the three divine persons of the “open Trinity” in God’s 
historical involvement and invitation to freedom for all creation.44 Leonardo Boff 
used perichoresis to describe the divine communion as a prototype of a just, 
                                                          
41 From a Barthian perspective, this is the argument of Paul D. Molnar in conversation with 
several contemporary theologians including T. F. Torrance in his book Divine Freedom and the 
Doctrine of the Immanent Trinity: In Dialogue with Karl Barth and Contemporary Theology 
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2002). 
42 CDG, 102. Torrance distinguishes this translation of perichoresis from those who confuse 
χορεύω (to dance) with χορέω (to make room for or to contain). CDG, 170, n. 8. 
43 Ibid. Also, TP, 32-33, 120-21, 139-42; GGT, 172-73. A fuller discussion of the implications 
of perichoresis for the doctrine of the Trinity is found in CDG, 168-202.  
44 Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom, esp. 171-8, 191-222. 
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egalitarian human community.45 Colin Gunton found resources in the Trinity to heal 
the political alternatives of individualism and collectivism with its ensuing 
fragmentation in modern, Western culture.46 However, critiques of these practical 
uses of Trinitarian theology for a social trinitarianism have emphasized the qualitative 
differences between the divine community and human communities, particularly with 
the inability of human communities to embody perichoresis.47 In distinction from 
Moltmann, Boff, and Gunton, Torrance, like Barth before him, discussed the 
immanent Trinity not from the vantage point of a particular vision of social life, but 
through the economic, self-revelation of the Trinity.48 The nature of the immanent 
relations according to Torrance will be further explored in the next section (3.3). 
Torrance’s distinctive discussion of the immanent Trinity is part of what 
Stanley J. Grenz called a “return of the immanent trinity” in late twentieth century 
Trinitarian theology.49 Grenz also included in the “return of the immanent trinity” the 
discussions of Elizabeth A. Johnson and Hans Urs von Balthasar, demonstrating that 
they, distinct from Torrance’s Barthian approach, used a methodological approach 
consciously informed by the analogia entis. But for Torrance, it was the concepts of 
homoousion and perichoresis together that elevated Trinitarian theology from second-
level speech about the economic Trinity to third-level speech about the ontological or 
immanent Trinity. Torrance explained,  
 
With the aid of the homoousion and the perichoresis our understanding of 
God’s self-revelation to us is lifted up from the economic Trinity to the 
ontological Trinity, yet paradoxically, without leaving the economic Trinity 
behind. In the course of the movement of our thought from level to level we 
acquire the refined theological concepts and relations by which we seek to 
                                                          
45 Leonardo Boff, Trinity and Society, trans. Paul Burns (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1988), 5-6, 
116ff; Holy Trinity, Perfect Community, trans. by Phillip Berryman (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 2000), 14-
16, 47-67. 
46 Colin Gunton, The One, the Three and the Many (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993), esp. 163-79. 
47 Miroslav Volf, “‘The Trinity is Our Social Program’: The Doctrine of the Trinity and the 
Shape of Social Engagement,” Modern Theology 14, no. 3 (1998): 403-23; John L. Gresham Jr., “The 
Social Model of the Trinity and its Critics,” Scottish Journal of Theology 46, no. 3 (1993): 325-43; 
Bernhard Nausner, “The Failure of a Laudable Project: Gunton, the Trinity and Human Self-
Understanding,” Scottish Journal of Theology 62, no. 4 (2009): 403-20; from a Lindbeckian 
perspective, Karen Kilby, “Perichoresis and Projection: Problems with Social Doctrines of the Trinity,” 
New Blackfriars 81 (October 2000): 432-45. 
48 See the discussion in Molnar, Divine Freedom and the Doctrine of the Immanent Trinity, 1-
25, 273-310. 
49 Grenz, Rediscovering the Triune God, 163-215.  
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express, as far as we may, the ultimate constitutive relations in God, in virtue 
of which he is who he is as the Triune God.50  
 
These two concepts allow human thought about God to move from the economy of 
salvation to “the eternal relations immanent in the one Being of God.”51 This is 
precisely how knowledge of God is refined to the highest level within Torrance’s 
stratified structure of knowledge. Knowledge of God moves from the “evangelical 
and doxological level” which is where the level of basic experience of God through 
the gospel in the life of the church occurs, to the “theological level” where we 
recognize God’s redemptive activity as Father, Son and Holy Spirit (the economic 
Trinity), and ultimately to who God is antecedently and eternally within God’s being 
(the immanent Trinity). Torrance maintained that this structure is an a posteriori 
reflection about not only how the doctrine of the Trinity arises in individual 
apprehension of God, but also how the doctrine arose in the life of the church, leading 
to its highest conceptual level.52 Moreover, this movement of knowledge is “grounded 
in the movement of God himself” from the ontological Trinity through the economic 
Trinity, “rais[ing] us up to share in his own divine Life and Love which he eternally is 
in himself. This is the inner core of the Christian faith.”53 Hence, these three levels of 
theological reflection are mutually interconnected, with the immanent Trinity as the 
highest, correlating factor.54 
Therefore, for Torrance the ontological Trinity and the inner relations are 
ontologically supreme because they comprise God’s own Trinitarian life, a relational 
life that is eternal and transcendent.55 The immanent Trinity and the relations within 
are epistemologically most significant, because they comprise the ontological ground 
for the movement of the economic Trinity and thus for human knowledge of God.56 
                                                          
50 CDG, 110. Italics for emphasis are mine. Also, GGT, 173. 
51 CDG, 172. 
52 Ibid., 82-84. 
53 Ibid., 99. 
54 Ibid., 109. 
55 Ibid., 108-9. 
56 “In our theoretic constructions we rise through level after level of organized concepts and 
statements to their ultimate ontological ground, for our concepts and statements are true only as they 
rest in the last resort upon being itself.” RST, 136. “For Nicene theology, then, the mutual relation of 
knowing and being between the Father and the Lord Jesus Christ constitutes the ontological ground for 
our knowing of God, for in and through it our knowledge of God the Father is objectively rooted in the 
eternal being of God himself.” TF, 58-59. Torrance contends that Athanasius’ approach to the doctrine 
of the Trinity likewise moved from the incarnation, through the homoousion to its “ultimate ground in 
the eternal relations and distinctions within the one Being of the Godhead.” TP, 9. For Torrance, like 
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“Just as we take our knowledge of the Father from our knowledge of the Son, so we 
must take our knowledge of the Spirit from our knowledge of the Son, and in him 
from our knowledge of the Father: that is, from the inner relations which the Father, 
Son and Holy Spirit have with another in the one indivisible being of the Holy 
Trinity.”57 For Torrance, such knowledge goes beyond knowledge of the “energies” 
of God in revelation, a distinction made by Basil and maintained by the Eastern 
Orthodox tradition, and into the “intrinsic relations of his eternal triune being.”58 
Torrance contended that “the economic condescension of God in revelation and 
salvation through Christ and in the Spirit mediates to us knowledge of God in his own 
internal relations, for through the Son and in the Spirit God does not remain 
ultimately closed to us but has opened up for us knowledge of God in himself.”59 For 
Torrance, this is something unique to Christianity. “For Judaism or for Greek 
Philosophy, and indeed for every religion apart from Christianity, God remains 
ultimately unknowable, the nameless, the incomprehensible One, who cannot be 
known in himself or conceived in his inner life.”60 Therefore, this third level of 
Trinitarian knowledge is uniquely the highest form of knowledge of God. Notice 
Torrance’s frequent use of superlatives concerning knowledge of the immanent 
Trinity and the relations within. “[O]ur thought is lifted up from the level of the 
economic Trinity to the level of the ontological Trinity… and we reach the supreme 
point in the knowledge of God in his internal, intelligible personal relations.”61 Such 
supremacy is consonant with other third-level speech within his stratified structure of 
knowledge. The relations within the immanent Trinity constitute a “higher order 
theory” in theology and provide an “ultimate theoretic structure characterized by 
logical economy and simplicity.”62 They provide an “ultimate set of fundamental 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Barth, the economic Trinity through the incarnation is the epistemological starting point, but the 
immanent Trinity holds ontological priority. 
57 TF, 306. 
58 Ibid., 336; Torrance notes that Gregory Nazianzen and John Calvin do not make Basil’s 
distinction between God’s being and God’s energies. TP, 38-40. 
59 TP, 86. 
60 Ibid., 1. 
61 Ibid. The italics for emphasis are mine. Torrance refers to the Immanent Trinity as the 
“supreme point in our knowing of God in the inner perichoretic relations of his triune Being” on a few 
occasions. CDG, 103; GGT, 168. 
62 GGT, 171. Engaging Einstein on the aim of scientific theory, Torrance maintains that “what 
the scientist tries to do is to find the simplest possible set of concepts and their inter-connections 
through which he can achieve as far as possible a complete and unitary penetration into things in such a 
way as to grasp them as they are in themselves in their own natural coherent structures.” RST, 134. 
Later, on the doctrine of the Trinity, he writes, “Hence in the doctrine of the Trinity we have a refined 
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concepts and relations.”63 Thus, the doctrine of God is “wholly governed” by the 
coinherent relations among the three divine persons.64 Or, as Torrance poignantly 
wrote it in his book The Ground and Grammar of Theology, 
 
I myself like to think of the doctrine of the Trinity as the ultimate 
ground of theological knowledge of God, the basic grammar of 
theology, for it is there that we find our knowledge of God reposing 
upon the final Reality of God himself, grounded in the ultimate 
relations intrinsic to God’s own Being, which govern and control all 
true knowledge of him from beginning to end.65 
For Torrance, like Barth before him, the Trinity controls the entire shape and structure 
of theology. Hence, the phrase “from beginning to end” contrasts with Friedrich 
Schleiermacher, whose undeveloped doctrine of the Trinity famously comes at the 
conclusion of his primary theological discussion.66 Yet for Torrance, the ontological 
Trinity is the most central or highest level of theological reflection.  With his own 
form of realism, these cogent, high-order, dynamic theories are to serve the reality of 
the ontological Trinity and the relations within. Thus Torrance wrote, 
 
What we are concerned with here is not any conceptual system as such, 
but the immanent relations in God himself as Father, Son, and Holy 
Spirit in the communion of love and knowledge which he sets up 
between us, and it is with that end in view that we proceed to develop a 
doctrinal system of the greatest conceivable unity and the greatest 
paucity of fundamental concepts, through which we can provide a 
revisable conceptual representation of the ultimate intelligible basis of 
our knowledge of God.67  
 
We conclude that with Torrance’s stratified epistemological framework, the relations 
within the immanent Trinity are most determinative for the knowledge of God.  The 
“real, intelligible relations immanent in God” are “ultimate constitutive relations in 
God, which by their internal perfection are the ground upon which the intelligibility 
and objectivity of all our knowledge of God finally repose, and as such they play a 
                                                                                                                                                                      
model comprising a minimum of basic concepts immediately derived form divine revelation and our 
intuitive apprehension of God in his saving activity in history, together with a minimum of secondary 
concepts or relations of thought.” RST, 161. 
63 CDG, 109. 
64 TP, 140. 
65 GGT, 158-59. 
66 Friedrich Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith (1830; repr., London: T&T Clark, 2005), 
738-51. 
67 RST, 161. Italics are mine. 
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role of unifying simplicity in all theological doctrines.”68 The Trinitarian relations 
constitute “the ultimate theological basis for the unifying and simplifying of all 
theology.”69 In other words, the immanent Trinity and the relations within are the 
highest ontological level and consequently provide the highest epistemological 
influence, controlling all lower levels of knowledge of God for Torrance.70 
There are two potential pitfalls with Torrance’s stratified structure of 
knowledge. According to this structure, ascending levels of knowledge can attain to 
more simplified, controlling formulas. If Torrance’s commitment to God’s self-
revelation is compromised, this could lead to finding principles in God which are then 
in turn applied to other theological and philosophical topics.71 We will discuss this 
pitfall more in chapter four as we begin to draw out the epistemological implications 
of this chapter’s ontological discussion of the immanent Trinity. For now, we may 
surmise that Torrance would respond that as long as these uppermost descriptions 
remain a servant to the reality which they serve, then they can be useful and truthful.  
Concerning the second potential pitfall, we ask to what level of simplicity, 
clarity and conceptual apprehension can knowledge of God attain? In stark contrast to 
this model, the apophatic tradition stemming from Gregory of Nyssa and Denys (or 
Dionysius) contends that as knowledge of God matures, it leads to less conceptual 
clarity, even “unsaying” and “unknowing,” as when Moses entered the dark cloud on 
top of Mount Sinai.72 The hierarchical and top-down mastery implied by Torrance’s 
stratified structure of knowledge may be most suitable with scientific forms of 
knowledge and thus susceptible to Andrew Louth’s critiques of categorizing theology 
as a science already discussed (2.2). Nevertheless, it seems feasible that what God has 
                                                          
68 GGT, 167-68. Italics are mine. 
69 Ibid., 177. Italics are mine. On occasion, Torrance will speak of the doctrine of the Trinity 
in the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed as “the theological foundations laid by the Greek Fathers upon 
which the whole Church in the West as well as the East, Catholic and Evangelical alike, continues to 
rest.” TP, 103. 
70 GGT, 158-59. 
71 See chapter five, “Can a Metaphysical Principle of Relationality Be Substituted for the 
Relations of the Immanent Trinity? Karl Barth and the Current Discussion,” in Molnar, Divine 
Freedom and the Doctrine of the Immanent Trinity, 125-66; See also the excellent revision by Lewis 
Ayres, “(Mis)Adventures in Trinitarian Ontology,” in The Trinity and an Entangled World: 
Relationality in Physical Science and Theology, ed. John Polkinghorne (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 
2010), 130-45. 
72 Andrew Louth, The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1981), 80-97, 159-78; Also, Edward Howells, “Apophatic Spirituality,” in The New Westminster 
Dictionary of Christian Spirituality, ed. Philip Sheldrake (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox 
Press, 2005), 117-19. 
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revealed of himself within creation can find conceptual development and brevity 
similar to how other forms of knowledge develop, yet tempered by an apophatic 
commitment to the transcendence and mystery of God which outruns all creaturely 
conceptualization. Therefore, this framework needs to be held in tension with the 
transcendent epistemological dynamic upon which Torrance repeatedly calls in 
discussing the immanent Trinity (2.7). For instance, Torrance cautioned,  
 
The God whom we have come to know through his infinite 
condescension in Jesus Christ, we know to be infinitely greater than we 
can ever conceive, so that it would be sheer presumption and 
theological sin on our part to identify the trinitarian structures in our 
thinking and speaking of God with the real constitutive relations in the 
triune Being-in-Communion of the Godhead. All true theological 
concepts and statements inevitably fall short of God to whom they 
refer, so that, as we have already noted, their fragility and inadequacy, 
as concepts and humans statements about God must be regarded as part 
of the correctness and truthfulness of their reference to God.73  
 
Elsewhere, Torrance wrote,   
 
While knowledge of God is essentially trinitarian, the eternal relations 
in God infinitely transcend our ability properly to grasp and speak of 
them. God has astonishingly condescended to make himself known to 
us in himself as Father, Son and Holy Spirit, but the mystery of God’s 
internal relations as Father, Son and Holy Spirit is quite ineffable and 
far beyond our understanding, and may be spoken of only with the 
utmost reverence and reserve.74  
 
Thus, Torrance maintained that we are to formulate our thoughts with “fear and 
trembling, with adoration and awe, and in recognition of the poverty and inadequacy 
of the language we use” when we speak of the ineffable Trinity and the “inter-
hypostatic onto-relations in the transcendent Life of God.”75 In short, he called for 
“apophatic reserve and reverence” when speaking of the relations of the immanent 
Trinity.76 Without such reserve that comes from the transcendent dynamic, the 
stratified structure left on its own would be presumptuous and potentially idolatrous.   
                                                          
73 CDG, 110-11. Italics his. 
74 TP, 134. 
75 CDG, 172-73. 
76 Ibid., 194. This is the rare occasion where Torrance uses the term “apophatic” in a positive 
sense. Similarly, Torrance affirms the “cataphatic content” balanced by “apophatic reserve” in Niolas 
Nissiotis, TP, 107-8. 
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Nevertheless, as we will see more clearly in the next section, the relations 
between the Trinitarian persons are real relations and part of the ontology of the three 
persons and one being of God for Torrance. He contended that the inner life of God is 
a “dynamic ontological structure.”77 Furthermore, this supremely important 
ontological structure has epistemological implications which we will explore in the 
next chapters. But first, we now turn to Torrance’s ontological discussion of the 
relations within the immanent Trinity. 
 
3.3 Onto-Relations within the immanent Trinity 
As demonstrated by the previous section, the ontological Trinity and the 
relations within are ontologically and consequently epistemologically supremely 
important for Torrance’s theology. The unique way which Torrance described the 
relations between the three persons within the one being of God is with the term onto-
relations. This section will demonstrate how Torrance understood and used the term 
onto-relations and its implications for his Trinitarian theology. For Torrance, an onto-
relation is defined as “the kind of relation subsisting between things which is an 
essential constituent of their being, and without which they would not be what they 
are. It is a being-constituting relation.”78 Torrance used the example of particle theory 
which had moved beyond the “analytical concept of separated particles” and had 
discovered that particles “interpenetrate and contain one another in such a way that 
the relations between particles are just as ontologically significant as the particles 
themselves.”79 The basic notion of an ontologically-constituting relationship was 
derived from Torrance’s doctrine of the Trinity and consequently, as we will see in 
the next chapter, has implications for the knowledge of God.  To further the 
discussion of Torrance’s concept of onto-relations, we note that his primary use for 
this concept is for the idea of a person. 
It was significant for Torrance that the doctrine of person emerged from 
Trinitarian reflection as opposed to emerging from philosophical speculation on 
individuals or on rational nature.80 He contended that an onto-relational concept of a 
                                                          
77 RET, 44; RST, 171-73. 
78 RET, 42-43. 
79 Ibid., 43. Also, GGT, 175. 
80 GGT, 173-74; RET, 43; RST, 171-72. 
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person developed as the Church Fathers worked out the doctrines of Christ and the 
Trinity.81  “It was in connection with this refined conception of perichoresis in its 
employment to speak of the intra-trinitarian relations in God, that Christian theology 
developed what I have long called its onto-relational concept of the divine Persons, or 
an understanding of the three divine Persons in the one God in which the ontic 
relations between them belong to what they essentially are in themselves in their 
distinctive hypostases.”82 In describing the being and persons of the Trinity, a new 
notion of person arose in which the relations connecting the divine persons belong to 
what the divine persons are. Torrance explained, 
 
These relations subsisting between them are just as substantial as what 
they are unchangeably in themselves and by themselves. Thus the 
Father is Father precisely in his indivisible ontic relation to the Son and 
the Spirit, and the Son and the Spirit are what they are as Son and 
Spirit precisely in their indivisible ontic relations to the Father and to 
One Another. That is to say, the relations between the divine Persons 
belong to what they are as Persons – they are constitutive onto-
relations.83 
 
This idea coheres with the Athanasian rule for defining person upon which Torrance 
drew.84  This distinguished Torrance from Karl Barth who was reluctant to use the 
word “person” of the Trinity. Instead, Barth used the phrase “tropos hyparxeos” 
(“modes of being”) to refer to the Trinitarian members.85 Yet, Torrance aligned 
himself with Gregory Nazianzen in defining persons as substantive relations over 
“modes of being” as developed by the other Cappadocians.86 More recently, this is 
also in agreement with Karl Rahner who affirmed the use of the word “person” for 
God despite its pitfalls, because of its fifteen-hundred year sustained use.87 Torrance 
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was aware of the anthropomorphic problems of using the analogy of a human person 
for God. Yet, in keeping with the priority of revelation, Torrance maintained,  
 
It would be a serious mistake, however, to interpret what is meant by 
“Person” in the doctrine of the Holy Trinity by reference to any 
general, and subsequent, notion of person, and not by reference to its 
aboriginal theological sense. Applied to God “Person” must be 
understood in an utterly unique way appropriate to his eternal 
uncreated and creative Nature, but it may also be applied to human 
‘persons’ made in the image of God in a very different creaturely way. 
Just as we may not understand what the Fatherhood of God means by 
analogical projection even via eminentiae out of human fatherhood, for 
human fatherhood is to be understood properly by reference to the 
Fatherhood of God beyond itself altogether, so we may not understand 
what it means to speak of God as Person or as personal in terms of 
what human beings are in themselves and in their relations to one 
another, for human personhood is to be understood properly by relation 
to the creative Personhood of God.88 
 
From this perspective, we proceed in agreement with Torrance in using the term 
person to speak of God, but with analogical and apophatic reserve. Through his use of 
the notion of onto-relations, we will further discover his understanding of God as 
personal. He used the concept of onto-relations to define and defend what he meant 
by divine personhood. “The problem is that after the concept of person was launched 
into the stream of developing human ideas it inevitably tended to have a history of its 
own, in which its original onto-relational character became overlaid and distorted 
through transient cultural interests.”89 We turn now to explore how Torrance used the 
concept of onto-relations to discuss the Triune being and persons.  
With the onto-relational concept of a person, Torrance was able to maintain 
the distinctiveness of the three divine persons and the oneness of the Trinity.90 
Looking back to Athanasius, Torrance clarified the use of the terms ousia and 
hypostasis. In order to avoid tri-theism or modalism, Torrance argued that Athanasius 
held that ousia in the strict sense should be used of the one Being of God, while 
hypostasis should properly be used to refer to each of the three divine Persons in their 
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onto-relations with one another.91  However, as we will see, this does not mean for 
Torrance that the ousia or being of God is impersonal, but quite to the contrary. Yet, 
before we take up the discussion of the being of God for Torrance, we begin with the 
three hypostasis or three divine persons.  
Torrance’s concept of onto-relations meant that the persons of the Trinity are 
distinct, yet constituted and known by their relationship with one another. He 
maintained that the term “Father” is used in a two-fold way in the New Testament and 
in the theology of the Early Church. First, “Father” is used in reference to the Creator 
as the “heavenly Father” and secondly, it is used in reference to the relationship which 
the Father has with the Son, the “Father of our Lord Jesus Christ.”92 It is the second 
use that Torrance emphasized. Torrance recalled Gregory Nazianzen’s reference to 
“the three divine Persons as relations or scheseis eternally and hypostatically 
subsisting in God.”93 The Son is one with the Father for “everything that God the 
Father is, the Son is, except his being ‘Father.’”94 The person of the Son is distinct 
from Father and Spirit, and yet distinctively embodies and communicates the fullness 
of God in the incarnation for the work of reconciliation and revelation.95 The Spirit is 
known in relation to the Father and particularly the Son who is the “informational 
content of God’s self-revelation,” yet the distinctive work of the Spirit is to mediate 
and actualize knowledge of God within us, enabling us to participate in the life and 
knowledge of God.96 Torrance summarized, 
  
Each divine Person retains his unique characteristics as Father, Son, or 
Holy Spirit, in a union without confusion, for the individual 
characteristics of each of the three Persons do not separate them, but 
constitute the deep mutual belonging together. There is no Son apart 
from the Father and the Holy Spirit, and no Father, apart from the Son 
and the Holy Spirit, and no Holy Spirit apart from the Father and the 
Son. Homoousially and hypostatically they interpenetrate each other in 
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such a way that each Person is distinctively who he is in relation to the 
other two.97 
 
In other words, the Trinity consists of three distinct Persons who are in relationship 
with one another and those relationships define their distinct personhood.  
Furthermore, as we will see next, their relations with one another constitute the one 
Being of God. In the words of the Council of Alexandria of AD 362, God is “one 
being, three persons.”98 We proceed further to see how Torrance used the concept of 
onto-relations to not only discuss the distinctiveness of the persons and the person-
constituting relations within the Trinity, but also discuss the oneness of the Trinity in 
the being of God.99  
Torrance’s use of the concept of onto-relations also enabled him to maintain 
the unity of the Trinity. Through God’s self-revelation to Israel as “I am who I am/I 
will be who I will be,” the being of God is revealed as personal and self-determined 
for fellowship.100 The being of God is further revealed as personal and relational by 
Jesus Christ who takes up the “I am” of God.101 Together, the “I am” of Yahweh and 
the “I am” of Jesus “tell us that the Being of God is not undifferentiated in his 
oneness, but comprises a Triunity of relations internal to the Godhead.”102 Torrance 
reminded us that Athanasius first called God’s oneness and unity the “Triunity of 
God.”103 Holding together the triunity and oneness among the three divine persons, 
Torrance reflected,  
Through sharing equally in the one living Being of God, in an 
essentially spiritual and onto-relational way, the Father, the Son, and 
the Holy Spirit form and constitute together in their distinctive 
properties in relation to one another the natural Communion and 
indivisible Unity of the Holy Trinity. And so St Basil emphatically 
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declared, ‘Their oneness consists in the Communion of the 
Godhead.’104  
 
In short, for Torrance the one being of the Trinity is a communion.105 “With God, 
Being and Communion are one and the same.”106 The nature of this communion is 
further explicated by the important concept of perichoresis discussed above in that 
each of the persons of the Trinity makes room for or mutually contains one another. 
Consequently, the being of God is not isolated, lonely, or non-relational, but is a being 
for others. As Torrance put it, the onto-relations of the three divine Persons includes 
their “being for one another, in which they dwell in one another, love one another, 
give themselves to one another and receive from one another in the Communion of 
the Holy Trinity.” 107 In other words, the Trinity is essentially relational.108 “For God 
to be, is to be for himself in himself, that is for the three Divine Persons which God is 
to be for one another in the onto-personal relations of the Holy Trinity. As such God’s 
Being is, so to speak, inherently altruistic, Being for others, Being who loves.”109  
Drawing upon Johnannine and Augustinian roots, Torrance maintained that as an 
onto-relational being, God is love. The shared relations between Father, Son, and the 
Holy Spirit are relations of love. Therefore, God’s inner Trinitarian Being is an 
“eternal movement of Love” and a “plentitude of eternal relations of Love.”110 God’s 
being contains a “mutual movement of personal Communion in the Love that God 
is.”111 Thus, God’s one being is not less personal or less relational than any one of the 
divine persons. Instead, because the dynamic relations between the Trinitarian persons 
are onto-relations of love, they are an essential aspect of the unity within the one 
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being of the Trinity. 112 As we will see in the next chapter, this loving, relational 
aspect of the nature of the ontological Trinity has a governing influence on the 
knowledge of God for Torrance. 
Above, we considered and endorsed Torrance’s notion that the Trinity has 
self-revealed as personal, noting the necessary analogical reserve. We now consider 
Torrance’s notion that the Trinity is relational. In his historical survey of Trinitarian 
theology, Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen writes, “If there is one crucial development 
concerning the Trinity on which all Christian theologians are currently in agreement, 
it is the rise to prominence of the understanding of God as communion.”113 While 
many twentieth-century theologians developed this theme, a seminal study at the 
fountainhead of these developments, following Barth and Rahner, was by the 
Orthodox theologian John D. Zizioulas.114 The primary interlocutors of both Zizioulas 
and Torrance were the Cappadocian theologians. Both agreed that “the concept of the 
person is indissolubly bound up with theology.”115 Both agreed that communion is 
part of divine and consequently human being. Yet, they differed on how they 
described the divine persons in communion. Zizioulas began his discussion with the 
emergence and evolution of the concept of person. “In the ancient Greek world for 
someone to be a person means that he has something added to his being; the ‘person’ 
is not his true ‘hypostasis.’ ‘Hypostasis’ still means basically ‘nature’ or 
‘substance.’”116 However, through the Cappadocians’ efforts to give ontological 
expression to notions of the Triune God, “the person is no longer an adjunct to a 
being, a category which we add to a concrete entity once we have first verified its 
ontological hypostasis. It is itself the hypostasis of the being.”117 The person supplants 
being as “the constitutive element (the ‘principle’ or ‘cause’) of beings” and thus 
became a primary ontological category.118 In light of God’s self-revelation as person, 
Torrance would agree. Yet, Zizioulas and Torrance part company here in an important 
way. Following Basil and Gregory Nyssen, Zizioulas held that the person of the 
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Father functioned as the source and cause of the Trinity for the Cappadocians.119 The 
communion within the Triune God “is a product of freedom as a result not of the 
substance of God but of a person, the Father… who is Trinity not because the divine 
nature is ecstatic but because the Father as a person freely wills this communion.”120 
However, Torrance maintained, looking to Athanasius, Epiphanius, Cyril of 
Alexandria, and Gregory Nazianzen, that the unity and authority of the Trinity lay in 
the being or ousia of the Godhead rather than the person or hypostasis of the 
Father.121 As we have seen, the being of God is the persons-in-relationship or onto-
relations for Torrance. Through the concept of perichoresis, Torrance held together 
the distinctive persons and unified being of God, a “trinity in unity and unity in 
trinity.”122 Consequently, it is simultaneously the persons-in-relation and the ousia of 
God which is the source of the unity and authority of the Trinity. Perhaps surprisingly, 
it was not from Zizioulas’ perspective but from Torrance’s that an agreed statement 
on the doctrine of the Trinity was reached between the Reformed and Orthodox 
churches, contending that the procession of the Spirit comes from the Triune being 
rather than the person of the Father, involving the whole Godhead.123 To summarize, 
for Zizioulas communion occurred because of the free choice of the Father while for 
Torrance communion is constituted by divine persons-in-relation or onto-relations 
which is the one being of God.124 Despite their differences, both Torrance and 
Zizioulas held that the being of God is relational, yet Torrance’s onto-relational 
approach maintained traditional orthodoxy and obtained ecumenical advance. We 
proceed on solid ground in maintaining with Torrance and virtually all contemporary 
Trinitarian theology that the being of God is relational.  
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To bring this discussion of onto-relations within the immanent Trinity to a 
close, notice that two necessary themes concerning the nature of God are constant for 
Torrance: God is both personal and relational. By holding together these two concepts 
he comprised his conjunctive concept of onto-relations which he used to conceptually 
and verbally apprehend the Triune God as simultaneously one being, three persons. 
Torrance’s onto-relational concept helped him to think “holistically” or 
“conjunctively,” that is, to hold together in an act of integrative knowing the one 
being and three persons of the Trinity.125 We will have more to say about this way of 
thought below in the assessment below (3.4). For here, it is noteworthy that 
Torrance’s holding together the divine oneness and threeness is in contrast with an 
Augustinian-Thomist approach which begins with the one divine essence and 
subsequently discusses the three divine persons.126 This also distinguishes him from 
social Trinitarians who begin with the three divine persons, allowing Torrance to 
avoid the critique of tri-theism.127 Looking to Gregory Nazianzen, Torrance quoted, 
“No sooner do I consider the One than I am enlightened by the radiance of the Three; 
no sooner do I distinguish them than I am carried back to the One.”128 His concept of 
onto-relations not only held together the one and the three, but simultaneously held 
together the Being and Persons of God. As Torrance put it, “If the one Being of God 
is identical with the Communion of the three Divine Persons and the Communion of 
the three divine Persons is identical with the one Being of God, then we must think of 
the one God as a fullness of personal Being in himself… As the one God he is a 
Communion of personal Being in himself, a Trinity in Unity and a Unity in 
Trinity.”129 In other words, “the divine Being and the divine Communion are to be 
understood wholly in terms of one another.”130 Therefore, Torrance’s concept and use 
of the term onto-relations not only held together the three-ness and one-ness of the 
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Trinity but also the persons and the being of God. Moreover, these distinctions are 
held together and cohere with the notion that God is simultaneously personal and 
relational. In short, the being of the Triune God for Torrance is an “essentially 
personal, dynamic and relational Being.”131 
Thus far we have moved from some of the basic dynamics which comprised 
Torrance’s theological epistemology discussed in chapter two to the heart or 
controlling center of his epistemology. We have established that the immanent Trinity 
and the relations within are at the highest level of a stratified structure of knowledge 
for Torrance. Next, we discovered that both the three persons and the unified being of 
the Trinity are constituted by what Torrance called their onto-relations. He used the 
concept of onto-relations to describe the being of God as simultaneously and 
essentially personal and relational. Therefore, the personal and relational dimensions 
of the immanent Trinity are supremely important for Torrance, ontologically and 
therefore epistemologically. We turn now to assess the viability of Torrance’s use of 
the concept onto-relations within a stratified epistemological framework to discuss the 
immanent Trinity in a postmodern, scientific context. 
 
3.4 Assessment 
There are ways of thinking that have arisen in the postmodern era that allow 
for and enable fresh perspectives on the tradition of Trinitarian thought that were 
eclipsed in the modern era. Reciprocally, there are themes from within Trinitarian 
theology which can contribute to postmodern thought. David S. Cunningham has 
named important contributions in both directions which will help us to asses 
Torrance’s Trinitarian theology for the postmodern era.132 We will name two of these 
contributions, one which the postmodern era has allowed to renew among Trinitarian 
theology and one which Trinitarian thought offers as a corrective to postmodern 
thought. We will then note a frame of thinking which Torrance discussed within his 
Trinitarian reflections that is particularly suitable for moving beyond the habits of 
modern reductionism. First concerns the idea of relationality latent within classical 
Trinitarian thought that modernity hid from view. Cunningham writes, “One of the 
distinctive features of modernity has been its enthusiasm for classifying everything 
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into discrete categories.”133  Particularly with the natural sciences, this seemed to 
offer a framework in which neutral observers could organize the world, conduct 
experiments and discover objective theories. However, these classification systems 
were not neutral, making assumptions and epistemic decisions about the world from 
the beginning in the construction of the classification. “In contrast to the modernist 
penchant for division, isolation, and classification, postmodernism posits a much 
more interdependent approach. Individual instances are not so much sorted into 
discrete categories as they [are] set in relation to other instances.”134 As maintained in 
chapter one, the modern era sought for reductionist, linear causalities while the 
postmodern era sees multi-dimensional and interrelated complexities. This more 
relational perspective has allowed for a reclaiming of the Christian tradition’s 
understanding of the Triune persons as relations, mutually interdependent upon one 
another for their meaning and non-hierarchical in their relations. Cunningham 
summarizes, 
 
[P]ostmodernism’s emphasis on complex relationality (in contrast to 
the hierarchical classificatory schemes of modernity) has made it easier 
for theologians to think through the fundamentally relational nature of 
God that is inscribed in the doctrine of the Trinity. In the process, 
ancient claims about the Trinity’s co-equality, co-eternity, and mutual 
reciprocity are being recovered and reendowed with a fullness of 
meaning and significance that had been largely obscured in the modern 
era.135 
 
Along with others, Torrance has helped to retrieve aspects of Trinitarian thought that 
were obscured by the modern era. 
Second, Cunningham also contends that Trinitarian theology provides a 
needed corrective to much postmodern thought, particularly with its continued 
individualist notion of personhood. Modernist thought understood a person as the 
following:  
 
[A] free and autonomous entity, an independent seat of consciousness, 
which has no necessary relations or dependencies on anyone or 
anything else. Needless to say, this is not the vision that St. Augustine 
had in mind when he advocated the use of the word persona to speak 
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of the divine Three. But the modern emphases on infinite freedom 
(understood as lack of constraint) and on autonomy (defined as 
throwing off one’s tutelage by others) have led to a highly 
individualistic and privatized sense of human personhood.136 
 
Cunningham observes that the postmodern era has maintained the notion of person as 
an autonomous individual. This led Cunningham and Nicholas Lash to argue against 
the use of the word “person” for Trinitarian theology.137 On the other hand, 
Cunningham concedes that “by strongly asserting the relational and interdependent 
model of personhood that is specified by the Christian doctrine of God, theology can 
help postmodernity extend and deepen its overcoming of Enlightenment 
presuppositions.”138 He concludes,  
 
Thus, if we are to continue to speak of “God in three persons,” we 
must simultaneously define the word person in a highly 
interdependent, relational way: to be a person is to be a relation, or 
perhaps a multiplicity of relations… In this way, the longstanding 
Trinitarian claim that ‘God is three persons’ can become a powerful 
critique of the (post)modern tendency to understand personhood in 
individualistic and privatized terms.139 
 
This is precisely what Torrance has done with his onto-relational definition of person. 
Torrance’s onto-relational notion makes a contribution not only to the essentially 
relational notion of personhood, but also demonstrates a way of thinking that is 
particularly helpful in the postmodern era. 
Finally, we turn to a framework of thought which emerged from Torrance’s 
Trinitarian theology which is particularly helpful for moving beyond reductionist 
frameworks. We have demonstrated that Torrance used the concept of onto-relations 
to maintain that the ontological Trinity is both three persons and one being. This 
concept is a demonstration of what Torrance elsewhere called “integrative knowing.” 
“Integrative knowing is a unifying mode of thought in which we seek to grasp 
something by penetrating into its inner intelligible relations and wholeness without 
distorting fragmentation of it.”140 It is directly related to Torrance’s notions of 
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“thinking conjunctively” or “thinking holistically.” Torrance discussed “thinking 
conjunctively” with respect to the two natures of Christ as well as with the economic 
and ontological Trinity.141 He also discussed apprehending the economic and 
ontological Trinity “holistically.”142 Torrance did not use the term “thinking 
conjunctively” or “holistically” directly concerning the one being, three persons or the 
personal and relational aspects of God, yet this is precisely what he did. His concept 
of onto-relations demonstrates integrative knowing and conjunctive or holistic 
thinking. It is important to note that it is precisely these ways of knowing which can 
resist and overcome reductionist modes of thought.  Integrative knowing and holistic 
thinking are modes of thought which are responsive to the multi-layered and 
interrelated complexities of reality. With respect to knowledge of God, this is an a 
posteriori way of thinking in response to the revelation of God in Christ. This mode 
of thought kept Torrance from defining the Triune God as something less complex or 
more static than God is. Torrance wrote,  
 
Hence our knowing of God engages in a perichoretic circular 
movement from Unity to Trinity and form Trinity to Unity, for God is 
God only as he is Father, Son and Holy Spirit, and cannot be conceived 
by us truly otherwise. This means that we understand the Monarchy of 
God not in a partitive way moving linearly, as it were, from one divine 
Person to Another, but in the same holistic way as we know the 
Trinity.143 
  
By developing and applying the esemplastic concept of onto-relations, Torrance was 
able to hold together the one and the many, the being and the persons, as well as the 
persons and relations within God. Such an a posteriori, holistic way of knowing 
overcomes the reductionist mindset and is particularly useful for the postmodern, 
scientific age, be it knowledge of God or of any complexity or mysterious reality. 
 Nevertheless, there is an aspect of Torrance’s stratified structure of the 
knowledge of God that needs further attention. The first-tier or bottom-level of the 
knowledge of God is the experience of God. Certainly he understood the work of the 
economic Trinity was involved in the development of theological understanding at an 
intuitive level. Yet, Torrance did not develop how the experience of God continues to 
function at the second and third epistemological levels. How are we to think about the 
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role of experience in the development of higher levels of knowledge? More 
specifically, how can we speak about the experience of human participation in God’s 
self-knowledge? We will attempt to extend Torrance’s theology to answer this 
question in chapter five. 
 
3.5 Review 
In this chapter we have seen how the immanent Trinity and in particular the 
onto-relations within the immanent Trinity are quite important for Torrance’s 
theology. They are important not only in that they are part of the highest strata of 
knowledge of God, but they ontologically hold together and define the one being and 
three persons of the Trinity. Furthermore, they hold together and define God as 
essentially personal and relational.  
It is helpful to remember that how Torrance wrote about the onto-relations 
among the persons of the Trinity is commensurate with the seven epistemological 
dynamics for knowledge of God discussed in the previous chapter. Such knowledge is 
a disciplined form of thought and speech, indeed, similar to the highest strata of 
scientific theory. More obviously, such knowledge is ontologically-determined and 
Trinitarian precisely because discussion of the Triune onto-relations concerns the 
inner-life of the ontological Trinity, revealed by the economic Trinity. Knowledge of 
the onto-relations within God is also creation-situated because God’s inter-relations 
are known through a point of access from a center in God and from within our 
“creaturely existence,” that is, “within the space and time of our earthly existence.”144 
Furthermore, such knowledge is rational and conceptual, but not essentially so, for the 
“ultimate Rationality” and intrinsic order of the divine onto-relations invite a response 
of “committed rational worship and praise through godly ways of thought and speech 
that are worthy of God.”145 Yet, recognizing the distinctiveness and limitations of 
human cognition and language, these onto-relations are “ineffable relations,” 
transcending human thought and speech.146  Thus, knowledge of the onto-relations 
within the Trinity is transcendent. Nevertheless, intra-trinitarian relations are real 
relations which have been revealed in personal, human forms of thought and speech in 
the incarnation. Even though the terms used to speak of the persons and relations of 
                                                          
144 Ibid., 136. 
145 Ibid., 111. 
146 Ibid., 193.  
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the immanent Trinity are to be used “with apophatic reserve and reverence,”147 the 
realism of the incarnation is held together with the limitations and responsive 
creativity of human cognition and language. Hence, this aspect of knowledge of God 
is in a qualified sense realist. Thus, Torrance invited his readers to think through 
theological concepts to reality, and not remain fixed on particular words or concepts, 
especially with this highest-level concept of the onto-relations within the ontological 
Trinity.148  
However, not all of these general dynamics function as equally central or 
determinative. If we are to follow Torrance’s epistemological principle that the nature 
of what one knows determines how one knows it, then the onto-relations within the 
immanent Trinity prove to be a supremely important dynamic for the knowledge of 
God at the center of his theological epistemology. We recall from the quotation at the 
beginning of this chapter that to know God we must, as Torrance put it, 
 
[K]now him in accordance with the form or structure of his own Being 
– that is, in terms of God’s inner divine relations… so that for us to 
know that God, we must know him in a mode of understanding on our 
part appropriate to the Trinity of Persons in God. There must be a 
“Trinitarian” character in our knowing of God corresponding to the 
trinity of relations in God himself.149  
 
Concerning the form or structure of the Triune Being, Torrance argued that the onto-
relations are part of the highest level of knowledge about the ontological Trinity that 
we may have. Moreover, this chapter has demonstrated that he considered the 
immanent Trinity and the onto-relations within to be the ultimate governing influence 
for all knowledge of God. While Torrance did not weigh the different dynamics 
against each other, this chapter concludes that the supremely important ontological 
Trinity centralizes important epistemological dynamics for the knowledge of God. 
This leads us to consider the implications of the onto-relations of the ontological 
Trinity for knowledge of God in chapter four.  
                                                          
147 Ibid., 194. 
148 “Theological concepts are used aright when we do not think the concepts themselves, 
thereby identifying them with the truth, but think through them of the realities or truths which they are 
meant to intend beyond themselves. This applies not least to the concept of perichoresis in which we 
are concerned with the real objective onto-relations in the eternal movement of Love in the 
Communion of the Holy Trinity as they have been disclosed to us in the incarnate economy of God’s 
revealing and saving acts in Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit.” CDG, 194. 
149 GGT, 148. 
140 
 
CHAPTER 4 
KNOWLEDGE OF GOD AS PERSONAL AND RELATIONAL 
 
4.1 Introduction  
Chapter two discussed seven of the basic, inter-related dynamics of T. F. 
Torrance’s theological epistemology. Chapter three demonstrated how the immanent 
Trinity and the Trinity’s onto-relations are a supremely important reality and hence a 
governing dynamic for the knowledge of God. This leads us to consider the 
implications from the ontological Trinity and the divine onto-relations for the 
knowledge of God. Thus, this chapter will provide an exposition of the Trinitarian, 
onto-relational character of the knowledge of God resulting from the onto-relations 
within God. As we will see, the onto-relations within God entail that knowledge of 
God is personal and relational. In chapter five, we will demonstrate how the 
ontological Trinity contributes to the participatory character of the knowledge of God. 
Through this engagement with Torrance’s epistemology, we will consider a vision of 
participation in the knowledge of God that moves beyond reductionism for the 
postmodern, scientific age. We now turn our attention to the implications of the onto-
relations within the ontological Trinity for the knowledge of God. 
 
4.2 An onto-relational order 
Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen notes that many theologians in the twentieth century 
have found implications from the doctrine of the Trinity, particularly communion 
theology, and have applied them to a wide range of topics including anthropology, 
Christology, prayer, and theology of other religions.1 Torrance has uniquely applied 
his distinctive Trinitarian theology to the area of epistemology. Torrance’s 
ontologically-determined epistemological dynamic holds that the nature of the object 
determines how one knows it. As we have seen, for Torrance, this is a scientific, or 
rather as this thesis has argued, a disciplined approach, namely to “know things only 
under the constraint of their distinctive nature.”2 Thus, he consistently maintains that 
                                                          
1 Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen, The Trinity: Global Perspectives (Louisville, KY: Westminster John 
Knox Press, 2007), 387-8. 
2 TF, 52. “This scientific approach, in which we know things only under the constraint of their 
distinctive nature, applies even more forcefully to the knowledge of God, for since there is no likeness 
between the eternal being of God and the being of created reality, God may be known only out of 
himself. Thus if we are to have any true and precise scientific knowledge of God we must allow his 
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“genuine knowledge in any field involves knowledge of that field in accordance with 
the nature of the realities with which we have to do in it, and knowledge of those 
realities in terms of their internal relations or intrinsic structures.”3 Consequently, in 
light of the onto-relations of the immanent Trinity, there is a “distinctive kind of 
order,”4 specifically, an “onto-relational order” for the knowledge of God for 
Torrance. As he clearly put it, 
 
If God is triune in his nature, then really to know God means that we 
must know him in accordance with his triune nature from the start. It is 
certainly scientifically objectionable to develop a doctrine of the 
Trinity on grounds other than that on which we develop our actual 
knowledge of God, the One God. But further, if we operate, not with 
some kind of epistemological dualism between form and being or 
structure and substance, but with the unity of form and being or of 
structure and substance, then to know God we must know him in 
accordance with the form or structure of his own Being – that is, in 
terms of God’s inner divine relations. And that means we must know 
him as the Triune God who within himself has relations between 
Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; so that for us to know that God, we must 
know him in a mode of understanding on our part appropriate to the 
Trinity of Persons in God. There must be a “Trinitarian” character in 
our knowing of God corresponding to the trinity of relations in God 
himself.5 
 
The Trinitarian onto-relations of God are therefore determinative for the nature of the 
knowledge of God for Torrance. This distinctive kind of order can “be allowed to 
exert [its] creative power upon the whole range of human life and thought” to 
transform the very foundations of culture.6 He argued that we must therefore adopt 
“onto-relational ways of thinking” which undermine older dualist and atomistic 
modes of thought.7 For instance, Torrance observed onto-relational thinking at work 
in modern particle theory and quantum theory.8 He did not develop an onto-relational 
mode of thought from quantum theory, but mentioned it as an epistemological 
analogy. Onto-relational ways of thinking about God did not arise independent of God 
in another field of inquiry which he subsequently applied to God, but rather this way 
                                                                                                                                                                      
own nature, as he becomes revealed to us, to determine how we are to know him, how we are to think 
of him, and what we are to say of him.” 
3 GGT, 146. 
4 RET, 44. 
5 GGT, 148. 
6 RET, 47. 
7 GGT, 172-178; RET, 44. 
8 RET, 42-51; GGT, 11-12, 173-6, 178; RST, 168. 
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of thought arose for Torrance from the “empirico-theoretical ground of the 
incarnational activity of God within the spatio-temporal structures of our world, and it 
remains, indirectly through the level of the economic trinitarian relations, empirically 
correlated with that ground.”9 In other words, he did not first construct a principle of 
onto-relations and then analogously apply it to God, but rather allowed the self-
revelation of the immanent Trinity through the economic Trinity to define his notion 
of onto-relations. Torrance intended for the immanent Trinity to remain ontologically 
supreme, maintaining God’s freedom to be who He is which through the self-
revelation of the economic Trinity led Torrance to give articulation to the onto-
relations within God.10  
Before turning to discuss the epistemological implications of the onto-
relations within the Triune God, we first note that the triune onto-relations have two 
broader, knowledge-encompassing consequences for humanity for Torrance. First, 
Torrance held that the divine onto-relations among the persons of the Trinity 
constitute human personhood. God is not only a “fullness of personal Being in 
himself, but is also a person-constituting Being.”11 
 
We must think of God…as ‘personalizing Person’, and of ourselves as 
‘personalized persons’, people who are personal primarily through 
onto-relations to him as the creative Source of our personal being, and 
secondarily through onto-relations to one another within the subject-
subject structures of our creaturely being as they have come from 
him.12  
 
The personal God establishes human personhood through God’s onto-relations 
extended in the redemptive activity of the economic Trinity. In short, the persons-in-
relationship within God constitute human persons-in-relationship.13 Second, just as 
the persons of the Triune God are person-constituting, likewise Torrance contended 
that the being of God is communion-constituting within God and among humans.14 
                                                          
9 GGT, 176. 
10 Molnar, Divine Freedom and the Doctrine of the Immanent Trinity, 125-46, 317-19. But we 
will see in chapter five that Torrance’s vision of participation did not assume an objectivism that can 
purely think from a “center in God” without the creaturely and cultural constraints which limit 
knowledge as Molnar seems to suggest, showing less appreciations for the subjective dimensions than 
did Torrance. 
11 RET, 43. 
12 CDG, 160. 
13 RET, 42-7; RST, 173-200; TP, 99-100. 
14 RET, 46; RST, 178-83. 
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“The eternal ground in God from which there flows his communion-seeking love and 
grace toward us, is the Communion which the Father, Son and Holy Spirit have 
among themselves, and, let it be repeated, really are.”15 The onto-relations among the 
persons of the Trinity are relationship-constituting not only within God, but among 
humans. Hence, the onto-relations within the immanent Trinity constitute both human 
persons and relationships, or human onto-relations. Reciprocally, human interrelations 
of love “reflect the fact that God is love” and image the onto-relations of the Trinity, 
albeit imperfectly.16 It is from within the divine-human onto-relations which the 
possibility of knowledge of God arises, giving knowledge of God its particular, onto-
relational form.  
From the Triune God at the heart of Torrance’s theological epistemology, 
onto-relational ways of thinking entail three, central epistemological dynamics: 
knowledge of God is personal, relational, and participatory. In this chapter we will 
examine how knowledge of God is personal and relational for Torrance. We will 
expound how it is participatory in the next chapter. There are other ontological 
aspects of God which are epistemically-formative for Torrance which we will not 
discuss, such as that God is spirit and thus known spiritually.17 In this chapter we 
discuss how knowledge of God is personal and relational because of the ontological 
priority of the persons-in-relationship or onto-relations within the immanent Trinity. 
Torrance himself did not uphold these dynamics as more weighty than others. 
However, from a Trinitarian framework, these two dynamics are a priority and 
particularly helpful for epistemology in the postmodern, scientific age. We now turn 
to discuss how knowledge of God is personal knowledge. 
 
4.3 Knowledge of God as Personal Knowledge 
4.3.1. The Trinity and Personal Knowledge 
As we move to discuss how the Triune God and the onto-relations within 
determine the personal form of knowledge of God, it may be helpful if we remind 
ourselves of a basic epistemological dynamic discussed in chapter two. A proper, 
disciplined way to know things is under the constraint of their distinctive nature. 
Torrance held that this is especially true for knowledge of God because there is a 
                                                          
15 CDG, 132. Also 133. 
16 RST, 178. 
17 CDG, 158. 
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fundamental distinction between the being of God and the being of created reality. 
Hence, “God may be known only out of himself. Thus if we are to have any true and 
precise scientific knowledge of God we must allow his own nature, as he becomes 
revealed to us, to determine how we are to know him, how we are to think of him, and 
what we are to say of him.”18 In chapter three we agreed with Torrance that the 
revelation of God in Christ, the economic Trinity, gives us access to knowledge of the 
ontological or immanent Trinity. Consequently, we are allowed to apprehend that God 
is a unity of persons-in-relationship, or in Torrance’s words, the being of God consists 
of onto-relations. This is an ultimate theoretical structure for Torrance, belonging to 
the highest strata of theology and thereby has a governing influence on all knowledge 
of God. Thus, knowledge of God is personal knowledge for Torrance, because, simply 
put, the object of this knowledge is personal. Torrance has consistently maintained the 
personal nature of the knowledge of God from his early lectures through his 
developed epistemological writings. For his Auburn lectures, Torrance wrote, 
“Christian Truth is identical with a personal being, indeed with a particular historical 
Person. It can be known only personally and cannot be universalized without losing 
its particular, historical, and personal character.” 19 Later, he put, “Since [Christ] is 
Person and Word the forms of knowledge that arise in us are correspondingly 
personal and verbal.”20 Ontologically, Torrance maintained that God is “the Person, 
the one source of all personal existence.”21 Consequently, “the Triune God is not only 
a fullness of personal Being in himself, but is also person-constituting Being.”22 
Hence, all personhood finds its origin and orientation in divine personhood. For 
Torrance, divine personhood is the fount of all personal existence and as a result 
personal knowledge is a fundamental type of knowledge, and quite clearly 
characterizes an essential facet of knowledge of God. 
 Not only does the personal nature of God’s being undergird all existence and 
determine the personal form of knowledge of God, but God’s activity further 
establishes that personal form. God has acted to reveal himself through personal self-
communication in Jesus Christ. The person of God necessitates active self-revealing. 
                                                          
18 TF, 52. 
19 “Theology and Church” The Auburn Lectures, 1938-39 (The Thomas F. Torrance 
Manuscript Collection. Special Collections, Princeton Theological Seminary Library), 3. 
20 TS, 207. 
21 GR, 80; Also, RST, 173-4. Italics mine. 
22 RET, 43. 
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This was as an early theme for Torrance. For instance, he wrote in his notes for his 
Auburn lecture “Philosophy and Theology,”  
 
For God is other than the world, and not the impersonal or immanental 
ground of the world; he is therefore other than the content of the soul. 
He is the other One, the Mysterious One and the Unknowable One, 
Whom we do not know because He is a Person, Who therefore can 
only be known by a personal communication. Personality is a secret; a 
mystery is hidden in it. Knowledge of a person is only possible through 
revelation, and the person reveals himself through his word. Through 
the word the mystery of the person is communicated, through the word 
that which we did not know is revealed. 23  
 
Unlike an impersonal notion of general revelation, God’s self-revelation is personal. 
The personal form of the knowledge of God which comes from God’s personal self-
revelation continued as a theme through his later writings.24 As discussed in chapter 
three, Torrance maintained that who God is in Himself, God is towards us in 
revelation.25 Because God is in Himself who he has revealed Himself to be as a 
personal being in Jesus Christ, truth is a personal being.26 Thus, divine personhood is 
revealed personally in Jesus Christ. Although Torrance at times will refer to God as 
the “object” of theology which could connote something other than personhood, he is 
quite clear that God gives Himself to be known as personal subject. “God is Person, 
and when He objectifies Himself for our knowledge He does not cease to be Subject, 
to be Himself.”27  
Furthermore, God reveals himself in a person-constituting way. “Knowledge 
of God takes place not only within the rational structures but also within the person 
and social structures of human life, where the Spirit is at work as personalizing 
Spirit.”28 As the divine source of personhood, God’s self-revelation is a personal and 
                                                          
23 “Philosophy and Theology,” The Auburn Lectures, 1938-39 (The Thomas F. Torrance 
Manuscript Collection. Special Collections, Princeton Theological Seminary Library), 36. See also 16-
17, 34-36; “Theology and Science” The Auburn Lectures, 1938-39(The Thomas F. Torrance 
Manuscript Collection. Special Collections, Princeton Theological Seminary Library), 56-59. 
24 Some examples include TS, 38-40, 146-48, 207-8; TF, 65-8; CDG, 102-3, 155-61. 
25 CDG, 8, 92, 95, 99, 114, 136, 142, 158, 237; TF, 71, 130, 135; TP, 2, 80-1, 117, 135; TIR, 
38; RET, 14-15; CTSC, 30-31; GGT, 39-41, 67, 89-91, 151-2, 156-168; DCO, 7, 108-9; RST, 156-7; 
TCFK, vii, 287-9, 303. 
26 TS, 141. 
27 This theme of God as Subject is consistently upheld by Torrance from the Auburn Lectures 
(1938-9) to the publication of Theological Science in 1969. “Philosophy and Theology” (The Thomas 
F. Torrance Manuscript Collection. Special Collections, Princeton Theological Seminary Library), 36; 
TS, 38. 
28 GR, 188. 
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personalizing activity.29 Thus, in agreement with Calvin, Torrance maintained that 
knowledge of God and knowledge of ourselves are interrelated and correlative.30  
As a communion of persons, God communicates himself through Christ and 
by the Spirit within a community of persons, that is, the church. The person-
constituting interaction of God creates the church as the “spatiotemporal correlate” of 
his self-revelation. The church provides the “social coefficient” to our knowledge of 
God for “we are unable to know God in any onto-relational way without knowing him 
in the togetherness of our personal relations with one another.”31 God’s self-revelation 
and the structures of human reception of that revelation are both personal. “This 
means that an intensely personal element characterizes both the object pole and 
subject pole of the onto-relational order in our knowledge of God.”32 Hence, from one 
end of the knowledge relation to the other, the end and means of human knowledge of 
God is personal knowledge, rooted in and shaped by the Triune God. 
Torrance also pointed out on several occasions that there is a distinctive form 
of inquiry for personal subjects verses determinate objects.33 Torrance noted how 
Calvin reversed the medieval order of scientific questions (back to Aristotle’s order) 
inquiring first after the nature of the thing we know, quale sit, allowing nature to 
determine how we know it. In Christian theology, we are directed to a personal reality 
and therefore ask quails sit, “who?” The question is first “who God is” in the actual 
knowledge of Him.34  One does not interact with persons in the same way one 
                                                          
29 RST, 138-39; RET, 46; CFM, 30-31. 
30 TS, xiv, 87, 306-8; GR, 31-3; RST, 58-9, 149. The first section and words of Calvin’s 
Institutes are on “The Knowledge of God and That of Ourselves are Connected. How They are 
Interrelated.” He opened this section with “Without knowledge of self there is no knowledge of God.” 
Calvin began by explaining, “Nearly all the wisdom we possess… consists of two parts, the knowledge 
of God and of ourselves. But, while joined by man bonds, which one precedes and brings forth the 
other is not easy to discern.” John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, vol. 1, John T. McNeil, 
ed. (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 2006), 35. On this theme in Calvin, see Edward A. 
Dowey, Jr., The Knowledge of God in Calvin’s Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1994), 18-24. 
31 RET, 46. 
32 RET, 46. 
33 On the personal form of knowledge of God, Nicholas Lash commented “It may be that, in 
order to get to know other human persons, we have to attend, rather than control; that human beings are 
mysteries to be respected, not problems energetically to be licked. Nevertheless, the way of knowledge 
of other persons is, in practice, always a way of demanding and costly engagement, a way of suffering, 
of compassion. There is an irreducible variety in the modes of human action, as there is the modes of 
human knowledge. In personal relationships, knowledge is the fruit, and not merely the precondition, 
of engagement, of suffering, of love. What I am suggesting is that perhaps one of the reasons that we 
characterize the transcendent mystery of God as ‘personal’ is because we have discovered that the 
process of ‘coming to know’ God, and of discerning his action in the world, has a similar structure.” 
Nicholas Lash, Theology on Dover Beach (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1979), 162-63. 
34 GR, 33. 
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interacts with microscopic particles, chemical properties, geological strata, or non-
human animal life.35 There is a distinctive kind of order that produces knowledge 
among personal relations.36 With persons a mode “in which personal reciprocity in 
speaking and listening, asking and answering, is the appropriate mode of 
rationality.”37 Personal forms of speech are apposite with personal reality.38 For 
Torrance, Jesus Christ is “at once Person and Word…who communicates His Word to 
us in the form of His own personal Being.”39 Therefore, to know God is to know a 
person and hence personal modes of thought are appropriate.40 Conversely, abstract 
and impersonal modes of thought are thereby inappropriate with God.41 “If personal 
relations belong to the structure of reality itself, then it is surely the model of personal 
agent that must be primary in our attempt to think intelligibly of God, and not the 
impersonal model of the detached observer over against the object, with its 
unbridgeable gulf between subject and object.”42  He named the Cartesian subject-
object relation as an “impersonal model of thought” in which we become “trapped in 
detached, objectivist relations to what is other than ourselves” and thereby exclude the 
“place of personal agency.”43  
Thus far in this chapter we have seen that for Torrance the nature of the Triune 
God including God’s onto-relations determines human personhood and the personal 
nature of the knowledge of God. The ontological Trinity and thus the economic 
Trinity, God’s being and God’s self-revelation, are personal and consequently 
knowledge of God is personal knowledge. Humans receive God’s personal self-
                                                          
35 “The Knowledge of God,” The Auburn Lectures, 1938-39 (The Thomas F. Torrance 
Manuscript Collection. Special Collections, Princeton Theological Seminary Library), 2-3: “Is our 
knowledge of God like our knowledge of geological strata or is it rather like our knowledge of a person 
with whom we are on terms of love? Obviously, of these two broad alternatives, our knowledge of God 
must be said to resemble the latter. It can be fairly argued that a large part of the difficulty we 
experience to-day in our apprehension of God is due to the ‘carry-over’ of the methods of obtaining 
knowledge in the one sphere to operation in the other where they are neither appropriate nor pertinent.” 
This argument is echoed in many later writings in line with his ontologically-determined 
epistemological dynamic discussed in chapter 2.3. 
36 RST, 173-78. 
37 GR, 93. 
38 TS, 207-8. 
39 TS, 133. Also, TIR, 42: “Because the Word is in the form of personal Being, relationship to 
the Word cannot be in word and understanding only but must itself be intensely personal…Knowledge 
of Christ and union with Christ went hand in hand together, so that relation to Christ was grounded and 
mediated through personal and living communion.” 
40 Torrance argued that the patristic doctrine of the Trinity gave us personal modes of thought 
in contrast to the impersonal classical Greek conceptions. TS, 305. 
41 CTSC, 70-71; RET, 45; CFM, 34-35. 
42 RST, 173. 
43 RST, 133. 
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revelation through a community of persons. Modes of thought and speech to 
conceptualize and articulate the knowledge of God are therefore appropriately 
personal. We will further explore the potential of this vision of personal knowledge by 
briefly assessing its viability for the postmodern, scientific age. 
 
4.3.2. Personal knowledge and the postmodern, scientific age 
On the way toward an assessment of participation in the knowledge of God in 
the postmodern, scientific world, we will offer an assessment of the dynamic of 
personal knowledge. This is not a full assessment of the whole complex of 
participation, but an important assessment of one of the central dynamics. Before we 
discuss the notion of personal knowledge for the postmodern, scientific context, it is 
important to remember that for Torrance it was the patristic doctrine of the Trinity 
that gave us personal modes of thought in contrast to the classical Greek 
conceptions.44 As Andrew Louth has reminded us, “For the Platonists God is an 
impersonal (or supra-personal) ultimate principle; for the Fathers God is a Person.”45 
Beyond patristic writers, various twentieth-century theologians and philosophers 
helped Torrance to develop his notion of personal knowledge. The personal nature of 
God and thus the personal form of communication are themes that are found in Emil 
Brunner, Torrance’s co-teacher early in his career at Auburn.46 Torrance on occasion 
also referred to the work of the philosopher John Macmurray who developed the 
conception of the uniqueness of knowing persons.47 While these two maintained that 
knowledge of persons had distinctive modes, Torrance more frequently cited the 
works of Martin Buber, and in particular The Eclipse of God and Ich und Du, to 
develop the form of communication and knowledge appropriate to persons. The 
influence of Buber on Torrance on this matter is evident from his early lectures down 
through his epistemological writings. 48 However, it was the chemist and philosopher 
                                                          
44 TS, 305; CDG, 103ff. 
45 Andrew Louth, Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition: From Plato to Denys (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1981), 195. 
46 TS, 133, n. 1.  
47 TS, 3, 11-12, 22, 30-1, 208 n.1; GR, 81; RST, 63, n. 30. Although Torrance did not reference 
this work in particular, in arguing for personal forms of knowledge, Macmurray argued against 
material (biological) and theoretical (sociology) reductionism. John Macmurray, The Form of the 
Personal (1957; repr. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Books, 1991). 
48 “The object of faith is God speaking in person and we cannot transmute that Word into an 
entity which we can manipulate along with other entities in our thinking. It is essentially a Thou over 
against Whom we stand addressed, from Whose presence and Word we may not withdraw in order to 
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of science Michael Polanyi who influenced Torrance’s notion of how personal 
knowledge functions in ways which are particularly important for the postmodern, 
scientific age.  
“When we turn to the distinctive kind of onto-relational order with which we 
have to reckon in Christian theology, however, we have something else to remember, 
its profoundly personal character…What is required here is some form of personal 
knowledge similar to that which Michael Polanyi has championed even in the realm 
of natural science.”49 Torrance maintained that no one had done more to advance the 
personal character of knowledge than Michael Polanyi.50 In his book Personal 
Knowledge, Michael Polanyi attacked objectivism, the modern notion of detached, 
impersonal knowledge and replaced it with the idea of personal knowledge which 
includes the “passionate participation” of the human knower.51  He argued that 
“complete objectivity as usually attributed to the exact sciences is a delusion and is in 
fact a false ideal.”52 In its stead, Polanyi emphasized that knowing is a personal 
activity that is multi-dimensional, involving many activities. For instance, even in the 
most exact of sciences, the art of knowing involves personal judgment in observation 
and verification, in making weighty or routine epistemic decisions, in the selection of 
good questions for investigation and hypothesis, in applying the maxims or rules of 
the particular science or art, in the appraisal of order and meaning amidst randomness, 
and other particular skills of which a person may not be aware except in the overall 
performance of the knowledge.53 The activity and responsibility of the knower is a 
key component of Polanyi’s notion of personal knowledge. Following Polanyi, 
Torrance recognized the active dimensions of personal knowing which Polanyi 
emphasized. Torrance defined personal knowledge as, 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
take up a detached attitude, and so try to pass a verdict on it, or try to express it in impersonal fashion. 
It is essentially a Thou Who will not be turned into an It, and Who obstructs and judges as a sinful 
betrayal any attempt to make the Word subjective to ourselves or an object within our consciousness 
over which we have control.” “Christian Faith,” The Auburn Lectures, 1938-39 (The Thomas F. 
Torrance Manuscript Collection. Special Collections, Princeton Theological Seminary Library), 16. 
See also TS, 5-6, 14, 22n.2, 42n.2, 309, 330n.3; GR, 29-55, 106; RST, 179-206.  
49 RET, 45. 
50 RST, 13. 
51 Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy (1958; repr., 
Chicago: University of Chicago, 1962), 17. 
52 Ibid., 18. 
53 Ibid., 18, 19-20, 27, 30-1, 33-40, 49-65. 
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the responsible participation of the person as an active rational centre 
of consciousness in all acts of understanding and knowing. It is only a 
person who can think, mean, interpret, understand; only a person who 
can appraise the validity of an argument or exercise a judgment in 
relating evidence to an external reality which he seeks to apprehend; 
only a person who can discern a coherent pattern in nature and use it as 
a clue in active pursuit of his inquiry; only a person who can submit his 
mind to the compelling demands of reality upon him; only a person 
who can think and decide as he must under obligations to the truth; and 
only a person who can act responsibly with universal intent in his 
knowing.54 
 
Torrance found in Polanyi an articulation of the active, personal dynamics inevitably 
a part of human knowing, scientific or otherwise. Before Torrance’s engagement with 
Michael Polanyi, he recognized personal elements at work in scientific ways of 
knowing. This is evidenced by his awareness of personal value and interest in the 
abstractions of scientific reasoning in his early, unpublished lectures.55 Yet, he further 
developed the personal and subjective dimensions of knowing through his 
engagement with Polanyi. Notice in Torrance’s above definition of personal 
knowledge the many times that Torrance wrote “only a person” followed by an 
assortment of activities which are part of the overall activity of knowing. The person’s 
engagement with reality is multi-faceted and the many personal aspects of knowing 
are recognized in his definition of personal knowledge. Within Torrance’s notion of 
personal knowledge, the focus is on the knower as an active rational agent engaged in 
a complex of knowing activities.  
Therefore, for Torrance, knowledge cannot be reduced to impersonal, formal 
relations between objects as in an abstract objectivism or discussions of artificial 
intelligence.56 Torrance demonstrated clear conviction beyond objectivism when he 
wrote that “it is therefore unscientific to pretend that the subjective element is 
eliminated when it cannot be.”57 Instead, genuine objectivity for Torrance includes 
human, personal engagement because, as he clearly put it, “personal being is, I 
submit, the prime bearer of objectivity.”58 Through his use of Polanyi’s emphasis on 
the personal dimensions of knowledge, Torrance has helped to move theological 
                                                          
54 BSCL, 141-42; Also, RET, 45-6; CTSC, 66-7. 
55 “Theology and Philosophy,” The Auburn Lectures, 1938-39 (The Thomas F. Torrance 
Manuscript Collection. Special Collections, Princeton Theological Seminary Library), 8-9. 
56 CTSC, 66-7. 
57 TS, 93. 
58 RST, 110. Also, 109, 134. 
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epistemology beyond the modern notion of objectivity which attempted to eliminate 
all personal factors in the knowing of reality. Moreover, his notion of personal 
knowledge overcomes reductionist attempts to fully explain human knowledge on 
levels less than the human person. This is backed by his anthropology. The idea that 
human personhood is derived from divine personhood immediately confronts 
reductionist attempts to explain human personhood on lower levels. 
Subjective dimensions of knowledge have become particularly important in 
the postmodern era and require theological attention. Also, the activity of the knower 
is important for considering a vision of participation in the knowledge of God. Thus, 
we will continue to develop important aspects of the subjective, active dimensions of 
knowing in the ensuing discussion of participation in the knowledge of God in chapter 
five. The next chapter will not only provide a fuller development of key dynamics of 
the subjective dimensions involved in participation in the knowledge of God, but also 
a continued assessment of this vision for the postmodern, scientific era. Nevertheless, 
here, in an assessment of this Trinitarian-shaped dynamic of Torrance’s theological 
epistemology, we must consider another challenge besides objectivism. In embracing 
the personal dimensions of knowledge, how did Polanyi and Torrance avoid reducing 
knowledge to subjectivity, which could lead to a cacophony of innumerable personal 
perspectives in a pluralistic environment? The challenge in the postmodern era is less 
the problem of objectivism (though it still survives in late modernity), but rather 
subjectivism, and close to it, relativism. 
In contending against objectivism, the way which Polanyi attempted to rescue 
his concept of personal knowledge from subjectivism is through the notion of 
commitment. Maintaining the passionate participation of the knower in all acts of 
knowing, Polanyi held that it is only through personal commitment to reality that 
knowledge can be obtained. Polanyi wrote, 
 
I can speak of facts, knowledge, proof, reality, etc. within my 
commitment situation, for it is constituted by my search for facts, 
knowledge, proof, reality, etc., as binding on me. These are proper 
designations for commitment targets which apply so long as I am 
committed to them; but they cannot be referred to non-committally. 
You cannot speak without self-contradiction of knowledge you do not 
believe, or of a reality which does not exist. I may deny validity to 
some particular knowledge, or some particular facts, but then to me 
these are only allegations of knowledge or of facts, and should be 
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denoted as ‘knowledge’ and as ‘facts’, to which I am not committed. 
Commitment is in this sense the only path for approaching the 
universally valid.59 
 
Active personal commitment to reality is commensurate with what Polanyi called 
universal intent, the aim of articulating reality which is beyond one’s own perception 
or interpretation. Thus the personal (subjective) and impersonal (objective) are 
brought together by personal acts of commitment. As Polanyi put it, “By trying to say 
something that is true about a reality believed to be existing independently of our 
knowing it, all assertions of fact necessarily carry universal intent. Our claim to speak 
of reality serves thus as the external anchoring of our commitment in making a factual 
statement.”60 Without commitment to reality and universal intent, knowledge is 
reduced to subjectivity. But through personal commitment to reality, knowledge 
maintains its personal character and submits to the demands of reality. Thus, there are 
two poles of commitment, the personal and the universal, which arise simultaneously 
in a knowing relationship.61 But this knowing relationship does not mean a loss of the 
sense of self, but emerges, as with children with their developmental awareness, with 
the distinction between what is my self and not myself. Only with distinct personhood 
can a person commit themselves to beliefs about the world around them.62 
Commitment to reality does not eradicate the possibility of mistaken beliefs which 
can be amended. However, commitment to reality avoids a subjectivist 
epistemological reductionism, reducing knowledge of reality to the subjective 
dimensions of knowing. Polanyi also used commitment to address notions of cultural 
relativism which would reduce knowledge to “products of a particular location and 
interest.” “Believing as I do in the justification of deliberate intellectual commitments, 
I accept these accidents of personal existence as the concrete opportunities for 
exercising our personal responsibility.”63 Instead of “a view from nowhere,” Polanyi’s 
notion of personal knowledge maintained a parallel between the particularity of a 
given culture and the particularity of the human body. He argued, 
 
                                                          
59 Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, 303. 
60 Ibid., 310.  
61 Ibid., 313. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid., 322. 
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I accept these limits [of place and time], for it is impossible to hold 
myself responsible beyond such limits. To ask how I would think if I 
were brought up outside any particular society, is as meaningless as to 
ask how I would think if I were born in no particular body, relying on 
no particular sensory and nervous organs. I believe, therefore, that as I 
am called upon to live and die in this body, struggling to satisfy its 
desires, recording my impressions by aid of such sense organs as it is 
equipped with, and acting through the puny machinery of my brain, my 
nerves and my muscles, so I am called upon also to acquire the 
instruments of intelligence from my early surroundings and to use 
these particular instruments to fulfill the universal obligations to which 
I am subject.64 
 
For Polanyi, our particular culture and the frameworks of belief we inhabit are like 
our bodies in that they are not obstacles to knowledge but tools which we use to know 
the world.65 Through commitment, he upheld a vision of personal knowledge which is 
particularist, fallibilist and critically realist. 
Torrance used Polanyi’s notion of commitment to reality to overcome the 
potential critique of subjectivism. Notice the second half of Torrance’s definition of 
personal knowledge: 
 
All this does not mean that personal knowledge is subjective, for the 
personal participation of the knower is controlled by impersonal 
requirements and submission to universal standards which transcend 
his subjectivity. It is only a person who is capable of distinguishing 
what he knows from his knowing of it, or objective states of affairs 
from his own subjective fantasies, and only a person, therefore who 
can engage in authentically objective operations. Personal knowledge 
is a way of knowing through responsible commitment to the claims of 
reality in which the personal and subjective are fused together in the 
act of establishing contact with reality and its intrinsic rationality. In 
personal knowledge responsibility and truth are two complementary 
aspects of commitment to reality: the act of judgment is the personal 
pole and the independent reality on which it bears is its external pole.66 
 
Torrance interpreted Polanyi’s notion of commitment as “the personal and responsible 
submission of the mind to the requirements of a reality independent of 
it…Commitment is objectively, not subjectively, oriented.”67 Torrance used Polanyi’s 
                                                          
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid., 58-62. 
66 BSCL, 141-2; Also, RET, 45-46; CTSC, 66-67. 
67 BSCL, 134. 
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notion of commitment embedded within his concept of personal knowledge to expand 
his own version of realism discussed earlier (2.8).  
Torrance’s notion of commitment embedded within his idea of personal 
knowledge can also help address the problem of relativism. In reaction to objectivism 
and its resultant foundationalism, relativism contends there are no universal standards 
outside of the competing conceptual frameworks, language games, social practices or 
historical epochs in which knowledge occurs. In this way, relativism is a cultural or 
subjective reductionism. Knowledge is reduced to the variously-described contextual 
factors in which knowledge occurs, ignoring the objective dimensions which gave rise 
to that knowledge within those context. Both Polanyi’s and Torrance’s notions of 
personal knowledge ignored neither the cultural contingency nor the fallibility of 
human knowledge. In fact, these contingencies and limitations are what made 
commitment necessary in a stratified, complex world. Particularity is part of their 
understanding of personal knowledge. Moreover, the attempt to transcend one’s 
personal particularity is precisely the problem with both objectivism and relativism.  
With objectivism, as we have seen, the attempt is to be above and beyond all personal 
dimensions of knowledge, obtaining to ahistorical, impersonal truth.  Against 
objectivism, relativism responds that there is no overarching rationality, paradigm, 
metalanguage, or Archimidean point from which to judge between competing 
paradigms. Yet, as with objectivism, the illusion remains with relativism that one can 
transcend one’s personal culture, paradigm, or theoretical framework. In reflecting on 
the notion of personal knowledge and relativism, Trevor Hart points out that it is 
“only on the assumption that we know what the truth really is can we assert with any 
certainty that no human perspective coincides with it, or that it lies beyond the reach 
of all perspectives.”68 From an implied position that encompasses all perspectives, 
relativism makes conclusions about all other perspectives, oftentimes the reductionist 
conclusion that knowledge is determined by the historical location, culture, society, 
theoretical framework, paradigm or form of life. Yet, for Torrance (and Polanyi), 
human knowing is a personal activity which cannot transcend human personhood but 
through commitment and universal intent, engages reality. While God’s knowing 
transcends human context, contingency and fallibility, human knowing does not. 
                                                          
68 Trevor Hart, Faith Thinking: The Dynamics of Christian Theology (Eugene, OR: Wipf & 
Stock, 1995), 69. 
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Beliefs, traditions, cultures and the complex knowing faculties of our bodies form the 
fallible framework of personal knowledge from which we explore the world.  
More will be said in chapter five on the overall notion of participation in the 
knowledge of God in a postmodern, scientific age. This assessment of an important 
dynamic derived from the ontological Trinity has found that Torrance’s notion of 
personal knowledge is particularist, fallibilist and realist. While it will not silence the 
critics of realism, it is a live option that has potential for moving beyond reductionist 
accounts of theological epistemology. Now we turn to another epistemological 
implication of the Triune God and the onto-relations within, namely that knowledge 
of God is relational. 
 
4.4  Knowledge of God as Relational Knowledge   
4.4.1 The Trinity and Relational Knowledge 
For Torrance, knowledge of God is grounded in the nature of God which 
prescribes the mode of knowing Him. The onto-relations within the Triune God are 
central to God’s nature and exercise a governing influence on the knowledge of God. 
As we have seen, this means that knowledge of God is personal knowledge, but now 
we will see how knowledge of God is relational knowledge for Torrance rooted in the 
being and activity of God. We begin with an informative quotation which contains 
various relational themes that we will delineate in this section. Torrance wrote, 
 
In no authentic knowledge do we begin with epistemology and then on 
the ground of theory independently argued go on to develop our actual 
knowledge. Far less can we pose in abstraction the question, ‘How can 
we know God?’ and then in the light of the answers we reach go on to 
examine and explicate what we known.  Only on the ground of our 
actual knowledge of God may we develop an epistemology of it, for 
the form cannot be separated from the content or the method from the 
subject-matter of that knowledge. It is God who makes possible our 
knowledge of Him by giving Himself to us as the object of our 
knowing and by bringing us into a relationship with Him in which we 
are made capable of knowing Him, but within that relationship it is the 
nature of God as the given object of our knowledge that prescribes the 
mode of knowing Him. Thus while knowledge of God is grounded in 
His own being and activity, it takes shape within our human being and 
activity as human knowledge of God.69 
                                                          
69 GR, 165. Here again Torrance contends for “epistemological particularism” over 
“epistemological methodism.” See chapter two, page 8, note 27. 
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This was not a short-lived idea for Torrance. From his earliest lectures to his more 
mature writings, Torrance held that knowledge of God neither begins nor exists apart 
from a knowing relationship with God.70 
First, we recall that Torrance’s central epistemological dynamics flow from the 
Trinity. As discussed in the previous chapter, God is relational within himself for the 
divine persons-in-relationship comprise the being of God. Torrance held that the 
persons of the Trinity are not truly known apart from one another due to their 
perichoretic relations in which they have their being in one another.71 He maintained 
that in apprehending the wholeness of the Trinity that there is a subsidiary awareness 
of the three Persons, and equally in apprehending a particular person of the Trinity 
there is a subsidiary awareness of the unity and wholeness of the being of God. “This 
is precisely what peri-choresis tells us, that God is known only in a circle of 
reciprocal relations.”72 The persons in relationship which comprise the one being of 
the Triune God necessitates that God is inherently relational.  
Looking to Matthew 11:27 and Luke 10:22, Torrance reminded us that there are 
mutual and unique relations of love and knowledge within the circle of the divine 
persons of the Trinity.73 He stated that it was important to Nicene theology that the 
persons of the Trinity had full knowledge of and with one another. Thus, Torrance 
echoed a classic theological theme: within the being of God is found the most 
complete knowledge of God, that is, God’s self knowledge. Theological development 
of God’s self knowledge extends back to Thomas Aquinas and continues through Karl 
                                                          
70 “The Knowledge of God,” The Auburn Lectures, 1938-39 (The Thomas F. Torrance 
Manuscript Collection. Special Collections, Princeton Theological Seminary Library), 4, 7, 11: “To 
come back to our concrete instance, there is no knowableness of God unless God is known, for you 
cannot know God without having him to know! There is no knowledge of God apart from and 
independent of God. There is therefore not in man a possibility to know God which is peculiar or 
private to himself and operative over against God or His Word. We only first know God, and can only 
first know God when we do know Him … We are, as it were, in a new dimension which could not be 
glimpsed from elsewhere or elsehow. Such knowledge is acknowledgement; it is the receiving of news, 
the introduction to a new acquaintance...To know God we must start with knowledge of God, and not 
from the partially known to the unknown. We start from the Known, from the self-revealing God 
Himself.” 
71 CDG, 173-74: “The Holy Trinity is revealed and is known only as an indivisible Whole, in 
Trinity and Unity, Unity and Trinity.” 
72 CDG, 174. 
73 Quoted in TF, 58: “All things have been delivered to me by my Father; and no one knows 
who the Son is except the Father; and no one knows who the Father is except the Son and any one to 
whom the Son chooses to reveal him.” 
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Barth.74 Consequently, for Torrance, the loving relation of knowing between Father, 
Son and Spirit “constitutes the ontological ground for our knowing of God, for in and 
through it our knowledge of God the Father is objectively rooted in the eternal being 
of God himself.”75 The ultimate source of knowledge of God is the self-knowledge of 
God contained within the personal relations of the Trinity. Thus, human knowledge of 
God is made possible only within the relationship that God establishes with humans. 
A conceptual relation is part of the grace-enabled personal relation.76 God 
“establishes relations of intimate reciprocity between us and himself, within which 
our knowing of God becomes interlocked with God’s knowing of us. In fact, our 
knowledge of God thus mediated is allowed to share in God’s knowledge of 
himself.”77 Human knowledge of God is found in relationship with God who knows 
himself more than any other and, as we will discuss more fully in the next chapter, 
human knowledge of God is a participation in the self-knowledge of God. For now, it 
is sufficient to note that in keeping with Torrance’s ontologically-determined 
epistemological dynamic, the inner-Trinitarian onto-relations give rise to the type of 
knowledge of God we have. 
Thus far, we have noted that God’s being is relational and that within those 
relations is contained the knowledge God has of himself. Though Torrance held 
together the being and action of God as one,78 for the sake of organizing this 
discussion we turn now from the being of God to the activity of God. Just as God’s 
being is relational, so God’s activity of self-revelation is relational. We recall that 
Torrance held that knowledge of God is not obtained from some point outside of God, 
lest that reference point becomes the control of our conceptions of him.79 Instead, 
through the incarnation of the Son and in the presence of the Spirit, God has given 
                                                          
74 St Thomas Aquinas, ST Ia. q. 1, a. 6, Latin and English, edited by Thomas Gilby, O.P. 
(Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 20-25. More on this theme in Aquinas 
is Eleonore Stump, chapter 5, “God’s knowledge” and chapter 7, “The foundations of knowledge” in 
her book, Aquinas (London: Routledge, 2003), 159-87, 217-43; Also, Mark F. Johnson, “God’s 
Knowledge in our Frail Mind: The Thomistic Model of Theology,” Angelicum 76 (1999): 25-45.  Karl 
Barth, CD II.1, 57-62. Discussions include John Webster, Karl Barth, 2nd ed. (London: Continuum, 
2004), 77-83; Eberhard Busch, The Great Passion (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2004), 76-81; Paul 
D. Molnar, “The Role of the Holy Spirit in Knowing the Triune God,” in Trinitarian Theology After 
Barth, ed. Myk Habets and Phillip Tolliday (Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2011), esp. 26-33. 
75 TF, 59. 
76 “Theological Realism,” 177-78. 
77 RST, 138-39. 
78 TS, 156. 
79 TF, 51. 
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humans access to knowledge of himself in a relationship-constituting way.80 
Revelation and reconciliation are accomplished and held together in the mediation of 
Christ. “It is God who makes possible our knowledge of Him by giving Himself to us 
as the object of our knowing and by bringing us into a relationship with Him in which 
we are made capable of knowing Him.”81 In other words, knowledge of God flows 
from the gracious relationship-establishing activity of God. 
For all types of knowledge, Torrance argued that epistemology must take into 
account not only the knowing subject and the object sought, but also the knowing 
relationship. To know anything, there is a relationship between the epistemic subject 
and the object. The knowing relationship is not a barrier which obstructs knowledge, 
but instead is the “active means of communication between subject and object.”82 The 
ongoing, dynamic interaction between subject and object offers knowledge.83 There is 
not a place outside or beyond an actual knowing relationship which permits 
knowledge.84 Rather, a would-be knower must be inside the knowing relationship.85 
The healing of the ontological breach between mind and reality restores the 
integration between theoretical and empirical factors in human knowing.86 Torrance 
argued that scientific knowledge involves an “open interaction with independent 
reality” in which “the personal and the objective are fused together in the activity of 
establishing contact with the real world and elucidating its intrinsic rationality.”87 
Specifically concerning the knowledge of God, Torrance wrote that there is a 
communion or a union in which knowledge of God exists.88 Knowledge of God 
                                                          
80 TP, 99-100: God’s revelatory activity “is a self-communication which includes the human 
subject in a real-ontological relation with God established on the ground of the hypostatic union in 
which God in Christ actively enters into our human situation and assumes it in relation to himself, and 
thereby grounds and embraces the answering knowledge and love of the believer in free interpersonal 
union and communion with himself.” 
81 GR, 165. 
82 TS, xvi; RST, 14-15. 
83 TS, 258; CTSC, 28-9, 115-17; RST, 109-13. 
84 TS, 4-6; GR, 4, 31, 165; STI, 54. 
85 TS, 1; GR, 4, 165; STI, 54-55. 
86 RET, 9-11, 39-42; CTSC, 23-5; This is addressed throughout chapter two, “Emerging from 
the Cultural Split” in GGT, 15-43. Also 72, 81-2. RST, xiii, 39-40, 60-61; STR, 1, 6n. 9, 169. This is 
also a theme in chapter one, “The Making of the ‘Modern’ Mind from Descartes and Newton to Kant,” 
in TCFK, 1-59. Also, xi-xii, 66, 68, 76-80, 88-90, 96-97, 281-82. 
87 CFM, 43. 
88 TS, 96-97. On 97, n. 1, Torrance quotes Tillich: “Knowing is a form of union. In every act 
of knowledge the knower and what is known are united; the gap between subject and object is 
overcome.” See also 307. Theology is “a form of intense intellectual communion with God.” RST, xii. 
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“cannot be extracted from the subject-object relation”89 and thus there is a 
“togetherness of subject and object.”90 From early on, Torrance contended that God is 
not approached with disinterested and dispassionate observation, but rather God 
approaches us and calls us to personal relations with Himself.91 In line with Calvin 
over against Aquinas and Ockham, Torrance maintained that through Christ and by 
the Spirit, God provides direct, intuitive knowledge of Himself in the context of 
relationship.92 The intuitive contact with divine reality found in religious experience 
in continuity with the tradition of the church is “the creative source of our basic 
convictions and primary concepts and relations.”93 In his initial lectures, Torrance 
held that religious experience is the atmosphere which gives life to theological 
reflection.94 Clearly, for Torrance knowledge of God occurs inside the relationship 
initiated by God’s revelation and redemption.95 
                                                          
89 TS, xiii-xiv. 
90 TS, 311. 
91 “Theology and Science,” The Auburn Lectures, 1938-39 (The Thomas F. Torrance 
Manuscript Collection. Special Collections, Princeton Theological Seminary Library), 57. 
92 TIR, 84-5: “In the Christian faith we are concerned with intuitive evident knowledge of God 
through his Word. We recall that intuitive knowledge was defined as direct knowledge of an actually 
present object, naturally caused by that object and not by another… After his conversion that was the 
way in which Calvin regarded knowledge of God, knowledge gained in the immediate experience of 
his personal presence. Intuitive knowledge of God arises, then, to use the old terminology, under the 
direct impact or causality of his divine Being. This involved the rejection both of Thomism and 
Ockhamism. If, as St Thomas taught, our knowledge of God is taken from sense-experience of created 
realities, it will never be able to rise above created realities and can only construe God in accordance 
with them. But if, as Ockham taught, abstractive knowledge abstracts from actual existence, then 
abstractive knowledge prevents us from knowing God in accordance with his own personal mode of 
Being. We know God, Calvin insisted, through his works or effects, but in his works or effects we meet 
God speaking to us personally through his Word. This is what Calvin called intuitive knowledge of 
God, but it is different than our intuitive knowledge of natural objects, for it is a knowledge in 
accordance with the nature and personal Being of God.” 
93 TCFK, 93. 
94 “Theology takes its rise and stands within Christianity. It is born out of the experience of 
salvation, comes along with it. The pursuit of theology therefore must always be inside the sphere of 
religion – there it finds its justification, its life-force, its only content… There is one kind of theology 
and that is religious theology.” “The Character of Theological Thought,” The Auburn Lectures, 1938-
39 (The Thomas F. Torrance Manuscript Collection. Special Collections, Princeton Theological 
Seminary Library), 3. He develops the place of experience on 3-5. 
95 CDG, 106: “While we know God only through God and not apart from him, we know him 
only as he enters into a reciprocal personal relation with us, in which he reveals himself to us within the 
range of our human knowing and at the same time empowers and sustains our knowing of him. God 
turns himself toward us and at the same time turns us toward himself, and therein adapts his revealing 
to us and adapts our knowing to him, so that our knowing of him is humanly as well as divinely 
conditioned. Thus there arises, as we have already noted, a significant anthropomorphic ingredient in 
our knowledge of God, but this is properly not one defined by what we human beings are and read back 
into God; it is one that derives from the reciprocal relations that God establishes between us and 
himself.” 
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Consequently, a concept Torrance used to describe the relational nature of the 
knowledge of God is “dialogical.” Since God brings us into personal relation with 
Himself, our relationship is “essentially and unceasingly dialogical.”96 Torrance 
explained, 
 
At no point can theological knowledge step outside this 
dialogical relation, without abstracting itself from the 
object, without falsifying itself, or without retreating 
into unreality. Thus theological knowledge is not 
reflection upon our rational experience or even upon 
faith; it is reflection upon the object of faith in direct 
dialogical relation with that object, and therefore in 
faith –i.e. in conversation and communion with the 
living God who communicates Himself to us in acts of 
revelation and reconciliation and who requires of us an 
answering relation in receiving, acknowledging, 
understanding, and in active personal participation in 
the relationship He establishes between us.97 
 
Thus dialogical knowledge of God is within a reciprocal relationship or 
communion with God.98 If our conversation with God ceases or we do theology as if 
it were “behind His back, as if He were not actually party to it,” then we deform 
dialogical theology into dialectical theology which is more concerned with “working 
out a system of ideas” than “real communion with the living God.”99 Conversely, 
because God is not a mute Object,100 a dialogical relation allows the Object to “break 
through the monologue of reason with itself, where it only asks questions and answers 
them itself…and force it into real dialogue.”101 Without such a dialogue, Torrance 
wonders “whether full objectivity is actually possible” in attempting to know 
impersonal objects “that cannot object to us or offer to correct us.”102 As the being 
and activity of God in revelation is relational, so the knowledge of God retains its 
relational character and is thus dialogical.  
                                                          
96 TS, 39, 133-35, 138, 148, 192, 207-8, 228, 306-7, 309. On worship as dialogical, see GR, 
156-58. 
97 TS, 39. 
98 RET, 136. 
99 TS, 128. 
100 TS, 29-30, 98; CTSC, 118-19; GGT, 152-54. 
101 TS, 133, 134. In an earlier, incipient form, “Philosophy and Theology,” The Auburn 
Lectures, 1938-39 (The Thomas F. Torrance Manuscript Collection. Special Collections, Princeton 
Theological Seminary Library), 37-38. 
102 TS, 311. 
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If knowledge of God originates within mutual Trinitarian relations and is extended 
relationally through God’s activity, then it is commensurate with the being and 
activity of God that a community arises as a response to the knowledge-containing 
Trinitarian relations with humanity. Access to the incarnationally-established 
relational knowledge is not confined to the time and place of the incarnation though. 
Rather, such relational knowledge is carried beyond first-century Palestine through 
the community created by the incarnation. “Neither in God nor in man is word found 
in isolation but only in community” for language itself is grounded in a society. God’s 
revelation created a community “as the appropriate medium of its continuing 
communication,” a “community of reciprocity” between God and Israel and God and 
the Church.103 Thus, the knowledge of God is “communal knowledge.”104 It is 
constituted by the church which provides reciprocal relations where we can 
experience and know God with one another.105 Since God is “a Communion of 
personal Being who communicates himself to us through Christ and in his Spirit, it is 
a community of persons in reciprocity both with God and with one another that is set 
up.”106 While Torrance maintained that the Trinitarian nature of God determines a 
Trinitarian type of knowledge, he does not emphasize a Trinitarian psychological 
structure as one finds in Augustine.107 Rather, knowledge of God begins within the 
community of divine persons-in-relationship within God and consequently finds it 
home in relationship within a community of human persons-in-relationship. In 
Torrance’s words,  
 
The person-constituting interaction of God with us calls into being a 
church as the spatiotemporal correlate of his self-giving and self-
revealing to mankind… we are unable to know God in any onto-
relational way without knowing him in the togetherness of our personal 
relations with one another. This is why a realist evangelical theology 
that seeks to be rigorously faithful to the nature of God and his 
interaction with us in the space and time of this world cannot but be a 
church-conditioned and church-oriented theology.108  
 
                                                          
103 GR, 137-53; quotation on 146-47; TIR, 42; STR, 5. 
104 TS, 210. 
105 RET, 46-49, 89-101; RST, 84-85, 98-130. 
106 RET, 46. Also, RST, 178-92. 
107 Augustine, De Trinitate, trans. Edmund Hill (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 1991), 270-
321. On Torrance’s engagement with Augustine’s triadic structure, see RST, 167-69, 178-79. 
108 RET, 46. 
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Torrance maintained that “theology is essentially church activity” since his days at 
Auburn.109 
Elsewhere, Torrance described God’s self-communication as creating “a circle of 
knowing which is also a circle of loving, in both cases a circle resting on the free 
ground of God’s own Trinitarian Being and Activity.”110 This Triune circle of loving 
and knowing is the ontological fount for the church, drawing in others into this divine 
circle to be a community of love and knowledge of God. Torrance continued, 
 
[T]he personal God who communicates himself to us in revelation and love, 
and a community of love among human beings, belong inseparably together 
in our knowledge of the Triune God, for it is precisely in that community 
where the Love of God has set up its own inner relations as its determining 
structure that we may grow and develop in our knowledge of him as a 
transcendent Fullness of Love in himself and as the constituting ground of all 
authentic relations of love among human beings.111  
 
Knowledge of God is thus communal knowledge, originating in the active onto-
relations of the Triune God which spawns a community of onto-relations among 
humanity. “In making himself known to his people he creatively evokes their 
corporate responses and harnesses them in the service of his continuing self-
communication to mankind. That is to say, God includes a personal and social 
coefficient on our part within the structure and operation of revealed knowledge of 
himself.”112 In short, the human structure for the knowledge of God is social or 
relational. 
To summarize, the knowledge of God is relational knowledge because the being 
of God is relational, containing divine persons-in-relationship or onto-relations. The 
knowledge of God is ultimately found within God’s relational being, originating in 
God’s self-knowledge. Furthermore, the knowledge of God is extended by the 
relational activity of God in revelation and reconciliation. Consequently, knowledge 
of God is found in relationship with God and is thus dialogical. The church is the 
relational human medium for the knowledge of God. Hence, the being, activity and 
means of God in which he shares his self-knowledge are all relational, determining 
the relational character of the knowledge of God for Torrance. 
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4.4.2 Relational knowledge and the postmodern, scientific age 
Toward an assessment of participation in the knowledge of God in the 
postmodern, scientific world, we offer here an assessment of the dynamic of relational 
knowledge. As with the assessment of personal knowledge, this is not the final 
assessment of the whole complex of participation, but an assessment of a central 
dynamic. As we assess the notion of relational knowledge for the postmodern, 
scientific context, it is important to keep in mind that for Torrance this dynamic is 
derived from the ontological Trinity. Relationality was not a philosophical principle 
projected back into God for Torrance, but an ontological reality within God that 
determines the character of human relationality and thus human knowledge of God. 
We begin this assessment by noting how the postmodern, scientific world has helped 
us to recapture the notion of relational knowledge that had been obscured in the 
modern era. 
As discussed in chapter three in relation to the Trinity (3.4), the postmodern world 
has helped us to see more holistically and relationally. For instance, F. Leron Shults 
has argued persuasively for a turn to relationality in philosophy, psychology and 
theology in the postmodern world.113 With reference to theology and science, John 
Polkinghorne noted the discoveries of Einstein’s theory of special relativity, chaos 
theory, and the EPR effect within quantum theory and thus described the universe as 
relational.114 Consequently, within the postmodern, scientific age, Polkinghorne 
contends that knowledge occurs within a “web of relationality.”115 It is noteworthy 
that Torrance held that the created structures of the universe in which God reveals 
himself are relational. We recall from the Trinitarian dynamic (2.4) that the 
incarnation which makes knowledge of God accessible to humanity occurs within the 
concrete contingencies of space and time.116 Torrance argued that space and time are 
not “containers” or “receptacles,” but alternatively are relational realities between 
                                                          
113 F. Leron Shults, Reforming Theological Anthropology: After the Philosophical Turn to 
Relationality (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2004); Reforming the Doctrine of God (Grand Rapids, MI: 
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objects and events.117 Though God is transcendent over space and time, God has 
entered into space and time through the incarnation and made himself known. The 
created mediums in which God has revealed himself are themselves relational 
realities.118     
Within the relational universe, human knowledge occurs within webs of human 
relationship, or more commonly put, within traditions. In the late twentieth century, 
perhaps no one has argued more persuasively of how traditions function to shape 
human knowledge and rationality than Alisdair MacIntyre.119 In demonstrating why 
the Enlightenment’s project of justifying morality had to fail, he helped to relocate 
knowledge from modernity’s “autonomous individual” to its place among intellectual 
traditions. Nothing is learned or known in isolation from the medium of knowing 
communities and the traditions of which they are a part. Without the notion of 
tradition, knowledge is conceived less relationally and personally, missing the 
concomitant virtues, practices and narrative framework that constitute a tradition’s 
way of knowing. Though Torrance did not develop the idea of tradition as did 
MacIntyre, his notion of relational knowledge similarly highlights the tradition-bound 
or relational-rootedness of knowledge without reducing knowledge to the traditions or 
social contexts in which they occurred.120 The postmodern, scientific world has 
continued to help us see things about the relational and social dimensions of 
knowledge that were obscured in the modern era.121 
Moving in the other direction, does Torrance’s notion of relational knowledge 
have something to contribute to the postmodern, scientific era?  Many in the science 
and religion discussion have utilized and developed notions of critical realism which 
                                                          
117 STI, 4, 11-12, 24, 60-61; GR, 124-28, 130-31; RST, 5-6; STR, 186-88; DCO, 12-13. 
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119 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, 3rd ed. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame, 
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121 For the social developments in the field of epistemology, see Frederick Schmitt, “Social 
Epistemology,” in The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, ed. John Greco and Ernest Sosa (Malden, 
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parallels with aspects of Torrance’s notion of relational knowledge.122 Niels 
Gregersen documents, “Since the mid-1960s, critical realism (CR) has been a 
majority position in the Anglo-American science-religion dialogue.”123 The adoption 
of critical realism began within the science-religion dialogue with Ian G. Barbour.124 
He was followed by Arthur Peacocke125 and John Polkinghorne.126  They were 
followed by J. Wentzel van Huyssteen who at first emphasized critical realism, but 
later developed criticisms of it.127 Each of these descriptions of critical realism 
attempt somehow to hold together the subjective and objective dimensions of 
knowledge in a dialogical relationship as a way of moving between a “naïve” 
representationalism and a pure constructionism. A similar discussion of critical 
realism particularly noteworthy for this thesis comes from an explicitly Torrancean 
framework by Alister E. McGrath. McGrath has extended Torrance’s version of 
realism by engaging the scientific critical realism of the philosopher Roy Bhaskar in 
order to counter the problems of reductionism.128 McGrath focuses upon three key 
aspects of Bhaskar’s critical realism for his scientific theology. First, McGrath 
endorses Bhaskar’s critical realism in the natural and social sciences which integrates 
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the social and historical dimensions of knowledge yet maintaining its realist 
orientation.129 Second, McGrath underlines Bhaskar’s idea of the “epistemic fallacy” 
which is the view that “statements about being can be reduced to or analysed in terms 
of statements about knowledge.”130 This reverses the positivists’ verficationist theory 
which put epistemology in charge of ontology even though ontology cannot be 
controlled by epistemology. “Existence is not dependent upon observation, or being 
observable.”131 The reduction of ontology to an empiricist epistemology is contested. 
Third, McGrath sanctions Bhaskar’s development of the stratification of reality.132 
The distinct layers and stratums of reality investigated by the natural and social 
sciences require an ontologically-determined methodology. As we have seen with 
Torrance’s ontologically-determined dynamic, this directly challenges ontological and 
epistemological reductionisms (2.3). In agreement with McGrath, each of these 
aspects of Bhaskar’s critical realism are quite helpful for conceiving knowledge in a 
postmodern, scientific age, yet there are other resources within Torrance’s idea of 
relational knowledge which go beyond this discussion of critical realism that are also 
relevant to a post-reductionist account of knowledge.  
To appreciate the contribution of Torrance’s notion of a Trinitarian-shaped, 
relational knowledge for the postmodern, scientific era, we begin with a critique of 
the use of critical realism in theology by Kees van Kooten Niekerk. He contends that 
critical realism overemphasizes the cognitive dimensions by providing a “theoretical 
understanding of the world” as within the sciences without due respect for the 
existential, moral and spiritual dimensions which are part of theology.133 We also note 
Nancey Murphy’s important critique of the use of critical realism in theology. She 
demonstrates that critical realism for some still operates within a modernist 
framework of both a representationalist view of language and a foundationalist 
epistemology.134 She also notes that along with a representationalist view of language 
often comes a correspondence theory of truth. However, Torrance’s Trinitarian notion 
of relational knowledge can overcome both Niekerk’s and Murphy’s critiques of 
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critical realism. We recall from Torrance’s truly realist dynamic (2.8) that Torrance’s 
brand of realism makes a strong distinction between human knowledge and reality or 
the truth of statement and the truth of being. Torrance wrote that one “cannot state in 
statements how statements are related to being, otherwise you convert the relation of 
statements to being into mere statements.”135 In other words, the relationship of 
human knowledge (and language) with reality cannot be reduced to thoughts (or 
words). Along with this important distinction, Torrance did not diminish the real 
ontological relationship between knower and known. As we have seen above, 
knowledge cannot be abstracted from the “subject-object relation” or the 
“communion” of the personal and objective. An especially helpful contribution 
Torrance derived from his Trinitarian epistemology is the emphasis on the ontological 
relationship inherent within knowledge. Torrance has uniquely maintained the 
distinction between human knowledge and reality and yet has emphasized the 
ontological relationship between knower and known. This type of relational 
knowledge makes important contributions to the postmodern, scientific age in at least 
two ways. First, in response to Murphy’s criticism, we note that in order to actually 
move beyond ontological and epistemological reductionisms, it is important for us in 
the postmodern age to remember that reality cannot be reduced to human thought, 
speech, experience, interpretation, and practices as if it can be explained solely in 
terms of subjective dimensions. On the other hand, knowledge cannot be reduced to 
an objective mirror of mind-independent (or language-independent) reality, for human 
knowledge involves interpreted experience, culturally-situated language and thought 
forms which are rooted in ways of life and all the subjective dimensions which the 
postmodern world has emphasized are part of human knowledge. Consequently, 
knowledge is neither reducible to its subjective nor objective dimensions. Instead, 
knowledge is more like a complex, involving the knower, the known and, particularly 
important here, the dynamic relationship that holds them together. Similar to the 
hermeneutical argument of Hans-Georg Gadamer that meaning arises in the blending 
of the horizons of the interpreter and text, with Torrance knowledge emerges in the 
dialogical relation of the personal and objective.136 Second, in response to Niekerk’s 
critique, the knowing relationship involves the whole person, including the cognitive 
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but also including the affective, practical, ethical and spiritual dimensions of the 
human knower. This will be developed further in the next chapter. Here, we conclude 
that a Trinitarian-shaped relational knowledge can move us beyond the various 
reductionist accounts that attempt to explain knowledge in dissecting ways instead of 
the whole complex of a knowing relationship to which relational knowledge gives 
attention. 
To summarize, personal and relational knowledge, which are divinely-rooted, 
guard against reductionist attempts to explain knowledge on levels less than human 
personhood and relationality. Though Torrance did not elevate these two 
epistemological dynamics, this thesis has demonstrated their importance in 
relationship to the ontological Trinity and their helpfulness in the postmodern, 
scientific age.  
In the next chapter, we will discover how knowledge of God is inherently 
participatory. Moreover, we will discuss how participation in the knowledge of God is 
a sharing in the self-knowledge within God enabled by the Son and the Spirit. We will 
also discover how participating in the knowledge of God is person-involving and life-
implicating. This will definitively move the notion of participation in the knowledge 
of God beyond a modern reductionist framework. We turn now to discuss knowledge 
of God as participatory and to assess the viability of this vision of participation for the 
postmodern, scientific era.  
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CHAPTER 5 
KNOWLEDGE OF GOD AS PARTICIPATORY 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we will discuss and expand Torrance’s vision of the knowledge of 
God as participatory (5.2). The Triune God remains the definitive framework which 
defines knowledge of God as participatory (5.2.1), for this knowledge is enabled by 
the incarnation (5.2.1.1) and the Holy Spirit (5.2.1.2) and is thus a soteriological 
participation (5.2.2). Claiming that knowledge of God is participatory raises the 
question of what is involved in this participation. Though this was not an emphasis of 
Torrance, we will demonstrate how participation in the knowledge of God involves 
the whole person (5.3) and a way of life (5.4). In demonstrating that knowledge of 
God involves the whole person, this chapter will provide a theological and scientific 
assessment (5.3.1), address Torrance’s emphasis on the reasoning mind (5.3.2), and 
return to the Trinitarian framework to see how the Son and Spirit secures the 
participation of the whole person (5.3.3). In demonstrating that the knowledge of God 
involves a way of life, this chapter will provide a theological and philosophical 
assessment (5.4.1), establish that participation in the knowledge of God involves 
ethics (5.4.2), and expound the important relationship between knowledge and ethics 
in the postmodern world (5.4.3).  
 
5.2 Knowledge of God is participatory 
 Knowledge of God is determined by the immanent Trinity and the onto-
relations within for Torrance. Consequently, we have argued that knowledge of God 
is centrally personal and relational. Derivative from the self-knowledge of the Triune 
persons-in-relationship, we will now explore how knowledge of God is also 
inherently participatory. To adopt an onto-relational frame of mind, Torrance 
encouraged “conjunctive thinking” as we mentioned in chapter three.1 That is, he 
invited his readers not to think in partitive, dissecting ways, but instead he maintained 
that at times it is needed to hold together multiple perspectives or realities to 
understand them appropriately. This mindset helps to overcome the problem of 
reductionism and is suitable for discussing multi-dimensional, complex realities. To 
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develop the participatory character of knowledge of God, this mindset is needed. 
Also, in order to consider how knowledge of God is participatory, we return to 
Torrance’s doctrine of the Trinity to envision his Trinitarian notion of participation in 
the self-knowledge of God. 
 
5.2.1 Knowledge of God as participation in the self-knowledge of Trinity  
Language concerning participation in God or participating in the knowledge of 
God is related to the doctrine of theosis or deification. Looking back to Old Testament 
and New Testament passages,2 the doctrine of theosis developed and took root 
especially in the Eastern Church.3 Yet, the doctrine of theosis has received renewed 
attention in contemporary Western theology.4 Athanasius, one of Torrance’s favored 
patristic writers, is credited as the first to mention Christian deification.5 Classic 
Eastern Orthodox doctrinal definitions were not fully developed until the seventh 
century by Maximus the Confessor6 and its most prominent defense in the fourteenth 
                                                          
2 Gen. 1:26-7; Gen. 3:5; Ps. 82:6; Jn. 10:34-35; Mt. 5:48; 2 Cor. 3:18; 1 Jn. 3:1-2; and esp. 2 
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One with God: Salvation as Deification and Justification (Collegeville,  MN: Liturgical Press, 2004). 
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6 Ibid., 262-295; Elena Vishnevskaya, “Divinization as Pericherotic Embrace in Maximus the 
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century by Gregory Palamas.7 Andrew Louth writes, “For whatever reasons, the 
doctrine of deification ceased to have a central role in Western theology from about 
the twelfth century.”8 He notes that it is absent in Peter Lombard and furthermore that 
Thomas Aquinas “only uses the language of deification of Christ’s human nature, not 
of human beings.”9 While Anna N. Williams argued that Thomas Aquinas 
incorporated themes of theosis throughout his theology,10 Gösta Hallonsten contends 
that Aquinas used language of participation, but does not have a developed doctrine of 
theosis as did Gregory Palamas.11 Nevertheless, soteriological themes related to 
theosis are not entirely absent in the West. Current research finds related themes of 
theosis in Martin Luther12 and John Calvin,13 focusing upon their soteriology of union 
with Christ or participation in Christ. Particularly important in considering Torrance’s 
use of participation language is Calvin’s Trinitarian framework in his discussion of 
theosis.14 Karl Barth repeatedly emphasized that “God is known through God and 
through God alone.”15 Yet, Barth did not emphasize participation in the Trinity as did 
Torrance, but instead emphasized the Triune revelation.  
Torrance’s conception of theosis was guarded and carefully nuanced, maintaining 
the ontological distinction between creature and Creator. As Torrance put it in 
reference to the atoning exchange of the incarnation, “for as he is not less divine in 
becoming man, so we are not less human in being brought under the immediate 
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presence and power of divine being…This is a deification, however, which more than 
recreates our lost humanity, for it lifts us up in Christ to enjoy a new fullness of 
human life in a blessed communion with divine life.”16 As we will further see, 
Torrance maintained that there is a real union and participation in the Triune God. 
While Torrance wrote only one article directly discussing the doctrine of theosis, 
many of its central themes permeated his theology due likely to his interaction with 
patristic resources and through his ecumenical dialogues with the Eastern church.17 
The concern here is not to survey Torrance’s doctrine of theosis, but to look 
specifically at and expand his understanding of participation in the knowledge of the 
Triune God.18 
Having knowledge of God goes beyond mere participation in a knowing 
relationship. As was introduced in the Trinitarian dynamic in chapter two (2.4), for 
Torrance humans are lifted up and enabled to participate in the self-knowledge of 
God.19 Participating in a relationship with God not only brings knowledge, but with 
God it becomes a partaking of His self-knowledge and a sharing in the communion of 
love within the onto-relations of the Trinity. As Torrance put it, “The Love with 
which we are loved by God is the love with which the Father, Son and Holy Spirit 
love one another in the Trinity, and the knowledge with which we know him is a 
sharing in the eternal knowing in which the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit know 
one another coeternally.”20 This is a gift of sheer grace from the being of the 
ontological Trinity and mediated through the action of the economic Trinity. Torrance 
held that God “communicates himself to us in such a way that he lifts us up into the 
inner communion of his divine Being so that we are given to share in the mutual 
knowing of the Father and the Son in the Holy Spirit and thus to know God as he is in 
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17 Thomas F. Torrance, “Incarnation and Atonement: Theosis and Henosis in the Light of 
Modern Scientific Rejection of Dualism,” Society of Ordained Scientists, Bulletin No. 7 (Edgeware, 
Middlesex, Spring 1992): 8-20. 
18 To more generally explore Torrance’s notion of theosis, see Myk Habets, Theosis in the 
Theology of Thomas Torrance (Surrey, UK: Ashgate, 2009). For shorter discussions, see Paul D. 
Molnar, Thomas F. Torrance (Surrey, UK: Ashgate, 2009), 157-8, 197-201, 232; Elmer M. Colyer, 
How to Read T. F. Torrance: Understanding His Trinitarian and Scientific Theology (Downers Grove: 
InterVarsity Press, 2001), 78-9, 92-4, 178-9, 219-20, 252-3. 
19 GR, 166; GGT, 154-5; RST, 138-9; TF, 54-60; CDG, 148. 
20 RST, 183. 
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himself in the immanent relations of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.”21  Throughout his 
career, he recalled a point of Irenaeus that “only God can know himself so it is only 
through God that God may be known.”22 So if humans are to know God it is only by 
somehow sharing or participating in the knowledge which God has of himself. Such 
sharing is made possible because God and his inner onto-relations are no longer 
closed to us. God has opened himself as Father, Son and Holy Spirit to share His love 
and self-knowledge with humanity through the incarnation. According to Torrance, 
“God the Father communicates himself to us in his Son and imparts himself to us in 
his Spirit in such a way as to enable us to receive his revelation and participate in the 
movement of mutual knowing and loving between the Father and the Son.”23 It is 
significant that human participation is not by nature but by grace, which locates 
epistemology within soteriology. Hence, we turn now to note how the Son and the 
Spirit enable participation in the knowledge of God for Torrance.  
 
5.2.1.1 Participation in the self-knowledge of the Trinity is realized through the 
Incarnation 
God’s self-communication goes beyond a nebulous spiritual, mental or verbal 
form of communication, but through Christ God enters into the human situation and 
assumes it. God takes on an ontological relation with humanity through the hypostatic 
union in Christ.  Such personal and participatory mediation on the part of God with 
humanity goes further than created intermediations between God and humanity as 
merely an indirect sharing of himself as Aquinas had argued.24 Moreover, God 
condescends in the incarnation in order to share in humanity so that humans may 
share in God’s self-knowing and self-loving.25 This is consistent with his earlier 
thought when Torrance lectured,  
It is the doctrine of Christianity that the reconciled reason participates 
in the life and activity of God in Christ, for in revelation God gives His 
                                                          
21 GGT, 154. 
22 TF, 54. Torrance upheld this point of Irenaeus over fifty years earlier as follows: “It is 
through God alone that God is known and becomes knowable.” “Knowledge of God,” The Auburn 
Lectures, 1938-39 (The Thomas F. Torrance Manuscript Collection. Special Collections, Princeton 
Theological Seminary Library), 15. 
23 CDG, 146. 
24 TP, 99-100. 
25 GGT, 155. 
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very Self to man to be loved and known. Faith is this God-given 
participation of the believer in, and assimilation to, Christ the Word. 
Here knowing and participating are one and the same motion, 
inasmuch as the Truth and the Reality of God are not separated in 
Christ.26 
 
Torrance frequently returned to how the Council of Nicea used the term 
homoousios to confess that Jesus is of one and the same Being with God, that is, “God 
of God and Light of Light.” This term “crystallizes the conviction that while the 
incarnation falls within the structures of our spatio-temporal humanity in this world, it 
also falls within the Life and Being of God.”27 In chapter two (2.8), we noted how the 
homoousion is thus the “linchpin of Christian theology” for Torrance’s “truly realist” 
epistemology, holding together “that what God is toward us in his saving economic 
activity in space and time through Christ and in the Holy Spirit, he is antecedently and 
eternally in himself.”28 We also introduced in chapter two (2.4) that the movement of 
the incarnation is a two-fold movement for Torrance which enables human 
participation in the self-knowledge of God. The incarnation is not only a movement 
from God to humans as personal Being and Act, but is also a movement from humans 
to God as we see in Jesus a fully human embodiment of the knowledge of God.29 The 
fully human embodiment of the knowledge of God is part of the “vicarious humanity 
of Jesus.”30 In brief, Jesus not only vicariously died on behalf of humanity, but also 
lived on behalf of humanity with implications from his entire life for the lives of his 
followers today, including the knowledge of God.31 Jesus possesses knowledge of 
God which all others do not. Therefore, the incarnation of Jesus exposits and grounds 
                                                          
26 “Christian Faith,” The Auburn Lectures, 1938-39 (The Thomas F. Torrance Manuscript 
Collection. Special Collections, Princeton Theological Seminary Library), 11. 
27 GGT, 160. 
28 GGT, 161. 
29 TS, 45: “These are not two separate movements, each proceeding from its own independent 
ground to meet the other, but one two-fold movement, for even the movement from the side of man 
toward God, free and spontaneous as it is, is coordinated with the movement of God toward man, and is 
part of the divine movement of revelation and reconciliation.” 
30 The Mediation of Christ, (1983; repr., Colorado Springs: Helmers & Howard, 1992), 
passim; GR, 133-64; See also James B. Torrance, “The Vicarious Humanity of Christ” in T. F. 
Torrance, ed., The Incarnation: Ecumenical Studies in the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed 
(Edinburgh: Handsel, 1981), 127-47; Elmer Colyer, How to Read T. F. Torrance (Downers Grove: 
InterVarsity, 2001), 97-126. 
31 See Christian D. Kettler, The God Who Believes: Faith, Doubt and the Vicarious Humanity 
of Christ (Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2005), 1-35, 58-90. 
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the knowledge of God within humanity.32 Torrance wrote, “Into our disobedience and 
covenant-breaking life, into our disinherited existence, there descends God the Son in 
order to live out from within it a life of pure obedience, fulfilling the covenant will of 
God, and bringing humanity back from estrangement to communion with the 
Father.”33 Through the incarnation, not only does God adapt himself to humanity so 
that we might know him, but through the incarnation humanity is reconciled and 
adapted to be in a knowing relationship with God.34  The adaptation of God to 
humanity and humanity to God has been actualized in Christ. As part of the dual 
adaptation, knowledge of God is given and received in Christ. Thus, the knowledge of 
God is perfectly and vicariously embodied for humanity within Jesus.35 Others can 
participate in this incarnationally-grounded knowledge of God through union with 
Jesus. The vicarious faithfulness of Jesus has theological consequences which 
surround the many acts of knowing involved in personal knowing which we will 
discuss below (5.3). Torrance is aware that a vision of participation in the self-
knowledge of God through Christ raises questions about how one may guard against 
the frailty, partiality, and even idolatry of human conceptions of God. This is held in 
check by the necessary inadequacy of theological statements which are part of his 
transcendent (2.7) and truly realist (2.8) dynamics. This also raises question about 
how humans participate in Christ who participates most fully in the knowledge of 
God. This Torrance answered in part with his doctrine of the Spirit. 
 
5.2.1.2 Participation in the self-knowledge of the Trinity is enabled by the Spirit 
For Torrance, God enables humans to participate in his self-knowledge by the 
Holy Spirit.36 The Spirit is an equally important person in the being of God. Yet, the 
                                                          
32 TP, 99-100. 
33 T. F. Torrance, Incarnation: The Person and Life of Christ, Robert T. Walker, ed. (Milton 
Keynes, UK: Paternoster; Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2008), 114. 
34 TS, 48. 
35 TS, 50-52. Christian D. Kettler engages T. F. Torrance and develops this theme in chapter 3, 
“Jesus Knows God For Us and In Our Place,” in The God Who Believes: Faith, Doubt, and the 
Vicarious Humanity of Christ (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2005), 58-90. 
36 Concerning Torrance’s pneumatology, see TIR, 192-258; GR, 165-94; KBBET, 208-12; TF, 
191-251; CDG, 59-67, 147-55, 180-94. See also Elmer Colyer, “Thomas F. Torrance on the Holy 
Spirit,” Word and World 23 (2003): 160-167; Colyer, How to Read T. F. Torrance, 211-241; Gary 
Deddo, “The Holy Spirit in T. F. Torrance’s Theology,” in The Promise of Trinitarian Theology: 
Theologians in Dialogue with T. F. Torrance, ed. Elmer Colyer (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 
2001), 81-114; Paul D. Molnar, “The Role of the Holy Spirit in knowing the Triune God,” in 
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Holy Spirit does not work independently or provide an independent way of knowing 
God apart from the Son and the Father.37 Instead, Torrance wrote, the Spirit “proceeds 
from the Father and is sent by the Son, and who as the Spirit of the Father and of the 
Son imparted to us enables us in communion with himself to participate in God’s 
knowing of himself.”38 Torrance extended this argument by maintaining that the 
Spirit is the living presence of God and the very Being of God who interacts with 
creation. The Spirit “brings the very Being of God to bear upon us in our experience, 
creating the relation to the divine Being which knowledge of God requires in order to 
be knowledge.”39 He acts upon humans so that knowledge of God’s being is rooted in 
God’s being and action.40 His activity is eloquent, for God is not a mute being. Thus, 
it is by the Spirit that God communicates His Word or Himself.41 The Spirit is at work 
not only in revelation external to humans, but also at work within humans “creating 
and calling forth from us forms of thought and speech” through which God may 
disclose Himself to us.42 The Spirit prepares and opens our minds to receive God’s 
self-communication, creating in us the capacity to know God without suppressing or 
bypassing our minds. “Hence through the Spirit we are given to participate in God’s 
own rationality, in his own self-knowledge or self-witness.”43 Nevertheless, beyond 
our rational structures, the Spirit also works to rehabilitate the human person and 
relationships because the Spirit is at work as “personalizing Spirit.” From within the 
inner relations of the Trinity, the Spirit redeems and reveals God in the context of 
persons in relationship.44 “The Holy Spirit is the eternal Communion of the Father 
and the Son and therefore when He is sent into our hearts by the Father in the Name 
of the Son we are made partakers with the Son in his Communion with the Father and 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Trinitarian Theology after Barth, ed. Myk Habets and Phillip Tolliday (Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2011), 
3-47, esp. 33-45. 
37 GR, 172: “Thus it is through the Son that the Spirit comes, from the Son that He shines 
forth, to the Son that He bears witness, and in the Spirit that God is known and man is recreated after 
His Image in Jesus Christ.” 
38 CDG, 117; Also 148. GR, 173-4: “The Holy Spirit is the eternal Communion of the Father 
and the Son and therefore when He is sent into our hearts by the Father in the Name of the Son we are 
made partakers with the Son in His Communion with the Father and thus of God’s own self-
knowledge.” 
39 GR, 176. 
40 GR, 176-7. See note 72 on Torrance’s agreement with Calvin’s doctrine of direct, intuitive 
knowledge of God. 
41 GR, 179-83. 
42 GR, 183. 
43 TIR, 94-95. 
44 GR, 188-89. 
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thus of God’s own self-knowledge.”45 Through the Spirit, God enables us to “share in 
the relation of mutual knowing between the Father and the Son and thus in God’s 
knowledge of himself.”46 
  
5.2.1.3 Soteriological Participation 
To summarize this section (5.2), knowledge of the Triune God is participatory. It 
is through the movements of the incarnation and of the Spirit that humans are lifted up 
to share in the self-love and self-knowledge of the Trinity. As Torrance put it, “The 
Love with which we are loved by God is the Love with which the Father, Son and 
Holy Spirit love one another in the Trinity, and the knowledge with which we know 
him is a sharing in the eternal knowing in which the Father, the Son and the Holy 
Spirit know one another coeternally.”47 Or most simply, Torrance quoted Paul, that it 
is “through Jesus we are given access to the Father in one Spirit.”48 
Notice that the Trinitarian source and goal for knowledge of God is communion. 
We recall that revelation and reconciliation belong together for Torrance. Likewise, 
Torrance’s Trinitarian epistemology is rooted in a Trinitarian soteriology. The 
soteriological moorings give knowledge of God a particular telos which, as we will 
develop below (5.3 & 5.4), provides it with important ethical distinctions in the 
postmodern, scientific world. For now, it is noteworthy that for Torrance this is not an 
ontological participation where all aspects of creation, including knowledge, naturally 
participate in God.49 Instead, this is a decidedly soteriological participation made 
possible through the economic Trinity. As Torrance put it, “To know this God, who 
both condescends to share all that we are and makes us share in all that he is in Jesus 
Christ, is to be lifted up in his Spirit to share in God’s own self-knowing and self-
                                                          
45 GR, 173-74. Emphasis mine. 
46 TF, 32. 
47 RST, 183. Also, RET, 21-24; GGT, 154-55. 
48 TF, 55, quoting Ephesians 2:18. 
49 A tenet of the early to mid-twentieth century French Catholic nouvelle théologie and then 
later of the “Radical Orthodoxy” movement of John Milbank is the ontological and thus sacramental 
participation of creation with the Creator. On the nouvelle théologie, see Hans Bouersma, “Analogy of 
Truth: The Sacramental Epistemology of nouvelle théologie,” in Ressourcement: A Movement for 
Renewal in Twewntieth-Century Catholic Theology, ed. Gabriel Flynn and Paul D. Murray (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2012), 157-71; Hans Boersma, Heavenly Participation: The Weaving of a 
Sacramental Tapestry (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2011), 154-169. On “radical orthodoxy,” see 
James K.A. Smith, Introducing Radical Orthodoxy: Mapping a Post-secular Theology (Grand Rapids, 
MI: Baker Academic, 2004), 74-77, 185-229. 
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loving until we are enabled to apprehend him in some real measure in himself beyond 
anything that we are capable of in ourselves.”50 With its Trinitarian moorings, 
theological epistemology is subsumed within and connected to soteriology for 
Torrance. 
This thesis has maintained that Torrance’s theological epistemology is thoroughly 
Trinitarian. It is the Triune God who is the source, determines the nature and 
actualizes the possibility of participation in the knowledge of God. Torrance’s 
language of participation keeps epistemology tied to its Trinitarian source, nature and 
actuality. Torrance did not develop the anthropological, subjective and practical 
dimensions of participation as much as he wrote about the Trinity.51 These themes, as 
we will see, are not entirely absent, but need expansion from his Trinitarian 
perspective. In order to further explore participation in the knowledge of God, we 
now turn to explore two wide-ranging, subjective dimensions of what that 
participation involves. 
 
5.3 Participation in the knowledge of God involves the whole person  
We noted in chapter four that when Torrance used the term “being,” he tended to 
refer to reality extrinsic to the human person. Nevertheless, at times Torrance engaged 
the “two poles of being,” that is the being of the knowing person and the being of 
what is known.52 In his discussion of the social coefficient of knowledge he wrote, 
“We are forced to take full account of subject-being, the being of the human knower 
in his active contact with what he knows, and the being of what is known as that 
which has the power of being open to knowledge.”53 More attention is given to the 
being of the knower in his earliest lectures at Auburn than in his more mature 
writings, yet through his later engagement with critical realism Torrance confessed to 
giving renewed attention to the question of the being of the knowing person.54 He 
maintained the importance for theology to be rooted in God’s own being (theologia in 
                                                          
50 GGT, 155, italics mine. Also RST, 186. 
51 A similar critique has been made of Karl Barth. John Webster wrote, “Throughout the 
discussion of the knowledge of God, therefore, Barth looks to Christological doctrine to do the work 
which might more conventionally be undertaken by accounts of the dynamics of human subjectivity.” 
John Webster, Karl Barth, 2nd ed. (London: Continuum, 2004), 80. 
52 TCFK, 159. 
53 RST, 132. 
54 RST, 132. 
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se) as well as mediated through the conditions and contingencies of human life in our 
creaturely existence (theologia nostra).55 While Torrance gave the being of the human 
knower some sustained attention,56 his focus upon realism tilted the emphasis of the 
majority of his writings toward the being of reality.57 Toward expanding Torrance’s 
notion of knowledge of God as participatory, we consider the being of the knower. 
 
5.3.1 Theological and Scientific Perspectives 
With explicit reliance upon Polanyi, participation is a defining quality of personal 
knowledge for Torrance. Torrance repeatedly states that “it is only a person who can 
think, mean, understand or interpret,” going on to delineate various personal actions 
involved in the process of knowing: believing in truth and submitting one’s mind to 
reality, discerning coherent patterns in nature, examining and weighing evidence, 
appraising arguments, and relating evidence to reality.58 Personal knowledge means 
that there is a “responsible participation of the person as an active rational agent in all 
acts of understanding and knowing.”59 Torrance concluded, “Michael Polanyi’s 
rejection of the Laplacian impersonal mode of thought and its replacement by another 
in which personal participation is shown to be essential to its rational and objective 
character, is a major contribution to the epistemological foundations of science.”60 
The participatory actions of the knower are a necessary facet of personal knowledge 
and thus knowledge is person-involving for Torrance.  
 Human knowing is a person-involving activity that has emerged within a 
stratified universe. As the logical positivists were theorizing a reductionist paradigm 
for the sciences, United States philosopher Roy Wood Sellars was developing a 
heirarchical view of the sciences which he called “emergent realism” or “emergent 
naturalism.” In 1916, Sellars maintained that the mental was an emergent property in 
his hierarchy of complex systems. His system progressed as follows: inorganic, 
                                                          
55 RET, 21-30. 
56 For example, TS, 85-105. 
57 Torrance therefore distinguishes and prioritizes the “truth of being” over the “truth of 
statement.” RST, 143-45; TCFK, 304, 318-20. 
58 BSCL, 141-42; RET, 45-46; CTSC, 66-67. 
59 RET, 45. 
60 CTSC, 67. 
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organic, mental or conscious, social, ethical and religious or spiritual.61 However, 
after Sellars, “in the reductionist climate in the philosophy of science between the 
1930s and the 1960s, emergentist proposals were sidetracked.”62 Since then, others 
within the philosophy of science argued in favor of emergentism.63 In the 1960s, 
Michael Polanyi argued for a hierarchical view of the universe which undergirded his 
discussions of the irreducibility of the category of a person and thus the personal 
participation of scientists in their knowledge.64 As with Sellars, Polanyi held that 
human consciousness and knowing were emergent properties in a stratified 
universe.65 More recently, four authors who have written within the religion-and-
science dialogue have argued for various forms of emergentism and their implications 
for human knowing. Against reductionism, Arthur Peacocke argues that God’s 
immanent work in creation through evolutionary processes gives rise to the 
emergence of reliable cognitive processes for survival and thus the development of 
human knowledge.66 Contending against both dualist and reductive physicalist 
accounts of human mind and consciousness, Philip Clayton argues that mind and thus 
knowledge are ontological emergent properties.67 Similarly, Nancey Murphy has 
                                                          
61 Roy Wood Sellars, Critical Realism: A Study of the Nature and Conditions of Knowledge 
(1916; repr., New York: Russell and Russell, 1966). Cited by Nancey Murphy, Reconciling Theology 
and Science: A Radical Reformation Perspective, 14, n. 12. 
62 Niels Henrik Gregersen, “Emergence and Complexity,” in The Oxford Handbook of 
Religion and Science, ed. Philip Clayton and Zachary Simpson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006), 768, 767-83. 
63 On the history of emergence, see Philip Clayton, Mind and Emergence: From Quantum to 
Consciousness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 1-37; Nancey Murphy, “Reductionism: How 
Did We Fall Into It and Can We Emerge From It?” in Evolution and Emergence: Systems, Organisms, 
Persons, ed. Nancey Murphy and William R. Stoeger, S.J., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 
19-39; Russell Manning, “Mere Summing Up? Some Considerations on the History of the Concept of 
Emergence and its Significance for Science and Religion,” Science and Christian Belief 19 (2007): 37-
58. 
64 See especially Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy 
(1958; repr. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1962). 
65 Ibid., 381-405. 
66 Arthure Peacocke, God and the New Biology (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1986), 
passim; Theology for a Scientific Age (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1993), 61-9, 300-303, 312-15; “A Map 
of Scientific Knowledge: Genetics, Evolution and Theology,” in Science and Theology: The New 
Consonance, ed. Ted Peters (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), 189-210; Paths from Science 
Towards God: The End of All Our Exploring (Oxford: Oneworld, 2001), 24-26; “Emergence, Mind, 
and Divine Action: The Heirarchy of the Sciences in Relation to the Human Mind-Brain-Body” in The 
Re-Emergence of Emergence: The Emergentist Hypothesis from Science to Religion, ed. Philip Clayton 
and Paul Davies, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 257-78. 
67 Philip Clayton, Mind and Emergence, esp. 107-55. Michael Silberstein grants Clayton’s 
argument for emergence as a suitable explanation for mind and justified true beliefs, but does not see 
the need for God. Michael Silberstein, “Emergence, Theology and the Manifest Image,” in The Oxford 
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contended for emergence, or as she puts it, a nonreductive physicalism, concerning 
the emergence of humanity and consequently knowledge.68 While not targeting the 
defense of emergentism, J. Wentzel van Huyssteen has engaged various intra-related 
scientific disciplines related to the topic of evolutionary epistemology to affirm both 
human similarity to the animal world and human uniqueness concerning the 
emergence of human consciousness and knowing.69 It is significant that before 
Peacocke, Clayton, Murphy and van Huyssteen, Torrance himself held that human 
rationality and knowledge are properties that have emerged from within a stratified 
universe, which he described in discussing the priestly function of humans in creation: 
 
From the perspective of theology man is clearly made the focal point in 
the interrelations between God and the universe. He is given a special 
place within the creation with a ruling and a priestly function to 
perform toward the rest of created reality. All lines of rationality and 
order, of purpose and fulfillment in the creation converge on him as 
man of God and man of science and depend on his destiny. From the 
perspective of natural science man must also be recognized to be a 
focal point of significance in the universe, both because he represents 
the culmination of its development to ever higher levels of reality and 
order and because all we know of the universe, even of the universe 
and its structures billions of years before ever man emerged, is 
correlated to the rationality of man. There is a profound harmony 
between the rationality of the human understanding and the rationality 
of the universe, and indeed a congruence between the stratified 
structure of science and the stratified structure of nature.70 
 
For Torrance, humans are a focal point of creation because of the emergence of 
rationality; humans and human knowledge are emergent complexities; and human 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Handbook of Religion and Science, ed. Philip Clayton and Zachary Simpson (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006), 784-800. 
68 Nancey Murphy, “Emergence and Mental Causation,” in The Re-Emergence of Emergence: 
The Emergentist Hypothesis from Science to Religion, ed. Philip Clayton and Paul Davies (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006), 227-43; Nancey Murphy, “From Causal Reductionisms to Self-
Directed Systems,” in Did My Neurons Make Me Do It? Philosophical and Neurobiological 
Perspectives on Moral Responsibility and Free Will, ed. Nancey Murphy and Warren S. Brown 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 42-104, esp. 78-84.  
69 See especially his chapter, “Human Uniqueness and Cognitive Evolution,” in Alone in the 
World?: Human Uniqueness in Science and Theology (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006), 
45-110. An earlier, shorter version is found in his article, “Evolution and Human Uniqueness: A 
Theological Perspective on the Emergence of Human Complexity,” in The Significance of Complexity: 
Approaching a Complex World through Science, Theology and the Humanities, ed. Kees Van Kooten 
Niekerk and Hans Buhl (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004), 195-215. See also, Duet or Duel: Theology 
and Science in a Postmodern Word (London: SCM Press, 1998), esp. 131-66. 
 70 DCO, 129. See also his chapter, “Man, Priest of Creation,” in GGT, 1-14. 
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knowledge exemplified by the stratified structure of science has congruence with the 
stratified structure of nature. Without tracing the history or defending particular 
emregentist theories, it is important for the argument to note that emergent 
cosmological and anthropological views have epistemological consequences. 
Epistemology follows ontology and, particularly important here, an emergent, 
stratified anthropology.  
To extend Torrance’s ontologically-determined dynamic, epistemology is not 
only to be in accordance with the nature of the object, but also with the nature of the 
knowing subject, a subject who knows out of the complex matrix of their whole 
being. As Philip Clayton put it,  
 
To say that the human person is a psycho-somatic unity is to say that 
the person is a complexly patterned entity within the world, one with 
diverse sets of naturally occurring properties, each of which needs to 
be understood by a science appropriate to its own level of complexity. 
We need multiple layers of explanatory accounts because the human 
person is a physical, biological, psychological, and (I believe also) 
spiritual reality, and because these aspects of its reality, though 
interdependent, are not mutually reducible.71 
 
Clayton refers to the multiple layers that constitute humans as ontological pluralism. 
This is commensurate with what Polanyi and Torrance referred to as the “stratification 
of reality” yet is focused here upon the knowing subject. As an emergent capacity, 
human knowing is not cut off and distinct from the rest of a person’s being, somehow 
functioning separately from their other emergent capabilities. Therefore, to 
understand knowledge of God as participatory means that knowledge will involve all 
of the ontological dimensions which constitute a knowing person. This includes a 
person’s thoughts as well as beliefs, commitments, desires, as well as their bodies and 
actions. Following Torrance’s notion of onto-relations, we also maintain that 
relationships are part of what constitute persons which we will develop below (5.4).  
The ability to know has arisen with many other inter-related, multi-causal capacities 
embodied within humans. Using his distinction between focal and subsidiary 
awareness, Polanyi wrote, “All our conscious transactions with the world involve our 
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subsidiary use of our body.”72 Only if one accepts a particular form of Cartesian 
mind-body dualism can one keep knowledge as merely a cognitive activity. Rather, 
knowing involves the entire being of a person and not merely an autonomous mind 
that somehow functions in a disembodied, dispassionate, or unwillful way. Consistent 
with his Auburn lectures, Torrance maintained that “we do not have a special faculty 
apart from reason but an orientation of the whole person which uses reason.”73 
Torrance’s point here concerning the whole person was informed by his biblical 
anthropology. 
To understand the human activity of knowing from the perspective of various 
biblical writers, one needs to understand how the biblical writers conceived of 
humanity. Informing each epistemology is an implicit anthropology providing basic 
categories for how we understand human knowledge. It is well-attested by Old 
Testament scholars that ancient Israel understood humans as a totality and not divided 
into parts which undergirded their way of knowing.74 As Robert C. Dentan put it, 
“The ancient Hebrew did not, in fact, suppose that men thought with their minds, felt 
with their emotions, and made decisions with their wills, but that all these activities 
were carried on by the whole person, every function involving the others also.”75 
Knowledge for the people of Israel was experiential and involved the whole person.76 
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This holistic perspective is carried over into the New Testament perception of 
humanity and consequently its views of knowledge.77 Similar to loving, for both 
Testaments the action of knowing involved the whole person.78 This is why the 
language of the heart is important to the biblical authors.79 While the heart is 
sometimes referred to as the organ of knowledge,80 it is not understood as a separate 
faculty for knowing, but as the seat of personhood which includes the will, emotion, 
conscience as well as intellect.81 Therefore, as D.C. Schindler puts it, “God is not 
merely an object for the mind alone… It is thus not merely the abstract mind that is 
elevated to receive God’s self-communication, but the whole of one’s person. In other 
words, it is not, in the end, the mind that knows God, but the person who knows God 
through the mind.”82 
Karl Barth expressed the biblical notion clearly in Church Dogmatics IV.3 
where he unpacked the doctrine of reconciliation using the theme of Christ the God-
Man who in his office as prophet is the mediator and guarantor of reconciliation. In 
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this context, Barth frequently used the phrase “the revelation of reconciliation,” 
indicating not only the relationship between reconciliation and revelation, but that 
God’s act of reconciliation through Jesus Christ communicates. “In other words, the 
covenant of God with man and man with God as fulfilled in Jesus Christ is not a 
dumb fact but one which speaks for itself. The reconciliation of the world with God 
accomplished and consisting in Him is revelation in its very reality.”83 Barth contends 
that such revelation retains its active, historical even dramatic character.84 It is within 
this discussion of the active “revelation of reconciliation” that we find some of 
Barth’s more precise critiques concerning modern reductive accounts of the 
knowledge of God as dispassionate cognitive activity which are worth quoting at 
length.  
We cannot impress upon ourselves too strongly that in the language of 
the Bible knowledge (yada, γιγνώσκειν) does not mean the acquisition 
of neutral information, which can be expressed in statements, 
principles and systems, concerning a being which confronts man, nor 
does it mean the entry into passive contemplation of a being which 
exists beyond the phenomenal world. What it really means is the 
process of history in which man, certainly observing and thinking, uses 
his senses, intelligence and imagination, but also his will, action and 
‘heart,’ and therefore as a whole man, becomes aware of another 
history which in the first instance encounters him as an alien history 
from without, and becomes aware of it in such a compelling way that 
he cannot be neutral towards it, but finds himself summoned to 
disclose and give himself to it in return, to direct himself according to 
the law which he encounters in it, to be taken up into its movement, in 
short, to demonstrate the acquaintance which he has been given with 
this other history in a corresponding alteration of his own being, action 
and conduct.85 
 
For just as God’s reconciling work involves the whole person, so too does God’s 
revelatory action. Barth continued by demonstrating how Israel did not conceive of 
the knowledge of God in a passive, intellectualized way. Using many varied 
references from the Old Testament, Barth summarized, “There is never any 
suggestion in all this of merely an objective seeing and understanding of the divine 
nature and being… And this knowledge of God in His past, present or future implies a 
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new human action corresponding to the divine and altered in relation to it.”86 For 
Barth, God’s active revelation of reconciliation evokes a corresponding, practical 
knowledge which involves the whole person. He furthered his critique by 
demonstrating in the New Testament that “the terms γιγνώσκειν and γνωσισ can also 
be applied to intellectual and contemplative apprehension. Yet nowhere can it be said 
that knowledge is merely of this type, having its theme and content in abstractly 
objective things or essences.”87 He argued that the object of knowledge frequently in 
the New Testament is the divine action in salvation which evokes human response. 
Consequently, “the terms faith and love and obedience are always near when 
reference is made to knowledge.” 88 Barth contended that knowledge of God in the 
biblical sense includes the transformation of the whole person and cannot be reduced 
to neutral observation or intellectual speculation. “So radical is the transformation 
which comes on man in this knowledge, so full of content is his own history in it, and 
so far is this intelligere from a merely ratiocinative, argumentative or even 
contemplative process which might be described as intellectualistic and the results of 
which might be attacked and denounced as empty gnosis!”89  
In thinking through the implications of the prophetic role of Jesus, Barth noted 
that in the revelation of reconciliation, reconciliation does actually occur. As part of 
the God-established relationship accomplished through reconciliation, knowledge 
most basically meant the union of the knower with God and then consequently 
included cognitive content and rational matter. 90 God and the reconciled, held 
together in an I-Thou relationship, are ontologically more basic, giving rise to 
knowledge. Knowledge and truth are the result of the encounter. Thus, knowledge for 
Barth held the cognitive elements within the personal. In other words, the personal 
elements of knowledge contained the cognitive elements. In this way, knowledge 
could not be reduced to the merely cognitive.91 But neither could knowledge be 
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reduced to the emotive or affective dimension. This is why, concerning theological 
language, Barth held neither to a literalism, whose linguistic form was essentially 
propositional and thus emphasized the cognitive, nor to an expressivism, whose 
linguistic form was basically symbolic and privileged the emotive. Instead, Barth held 
to a theological realism that engaged the whole person.92 This enabled Barth to stand 
against any one-dimensional epistemological reductionism with regard to the human 
subject, either of the rational, emotive or of any other aspect of human nature.93 
Instead the whole person was involved in the knowledge of God.94 “What we have 
rather brusquely to oppose in this insight is a constant and widespread devaluation of 
the concept of knowledge. It is not the case that Christian knowledge can be regarded 
and described as a mere acceptance or reflection, as mere thought, as mere conviction 
of perhaps a profound and even emotional nature.”95 For Barth, this would be a 
subjectivist devaluation of the concept of Christian knowledge. Instead, Christian 
knowledge “is set in motion by its living object” which provides its basis, theme and 
content.96 Consequently, “the object itself sees to it that the act of contemplating and 
grasping it, of accepting and considering it, cannot possibly be purely intellectual.”97 
For Barth, the prophetic role of Jesus in the revelation of reconciliation gives a full-
orbed shape to the knowledge of God which is as multi-dimensional as God who 
provides it, the human personality which responds, and the reconciliation which 
establishes and preserves the knowledge-involving relationship. T. F. Torrance’s view 
that knowledge of God involves the whole person continues the notion found within 
Scripture and held by his mentor, Karl Barth. Recapturing this epistemological 
perspective is particularly helpful in overcoming modern reductionist epistemologies. 
The whole person is involved in knowing, and thus knowledge is better 
discussed from a holistic, complex framework than a reductionist one. We recall from 
chapter one that Nicholas Rescher defines complexity as “first and foremost a matter 
of the number and variety of an item’s constituent elements and of the elaborateness 
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of their interrelational structure, be it organizational or operational.”98 We humans, as 
far as we know, are the most complex systems in the universe. Furthermore, human 
consciousness and the ability to know is one of the most spectacular developments 
among the species. The human brain as a vital part of that capacity is certainly one of 
the most complex organs known, made up of millions of cells, or neurons, which 
make millions of connections within the brain and is intricately connected with the 
nervous system throughout the human body.99 As discussed above, the knowing 
person includes many dimensions which influence human knowledge, including 
emotion, intellect, will and relationships. Though countless aspects of human 
complexity could be mentioned, this is sufficient to note that human beings are 
complex and consequently, the activity of human knowing is complex. Beyond 
modern reductionist epistemologies, we conclude that knowledge is more adequately 
understood as a multi-dimensional complexity in which humans participate. This 
perspective can accommodate for the stratification of reality and the many levels 
constitutive of a human knowing agent. It can take into consideration the physical, 
chemical, evolutionary and biological, psychological, sociological, moral, spiritual 
and theological dimensions of epistemology without reducing knowledge to a 
particular level. The ontological complexity of the knowing subject necessitates a 
more complex epistemology. This has advantages over a reductionist framework 
which focuses upon parts and their aggregation to locate a basic cause. Thus, the 
sciences of complexity and complexity theory provide a more suitable analogy for 
knowledge of God, particularly as the restraints of reductionism are overcome in the 
postmodern, scientific age. To expand Torrance’s notion of participation in the 
knowledge of God, we briefly consider how his Trinitarian framework could help to 
nuance his emphasis on the reasoning mind. 
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5.3.2 The framework encompassing Torrance’s emphasis on the reasoning mind 
While each dimension of human being influences the activity of knowing, 
Torrance emphasized the reasoning mind. He has been critiqued for holding “too 
rationalistic understanding of faith” and thus diminishing the involvement of the whole 
person.100  
 
Throughout the book [Theological Science], and in spite of several attempts 
to qualify it, Torrance has an extremely rationalistic or intellectualistic 
understanding of faith. The dominant character of faith, as depicted, is its 
rationality and not its qualities of trust or obedience… There is not enough 
provision for affective, volitional, or active dimensions of the response of the 
total man to God in Christ.101 
 
While this critique of Theological Science may have merit, it is important to note that 
Torrance recognized other dimensions involved in human knowing. For instance, in 
his earliest Auburn lectures, Torrance gave repeated attention to the will and the 
importance of decision in advancing knowledge of God. From that time, he 
maintained that theological thought requires personal decisions that are life and death 
decisions, affecting one’s whole life: 
 
All religious thought is charged with personal decision. It is concerned 
with questions on which we must take our own stands; upon which we 
are called by God to make up our minds; matters of life and death… 
When I go shopping it does not matter very much whether I buy this at 
one dollar or that at a dollar and a half. When someone thinks of taking 
a wife unto himself, it matters a little more whom he chooses. The 
decision is more personal, and affects his whole life. It is [important].  
But in Christianity we are confronted by God who challenges us to 
make a decision of life and death… The kind of decision we make in 
religion is absolutely vital. There is nothing in our life that is not 
affected by it. 102  
 
Though more regular a concern earlier in his career, Torrance’s concern with decision 
was not without mention in his later epistemological works, including his book 
Theological Science. For instance, “From beginning to end, however, we operate in 
theology through response to a Word addressed to us, in obedience to an act of Grace 
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upon us, and in a life of decision that is correlative to divine election.”103 Though 
Torrance accented reason and the mind, he maintained that knowledge of God is thus 
not a spectator sport which can be engaged in a detached, impartial manner, but 
required decisions which involved the whole person.  
Moreover, through Torrance’s discussions of sin, we find that noetic 
influences extend beyond mere reasoned argument. He recognized that human 
persons can maintain a disposition that is opposed to the truth of God in Christ. 
Human being in all its complexity is distorted because of sin. “If Christian Truth is 
Personal Being, then it must be apparent that sin is also a matter of being, twisted, 
distorted being. Sin is in fact a being-in-error.”104 Torrance maintained that the sinful 
disposition of humans begets decisions in thought and life which run counter to the 
way of Jesus.105 Consequently, what underlies and directs natural human knowledge 
is a deep-seated alienation from God.106 The fallen heart or will can misdirect 
attempts at knowledge, distorting knowledge of all kinds. The order in the world that 
nature reveals to scientific investigation and the divine order revealed by the 
incarnation can be rationally and morally resisted due to this alienation.107 Therefore, 
what is needed is a severe reorientation, a conversion, which goes deeper than a 
dialectical engagement of the reason. Human epistemic capacities rooted in the whole 
person are in need of repair. As Torrance put it, in union with Christ, we participate in 
the healing order opened up by Jesus.108 While sin has distorted human being and thus 
knowing, through the incarnation comes reconciliation and justification, a justification 
that calls into question our natural goodness and natural knowledge, indicting natural 
human being and knowing. Torrance wrote, 
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Justification by the grace of Christ alone calls in question not only all 
natural goodness but all natural knowledge. Natural knowledge is as 
much the work of the flesh as natural goodness; it is a work of the 
natural man. It is at this point that Karl Barth has made such an 
immense contribution to the Reformation. We cannot separate 
knowing and being for they belong to the same man, and it is the 
whole man, with his knowing and his acting, with the whole of his 
being, who is called in question by justification.109   
 
Yet, in the reconciliation between God and humans, healing begins at the deepest 
human levels of human being which brings a reorientation to all types of human 
knowing.110 For knowledge to obtain, there is a need for harmony between the human 
mind and whoever or whatever is known. A redeemed mind is enabled to 
harmoniously engage the order within creation and within God through the 
incarnation. Epistemic engagement from a healed mind, enabled by the redemption of 
the whole person through the incarnation, facilitates proper engagement, leading to 
the development and maturation of knowledge. In this way, Torrance maintained that 
a sanctity of mind is needed in mathematics and physics as it is needed in theology. 
Torrance recalled a conversation with the European mathematician, Professor F. 
Gonseth who remarked that “one cannot be a good mathematician without a ‘sanctity 
of mind’, if only because the purity and precision of mathematical thinking are 
incompatible with any kind of mental dishonesty.” 111 The sanctity of mind is thus not 
separate from but is part of the sanctity of the whole person. Thus, because his vision 
of participation in the knowledge of God remained securely within a soteriological 
framework, this included the mind but extended to the whole person. Furthermore, the 
supreme dynamic that controlled both his soteriology and epistemology was the 
Trinity. Hence, we return to see how the Trinity, and in particular the incarnation, 
played a key role in enabling and surrounding the participation of the whole person in 
the knowledge of God. 
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5.3.3 The Son and Spirit secure participation of the whole person 
At this point in expounding upon how participation in the knowledge of God 
involved the whole person, we return to the central epistemological dynamic for 
Torrance, the Trinity. We have seen that the fount of knowledge of God for Torrance 
is the mutual relation of knowing between Father, Son and Spirit which is, in fact, 
more basically a mutual relation of being between them.112 The onto-relations and 
self-knowing of the Ontological Trinity is the source of all knowledge of God. Human 
knowledge of God is made possible “only if he brings us into communion with him in 
the inner relations of his own being as Father, Son and Holy Spirit.”113 We described 
above how sharing in the self-knowledge of the ontological Trinity is enabled by the 
Son (5.2.3.1) and the Spirit (5.2.3.2). A key concept upon which Torrance focused 
was the vicarious humanity of Jesus who was the unique embodiment of the 
knowledge of God within humanity.  
We described the “vicarious humanity of Jesus” above (5.2.3.1) which meant for 
Torrance that Jesus was not only the Word from God to humanity, but also the perfect 
embodiment of the Word within humanity toward God. Torrance maintained the 
hypostatic union of God with humanity in Jesus. In this union Jesus serves as the 
mediator in both directions, bringing revelation and reconciliation from God to 
humans and offering the perfect human response to God on behalf of humanity.114 It 
is in keeping with his full humanity that the whole person of Jesus participated in the 
knowledge of God. No aspect of Christ’s humanity was exempt from the knowing 
relationship. He often quoted Gregory of Nazianzus, “what Christ has not assumed is 
not healed; but that which is united with his Godhead is also saved.”115 God assumed 
full humanity and personhood in Christ including all of its dimensions. Through the 
incarnation, God brings healing to all levels of the stratified order which comprise 
human beings.116 To deny some aspect of humanity is to break the hypostatic union 
and to fall prey to forms of Gnosticism and Docetism.117  In Christ “we may now 
freely participate in the knowledge of God as an actuality already translated and made 
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accessible for us by His grace.”118 An important consequence for the argument here is 
that all aspects of human participation in the knowledge of God are surrounded and 
included by the faithfulness of Jesus. In other words, through the vicarious humanity 
of Jesus other humans in all their complexity are enabled to participate in the intra-
trinitarian knowledge of God. 
Therefore, it is through union with Christ that is enabled by the Spirit that we 
participate in the mutual relation of knowing and being between Father, Son and 
Spirit.119 Human union with Christ is an “interrelation of knowing and being between 
us and the incarnate Son, although in our case this union is one of participation 
through grace and not one of nature.”120 Union with Christ is no mere cognitive 
union, though we have noted that Torrance would contend that it is not less than 
that.121 Instead, union with Christ involves our whole being which is enlivened by the 
Spirit. In knowledge of God, the being of God influences the entire being of 
humanity. As Torrance put it, “Knowing God requires cognitive union with him in 
which our whole being is affected by his love and holiness.”122 More emphatically, he 
declared that in knowledge of God the “Object takes us under its command and directs 
our very being and existence in relation to it, in a measure that obtains in no other 
field of knowledge.”123 Consequently, human participation in the knowledge of God 
involves not only the mind, but the whole person. In union with the vicarious, 
perfected divine-human relation in Jesus and empowered by the Spirit, the being of 
God influences the being of persons, enabling participation in God’s self-knowledge. 
In summary of this section (5.3), to demonstrate that participation in the 
knowledge of God involves the whole person, we have argued that human knowing is 
an emergent capacity of human beings. Human knowing does not occur in a 
disembodied way, but is interconnected with the whole of a person that is more 
analogous with a complexity than a reductionist framework. Knowledge of God is 
thus not cut off from any dimension of human being. Though sin distorts human being 
and knowing, justification and revelation leads to sanctity of being and knowing. For 
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Torrance, fully human participation in the knowledge of God occurs originally and 
fundamentally in the vicarious humanity of Jesus. Through union with Jesus, the 
relation with God is a being-constituting relation, involving the whole person and 
enabling authentic participation by the Spirit. To say that knowledge of God involves 
the whole person also means that it involves all aspects of their existence. Thus we 
now turn to see how knowledge of God involves not only the whole person, but a way 
of life. 
 
5.4 Participation in the knowledge of God involves a way of life  
We have concluded that, derived from the ontological Trinity, knowledge of God 
is personal, relational and participatory, and thus involves the whole person. 
Therefore, given the nature of knowledge of God, we will also demonstrate that 
participation in the knowledge of God inherently involves a way of life. While 
Torrance did not extensively develop this theme, it is inherent within his Trinitarian 
framework for the knowledge of God.  
 
5.4.1 Theological and Philosophical Perspectives 
A relationship is inherently participatory and Torrance described the knowledge of 
God as relational. From his Trinitarian notion of participation and from the relational 
nature of knowledge of God, there is intrinsically a participatory dimension to his 
conception of knowledge of God. We observed in chapter four that knowledge of God 
involves a dialogical relation that God establishes by grace. This knowledge is not 
primarily reflection on human rational experience or faith for Torrance, but is 
reflection upon God in a dialogical relation of faith. Knowledge arises “in 
conversation and communion with the living God who communicates Himself to us in 
acts of revelation and reconciliation and who requires of us an answering relation in 
receiving, acknowledging, understanding, and in active personal participation in the 
relationship He establishes between us.”124 Without participation in this relationship, 
knowledge of God becomes impossible.125 “At no point can theological knowledge 
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step outside this dialogical relation, without abstracting itself from the object, without 
falsifying itself, or without retreating into unreality.”126 Nevertheless, knowledge of 
any sort involves a proper kind of detachment for Torrance, but not the kind of 
scientific detachment of objectivism promoted in the nineteenth century that stems 
from a Cartesian split between subject and object. Rather, there is an attachment to the 
object of inquiry in order to help the knower to detach herself from her own 
presuppositions. “That is why the scientist, far from being disinterested in his inquiry, 
is passionately involved vis-à-vis the relentless compulsion upon him of the inherent 
rationality of the universe, i.e. what we call the scientific conscience.”127 Proper 
attachment (or commitment) with the object of knowledge enables proper detachment 
from one’s own presuppositions or the presuppositions of the surrounding 
community. Properly conceived attachment and detachment are a part of relational 
knowledge of God for Torrance. Knowledge invites proper responses to the attached 
reality in the knowing relationship. In this way, this section argues that knowledge is 
participatory and thus involves ethics or a way of life in response to ontological 
realities.  
In chapter two, we discussed the epistemological dynamic that ontology 
determines epistemology, that is, the nature of what we know determines how we 
know it. It is also noteworthy that for Torrance ontology informs ethics as well. In an 
informative quote, Torrance demonstrates his conceptual tie between ontology and 
human behavior:  
The recognition that a proper scientific description of contingent 
realities and events provides an account not only of how things 
actually are but of how they ought to be, goes far toward bridging the 
unfortunate gap between natural science and moral science or ethics. 
After all, if in rigorous scientific inquiry we feel obliged to know and 
understand things strictly in accordance with their natures, in a true 
and faithful way, it is also the case that we feel ourselves obliged to 
behave toward them strictly in accordance with their natures, in a true 
and faithful way. Thus true knowledge and right behavior are both 
responses to the compelling claims of reality which we cannot 
                                                                                                                                                                      
you for the moment to stop your ears to those who tell you there is no road to knowledge about God, 
and come a little way with me and see. After all, the proof of the pudding is in the eating, and anyone 
who is actually following a recognized road will not be too worried if he has non-travellers telling each 
other that no such road exists.” Knowing God, 2nd ed. (London: Hodder & Staughton, 1993), 16-17. 
126 TS, 39. 
127 GR, 9. 
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rationally or morally resist. This is surely an essential part of what we 
mean by the scientific conscience. If science and ethics overlap at this 
crucial point, it seems clear that commonly accepted views of science 
and ethics must change in order to do justice to the double fact that 
there is an inescapable moral ingredient in scientific activity and an 
inescapable ontological ingredient in ethical behavior. There is a 
proper inter-relation between the ‘is’ and the ‘ought’, between being 
and obligation, which we need to recover today in natural, moral, and 
legal science alike.128 
 
For Torrance, objectivity lays claim upon the life of knower. There is ontologically-
appropriate behavior.  This is consistent with what Ryan O’Dowd sees in the outlook 
of the Pentateuch and especially in the wisdom literature.129 The created order, or the 
being of reality, has ethical implications for human beings. Furthermore, this is true 
when the being engaged is not any aspect of creation, but the ontologically-distinct 
Creator. 
 Stemming from Torrance’s contention for ontological integrity in all inquiry is 
his concern for the integration of form and content.130 Methods are to be apposite to 
the nature of the subject matter under investigation and the means to understanding 
are to be in accord with the substance of what is sought. As discussed, epistemology 
is to follow ontology. For Torrance, the ontology-epistemology discussion has 
primarily focused on appropriate intellectual methods, suitable approaches, and fitting 
means of inquiry and verification.131 Yet, to extend his ontologically-determined 
principle once again, the integration of form goes beyond just the mind of a knower 
but also includes the life of the knower. In other words, if the nature of the reality 
determines how one knows it, then how one knows it goes beyond just the mind of the 
knower to include the life of the knower which gives context, shape and direction to 
their mind. For instance, a person’s loyalties, trusts, interests, passions, basic 
                                                          
128 CFM, 40-1.  
129 “In one way the epistemology in Deuteronomy is grounded in the ontology and ethics of 
Yahweh’s created world. Knowledge is a product of living in the redemptive story in accordance with 
the torah. This torah is a living memorial of Yahweh’s Horeb theophany and thus the moral and orderly 
means to reproduce his powerful presence in all future generations.” Ryan P. O’Dowd, “Memory in the 
Boundary: Epistemology in Deuteronomy,” in The Bible and Epistemology: Biblical Soundings on the 
Knowledge of God, ed. Mary Healy and Robin Parry (Milton Keynes, UK: Paternoster, 2007), 20; 
Ryan O’Dowd, The Wisdom of Torah: Epistemology in Deuteronomy and the Wisdom Literature 
(Göttingen, Germany: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2009), 163-65. 
130 TCFK, “The Integration of From in Natural and Theological Science,” 61-106. A good 
summary and discussion of this theme is Elmer M. Colyer, The Nature of Doctrine in T. F. Torrance’s 
Theology (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2001), 15-91. 
131 See chapter 2.3. 
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convictions as well as the community and traditions to which one belongs influences 
their way of reasoning.132 However, Torrance’s discussions of ontologically-informed 
methods focused on determining appropriate intellectual methods (2.3). He did not 
often extend the consequences of the ontological dynamic beyond the mind. 
Nevertheless, elsewhere Torrance is concerned with the integration of the life of the 
knower with theology. This is precisely what he advocates when he contends that 
theologia is eusebia.133 A godly life and faithful speech about God belong together 
and mutually condition one another.134 Derivative from a knowing relationship with 
the life of the Triune God comes a “distinctively Christian way of life in which the 
seal of the Holy Trinity was indelibly stamped upon the mind (διανοια or φρονηµα) of 
the church.”135 The being of the ontological Trinity expressed in the evangelical 
action of the economic Trinity gives rise to an ontologically appropriate form of 
responsive life which contains and shapes knowledge of God. For Torrance, this is 
ultimately expressed within humanity through the Incarnation and subsequently 
within other humans in union with Christ. 
By way of comparison, this ontological-ethical link has parallels with the Greek 
philosophical tradition. Pierre Hadot has demonstrated that each philosophical school, 
whether Platonism, Aristotelianism, Stoicism, or Epicureanism, represented a form of 
life defined by an ontological vision, or more specifically an ideal of wisdom.136 
Philosophy did not consist in merely teaching theories for the mind to contemplate, 
though it certainly involved the contemplation of nature. Rather, its aim was the art of 
living, encompassing the whole of existence. Consequently, each school had 
particular inner attitudes and practices to help its constituents to embody the ideal 
vision of wisdom and its vision of the good life. There was not a strict separation 
between theory and practice, for the philosophical theories were practical, giving 
shape to a way of life.137 They sought to address all dimensions of human persons, 
                                                          
132 This is recognized more readily in the field of ethics. For example, see Oliver O’Donovan, 
Resurrection and Moral Order: An Outline for Evangelical Ethics, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 1994), 204-25; Glen H. Stassen and David P. Gushee, Kingdom Ethics: Following Jesus in 
Contemporary Context (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2003), 55-68. 
133 TF, 13-46. 
134 See chapter 5.3.2. 
135 TF, 17. 
136 Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life, trans. Arnold I. Davidson (Malden, MA: 
Blackwell Publishing, 1995). 
137 Hadot, Philosophy, 59-60. 
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especially the passions.138 The end in mind encompassed a wise form of life which 
was in accord with the nature of humans and reality.139 Its goal was the 
transformation of humanity’s way of existence.140 Hadot concludes that during the 
Hellenistic and Greek eras, philosophy cannot be conceived primarily as 
philosophical discourse,141 but rather was first and foremost “a way of life, an art of 
living and a way of being.”142  
Similarly, with a serious and stirring quote from an early lecture, Torrance clearly 
advocates the practical, life-altering aspects of theology.  
 
This brings us to note one further form in which theological thought 
manifests itself. It is practical. It means something to us in life, and to 
our spiritual experience as persons. Theological thought is dynamic; it 
is living, charged with the power of God. As such it is no abstract form 
of meditation; no arm-chair theology can be of value. True theology 
applies to man in his real life, and is subordinated to the purposes of 
God for men. There can be no thinking here for thinking’s sake. There 
is a great responsibility and a task attached to it. It has to do with the 
salvation of men. Thus the decisions we make in it are matters of life 
and death. It is the kind of thought which produces martyrs. Men feel it 
to be so important that they are willing to die on behalf of their 
convictions.143 
                                                          
138 Ibid., 83: “In the view of all the philosophical schools, mankind’s principal cause of 
suffering, disorder, and unconsciousness were the passions: that is unregulated desires and exaggerated 
fears. People are prevented from truly living, it was taught, because they are dominated by worries. 
Philosophy thus appears, in the first place, as a therapeutic of the passions…Each school had its own 
therapeutic method, but all of them linked their therapeutics to a profound transformation of the 
individual’s mode of seeing and being. The object of spiritual exercises is precisely to bring about this 
transformation.” 
139 Ibid., 102: “Their goal is a kind of self-formation, or paideia, which is to teach us to live, 
not in conformity with human prejudices and social conventions – for social life is itself a product of 
the passions – but in conformity with the nature of man, which is none other than reason.” 
140 Ibid., 265: “During this period, philosophy was a way of life. This is not to say that it was a 
specific type of moral conduct; we can easily see the role played in the passage from Philo by the 
contemplation of nature. Rather, it means that philosophy was a mode of existing-in-the-world, which 
had to be practiced at each instant, and the goal of which was to transform the whole of the individual’s 
life. For the ancients, the mere word philo-sophia—the love of wisdom—was enough to express this 
conception of philosophy … Philosophy thus took on the form of an exercise of the thought, will, and 
the totality of one’s being, the goal of which was to achieve a state practically inaccessible to mankind: 
wisdom. Philosophy was a method of spiritual progress which demanded a radical conversion and 
transformation of the individual’s way of being.” 
141 Ibid., 269: “In general, historians of philosophy pay little attention to the fact that ancient 
philosophy was, first and foremost, a way of life. They consider philosophy as, above all, philosophical 
discourse.” 
142 Ibid., 268. 
143 “The Character of Theological Thought,” The Auburn Lectures, 1938-1939 (The Thomas 
F. Torrance Manuscript Collection. Special Collections, Princeton Theological Seminary Library), 21-
22. The trials and suffering which accompany salvation and knowledge of God is a theme of Hebrews. 
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It is noteworthy that Torrance here subordinated theology to the purposes of God and 
links it with salvation. We have given attention to how the nature of knowledge of 
God is formed by the onto-relations within the ontological Trinity for Torrance. As 
mentioned previously, the purposes of the economic Trinity also shape the nature of 
knowledge of God. In other words, the knowledge of God is enveloped in the more 
comprehensive soteriological purposes of God.144 As Torrance later developed this 
theme,  
 
The object of theological knowledge is engaged in purposive action – 
God fulfilling His creative and redeeming purposes. He is not known 
except within these purposes or in accordance with them. We cannot 
know God against His will, but only as He wills to reveal Himself; nor 
can we know Him apart from His purpose for us, apart from His claim 
upon the whole of our existence, or apart from His will to redeem and 
reconcile it to Himself. The truth with which we are concerned in 
theology is teleological truth, truth for us, truth laying hold upon us for 
a divine end, so that knowledge of it must be analogous to its 
teleological nature… we cannot know [God] without being drawn into 
[His] redeeming and reconciling activity, without being renewed and 
re-ordered in accordance with [God’s] saving will. In other words, we 
cannot truly know God without being reconciled and renewed in Jesus 
Christ. Thus the objectivity of our theological knowledge is immutably 
soteriological in nature.145  
 
As a result, God’s soteriological aims give shape to the nature and form of God’s self-
revelation.146 We have seen Torrance’s development of this theme in his discussions 
of the incarnation and more particularly in his holding together of reconciliation and 
                                                          
144 A cogent statement on how epistemology is encompassed within soteriology is William J. 
Abraham, Crossing the Threshold of Divine Revelation (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2006), 63: “The 
Christian claim about revelation in Christ has to be understood, then, as part of a comprehensive vision 
of ourselves and our predicament that shapes the very form and character of that revelation. God did 
not send a library of books for our enlightenment, even though we find the books of scripture 
indispensable in one way or another for maturity in faith. Nor did God send his Son so that we might 
hold extended seminars on ontology and metaphysics, even though these may throw valuable light on 
what is at stake. God sent the Son to liberate the cosmos from sin and grant us eternal life. Hence the 
crucial first-order verbs that are deployed to describe God’s action in Christ focus not so much on 
revelation as on salvation, redemption, healing and restoration. It is in and through these actions that 
God is truly revealed and made known. To develop a vision of revelation independently of them is 
profoundly misleading and distorting.” 
145 TS, 41. 
146 A recent discussion of the soteriologically-shaped nature and form of revelation is 
discussed in Paul K. Moser “Cognitive Idolatry and Divine Hiddenness,” in Divine Hiddenness, ed. 
Daniel Howard-Snyder and Paul K. Moser (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 120-48. 
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revelation.147 God’s movement of revelation is bound up with His movement of 
redemption. Therefore, the purposes of knowledge of God are transformative for the 
church, the individuals within it, and indeed the entire cosmos. This makes knowledge 
of God transformative, not just for the private thoughts or the isolated individual, but 
includes the person’s relationships and thus their entire existence. In short, knowledge 
of God involves a new way of life for the people of God. 
 
5.4.2 Participation involves ethics 
Torrance maintained that the incarnation provides the link between knowledge of 
God and the whole life of humans. Through his vicarious humanity, the Son lived a 
fully human life of faithfulness to the glory of the Father and embodied a life of 
redemptive obedience on behalf of humanity.148 “We are to think of the whole life 
and activity of Jesus from the cradle to the grave as constituting the vicarious human 
response to himself which God has freely and unconditionally provided for us.”149 
From early in his career, Torrance held that “the irrelevance of theology to life is one 
of the major problems of philosophical theology.”150  He then found in the incarnation 
the bridge from truth and thus knowledge of God to the whole of human life:  
 
If theological activity remains true to the character of Christian truth as 
Personal Being, as the Word made flesh, then it ought to be quite as 
relevant to life as the Word is bone of our bone and flesh of our flesh 
in Jesus. The astonishing thing about Christian Truth is that it has 
immediate relevance to every human situation (because of the 
Incarnation) without losing any of its eternal significance. If we insist 
on universalizing this Christian Truth, thus destroying its historic-event 
character, then we destroy the very power of Christian Truth for 
relevance to the world, for we destroy its concrete embodied from – 
and we shall cudgel our brains in vain to restore the relevance. That we 
cannot allow ourselves to fall into that impasse [sic]. Christian Truth is 
                                                          
147 The Mediation of Christ, 1-46; Incarnation, 76, 108, 126, 190, 192. 
148 Incarnation, 114-29. Gary Deddo gives attention to how the incarnational theology 
including the vicarious humanity of Christ developed by James B. Torrance and T. F. Torrance grounds 
the Christian life. See Gary Deddo, “The Christian Life and Our Participation in Christ’s Continuing 
Ministry,” in An Introduction to Torrance Theology: Discovering the Incarnate Saviour, ed. Gerrit 
Scott Dawson (London: T& T Clark, 2007), 135-56. On 137: “The legacy of the Torrance theological 
vision guards against faulty and false foundations for the Christian life and the worship and witness of 
the Church by grounding the whole of the Christian life in its source. For the life of the Church has but 
one foundation … That foundation is Jesus Christ himself.” 
149 Mediation of Christ, 80. 
150 “Theology and Church,” 4. 
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Truth in the form of being after which we were originally created, and 
though it may often run counter to the form and fashion of this fallen 
world, it is completely relevant to our genuine existence and life and 
every concrete situation in which we may find ourselves. Theological 
Truth cannot be kept apart from life. The Word became flesh: it has 
something to say to all flesh: it interjects itself into all phases and 
forms of human activity.151 
 
In another of his earliest lectures, Torrance maintained that in the incarnation, truth is 
“bound up intimately and inseparably to our actual existence, and therefore relevant to 
every aspect of the life of man. Here we have the Truth which is Eternal, and yet 
absolutely practical.”152 Torrance used the analogy of an axel which is at the center of 
the intersection of the spokes of a cart wheel. The axel provides the central 
orientation, holding together the whole. He concludes that this is how the Word of 
God and faith-knowledge operate with all systems of thought.153  Knowledge of God 
has the potential to affect all forms of knowledge and thus all areas of life.154 Through 
the divine-human connection within the incarnation, knowledge of God is connected 
to all areas of human thought and life, providing a centralizing orientation to ethics. 
Therefore, it is through union with Christ that we not only participate in the 
knowledge of God in Christ, but also share in its way of life.  
This Christological link which Torrance upheld between knowledge of God and 
ethics theologically captures what biblical scholars see inherent in the concept of 
knowledge of God in Scripture. Beginning in the Old Testament, to know God 
includes seeking God,155 serving God wholeheartedly,156 keeping the law,157 sharing 
peace with all creation,158 caring for the poor,159 demonstrating steadfast love,160 and 
                                                          
151 “Theology and Church,” 4-5. 
152 “Theology and Action,” The Auburn Lectures, 1938-1939 (The Thomas F. Torrance 
Manuscript Collection. Special Collections, Princeton Theological Seminary Library), 32. 
153 “Christian Faith,” The Auburn Lectures, 1938-1939 (The Thomas F. Torrance Manuscript 
Collection. Special Collections, Princeton Theological Seminary Library), 13. 
154 William J. Abraham describes revelation as a “world-constituting experience” for the 
believer. He uses the idea of a “threshold” to illustrate how revelation functions. As in coming to the 
threshold at the top of a mountain, one suddenly gains a new 360-degree view of the countryside. Or 
crossing the threshold of a house, one can see a new vision inside the house of what could previously 
not be seen outside the house. Abraham, Crossing the Threshold of Divine Revelation, 84-86. 
155 Ps. 9:11[10]. 
156 1 Chr. 28:9. 
157 Jer. 31:33-34. 
158 Isa. 11:6-9. 
159 Jer. 22:15-16; Prov. 29:7; Mic. 3:1. 
160 Hos. 2:19-20; 6:6. 
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living in the fear of God161 among other worshipful and ethical practices.162 The 
knowledge of God according to Old Testament scholars is active, practical and 
includes obedience.163 This embodied, obedience-involving notion of knowledge is 
continued in the New Testament.164   
There is a close relationship between knowledge of God and obedience in both 
Old and New Testaments. Some Scriptures imply that knowledge of God leads to 
obedience165 while others imply that obedience leads to knowledge of God.166 Others 
                                                          
161 Prov. 2:5. 
162 Terrence E. Fretheim, “צדי,” in New International Dictionary of OT Theology and 
Exegesis, edited by Willem A. VanGemeren Vol. 2 (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1997), 413; R. 
Bultmann, “γινώσκω,” 698; The knowledge of God in the OT “is essentially a communion with God… 
It is something altogether different from intellectual knowledge: it is a knowledge of the heart and 
demands man’s love (Deut. Vi), its vital demand is walking humbly in the ways of the Lord (Micah vi. 
8); it is the recognition of God as God, total surrender to God as the Lord.” T. C. Vriezen, An Outline 
of Old Testament Theology, 128. 
163 “’To know Yahweh’ refers to a practical, religo-ethical relationship,” according to 
Bergman and G.J. Botterweck, “yāda`,” 469; Knowing God according to the OT is the “first demand 
of life” (Hos. 6:6; 2:20; 4:1; 5:4; Isa 1:3; Jer. 2:8; 4:22; 31:34), writes T. C. Vriezen, An Outline of Old 
Testament Theology, 128. 
164 The NT continues the usage of the OT meaning “to know God” which stands for the 
“acknowledgement of God and of his will (Lk 19:4, 44; Rom 2:18; 1 Cor 1:21; 2 Cor 8:9; Gal 4:8f; 1 
Thess 4:5; Heb 3:10).” Heinrich Zimmermann, “Knowledge of God in the New Testament,” in 
Encyclopedia of Biblical Theology, ed. J.B. Bauer, Vol. 2 (London: Sheed & Ward, 1970), 475; Like 
the OT, Knowledge of God in the NT “expresses itself in action (e.g. Luke 19:44; Acts 2:36; 2 Pet. 
2:20-21; Rev. 2:23),” notes O.A. Piper, “Knowledge,” in The Interpreter’s Dictionary of the Bible, ed. 
by George Arthur Buttrick, Vol. 3 (New York & Nashville: Abingdon, 1962), 44; Summarizing the 
early Christian view of knowledge, R. Bultmann writes, “The Christian view of knowledge is thus 
largely determined by the OT. An obedient and grateful acknowledgement of the deeds and demands of 
God is linked with knowledge of God and what He has done and demands,” in his article, “γινώσκω,” 
707; In Paul, knowledge is associated with wisdom (Rom. 11:33; 1 Cor. 12:8; Col. 1:9; 2:3); “Phrases 
like ‘know God’s decree’ (Rom. 2:18; Acts 22:14), ‘know the law’ (Rom. 7:1), ‘know God’s will’ 
(Rom. 2:18; Acts 22:14), do not imply a merely theoretical knowledge, but the recognition that it 
applies to the person individually and demands his obedience. (When Paul in Rom. 2:20 calls the law 
‘the embodiment of knowledge and truth’ in his description of the Jew, he implies a clear distinction 
between existential knowledge and theoretical truth.)” E. Schϋtz & E.D. Schmitz, “Knowledge,” 399; 
Similarly, A.G. Patzia, “Knowledge,” 638-640; As with the OT, for Paul, knowledge of God “involves 
a willingness to obey (1 Thess 4:5; 2 Thess 1:8; 1 Cor 15:34; 2 Cor 10:5; Col 1:10),” from Ian W. 
Scott, Paul’s Way of Knowing, 152. 
165 For instance, the writer of Colossians prays for increased knowledge of God so that it may 
lead to a worthy and fruitful life. “For this reason, since the day we heard you, we have not stopped 
praying for you and asking God to fill you with the knowledge of his will through all spiritual wisdom 
and understanding. And we pray this in order that you live a life worthy of the Lord and may please 
him in every way: bearing fruit in every good work, growing in the knowledge of God, being 
strengthened with all power according to his glorious might so that you may have great endurance and 
patience, and joyfully giving thanks to the Father who has qualified you to share in the inheritance of 
the saints in the kingdom of light” (Col. 1:9-12). Also, Philip. 1:9-10. 
166 For instance, according to the gospel of John, Jesus said, “If anyone chooses to do God’s 
will, he will know (γνωσεται) whether my teaching comes from God or whether I speak on my own” 
(John 7:17). In line with this perspective, John Calvin wrote, “All right knowledge of God is born of 
obedience.”  John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, John T. McNeil, eds. (1960; repr. 
Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2006), I.vi.2. 
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imply that obedience is internal to the knowledge of God.167 Still others contend that 
knowledge of God is evidenced by obedience.168 For the argument here, it is not 
necessary to decide precisely how obedience is related to the knowledge of God. It is 
sufficient to note that according to biblical scholars knowledge of God in Scripture is 
bound up with a way of life.169 This is further demonstrated by noting that to not 
know God or to not have knowledge of God is to live unjustly, immorally and like the 
pagans.170 On the other hand, conversion to the faith is sometimes referred to in the 
                                                          
167 For instance, Jeremiah delivers a severe warning addressed to Jehoiakim (Jer 22:15f): “Did 
not your father eat and drink, and do justice and righteousness? Then it was well with him. He judged 
the cause of the poor and needy; then it was well. Is not this to know me? says the Lord.” Here justice 
and particularly concern for the poor is equated with knowledge of God. See G. Johannes Botterweck, 
“Knowledge of God in the Old Testament,” in Encyclopedia of Biblical Theology, ed. J.B. Bauer, Vol. 
2 (London: Sheed & Ward, 1970), 472-3. Philosopher D.C. Schindler writes, “Any reflection on the 
epistemology presented in the Bible would be inadequate if it were to fail to recognize that obedience 
to the law and the active love of neighbor is not simply an external consequence of the knowledge of 
God, but is in fact internal to it. Knowing God and loving God and one’s neighbor are in a certain 
respect one and the same thing.” Furthermore, given the relational nature of knowledge of God, 
Schindler importantly observes, “if truth is not a mere quality, but is a person, then the love in and by 
which one comes to know the truth is not merely a means to one’s intellectual grasp of that truth, but an 
intrinsic part of that very comprehension.” In D.C. Schindler, “Mystery and Mastery: Philosophical 
Reflections on Biblical Epistemology,” 187, 195. 
168 For instance, according to 1 John, knowledge of God is evidenced or demonstrated by 
keeping God’s commandments and living like Christ (1 John 2:3-6), especially the command to love 
one’s neighbor (1 John 2:7-11; 4:7f). 
169 Considering the ethical aspects of knowing in Hebraic thought, Ryan O’Dowd astutely 
comments, “Knowing is a responsibility as much as it is a process.” Ryan O’Dowd, The Wisdom of 
Torah, 182. In the NT, it is illustrative that knowledge finds itself among lists of virtues (2 Cor. 6:6; 1 
Peter 1:5-8), demonstrating that is part of the way of life in Christ. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that 1 
Peter 3:7 appeals to husbands to live with their wives kata gnōsin, which seems to be more than an 
appeal to live “considerately” (RSV) or “with understanding” (NEB), but is an appeal to live in 
consonance with the knowledge of God in Christ in the marriage. R. Bultmann, “γινώσκω,” 708. 
Robert C. Dentan expands, “It is a frequently noted paradox that the nation that gave the Western world 
its religion had no word for ‘religion.’ It goes without saying that it had no word for so intellectual a 
concept as ‘theology.’” Dentan contends that the phrases which are functional equivalents for religion 
and theology in the Old Testament are “the fear of God” and “the knowledge of God.” In biblical 
thought, “the life of man is a single reality – open to God at every point – which cannot be divided into 
separate, opposing spheres called the religious and the secular. When all of life is religious, there is no 
need for any special word for religion.” Dentan, The Knowledge of God in Ancient Israel, 33-36. In my 
view, the same could be said for “ethics.” 
170 There is theological significance in the phrase “not to know God” in the Old and New 
Testaments. Concerning the use of the word yada in the OT, Terrence E. Fretheim notes that “not to 
know Yahweh is to be unfaithful, guilty of harlotry, ‘sleeping around’ with other gods. ‘A spirit of 
prostitution is in their heart; they do not acknowledge the LORD’ (Hos 5:4). Though Israel may claim 
otherwise (Hos 8:2), there is in fact ‘no faithfulness, no love, no acknowledgement of God in the land’ 
(Hos 4:1).” Fretheim, “צדי,” 413; See also Bergman & J. G. Botterweck, “yāda`,” 469; Furthermore, 
Old Testament prophets attribute Israel’s spiritual depletion and exile to the lack of knowledge: Is. 1:3; 
5:13; 56:10-11; Jer. 8:7; 9:3, 6; 14:18; Hos. 4:1, 6; 5:4). “When the prophets lament the lack of the 
knowledge of God, this practically amounts to apostasy and idolatry which bring on future evils and 
punishment… Moral decline is intimately connected with this absence of the knowledge of God.” For 
example:  Hos. 4:6, 10; 5:4, 7; 11:2, 5; Is. 1:2, 4; Jer. 2:8; 4:22; 8:5-6. Discussed in G. Johannes 
Botterweck, “Knowledge of God,” 473; O.A. Piper writes, “Israel’s lack of knowledge is not 
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New Testament as “coming to the knowledge of God.”171 Within its narrative 
framework, knowledge of God according to both Old and New Testaments includes 
ethics or a way of life.172 Though Torrance does not locate ethics within the concept 
of knowledge of God by looking at the use of the related terms within Scripture, he 
does maintain that ethics are part of the knowledge of God by virtue of the 
incarnation, providing the perfect embodiment of the knowledge of God in a way of 
life. Torrance’s ethical discussions are limited, yet to extend his Trinitarian 
framework faithfully, we conclude that participation in the knowledge of God 
involves a way of life. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
theoretical ignorance, but rather failure to practice the filial relationship in which they stand with God” 
(3:43). O.A. Piper, “Knowledge,” 43; Likewise, there is a link between ignorance and sin in the New 
Testament. Rom. 1:21-25; 1 Cor. 2:8. In both Old and New Testaments, to not know God is to live as 
the pagans and the Gentiles: Jer. 10:25; 31:34; Gal. 4:8; Titus 1:16; 1 Thes. 4:5; 2 Thes. 1:8; Heb. 8:11. 
Gerhard Friedrich, ed., TDNT, Vol. V, Trans. By Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
1967), S.v. “οιδα,” pp. 117-118; Commenting on the use of the word agnoeō in the New Testament, 
Schϋtz & E.D. Schmitz note that it can mean to not understand, to not grasp, not be informed, and 
includes lack of responsive obedience. “It never means merely a lack of intellectual knowledge which 
can be removed by a neutral statement of facts. It is used in the OT sense. This lack of knowledge can 
be removed only by knowledge intimately linked with an existential recognition and acceptance.” It 
can mean “a failure to know in the sense of a disobedient closing of the mind to the revealing word of 
God (Acts 13:27; Rom. 10:3)… Ignorance and disobedience are here [Rom. 10:3] used as parallels; 
ignorance is the guilty turning away from the revelation of God in Jesus Christ.” E. Schϋtz & E.D. 
Schmitz, “Knowledge,” 406-7. 
171 1 Tim. 2:4; 2 Tim. 3:7; cf. Heb. 10:26; 1 Tim. 5:3; 2 Tim. 2:25; Tit. 1:1; 2 Pet. 2:21; cf. 
Col. 3:10. The term epignosis became almost a technical term for conversion in the NT according to R. 
Bultmann, “γινώσκω,” 707. 
172 Considering the foundations of ancient Hebrew epistemology in the Pentateuch, Ryan 
O’Dowd concludes, “We have found that Israel’s way of knowing is grounded in a storied, ethical, and 
religious way of life. Knowing, in fact, is a matter of divine-imitation where creating, or imagining, is 
at one and the same time obeying God and knowing God. The laws thus fit naturally into this ethico-
epistemological nexus; obeying God’s commands is to be like him and know him.” Ryan O’Dowd, The 
Wisdom of Torah, 23-4; Michael V. Fox argues for the unity of knowledge and ethics in the Proverbs 
In “The Pedagogy of Proverbs 2,” JBL 113, no. 2 (1994): 238; Cited in Ryan P. O’Dowd, “A Chord of 
Three Strands: Epistemology in Job, Proverbs and Ecclesiastes” in The Bible and Epistemology: 
Biblical Soundings on the Knowledge of God, ed. Mary Healy and Robin Parry (Milton Keynes, UK: 
Paternoster, 2007), 69; On the relationship between Pauline ethics and epistemology, Mary Healy, 
“Knowledge of the Mystery: A Study of Pauline Epistemology,” in The Bible and Epistemology: 
Biblical Soundings on the Knowledge of God, ed. Mary Healy and Robin Parry (Milton Keynes, UK: 
Paternoster, 2007), 146-148. On 147: “For Paul it is inconceivable that a living contact with Christ 
would not increasingly shape a person’s whole personality, leading to a perceptible effect on one’s 
outward conduct. To be ‘full of goodness’ is inseparable from being ‘filled with all knowledge’ of God 
and his saving work (Rom 15:14).” On the ethical purpose for the knowledge of God in the gospel of 
John, Cornelius Bennema, “Christ, the Spirit and the Knowledge of God: A Study in Johannine 
Epistemology,” in The Bible and Epistemology: Biblical Soundings on the Knowledge of God, ed. 
Mary Healy and Robin Parry (Milton Keynes, UK: Paternoster, 2007), 129; “The knowing of God is an 
act that includes the whole of one’s life, unto its existential extremities, and both gives and demands 
that this life be properly ordered.” D.C. Schindler, “Mystery and Mastery,” 187; Also, E. Schϋtz & 
E.D. Schmitz, “Knowledge,” 396. 
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5.4.3 Knowledge and ethics in the postmodern world 
In the postmodern world, the social and ethical dimensions of knowledge have 
been rediscovered. In the Cartesian world, knowledge is attained by objective views 
“from nowhere,” disconnected from the person and her relationships. It is a product of 
a “thinking thing” from a foundation of indubitable ideas intended to correspond with 
the external world. However, the postmodern world has reclaimed context, 
embodiment and social practices. For instance, Ludwig Wittgenstein argued how 
“forms of life” give rise to the many uses of language. For Wittgenstein, the speaking 
of a language is an activity that emerges from and is embedded within a culture’s non-
linguistic activities and thus must be understood within that context.173 Fergus Kerr 
observed that theorists of meaning with a realist orientation focus upon indicative 
sentences where language is the attempt to represent reality. Yet, given other types of 
sentences, for instance questions and commands, reminds us as Wittgenstein did, that 
language is part of a multiplicity of forms and actions which “rehabilitate[s] the self 
as a responsive agent in vital connection with others of the same kind” instead of a 
“detached spectator in the world.”174 Thus, for Wittgenstein, an embodied, social way 
of life is the given. It is only as participants in a language-game, a way of being 
together and its set of practices, that humans can use language and have knowledge.  
Three other recent philosophers considered postmodern in some sense have 
emphasized the social and ethical dimensions of human language and knowledge. 
First, central to his philosophical and historical works concerning healthcare, 
psychiatry, prison reform, sexuality and social ethics in general, Michel Foucault has 
argued that knowledge is conceived and defined within a nexus of social power which 
                                                          
173 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. by P.M.S. Hacker and Joachim 
Schulte, 4th ed. (West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Backwell, 2009), 14-15. Wittgenstein gives many examples 
in, Preliminary Studies for the “Philosophical Investigations” Generally Known as the Blue and 
Brown Books (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969), 127-85.  For discussion, see Fergus Kerr, Theology 
After Wittgenstein (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 28-31, 64-76, 132-6; David Bloor, Wittgenstein: A 
Social Theory of Knowledge  (London: The MacMillan Press, 1983), 22-49; Naomi Scheman, “Forms 
of Life: Mapping the Rough Ground,” in The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein, ed. Hans Sluga 
and David G. Stern (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 383-410; Thomas Morawetz, 
Wittgenstein and Knowledge: The Importance of On Certainty (Amherst: University of Massachusetts, 
1978), 5-33; “Form of Life” in Hans-Johann Glock, A Wittgenstein Dictionary (Oxford, UK: Blackwell 
Reference, 1996), 124-29. 
174 Kerr, Theology After Wittgenstein, 134. 
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he called “power-knowledge relations.”175 For Foucault, power is not a possession but 
a relation between persons and institutions from whose practices knowledge emerges. 
As he put it, “power produces knowledge… power and knowledge directly imply one 
another… there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of 
knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same 
time power relations.”176 Second, not without controversy but with a wide impact, 
Thomas Kuhn promoted a more complex view of the history and methodology of 
science than a strict empiricism had by drawing attention to the role of the social and 
psychological dimensions of the scientific community in the development of its 
theories and “paradigms.”177 Third, Alasdair MacIntyre has underscored the role of 
historical communities and tradition in ethics and human reasoning in general.178 
Practices within a tradition help to form virtues which assist the development and 
articulation of knowledge. The place of virtues in the development of knowledge has 
been championed within the field of virtue epistemology, giving attention to the affect 
of character upon epistemic activities.179 The irreducibly lived and embodied 
                                                          
175 On power-knowledge relations, see Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, 
trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Tavistock, 1972), esp. 178-99; Power/Knowledge: Selected 
Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977, ed. Colin Gordon (Sussex, UK: Harvester Press, 1980), esp. 
55-62, 109-33; Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. by Alan Sheridan (1977; repr. 
New York: Vintage, 1995); The Politics of Truth, trans. L. Hochroch and C. Porter (1997; repr. Los 
Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2007), esp. 147-167. For a good summary of this theme, see Tony Schirato, 
Geoff Danaher, and Jenn Webb, Understanding Foucault: A Critical Introduction (London, UK: 
SAGE Publications, 2012), 42-66. For discussion, see Joseph Ruse, “Power/Knowledge” in The 
Cambridge Companion to Foucault, ed. Gary Gutting (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 
92-114. For theological engagement of this theme, see Jonathan Tran, Foucault and Theology (New 
York: T&T Clark, 2011), 17-47; Jeremy R. Carrette, Foucault and Religion: Spiritual corporality and 
political spirituality (London: Routledge, 2000), 109-141. 
176 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 27-28. 
177 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 3rd ed. (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1996). Two further developments in the philosophy of science after Kuhn accenting the 
social and historical dimension were provided by Imre Lakatos and Paul Feyerabend. Imre Lakatos, 
“Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programes” in Imre Lakatos: The 
Methodology of Scientific Research Programes (Philosophical Papers I), ed. John Worrall and G. 
Currie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 8-101; Paul Feyerabend, Against Method 
(London: New Left Books, 1977).  Yet, defending the rationality of science in response to Kuhn, 
Lakatos and Feyerabend, see W. H. Newton-Smith, The Rationality of Science (London: Routledge, 
1981), 102-124. Introductions to the discussion concerning the place of Kuhn in the philosophy of 
science include Alexander Bird, Philosophy of Science (1998; repr. Oxon, UK: Routledge, 2002), 275-
285; James Ladyman, Understanding Philosophy of Science (Oxon, UK: Routledge, 2002), 96-105, 
114-122. 
178 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue 3rd ed. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 2007); 
Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1988). 
179 Ernest Sosa, Knowing Full Well (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011); Robert C. 
Roberts and W. Jay Wood, Intellectual Virtues: An Essay in Regulative Epistemology (Oxford: Oxford 
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dimensions of human knowing have been important among postmodern 
epistemologies. 
Theologians influenced by this postmodern theme have reflected upon how 
embodiment, forms of life, practices and thus ethics give rise to knowledge.180 Four 
noteworthy examples include Nicholas Lash who gives emphasis to the practices in 
the Christian tradition, suggesting that “problems of knowledge are problems of 
ethics.”181 Beginning his systematic theology with ethics, James McClendon 
accentuates how the shape of the common life of the body of Christ gives rise to the 
community practices of doctrine and witness.182 For John Howard Yoder, ethics are 
socially embodied, hermeneutics are located within a people and epistemology is 
within its body politic. In particular, nonviolence is an epistemology, for Christian 
knowing and understanding is to resist the temptation to rely on coercion or power 
over others.183  The Latin liberation theologian, Gustavo Gutiérrez contends that 
                                                                                                                                                                      
University Press, 2007); Michael Brady and Duncan Pritchard, eds. Moral and Epistemic Virtues 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2003); W. Jay Wood, Epistemology. Becoming Intellectually Virtuous (Downers 
Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1998); “The Place of Phronesis in the Methodology of Theology,” in 
Philosophy and Theological Discourse, ed. Stephen T. Davis (London: MacMillan, 1997), 204-223; 
Linda Trinkhaus Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind. An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical 
Foundations of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Jonathon Kvanvig, The 
Intellectual Virtues and the Life of the Mind (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1992). 
180 Terrence W. Tilley in his typology of postmodern theology names “communal praxis” as 
his fourth type, discussing Gustavo Gutiérrez and James W. McClendon in chapters 8 and 10. See his 
Postmodern Theologies: The Challenge of Religious Diversity (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1995), 115-128, 
142-152. Also on the postmodern emphasis upon the context of practices for theology, see Nancey 
Murphy and Brad J. Kallenberg, “Anglo-American Postmodernity: A Theology of Communal 
Practice,” in The Cambridge Companion to Postmodern Theology, ed. Kevin J. Vanhoozer 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 26-41; David S. Cunningham, “The Trinity,” in The 
Cambridge Companion to Postmodern Theology, ed. Kevin J. Vanhoozer (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), esp. 199-201. 
181 Nicholas Lash, Easter in Ordinary: Reflections on Human Experience and the Knowledge 
of God (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame, 1990), 275. On 276: “In other words, it is only 
through the redemptive transformation of our human practices that we can acquire some sense of what 
the truth of these images might be when used as metaphors for our relation to the unknown God. 
Perhaps we might say that the only images we have of God are not the images that his people use, but 
the images that they are.” See also, The Beginning and the End of ‘Religion’ (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 115, 155; Holiness, Speech and Silence: Reflections on the Question of God 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 55-6; Theology on the Way to Emmaus (London: 
SCM, 1986), 95-138. 
182 In particular, see the sections “Why Ethics Comes First,” in James Wm. McClendon, Jr., 
Systematic Theology: Ethics (Nashville: Abingdon, 1986), 41-46; and “What is Doctrine?” in his 
Systematic Theology: Doctrine (Nashville: Abingdon, 1994), 21-62. For a fuller discussion of 
McClendon’s epistemology, influenced by J.L. Austen, see James Wm. McClendon, Jr. and James M. 
Smith, Convictions: Defusing Religious Relativism, Rev. ed. (Valley Forge, PA: Trinity Press, 1994). 
183 John Howard Yoder, The Priestly Kingdom: Social Ethics as Gospel (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame, 1984), 15-101; Yoder, “Why Ecclesiology is Social Ethics,” in The Royal 
Priesthood (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994), 102-126; Yoder, “Walk and Word: The Alternatives to 
208 
 
 
 
theology is “critical reflection on praxis,” beginning with the lived experience of the 
poor and oppressed.184  
A postmodern theme from these philosophers and theologians is the social and 
practical embeddedness of knowledge. Practices, ways of life, and language games, 
performed in relationship help to inform and explicate knowledge. Participation in 
knowledge is bound up with a way of life and reciprocally, ways of living include 
ways of knowing. Thus, participation in the knowledge of God not only forms a way 
of life, but also participation in a way of life helps to clarify, explain and articulate 
knowledge of God. This echoes what Frederick D. Aquino has called a “patristic 
virtue epistemology.”185  
Torrance himself did not emphasize this postmodern theme, but he at least 
recognized the influence of the lives of the community of knowers upon the 
formulation of knowledge of God without compromising its divine origin or the 
priority of grace. As Torrance clearly put it,  
 
It is only as our minds are open and adjusted to God in accordance 
with his revealed nature, and only as we respond to him in faith, 
obedience and worship, that we can think and speak of God with the 
kind of precision that is appropriate to his divine nature. Piety and 
precision, godliness and exactness belong together and condition one 
another, for knowledge of God arises and takes shape in our mind 
under the determination of his revealed nature, and is maintained in the 
experience of worship, prayer, holiness and godliness. Thus empirical 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Methodologism,” in Theology without Foundations, ed. Stanley Haeurwas, Nancey Murphy and Mark 
Nation (Nashville: Abingdon, 1994), 77-90; Christian E. Early with Ted G. Grimsrud, “John Howard 
Yoder on Diversity as a Gift: Epistemology and Eschatology,” in A Pacifist Way of Knowing: John 
Howard Yoder’s Nonviolent Epistemology, ed. Christian E. Early and Ted G. Grimsrud (Eugene, OR: 
Cascade, 2010), 133-54. 
184 Gustavo Gutiérrez, A Theology of Liberation, ed. and trans. C. Inda and J. Eagleson 
(Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1973), 6. 
 
185 The formation of character for knowledge of God, or the vision of God, is a theme that can 
be found in many patristic writers. Frederick D. Aquino, “The Healing of Cognition in Deification: 
Toward a Patristic Virtue Epistemology,” in Immersed in the Life of God: The Healing Resources of 
the Christian Faith, ed. Paul L. Gavrilyuk, Douglas M. Koskela, and Jason E. Vickers (Grand Rapids, 
MI: Eerdmans, 2008), 123-142. I recognize that most Reformed theologians do not put the 
development of character or anything before the reception of knowledge of God by grace and likewise 
do not typically engage the topic of virtues. Though an engagement with Augustine could help, who 
maintained the priority of grace and advocated the development of virtues, space did not permit me to 
expand this important concern. In the following paragraphs, I mention how Torrance discussed 
“dispositions of mind” as faithful response and responsible participation in the knowledge of God. 
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and theoretical, religious and theological elements blend indivisibly 
together in theological understanding and formulation.186 
 
For Torrance, as we respond to God with the divinely-provided actions, we are 
enabled by the Spirit to conceptualize and articulate the knowledge of God in more 
fitting ways. In obedient communion, important aspects of our knowledge of God 
develop.187 Torrance communicates this epistemic function of faithful human 
response in various ways. He writes, “our human reason becomes adapted and 
adjusted to knowledge of God in accordance with his nature” and we are brought into 
more accurate knowledge of the Triune God.188 We become “inwardly so adapted” in 
order to learn “how to think worthily of God, that is, in a godly way appropriate to 
God.”189 Our minds are “tuned” and “lifted up to a level of spiritual perception and 
theological judgment appropriate for the knowledge of God.” 190 We are “given the 
capacity for forming theological concepts that answer faithfully to the revealed nature 
of God.”191 In union with Christ, humans actively participate in the refinement of the 
knowledge of God “from below” in worshipful acts and dispositions of mind in a 
community of reciprocity with God.192 From an early lecture, “knowing God brings 
with it a necessary conformity to the object known.”193 This matrix of responsive, 
mind-influencing dispositions is at work in the development of theological 
knowledge.194 They contribute to theological understanding in bringing knowledge of 
                                                          
186 TF, 54. 
 
187 Torrance approving notes the role of responsive obedience in developing knowledge of 
God for Calvin in GR, 31-2:  “For Calvin this involved also an acutely personal relation with God, for 
God addresses us personally in His Word and summons us to make a personal response in obedient 
love, and it is out of that obedience to God’s self-revelation that our knowledge grows and deepens.” 
188 TF, 56-57. 
189 RET, 48. 
190 RST, 121. 
191 RST, 122. 
192 TF, 43. 
193 “Knowledge of God,” The Auburn Lectures, 1938-39 (The Thomas F. Torrance Manuscript 
Collection. Special Collections, Princeton Theological Seminary Library), 11. 
194 Beyond theological knowledge, Torrance recognized early in his career that “there is no 
such thing as impartial thought” and that the “conclusions of our abstract thinking do not really arise 
from the logical basis on which they seem to repose.” Instead, “they come from something much 
deeper, a certain habit and set of mind which gives these arguments their force.” “Theology and 
Action,” The Auburn Lectures, 1938-39 (The Thomas F. Torrance Manuscript Collection. Special 
Collections, Princeton Theological Seminary Library), 10. 
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God to conceptualization and articulation.195 These responses may be construed as 
participatory epistemic practices. These practices are part of the “responsible 
participation of the person as an active relational agent in acts of understanding and 
knowing” and thus make a real contribution in the person and mind of the knower for 
Torrance.196 Torrance then went on to rehearse numerous actions of a person involved 
in knowing: thinking, meaning, interpreting, understanding, appraising arguments, 
correlating claims with reality, discerning patterns, submitting one’s mind to reality, 
and responsibly committing to the claims of the reality.197 It is significant to note here 
that personal knowledge includes various epistemic actions that involve the whole 
person which, Torrance contended, are to be engaged responsibly. Persons have 
choices as to how they will participate in the many epistemic activities involved in 
personal knowledge.198 Thus, for Torrance the personal dimension of knowledge 
includes many active aspects involved in human knowing. These active ways of 
participating can be engaged responsibly or irresponsibly, helpfully or unhelpfully, 
suitably or ill-suitably for the development and refinement of knowledge. Likewise, 
with the many “acts of understanding and knowing” involved in the knowledge of 
God, there are responsible and irresponsible kinds of participation. The many active, 
human components which are part of participation in the knowledge of God can be 
engaged well or poorly, faithfully or unfaithfully, suitable with the nature of what is 
known or ill-suited. Because knowledge includes person-involving actions, the moral 
dimension of the person is included.  
While knowledge of God cannot be reduced to either practices, language, relations 
or a way of life, nevertheless knowledge of God includes them as part of the whole 
complex of knowing.199 So once again, knowledge of God is not reducible to one 
basic, isolated dimension, but is more like a complexity, which includes not only the 
                                                          
195 Torrance says of theological statements that they “are progressively deepened and clarified 
through the Church’s worship and dialogue and repentant thinking within the whole communion of 
saints.” GR, 190. More recently, William J. Abraham contends, “Through the grace of God, spiritual 
exercises help to focus the attention and to purify the doors of perception, and thus enable us to see 
God.” Crossing the Threshold of Divine Revelation, 76. 
196 RET, 46. 
197 RET, 45-46. Also, BSCL, 141-42; CTSC, 66-67. 
198 Torrance credits Martin Buber for the rediscovery of the role of decision in theology in an 
early lecture, “Theology and Action,” The Auburn Lectures, 1938-39 (The Thomas F. Torrance 
Manuscript Collection. Special Collections, Princeton Theological Seminary Library), 4. 
199 Jones, Reductionism, 264-71. 
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various dimensions of the person (5.3), but also the relational, ethical dimensions of 
knowledge (5.4). This complex includes the knowing person, God, and the knowing 
relationship which is by participation, involving the whole person and a way of life. 
In demonstrating that the knowledge of God is participatory, this section has 
located the bridge from Torrance’s Trinitarian epistemology to ethics. As mentioned 
in the introduction, there have been very few discussions about ethics in the writings 
of T. F. Torrance.200 This chapter does not construct the bridge, for participation in 
the knowledge of God already contains ethical dimensions. Neither does this chapter 
cross the bridge to explore the ethical or practical terrain. Rather, the thesis has 
unearthed the bridge, having traversed Torrance’s epistemological landscape and 
located the connection near the center of his theological epistemology, within the 
nature and purposes of the Triune God.  
Recovering the ethical dimension of theological eistemology is a necessary 
component to overcoming reductionist notions of knowledge and for knowledge of 
God to be viable in the postmodern age. As Justin Thacker has argued, the main 
reasons postmodern philosophers rejected the Christian narrative has “not to do with 
its perceived lack of epistemological warrant, but rather because of the social ethic (or 
lack of one) that it generates.”201 We agree that the ethical dimensions of the 
knowledge of God need to be embraced as an essential part of participation in that 
knowledge for the postmodern context. 
We turn now to the conclusion to draw together the themes from the previous 
chapters’ engagement and assessment of Torrance’s Trinitarian epistemology in order 
to summarize a faithful and viable vision of participation in the knowledge of God for 
the postmodern, scientific age. 
                                                          
200 One exception is the two brief discussions of Paul D. Molnar. His discussion primarily 
aims to guard ethics against Pelagian tendencies by discussing the ethical implications of justification 
by faith within Torrance’s theology in Incarnation & Resurrection: Toward a Contemporary 
Understanding (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2007), 100-104, 144-151. Beyond this concern, brief 
mention of ethics within Torrance can be found also in Molnar’s book, Thomas F. Torrance, 102, 151, 
168, 348-49.  
201 Justin Thacker, Postmodernism and the Ethics of Theological Knowledge (Aldershot, UK: 
Ashgate, 2007), 37, 5-36. 
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CONCLUSION 
BEYOND REDUCTIONISM: PARITICIPATING IN THE KNOWLEDGE OF 
GOD IN A POSTMODERN, SCIENTIFIC AGE 
 
6.1 Introduction 
We began by discussing how modern reductionist accounts of epistemology have 
atomized and deformed notions of the knowledge of God. We proposed that through 
an engagement with the Trinitarian epistemology of T. F. Torrance, this thesis would 
provide a more holistic, complex vision of participation in the knowledge of God that 
is viable in the postmodern, scientific age (Chapter One). This study then engaged the 
basic dynamics of knowledge of God for Torrance. Through that engagement, we 
concluded that knowledge of God can be a disciplined form of knowledge, but is best 
not characterized as “scientific” to avoid possible reductionisms in the contemporary 
context. We also concluded that knowledge of God is shaped by its distinctive 
ontology and thus most centrally Trinitarian. Furthermore, through the Son and Spirit, 
we maintained that knowledge of God is creation-situated. We argued that while such 
knowledge involves human reason and concepts, it is not reducible to reason. We 
affirmed that knowledge of God is transcendent, going beyond human concepts and 
language. Nevertheless, we argued that such knowledge is realist, providing actual 
knowledge while noting the constructive role of human language and concepts 
(Chapter Two). At the heart of these epistemological dynamics is the determinative 
object of knowledge, the Triune God. We agreed with Torrance that the persons-in-
relationship or “onto-relations” of the Triune God are supremely important for a 
doctrine of God (Chapter Three). Continuing within his Trinitarian framework, we 
argued that the ontological Trinity and the onto-relations within give knowledge of 
God its personal and relational character (Chapter Four). Likewise, we argued that the 
Trinitarian shaping of epistemology also gives knowledge of God its participatory 
character which involves the whole person and a way of life (Chapter Five). This 
vision of participation extends the Trinitarian epistemology of Torrance with priorities 
to which his theological writings clearly point but which he himself did not develop.  
In this conclusion, we will first pull together the threads of my critique and 
expansion of Torrance’s Trinitarian epistemology to summarize three key aspects of a 
faithful and viable vision of participating in the knowledge of God for the 
postmodern, scientific age (6.2). This summary is not sequentially-organized, 
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unfolding the argument of each chapter as in the previous paragraph. Instead, this 
summary is thematically-organized to give a coherent vision of epistemic 
participation in the contemporary context. Second, we will note a few implications of 
this epistemological vision of participation in the knowledge of God (6.3). To discuss 
these implications, we return to the three contextual levels referenced in the 
introduction (1.3.1-1.3.3). These implications, both theoretical and practical, suggest 
the need for further research. Yet first, we begin with a systematic, three-point 
summary of the notion of participation in the knowledge of God developed through 
this engagement with Torrance’s epistemology. 
 
6.2 Retrospect 
 First, a faithful and viable notion of the knowledge of God needs to maintain 
both its ontological distinctiveness and its similarities with other forms of knowledge. 
To speak of participating in the knowledge of God in the contemporary era, one must 
admit that this type of knowledge, if valid, is in some ways unique. While a 
reductionist framework will attempt to explain knowledge of God on more basic 
levels, Torrance has helped us to recognize—along  with other philosophers of 
science and theologians engaged in the science and religion dialogue—that reality is 
stratified or multi-layered. Recognizing ontological depth and pluralism gives rise to 
the possibility of differing epistemologies. Respect for multiple strata of reality and 
their consequent differing epistemological methods directly counters reductionist 
claims, allowing ontology to determine epistemology instead of the reverse. This 
allows for the possibility of knowledge of God to be understood on its own terms 
without either a necessary recourse to a lower level or isolating the discussion to its 
own intellectual ghetto. Thus, knowledge of God flows from its distinctive ontology, 
the ontological or immanent Trinity, which shapes its unique epistemology. 
Consequently, theology can be conceived as a scientia or discipline, but not as a 
science in the contemporary use of the term because of theology’s unique subject. 
This preserves the distinctiveness and integrity of theology, guarding it against 
reductionism. 
 Nevertheless, while the source of this knowledge is ontologically distinct, 
Christian theology maintains that the transcendent, Triune God has definitively self-
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revealed within the actualities of the space-time universe in the incarnation of Jesus 
and through the Holy Spirit. The incarnation holds together both the transcendent and 
creation-situated dynamics of theological epistemology while the Spirit enables 
human participation in both. Consequently, because knowledge of God is creation-
situated, it has many of the same characteristics and boundaries of other types of 
knowledge within the world. The postmodern age has highlighted many of the 
constraints and lower-level factors which contribute to knowledge. We recall three 
postmodern epistemological themes encountered in this study. One postmodern 
epistemological theme is that knowledge is particular and contextual, moving beyond 
the supposed objective “views from nowhere” of foundationalism.  Knowledge of 
God is also particular, given through the self-revelation of God among the people of 
Israel and uniquely in Jesus. While knowledge of God is contextualized among the 
various cultures in which the people of God inhabit, it is not without universal intent. 
One of the broadest contexts from which to consider the knowledge of God is the 
space-time universe. As Torrance argued, this makes possible a revised notion of 
natural theology, not autonomous from but grounded in God’s self-revelation. 
Furthermore, it means that knowledge of God can find correlates with the empirical 
world. A second postmodern epistemological theme—including and extending 
beyond the sciences—is fallibilism. Knowledge of God, though of a transcendent 
origin communicated via revelation, involves human conceptualization. Whatever is 
known in the world cannot be fully captured by human knowledge. All creaturely 
reality transcends full cognitive grasp and God transcends creation. There is a real 
ontological difference between human concepts and reality as well as between 
creature and Creator. Thus, there is an inherent fallibilism and revisability within 
human knowledge, especially knowledge of God. A third postmodern theme is that 
human knowledge of reality is language-ridden and thus in some measure socially-
constructed. The Trinity is not only important in enabling participation from the “top 
down” by self-revelation in Jesus, but also from the “bottom up” through the Spirit at 
work within God’s people. The social and constructive elements of human knowing 
are part of that participation which the postmodern world helps us to see, and from a 
Trinitarian perspective, can embrace. These three postmodern themes—particularity, 
fallibility, and linguistic-constructivity—characterize human knowledge, including 
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knowledge of God. However, knowledge of God is not reducible to these dynamics. 
Therefore, this thesis concludes that the transcendence and ontological distinctiveness 
of knowledge of God guards it against reductionism. Yet, recognizing that knowledge 
of God is creation-situated through the Son and Spirit, it finds parallels, analogies 
and consonance with other types of knowledge in the world. Both dimensions are 
needed for the notion of participation in the knowledge of God to be faithful and 
viable in the contemporary postmodern, scientific age.  
Second, knowledge of God is well-conceived as personal, relational and 
participatory forms of knowledge. We return to the ontological fount which forms the 
distinctive nature of the knowledge of God, the Triune God. This was not only the 
heart of Torrance’s theological epistemology, but informs what is distinctively 
important about knowledge of God for the postmodern, scientific era. This thesis 
argued that the personal, relational and participatory forms of knowledge of God are 
derived from the personal-relational nature of the Triune God. Beginning with the 
personal form of knowledge, it is widely recognized that the subjective dimensions of 
knowledge have become particularly important in the postmodern era in response to 
the objectivist notions of the modern era. It is a person who knows, not simply a 
mind, brain, or reason. We explored the various dimensions of the person engaged in 
epistemic activity. This was further explored when we considered the participatory 
form of knowledge. Yet, in the personal form of knowledge, we argued that 
knowledge cannot be reduced to impersonal, formal relations between objects—
whether scientific or theological knowledge—but involves a person, a whole person. 
Next, we recall the relational form of knowledge. The postmodern world is less 
concerned with divisive and reductionist categories and more concerned with 
discovering intricate and complex relationships. The scientific world from quantum 
theory to chaos theory—both micro-level and macro-sciences—are helping us to 
comprehend the webs of relationality that comprise our entangled world. Furthermore, 
knowledge itself emerges within a relationship between knowers and what is known. 
Though the nature of human knowledge is ontologically distinct from reality, there is 
a real relationship between them that gives rise to knowledge. Additionally, a 
postmodern emphasis is upon the networks of relationships or traditions which assist 
the development of knowledge. This can lead to reducing knowledge to some form of 
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social constructivism. While embracing the social coefficient of all knowledge, the 
notion of commitment to reality, inherent in Torrance’s (and Polanyi’s) realism, can 
serve as an important virtuous intellectual practice to avoid the pitfalls of subjectivism 
and relativism. Nevertheless, we argued that in multiple ways, knowledge is 
relational, including knowledge of God.  Lastly, we have argued that knowledge of 
God is participatory, engaging the whole person and their relationships just described. 
Moving beyond reductionist anthropology means that such engagement involves the 
whole person, entailing the multi-dimensional faculties which enable humans to 
know. To recognize every emergent level of the human involved in knowing includes 
biological, psychological, social, ethical and spiritual dimensions. We maintained that 
human knowledge is a complexity, emerging from the manifold human faculties that 
enable knowledge. Hence, theological epistemology can benefit from neuroscience, 
evolutionary biology, psychology as well as theological and ethical reflection upon 
these and other scientific disciplines. Furthermore, because participation involves the 
whole person and their relationships, it also involves a way of life. Knowledge 
implicates life and reciprocally ways of living inform ways of knowing. The social 
and ethical dimensions which give rise to and result from specific types of knowledge 
are particularly important for the postmodern, scientific age. Therefore, this thesis 
concludes that it is an ontologically faithful analogy to the Triune God and helpful in 
the postmodern, scientific age to conceive knowledge of God as personal, relational 
and participatory.  
 Third, knowledge of God is like a multi-dimensional complexity, involving 
God, humans and the relationship between them. Knowledge of God in particular 
cannot be squeezed into a reductionist framework without deforming its structure and 
purpose. To begin, theological epistemology will be as whole as its undergirding 
theology. Neglect either a dimension of who God has revealed himself to be or the 
soteriological purposes of that self-revelation, and the nature and purpose of 
knowledge of God will be diminished. Likewise, theological epistemology will be as 
whole as its concomitant anthropology. Leave out a dimension of the human person, 
and an important aspect of human knowing is neglected. Lastly, theological 
epistemology will be as whole as the epistemic relationship between God and 
humanity. Overlook the mutual self-giving of God in Christ for humanity and humans 
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in response to God—both exemplified supremely in Christ—and knowledge of God 
will be moderated in form and function. Thus, knowledge of God cannot be reduced 
to either one aspect or activity of God, one dimension of human personhood, or one 
component of the knowing relationship. Each of these three realities and their 
interconnectedness is inexhaustibly complex. In order to properly conceive of the 
knowledge of God, the esemplastic skill of, as Torrance put it, “thinking 
conjunctively,” “integrative knowing,” or alternatively, thinking holistically about 
complexities is needed. Therefore, to move beyond modernity’s image of knowledge 
as a building built from a foundation (Descartes) and postmodernity’s image of a web 
or net (W.V.O Quine), this thesis proposes the image of knowledge as participation in 
a personal-relational complexity, emergent from the multi-dimensional knowing 
person in relationship with the ontologically distinct other. Knowledge involves the 
multi-dimensional knower, the multi-faceted known and the complex, dynamic 
relationship that holds them together. The use of person, relationship and complexity 
emerged from this engagement of theological epistemology, but has potential for 
other areas of epistemology, particularly in the postmodern, scientific age. With this 
summary of a viable notion of participation in the knowledge of God in mind, we 
close by noting a few implications and possibilities for future research. 
 
6.3 Prospects 
This notion of participation in the knowledge of God that has developed through 
our engagement with the Trinitarian epistemology of T. F. Torrance has many 
implications, both theoretical and practical. While each of these implications requires 
further development, they are worth mentioning here in the conclusion as containing 
potential for future research. To organize these implications, we return to the three 
contextual levels of conversation concerning the knowledge of God mentioned in the 
introductory chapter, the global and historical conversation (1.3.1), the Charismatic-
Evangelical and Reformed theological contexts (1.3.2), and those scholars involved in 
T. F. Torrance scholarship (1.3.3). The focus of this thesis has been on the historical 
conversation concerning knowledge of God and thus this contextual level provides the 
most implications. Beginning with this contextual level, we will note seven 
implications which have potential for future research. 
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First, the model of complexity could help provide other analogies between 
epistemological methods or ways of knowing between theology and science. Torrance 
interacted with the epistemological developments that occurred within the sciences 
from the early to mid-twentieth century. Since then, there have been other 
epistemological developments among the sciences and the philosophy of science 
which could be engaged. While Alister E. McGrath has taken Torrance’s project 
forward, interacting with the critical realism of Roy Bhaskar, there are other 
epistemological developments alongside critical realism that need exploration. For 
instance, the many sciences which have a systems or complexity methodology may 
bring further analogous epistemological insight for the knowledge of God. 
Second, there are many analogies for theological epistemology with the 
epistemologies at work within the humanities. As Andrew Louth argued, 
epistemological analogies from the humanities may find closer resonance with 
theology than those of the sciences. While Hans Urs von Balthasar has insightfully 
used beauty, goodness and truth to organize his systematic theology operating within 
a framework of the analogia entis, more work could be done from the framework of 
the analogia fidei to find resonance between the ways of knowing in theology and the 
humanities, particularly those ways which could be considered personal, relational or 
participatory. 
Third, a personal, relational, and participatory epistemology alludes to inter-
disciplinary possibilities for the fields of theology, ethics and spirituality. Currently, 
the disciplines have well-intended boundaries which serve to keep the respective 
discussions on task, pursuing their own sets of questions. Nevertheless, within a 
complex framework, theology is necessarily intertwined with ethics and spirituality. 
To be true to the interconnected nature of the subject-matter, the lines which separate 
the disciplines should be further complemented by the lines which connect them. 
Consequently, Christian theologians, ethicists and those who study spirituality should 
at least be aware of the interrelations which call for attention and be open to further 
inter-disciplinary exploration.  
Fourth, this thesis suggests the need for further discussion concerning 
theological method. Torrance was concerned with the integration of the form and 
methods of theology with the nature of the object or subject-matter. His focus was 
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upon the utilization of fitting intellectual methods. Yet, given the participatory nature 
of the knowledge of God, the whole person and life of the knower may need to be 
considered in discussions of theological method. Human beings are not autonomous 
minds, somehow thinking without passion, will or relationships. Hence, theological 
methods need to recognize further the dimensions which inform and direct human 
reasoning. More personal than the postmodern acknowledgement of perspectivalism 
which acknowledges the (historical, cultural and social) particularity of knowledge 
and more local than the contextual approaches which give attention to the culture 
(Black, Hispanic, Latin American, etc.) or gender (Feminist) from which one 
theologizes, such an approach could incorporate the significance of the lives of 
theologians, including perhaps their loyalties and commitments, communities of faith, 
and relevant practices as a formative aspect in the theology which they construct. 
While this may be generally recognized at some level in discussions of “praxis” and 
“experience” in theological method, there is still need for wider acceptance and 
engagement of the personal, ethical and spiritual dynamics which often drive 
theological methods. Further exploration is needed, not to centralize these personal 
factors, but to recognize and thus engage those factors from a Trinitarian framework 
with a Christological center and a Spirit-guided engagement with the Scriptures, 
tradition, and experiences of the church within its space-time and various-cultured 
context. 
Fifth, this engagement of Torrance on the knowledge of God carries 
implications for those institutions which aim to cultivate and develop knowledge of 
God. If the nature of the subject-matter determines how we know it, then the nature of 
the knowledge of God should play a role in the ends and means of theological 
institutions. Epistemology brings implications for most all of the activities of the 
church, including its preaching, teaching, evangelism, education, and spiritual 
formation. The conception of knowledge undergirds and shapes how each of these 
activities are conceived and conducted. Likewise, there are implications for the 
institutions which train the leaders of the church, including its theologians. Given the 
person-involving and life-engaging dimensions of participation in the knowledge of 
God, theological institutions should take into account the overall formation of 
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persons-in-community in their programs. The relationship between epistemology and 
the aims and methods of theological institutions needs further exploration.1 
Sixth, the ethical dimensions of knowledge are quite significant for the 
postmodern world with its concern for the personal, social, and political agendas 
behind or within claims to knowledge, especially knowledge of God. Postmodern 
philosophers such as Richard Rorty and Jean-Francỏis Lyotard have exposed 
modernity’s strong foundationalist epistemology with its claims of objective truth and 
universal knowledge used to construct and maintain the power structures within 
Western society. There is a potent stream of ethical concern concerning power and 
knowledge that runs from Friedrich Nietzsche’s concept of the “will to power” and 
his “genealogy of morality” to Michel Foucault’s discussions of power and his 
“genealogy of knowledge.” The postmodern ethos of Western culture on the academic 
and popular levels has palpable unease with authoritative claims to knowledge, and 
particularly claims concerning knowledge of God and the social agendas latent within 
them. Explorations of the ethics of knowledge of God could bring to light the many 
ethical and social implications of such knowledge, demonstrating consonance with the 
knowledge revealed in Christ who gave himself for the good of the world.2  
Seventh, notions of knowledge of God raise not only ethical questions in the 
postmodern, scientific age, but more specifically the question of human flourishing. 
What is the relationship between participation in the knowledge of God and human 
well-being? This question and related ones have begun to be re-opened by theologians 
such as Ellen T. Charry as well as philosophers and various natural and social 
scientists who work within the interdisciplinary field of the science of well-being and 
                                                          
1 The conception of knowledge of God and its relationship to theological education has 
received attention in the last thirty years, seminally influenced by Edward Farley, Theologia: The 
Fragmentation and Unity of Theological Education (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1983); The Fragility 
of Knowledge: Theological Education in the Church and the University (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1988). 
A discussion in response to issues raised by Farley includes Charles M. Wood, Vision and 
Discernment: An Orientation in Theological Study (Atlanta: Scholar’s Press, 1985). The Association of 
Theological Schools’ journal, Theological Education, frequently broaches the topic of reform, 
engaging the topic of epistemology. One published dissertation that engages Torrance’s epistemology 
and the education ministry of the church is Robert K. Martin, The Incarnate Ground of Christian 
Faith: Toward a Christian Theological Epistemology for the Educational Ministry of the Church 
(Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1998). 
2 One recent example, engaging the thought of Rorty and Lyotard and concluding with an 
ethic of love rooted in the Trinity, is Justin Thacker, Postmodernism and the Ethics of Theological 
Knowledge (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2007). Engagement with other postmodern thinkers (i.e. 
Nietzsche and Foucault) to answer their ethical concerns with the ethics inherent in knowledge of God 
is needed. 
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related fields.3 This exploration could benefit greatly by theologians who are engaged 
in the dialogue between theology and the sciences, particularly those who are willing 
to engage in inter-disciplinary research and who are sensitive to complexity or 
systems theories to consider the numerous factors which contribute to human 
flourishing from a theological perspective.   
Now we turn from the historical context to the more localized context of 
Charismatic-Evangelical and Reformed theology to mention two implications for each 
of these streams within Protestantism. What can Evangelicals, particularly Pentecostal 
and Charismatic Evangelicals, learn from an engagement with the Trinitarian 
epistemology of T. F. Torrance? The vision of participation in the knowledge of God 
that has emerged through this assessment suggests three implications, one more 
objective-oriented, another more subjective-oriented and the last includes both. First, 
this notion of participation can provide a Trinitarian framework for the Christological 
approaches to knowledge of God encouraged by Evangelical scholars4 and the 
Pneumatological approaches promoted by Pentecostal scholars.5 Christian theology’s 
doctrine of God is uniquely Trinitarian and methodologically one does not need to 
choose between the Son and the Spirit in considering issues such as the knowledge of 
God, discernment or theological method. Rather, future research needs to equally 
consider the three distinct persons-in-relationship and their unity-in-diversity within 
the Triune God in developing these and other doctrinal themes. 
Second, for Pentecostal and Charismatic Evangelicals, the question is often 
raised, “How are we to discern the presence of the Spirit?” Instead of looking for a 
particular sign or demonstration within an individual, Christian community or among 
                                                          
3 Ellen T. Charry, By the Renewing of Your Minds: The Pastoral Function of Christian 
Doctrine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), esp. 3-32, 233-45. See especially her full treatment, 
God and the Art of Happiness (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010). Also, see the entire issue dedicated to 
the topic of human flourishing, Fuller Theology, News and Notes (Spring: 2010): 1-31. For an 
introduction to how evolutionary biology, neuroscience, psychology, and sociology are contributing to 
the “science of well-being,” see Felicia A. Hupper, Nick Baylis and Barry Keverne, eds., The Science 
of Well-Being (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). For a broad notion of the contribution of 
religion to human flourishing, David G. Myers, “Religion and Human Flourishing,” in The Science of 
Subjective Well-Being, ed. Michael Eid and Randy J. Larsen (New York: Guilford, 2008), 323-46. 
4 For instance, see Alister E. McGrath’s “contours of a scientific theology” which develops 
“why a scientific theology is Christocentric,” but does not develop the place of the Spirit. Alister E. 
McGrath, Reality. Vol. 2 of A Scientific Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2002), 297-313. 
5 Amos Yong’s approach is Pneumatological, but not entirely without Trinitarian engagement. 
Amos Yong, Spirit-Word-Community: Theological Hermeneutics in Trinitarian Perspective (Eugene, 
OR: Wipf and Stock, 2002), esp. 49-81; Beyond the Impasse: Toward a Pneumatological Theology of 
Religions (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2003). 
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world religions, a complex approach encourages the practice of discernment to 
consider multiple dynamics. In other words, the presence of the Spirit cannot be 
reduced down to one particular experience, activity or manifestation. Rather, the 
Spirit’s presence is discerned among the multi-dimensional persons and communities, 
involving aspects from their whole way of life. Consequently, Paul lists a cluster of 
the fruits of the Spirit and there are lists of diverse gifts of the Spirit, yet it is the 
“same God at work” in all of them.6 Furthermore, because of the unity within the one 
being, three persons of God, how the persons of the Father and Son can be utilized in 
the discernment of the Spirit needs further exploration. A complex, Trinitarian notion 
of participation in the knowledge of God suggests needed research into the complex 
of subjective dimensions of discernment of the Spirit. 
Third, the wound of reductionism has afflicted both Evangelicalism and 
Pentecostalism in differing ways. From Schleiermacher forward, the role of 
experience has been normalized in the liberal Protestant traditions which Karl Barth 
and T. F. Torrance have challenged. In a distinctive way, the role of experience has 
been championed also in the conservative branches of Protestantism.7 This has 
included the descendants of John Wesley, focusing here upon Pentecostalism and its 
Charismatic and “Third-Wave” descendants,8 as well as those in the broadly-defined 
stream of Evangelicalism.9 However, those within Protestant Evangelicalism have 
                                                          
6 On the fruit, Galatians 5:22-5. On the gifts, 1 Corinthians 12; Romans 12:3-7; Ephesians 4:7-
13; 1 Peter 4:10-11. The quotation is from 1 Corinthians 12:4-6. Note its Trinitarian moorings. “There 
are different kinds of gifts, but the same Spirit distributes them.  There are different kinds of service, 
but the same Lord. There are different kinds of working, but in all of them and in everyone it is the 
same God at work.” 
7. These would be two quite different expressions of what George Lindbeck terms the 
“experiential-expressive” religious framework in The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a 
Postliberal Age (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1984), 16.  
8. The central experience of Pentecostalism is that of Spirit-baptism evidenced by glossolalia, 
which provides empowerment for mission. The central experience of Charismatics and those in the 
“Third Wave” certainly may include an initial experience of the Spirit, but is the ongoing empowering 
presence of the Spirit in Christian life and mission. For a perspective from the Vineyard, see Wilson 
and Nathan, Empowered Evangelicals, 205-28. “Indeed, I would suggest that a Pentecostal 
epistemology is always already a kind of aesthetic, an epistemic grammar that privileges aesthesis 
(experience) before noesis (intellection).” James K. A. Smith, Thinking in Tongues: Pentecostal 
Contributions to Christian Philosophy (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2011), 81. On the inter-
relationship of spirituality and theology within Pentecostalism, see Steven Land, Pentecostal 
Spirituality (1993; repr. Cleveland, TN: CPT Press, 2010), 3-48.  
9. The central experience of Evangelicalism is that of regeneration or being “born again.” On 
the importance of the role of experience in Evangelicalism and Evangelical theology, see Stanley 
Grenz, Reenvisioning the Center: Evangelical Theology in a Post-Theological Era (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Baker, 2000, 2006), esp. 33-60, 192-225; Reenvisioning Evangelical Theology: A Fresh Agenda for the 
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emphasized Scripture over experience in discussions of knowledge of God. Nancey 
Murphy has demonstrated how modern and postmodern philosophy has set up 
competing foundationalist paradigms of Scripture verses experience in discussions 
between fundamentalist and liberal theology.10 Similar to the holism she suggests, a 
complex epistemology recognizes the intertwined relationship between Scripture and 
experience: our experiences influence our interpretation of Scripture, while Scripture 
interprets our experiences. Embracing this more complex relationship can help 
Evangelical and Pentecostal theology move forward. 
For the Reformed tradition, perhaps an expanded functional anthropology 
could enlarge the tradition’s epistemology and thus their notions of theology. To 
recommend an expanded functional anthropology suggests that a holistic person-
involving, life-implicating epistemology is to be embodied, and not simply 
cognitively and verbally defined. This vision of participation in the knowledge of God 
could encourage the development of orthopraxis and orthopathy alongside this 
tradition’s esteemed tradition of orthodoxy. Further research could extend the 
implications of this epistemology to most any aspect of the church’s practices and 
Christian living. 
As noted above, there is a reciprocal relationship between theology, ethics and 
spirituality. In aiming to be consistent with the doctrines of the sovereignty of God 
and sola gratia, the Reformed tradition has often given less attention to ethics, 
spirituality and the human dimensions of salvation, sanctification and the Christian 
life. Yet, as with this study’s Trinitarian epistemology and its notion of 
participation—occurring supremely among humanity in Christ and by the Spirit—
fears about “synergy” can be abated and theologians in the Reformed tradition can 
pursue the development of the many human facets and the manifold practices of the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
21st Century (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1992); Roger E. Olsen, Reformed and Always 
Reforming: The Postconservative Approach to Evangelical Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 2009), 
esp. 67-94. On the problem of defining Evangelicalism, see Mark A. Noll, American Evangelical 
Christianity: An Introduction (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2001), 7-107; David Bebbington, 
Evangelicalism in Modern Britain: A History from the 1730s to the 1980s (London: Hyman, 1989). 
Also helpful on Evangelicalism is David F. Wells and John D. Woodbridge, eds., The Evangelicals: 
What They Believe, Who They Are, Where They Are Changing (Nashville: Abingdon, 1975); Donald K. 
Dayton and Robert K. Johnston, eds., The Variety of American Evangelicalism (Downers Grove, IL: 
InterVarsity Press, 1991); George Marsden, Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1991).   
10 Nancey Murphy, Beyond Liberalism and Fundamentalism: How Modern and Postmodern 
Philosophy Set the Theological Agenda (Valle Forge, PA: Trinity, 2003), esp. 11-35, 85-109. 
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Christian life. Though the theological frameworks will be different than those from 
the Eastern Orthodox, Roman Catholic and Arminian Protestant traditions, human 
response, experience and Christian practices need further investigation from the 
Reformed perspective. 
Turning to the most specialized context of theological discussion, T. F. 
Torrance scholarship, we conclude by noting two implications or suggestions for 
further research. Similar to the previous suggestion for the Reformed tradition, within 
Torrance’s theology there is room for expanding discussions of the human dimensions 
of Christian thought and life. For a specific example, Torrance repeatedly encouraged 
certain dispositions of the mind as commensurate with the nature of the object known, 
and denounced others intellectual dispositions as unsuitable. What is the relationship 
between these cognitive dispositions and the discussions of intellectual virtue? How 
are they to be obtained? For a more general example, while Ray Anderson and 
Andrew Purves have most notably explored some of the ministry implications of 
Torrance’s theological vision,11 the implications for ethics and spirituality have not 
yet been developed. 
Secondly, Torrance scholars could help to locate his place among the 
burgeoning theology and science dialogue. What influence did Torrance have on 
those engaged in that dialogue today? How does his vision compare with those whose 
first discipline is science and second discipline is theology? How does his vision 
compare with the other major twentieth-century theologian who engaged with the 
sciences, Wolfhart Pannenberg? Though this thesis located some of his theological 
incorporation of epistemological developments in the sciences of the mid twentiety-
century, the question remains: what aspects of his vision of the relationship between 
theology and science are enduring and what aspects were transitory? Though a 
pioneer in this dialogue, why is it that his theology factors less prominently in the 
discussion today? The place and shape of Torrance’s distinctive contribution to the 
science and theology dialogue needs additional demarcation. 
 
 
                                                          
11 Two good examples include Ray S. Anderson, ed. Theological Foundations for Ministry 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1979); Ray S. Anderson, “The Practical Theology of Thomas F. 
Torrance,” Participatio Vol. 1 (2009): 49-65. Andrew Purves, Reconstructing Pastoral Theology: A 
Christological Foundation (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2004). 
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